Something has to be done about Allied ASW

[mogami]

Hi, In early 1945 the USN sent a wolf pack into sea of Japan (including the above mentioned Flying Fish) The pack contained 9 submarines. IJN ASW was at this point nearly non existent. 1 USN submarine was lost.

[Tom Hunter]

Admiral Laurent seems to be on to something, especially when Force Z is hunting submarines that it just happens to pass over.

Though I suspect fixing this would be either difficult or break some other aspect of submarine and ASW warfare.

[Bombur]

-I made an attempt to tone down both sides ASW by decreasing depth charge accuracy by 50% and halving their effect too. It worked as far as ASW efficacy is of concern, but I have an interesting side effect. Subs now are able to hit fast warships, like DD´s and CA´s. In my Guadalcanal modified scenario, playing as Japanese vs. the AI I was able to sink two DD´s and one CA in 20 days (scenario playtesting stopped due to my own stupidity...I lost the savegame file)[:(]. So, it´s possible that, if we want to decrease ASW efficacy, we should also decrease submarine torpedo accuracy

[MadDawg]

Actually this is one of the main reasons I stopped playing this game many months ago...I really enjoyed it but found the ASW part frustrating to the point that it removed my enjoyment from the rest of the game.

The final straw was when playing the Guadalcanal campaign and I lost 20 odd submarines in the first 12 days as the Japanese...the problem with this is that I was using them in areas the Japanese did historically at that time (where they had reasonable success too), all in deep water and all sunk by escorts, not dedicated ASW forces. The other player did nothing special to sink them. I suspect that players who don't see such results could be leaving submarine placement on automatic where they other wonder around aimlessly...I placed these manually south of Guadalcanal, separately and as mentioned in deep water...and almost always as soon as they were spotted they were sunk. This was a repeatable event in more than one Guadacanal campaign I played.

This was with only the second patch though, I was hoping to give the next patch another go assuming it had been looked into either now or previously, but it sounds like it hasn't? [:(]

[spence]

Subs did hit fast warships though.

The US subs sank 8 carriers, the Kongo, 5 CA, 9 CL and a bunch of DDs with submarines;
1 CA, a CL and 6 DDs in 1942 even; losing only 4 boats in the process to enemy action in 1942. And they tagged quite a few more fast warships without sinking them.

IJN subs sank the Wasp and Liscome Bay, pickled the Saratoga twice, (finished off Yorktown but that CV was not a fast warship at the time), hit the North Carolina, sank the Indianapolis and the Juneau and 10 DDs. Other than Indianapolis, Liscome Bay and a couple DDs all of their successes were in 1942 though and the cost in 1942 was 19 boats though the ones who scored big got away.

The Brit subs got a CA and a CL at least. From what I've been able to dig up they only lost 1 sub to ASW in the Pacific along with 2 to mines.

The Dutch subs sank at least 1 DD. The Dutch lost 8 boats in 42 but I think only 2 were to directly to ASW forces, the others being either to mines or scuttling to prevent capture while repairing damage (inflicted by ASW assets) in Soerabya.

I think it safe to say that subs CAN hit fast warships.

[MadDawg]

ORIGINAL: spence

IJN subs sank the Wasp and Liscome Bay, pickled the Saratoga twice, (finished off Yorktown but that CV was not a fast warship at the time), hit the North Carolina, sank the Indianapolis and the Juneau and 10 DDs. Other than Indianapolis and a couple DDs all of their successes were in 1942 though and the cost in 1942 was 19 boats though the ones who scored big got away.

Spence, good info! I wasnt going to look up the details as I posted them at the time, but I recall this info now and when you compare this to my post above you can see what I was concerned about. I lost the same amout of subs in 12 days that the Japanese lost in a year, using them in an historical way in an area and at the time when they had their best run of the war...

Dawg

[spence]

Twelve in 12 days is a bit much, though from what I've been looking at 12 of the 17 IJN subs lost in combat in 1942 died in the Solomons area so although they had a large share of their successes in that area it appears it was decidedly unhealthy for IJN submariners (as well as soldiers, aviators and other sailor types).

[jwilkerson]

ORIGINAL: Tristanjohn

ORIGINAL: Tom Hunter

I think it should be pointed out that later in the war the Americans did form sub hunting groups that attacked areas where the Japanese were known to be maintaining sub patrol lines.

These attacks were often very effective sinking a number of subs in a short period of days. ASW may be unrealistic in certain respects, or maybe just really hard to model accurately, but there were times where it was really deadly.

That's only from the Allied side. They developed the necessary technology and training and doctrine as the war went along.

Adding a bit - Cpt Johnny Walker RN was responsible for developing the "Support Group" ... as opposed to the independently operated group. The support group was kind of like an escort force with the mission of prosecuting the submarines ... versus the pure escort group ... which had the mission to protect the merchantmen. But the support group did not operate in a vacuum. They steamed near the convoy's and then went after the subs when they showed up. This technique was very much opposed by the admiralty - but CPT Walker succeeded in proving it out none-the-less. He did so during the period 1942-43. Then during late 43 these tactics were rolled out the to USN which had them available in 1944. In particular the "creeping attack" which used 3-4 ASW ships to attack one submarine - was a part of CPT Walker's tactics.

The independent ASW force was tried briefly - and unsuccessfully in the Atlantic ( at Admiral King's insistance ) in 1942 ... and not retried until 1944 when for example a group containing USS England proved that an indepedent group could provide useful service.

In game terms let the RN use ASW task forces in 1943, and let the USN use them in 1944.

[Culiacan Mexico]

ORIGINAL: Oznoyng
...From what I can see, to limit sub losses in WitP, you have to put highly skilled, but cowardly skippers in subs, send them to areas in the middle of the ocean far from any enemy base in the hopes of encountering an enemy target. If you happen to encounter a target, you need to hope that you can make contact, then hope that the commander makes the right decision on whether to attack...

[;)]

I send most of my Japanese submarines to base on turn one just to replace the ship commander with one that you describe: high naval ability, but low aggression. They seem less likely to attack ASW ships and seem to escape attack more often than the commanders the computer chooses. I don’t know if this is the case, but it seems that way; and until the designers say otherwise… I will continue to believe Commander’s abilities are very important.

I am not claiming ASW is correct… just that I believe the abilities of the submarine commanders is important.

---------------------------------
Joey Billings

NAVAL

naval roll by sub captain effects sub contact chance
naval rating by sub captain effects subs chance to survive ASW attack


AGGRESSION

aggression rating of sub captain effects chance of contacting enemy TFs

-----------------------------------
Nikademus

to add a practical example, in case anyone missed it in the Japanse strategy thread)

say you have a IJA Div, Exp 70 with a leader with overall values of 70 attacking a US Regimental Combat team with the same stats...your average modified result in a clear unfortified hex will be 5-7:1 odds.

Change the US leader to 20 and you'll get modified odds about 5-6 times greater. (31-39:1 odds)
---------------------------------

Would that then mean (Naval Ability):

A group of escorts with commanders in the 50’s searching for a submarine with a commander in the 50’s has an ‘X’ chance of finding and attacking, while the same escort seeking out a submarine with a commander in the 70’s change the equation significantly (x/2 or x/4)? Are they effects of this difference in leadership value actually greater than that? Is it possible that the differences in leaderships first affect the chance of detection then the ability of the submarine to evade/survive the attack. That would mean that any variation in abilities between the commanders would be squared: instead of x/2 or x/4 it would be x/4 or x/16.

I tend to find that American submarines are less likely to attack an escorted convoy Vs an unescorted one… so there should be something in the code that recognizes the difference. Joel Billings gave no indication that aggression comes into play regarding a submarines ability to ignore escorted convoys/ASW fleets Vs unescorted/lightly escort convoys. Maybe it doesn’t, maybe it does, but he just didn’t mention it. I would have ‘hoped’ this was a factor; and considering Aggression is factored in air combat, I have to belief that it also plays a factor with Submarine commanders and their choice to attack heavily escorted convoys.

Just speculating on my part. [:)]

[Bombur]

ORIGINAL: spence

Subs did hit fast warships though.

The US subs sank 8 carriers, the Kongo, 5 CA, 9 CL and a bunch of DDs with submarines;
1 CA, a CL and 6 DDs in 1942 even; losing only 4 boats in the process to enemy action in 1942. And they tagged quite a few more fast warships without sinking them.

-Correct, but most of these results were achieved in 1944, when IJN had few escorts left. For effects of my mod evaluation, I cannot say nothing about USA ships as they sunk nothing. Maybe against a human player...

IJN subs sank the Wasp and Liscome Bay, pickled the Saratoga twice, (finished off Yorktown but that CV was not a fast warship at the time), hit the North Carolina, sank the Indianapolis and the Juneau and 10 DDs. Other than Indianapolis, Liscome Bay and a couple DDs all of their successes were in 1942 though and the cost in 1942 was 19 boats though the ones who scored big got away.

-Correction: Indianapolis was sunk in 1945. While I agree with you, it should be noticed that your data is related to 1942 as a whole. In my mod it took only 20 days for the IJN sink a CA and 2 DD´s. It´s still early to draw conclusions but it seems the IJN subs became too effective. I´m again playtesting the mod vs the AI, but I feel, that, among the main troubles with the game, this one is the easiest to be fixed.

[Nikademus]

ORIGINAL: Culiacan Mexico


Nikademus

---------------------------------

Would that then mean (Naval Ability):

A group of escorts with commanders in the 50’s searching for a submarine with a commander in the 50’s has an ‘X’ chance of finding and attacking, while the same escort seeking out a submarine with a commander in the 70’s change the equation significantly (x/2 or x/4)? Are they effects of this difference in leadership value actually greater than that? Is it possible that the differences in leaderships first affect the chance of detection then the ability of the submarine to evade/survive the attack. That would mean that any variation in abilities between the commanders would be squared: instead of x/2 or x/4 it would be x/4 or x/16.

A associate of mine insisted that his ASW was much more effective after replacing TF leaders with a better or high quality one. I ran some tests of my own but the results were inconclusive. Given what i've found in regards to the LCU model, I dont doubt that leaders 'can' have a big effect on ASW TF and sub TF effectiveness. Overall, leader ratings are the big "under the hood" modifyer because while their impact can be substantial, often their influence can be buried by all the other checks in the game or simply because the skill rating differences between the opposing sides are such that the impact isn't all that noticible.

[Tom Hunter]

jwilkerson, I left Walker out of my posts to stay in the Pacific but your right about him. He was an amazing guy and the Allies owe him a lot.

Bombur the only ships that regulary traveled fast enough to be impossible to torpedo were the 2 Queens Mary and Elizabeth. But they were built for high speed running the way a battleship was built for gun combat and they should not be used for comparison with other ships.

It certainly more difficult to hit a ship going 17 knots than one going 8 but as both sides proved its not impossible.

In other news I had a sub lauch torpedoes at two enemy targets today, and another one attack elsewhere. This is the first turn ever that more than one of my subs has attacked on the same day, and its the first time an Allied sub has attacked twice one of my US torpedos even exploded and hurt the enemy! how is that for luck? The captian of the Finback is getting a medal.

Blackwatch also put some fish into the USS Long Island, proving that you can torpedo a CV and get away from the escorts. Or at least proving that he can.

[Oznoyng]

ORIGINAL: Culiacan Mexico
I send most of my Japanese submarines to base on turn one just to replace the ship commander with one that you describe: high naval ability, but low aggression.

I have not been sending my commanders back to change them out. I view the first turn movement bonus as an opportunity for the Japanese player to reshuffle his forces/deployments to fit his plan. I also view the early part of the war as the best time for the Japanese to catch unescorted ships.

Given my experiences so far, I expect that I will be RTB'ing my subs and replacing the commanders, if not on 12/7/41, then soon after.

[Tristanjohn]

ORIGINAL: Mogami

Hi, In early 1945 the USN sent a wolf pack into sea of Japan (including the above mentioned Flying Fish) The pack contained 9 submarines. IJN ASW was at this point nearly non existent. 1 USN submarine was lost.

Well, that was Operation BARNEY under Commander E. T. Hydeman in Sea Dog. This wolf-pack (to include Crevalle, Spadefish, Tunny, Skate, Bonefish, Flying Fish, Bowfin and Tinosa) was known as "Hydeman's Hellcats" and, sailing from Guam 27 May 1945, entered the Sea of Japan through the Tsushima Strait on 5 and 6 June, where, in all, some 57,000 tons of Japanese shipping was sunk, including I-122 (bagged by Skate) and 27 merchants. The boat we lost was Bonefish. She ran into Toyama Wan near Honshu on 18 June. An enemy ship was sunk there the next day, and it is presumed Bonefish got her, but she was never heard from again. Bonefish was the last United States submarine lost in the war.

Hydeman got his command out on the evening of 23 June, returning by way of the Sakhalin Islands to Pearl Harbor, arriving there Indpendence Day.

In fact, Admiral Lockwood sent a second wolf-pack into the Sea of Japan, this one consisting of six boats (Jallao, Stickleback, Torsk, Pargo, Piper and Pogy), where it operated until VJ Day. By the middle of that last summer pickings were slim for USN submarines. The last significant merchant sunk by one of our boats was the cargo-passenger steamer Teihoku Maru of 5,800 tons, sent to the bottom by Jallao in the Sea of Japan 11 August. Within hours of the end, Spikefish sank I-373, this occuring 14 August just south of Shanghai. [Note: Morison makes the point that by the spring of 1945 Army aircraft and mines did more damage to enemy shipping than USN submarines. I haven't seen the data for his remark, but I have no reason to doubt it.]

By the way, at this juncture of the war we'd developed FM sonar for subs to detect mines in the water, and I believe all of Hydeman's boats were so equipped.

Anyway, the Japanese were still running convoys, though until this initial invasion of the waters between their home islands and China I'd guess they were relatively lax in that regard in the Sea of Japan. Of course as far as that goes, by this time there was hardly anything left worth mentioning to make a convoy up of to begin with! (Sorry for my dangling participles, but sometimes it just reads best that way. [:)])

As for IJN ASW work at the end of the war, it was never "good" for them compared to what the Americans and British developed in terms of technology and doctrine, but it did improve somewhat. For instance, Trigger, operating off Okinawa on 20 March, reported she had been forced under and held down there for two days by heavy depth charging after having sunk a freighter out of a convoy. The last contact with her was on 26 March when she sent in a weather report, but then she failed to acknowledge an order to join a wolf-pack that same day. Several USN submarines reported on the 28th of hearing a number of depth-charge attacks, and post-war interrogations revealed that the Japanese had made a combined air and surface attack that same day on one of our boats operating in those waters where Trigger was supposed to be.

[Tristanjohn]

ORIGINAL: Tom Hunter

Admiral Laurent seems to be on to something, especially when Force Z is hunting submarines that it just happens to pass over.

Though I suspect fixing this would be either difficult or break some other aspect of submarine and ASW warfare.

That aspect of it has been mentioned before. I don't know exactly how the mechanics work. I don't know that because no one who does know bothers to tell us, or, if this information has been conveyed to the community it was during the year and a half I was off this board.

Whatever those mechanics are, they don't work very well. The result ingame is unacceptable.

[Bradley7735]

Tris, are you sure Bonefish was the last sub lost in the war? I thought there was one more in July or August. I think it was only a few days before the war ended. But, I can't remember the sub's name. Bullhead or something like that.

I could be confused.

[Tristanjohn]

ORIGINAL: jwilkerson

ORIGINAL: Tristanjohn

ORIGINAL: Tom Hunter

I think it should be pointed out that later in the war the Americans did form sub hunting groups that attacked areas where the Japanese were known to be maintaining sub patrol lines.

These attacks were often very effective sinking a number of subs in a short period of days. ASW may be unrealistic in certain respects, or maybe just really hard to model accurately, but there were times where it was really deadly.

That's only from the Allied side. They developed the necessary technology and training and doctrine as the war went along.

Adding a bit - Cpt Johnny Walker RN was responsible for developing the "Support Group" ... as opposed to the independently operated group. The support group was kind of like an escort force with the mission of prosecuting the submarines ... versus the pure escort group ... which had the mission to protect the merchantmen. But the support group did not operate in a vacuum. They steamed near the convoy's and then went after the subs when they showed up. This technique was very much opposed by the admiralty - but CPT Walker succeeded in proving it out none-the-less. He did so during the period 1942-43. Then during late 43 these tactics were rolled out the to USN which had them available in 1944. In particular the "creeping attack" which used 3-4 ASW ships to attack one submarine - was a part of CPT Walker's tactics.

The independent ASW force was tried briefly - and unsuccessfully in the Atlantic ( at Admiral King's insistance ) in 1942 ... and not retried until 1944 when for example a group containing USS England proved that an indepedent group could provide useful service.

In game terms let the RN use ASW task forces in 1943, and let the USN use them in 1944.

Yes, his first opportunity came with HG76 (Gibraltar to Liverpool) in December of 1941. I was going to do a short piece on that convoy for the CHS project (HMS Audacity, which sailed in escort, had aboard some "Martlets," and the argument at the time over on the CHS AAR was whether these were Mark I/III's or Mark II's) but never got around to it. Walker's an interesting study, though, so maybe I will do the piece at that.

Re his tactics: for openers he arranged the escorts in two separate screens, forming an inner and an outer ring of protection. There's much more, of course. I'm not at home and so don't have my bookmarks in place or I'd provide a few informative links on this story. Here's one that I grabbed quick off Goodgle: Johnny Walker

That is not an especially reliable page. For instance, a quick read suggests Walker held the rank of Captain when this stuff happened, when in fact he was just a (passed-over at that) Commander, etc.

Anyway, Walker more or less invented the proactive ASW defense, at least an effective one. A kind of genius. And keep in mind this was still early in the war, before some of the more sophisticated ASW technology was available. (Have you read about how the ships he was escorting kept losing their heads? Also, Audacity was lost on that voyage, but would not have been in all likelihood had its skipper listened to Walker. [;)])

[Tristanjohn]

ORIGINAL: Bradley7735

Tris, are you sure Bonefish was the last sub lost in the war? I thought there was one more in July or August. I think it was only a few days before the war ended. But, I can't remember the sub's name. Bullhead or something like that.

I could be confused.

One of us must be wrong. No matter either way, look it up and get back to me. [:)]

[Bradley7735]

yup. Looked it up. (it's amazing what I can do with these newfangled computers).

USS Bullhead. Sunk August 6th 1945. It's listed as the last one sunk. Bonefish was sunk in June.

[Tristanjohn]

ORIGINAL: Bradley7735

Tris, are you sure Bonefish was the last sub lost in the war? I thought there was one more in July or August. I think it was only a few days before the war ended. But, I can't remember the sub's name. Bullhead or something like that.

I could be confused.

This site agrees with you, listing Bullhead as sunk 6 August 1945: USS Bullhead

As does this one: USS Bullhead 2

So, that takes care of that. [:)]