I'm wondering whether the torpedo firing routines for the Japs has been altered?
As Jap DD's - CL's & CA's all carry a heavy load of long lance torpedoes , they USED to make a solid impression aganinst Allied forces. But in V2.1 very few Jap ships fire and hit anything with torpedoes while allied MK torpedoes are wrecking havoc among my own ships.
In the last turn in my pbem game against Mogami , a force containing 2 BC's , 4 CA's , 2 CL's & 6 DD's engaged an Allied 4 CA , 2 CL + ?? DD' force off Espirito Santo in a night engagement....
Guess how badly Kurita got his ass kicked : p
1 CA on both sides sank while all my major ships got 20-30 damage points and not a single Type 94 torp hit!!! This action took place at 8 and 2000 yards. Ideal torp range.
Somehow I also get the feeling that the Allies are much better in night fighting than they historical were! This happened in march 42!?
If this continues I'll rename Ironbottom sound into Kaku Maru bottom sound <G> : ]
Torpedo routines
Torpedo routines
"The problem in defense is how far you can go without destroying from within what you are trying to defend from without"
- Dwight D. Eisenhower
: ] I've heard about radar : Yeees.
Unfortunately it's grossly overestimated in PacWar...early 42 radar wasn't that good and it certainly didn't stop the Nips from firing their torpedoes.
Surprise is an unknown word to the Allies now.
Unfortunately it's grossly overestimated in PacWar...early 42 radar wasn't that good and it certainly didn't stop the Nips from firing their torpedoes.
Surprise is an unknown word to the Allies now.
"The problem in defense is how far you can go without destroying from within what you are trying to defend from without"
- Dwight D. Eisenhower
Like PzB said, early radar wasn't much to speak of. And this
certainly wouldn't intefere with the Japs firing their fantastic
Long Lance torpedoes with great affect.
The Jap crews were unusually
well trained in night fighting and should be given a bonus in night
actions, this would tend to offset any advantages the primitive radar
might give the U.S.
This is one thing that needs correcting.
certainly wouldn't intefere with the Japs firing their fantastic
Long Lance torpedoes with great affect.
The Jap crews were unusuallywell trained in night fighting and should be given a bonus in night
actions, this would tend to offset any advantages the primitive radar
might give the U.S.
This is one thing that needs correcting.
Actually, through a lot of my readings state that early Allied shipborne radar was quite good, however, the Ship Commanders tended to not listen to the information! Virtually every battle in the Soloman Islands should have been a victory for the USN, had their TF commanders relied on radar. They continually ingonred it and blundered into enemy formations known to be there. They engaged in night fights by firing their guns instead of torpedo's (which immediately gave away their position), closed the range too much to allow the IJN DD's to get good shots on the USN Cruisers, etc...
It wasn't radar's fault that historically USN TF commanders were incompetent when it came to the use of radar. Possible WitP should have some sort of rating for this?
Jeremy
It wasn't radar's fault that historically USN TF commanders were incompetent when it came to the use of radar. Possible WitP should have some sort of rating for this?
Jeremy
Maybe leader ratings should have an influence on radar as Tom says. As the Allies got few really good leaders early in the game, this could help even the score a bit.
It should still be remember that many of the competent US commanders in the Solomon campaign used radar to all it was worth and still ended up on the loosing side.
At the battle for Tassafronga, the last major surface engagement in the Solomons, Rear Admiral Wright had a sound plan for using his newest SG radars and surprised 8 Jap supply detroyers lead buy Tanaka. Taken by surprise and in complete disarray Tanaka reorganized his ships , fired back and hit 4 US heavy cruisers with torpedoes - one of them sank. The US force consisted of 4 CA's, 1 CL & 6 dd's and still they only managed to sink one Jap DD!!!!
Willis Lee , the commander of the Washington & South Dakota task force was a student of radar. He did well in his battle against Kirishima and co. but this time the Japs were lead by the cautious Kondo...hardly a match for Lee in any circumstances.
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John
It should still be remember that many of the competent US commanders in the Solomon campaign used radar to all it was worth and still ended up on the loosing side.
At the battle for Tassafronga, the last major surface engagement in the Solomons, Rear Admiral Wright had a sound plan for using his newest SG radars and surprised 8 Jap supply detroyers lead buy Tanaka. Taken by surprise and in complete disarray Tanaka reorganized his ships , fired back and hit 4 US heavy cruisers with torpedoes - one of them sank. The US force consisted of 4 CA's, 1 CL & 6 dd's and still they only managed to sink one Jap DD!!!!
Willis Lee , the commander of the Washington & South Dakota task force was a student of radar. He did well in his battle against Kirishima and co. but this time the Japs were lead by the cautious Kondo...hardly a match for Lee in any circumstances.
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John
"The problem in defense is how far you can go without destroying from within what you are trying to defend from without"
- Dwight D. Eisenhower
I am pretty sure that at Tassafronga (This was the battle where the USS Northampton was lost, right?) the USN did one slight error with its Radar, by placing the ship with the radar at the rear of the fleet instead of the vanguard, allowing the Japanese to close the range (plus I am pretty sure they opened with guns instead of torpedo's which would have increased the benefit of radar).
Hm not according to my sources.
It says that that Admiral Wright was new on the scene but thathe possessed a sound battle plan that included the intelligent deployment of ships with SG radars.
All the US torpedoes launched missed the Jap force.
Yes it was the Northampton that sank here, the 3 others were saved only by herculean feats of damage controll. The Minneapolis lost her entire bow!!
The entire Solomons campaign is extremely interesting reading.
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John
It says that that Admiral Wright was new on the scene but thathe possessed a sound battle plan that included the intelligent deployment of ships with SG radars.
All the US torpedoes launched missed the Jap force.
Yes it was the Northampton that sank here, the 3 others were saved only by herculean feats of damage controll. The Minneapolis lost her entire bow!!
The entire Solomons campaign is extremely interesting reading.
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John
"The problem in defense is how far you can go without destroying from within what you are trying to defend from without"
- Dwight D. Eisenhower
I agree that the naval combat skill of a leader in a TF should have
an affect on the usefulness of any radar in a battle.
It seems very odd that PzB's TF didn't score any hits at such optimum torpedo
range. Perhaps he just got very unlucky, but in most instances (assuming
an able TF commander that doesn't negatively affect combat modifiers)
like this the Japs should be extremely dangerous with their Long Lance
torpedoes. I assume just because the U.S. happened to have a radar
equipped ship in this battle that that wouldn't somehow magically
penalize the Japs when firing torpedoes. Is there such a penalty in the
Jap torpedo attack formulas in PW?
an affect on the usefulness of any radar in a battle.
It seems very odd that PzB's TF didn't score any hits at such optimum torpedo
range. Perhaps he just got very unlucky, but in most instances (assuming
an able TF commander that doesn't negatively affect combat modifiers)
like this the Japs should be extremely dangerous with their Long Lance
torpedoes. I assume just because the U.S. happened to have a radar
equipped ship in this battle that that wouldn't somehow magically
penalize the Japs when firing torpedoes. Is there such a penalty in the
Jap torpedo attack formulas in PW?
IMHO the bottom line is if any game simulating real battles doesn't typically have results very close to the outcome of the battles then something is wrong with the game. A Japanese task force with good leaders vs an American with marginal or poor at night should clearly favor the Japanese barring bad luck. Even with equivelant American leadership it should somewhat favor Japanese victory until mid '43. The Japanese clearly won most of the night battles in 1942-43 in spite of American radar (or because of it maybe). If the same trend isn't appearing in the game then something clearly needs "tweaking". You gotta' give credit where it is due, the Japanese were good at night fighting!
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The following comment was made by Paul S. Dull in his book "A Battle History Of The Imperial Japanese Navy" to the battle of Tassafaronga or Lunga Point as the Japanese call it:
'Tanaka had again done the impossible. Not only had his six destroyers delivered their cargo (200 drums apiece) and landed troops, but they and their screen had also engaged a superior force, sinking one heavy cruiser and mauling three more, while losing only one destroyer. Use of their superior 24-inch torpedoes instead of their guns made Tanaka's ships seem as elusive as ghosts to the Americans. The Americanss' tragedy was caused by a combination of circumstances, which were effectively exploited by Tanaka's tactics. In November 1942 U.S. naval units were still not well-trained in night battle. Furthermore, the Americans were forced by conditions half a world away to use ships that have not worked together; they were using poor destroyer tactics and inferior torpedoes. Nor was the use of radar helpful, because it caused the U.S. ships to train all their heavy guns on the closest Japanese ship, the Takanami, while the others were left untouched.'
In this battle report Paul S. Dull stated the Naganami reported enemy ships before Admiral Wright's radar spotted the enemy at 2306 at a range of 13 miles.
Greetings, Marc
[This message has been edited by Marc (edited October 19, 2000).]
[This message has been edited by Marc (edited October 19, 2000).]
'Tanaka had again done the impossible. Not only had his six destroyers delivered their cargo (200 drums apiece) and landed troops, but they and their screen had also engaged a superior force, sinking one heavy cruiser and mauling three more, while losing only one destroyer. Use of their superior 24-inch torpedoes instead of their guns made Tanaka's ships seem as elusive as ghosts to the Americans. The Americanss' tragedy was caused by a combination of circumstances, which were effectively exploited by Tanaka's tactics. In November 1942 U.S. naval units were still not well-trained in night battle. Furthermore, the Americans were forced by conditions half a world away to use ships that have not worked together; they were using poor destroyer tactics and inferior torpedoes. Nor was the use of radar helpful, because it caused the U.S. ships to train all their heavy guns on the closest Japanese ship, the Takanami, while the others were left untouched.'
In this battle report Paul S. Dull stated the Naganami reported enemy ships before Admiral Wright's radar spotted the enemy at 2306 at a range of 13 miles.
Greetings, Marc
[This message has been edited by Marc (edited October 19, 2000).]
[This message has been edited by Marc (edited October 19, 2000).]
Marc, this is exactly what I stated. The TF's commander placed their Radar vessel in the rear of the TF, negating its usefullness. If it were at the front of the TF then they would have spotted the enemy before they themselves were spotted. This was one of the last battles of the Soloman Islands, and these ships worked together in many previous engagements in the Solomans.
In PacWar radar is issued either in none-or-total aspects. The USN either has it, or it doesn't. It is impossible to recreate the actions of the Soloman Islands because of this. Possibly increasing IJN Commander's aggressiveness might cause them to use Torpedo's more constantly. But, I cannot remember of a single IJN action after the Soloman Islands where the Long Lance Torpedo was used to any great effect (in a surface warship!)
Another possible solution would be to increase the actual accuracy of the Long Lance (Type 96?) torpedo. I am not sure what will happen if we mess with the weaponry (it does some nasty things!), but, if you guys want to give it a try, and relay the relative success/failure of the modification we could look into making the changes 'official'.
Jeremy
In PacWar radar is issued either in none-or-total aspects. The USN either has it, or it doesn't. It is impossible to recreate the actions of the Soloman Islands because of this. Possibly increasing IJN Commander's aggressiveness might cause them to use Torpedo's more constantly. But, I cannot remember of a single IJN action after the Soloman Islands where the Long Lance Torpedo was used to any great effect (in a surface warship!)
Another possible solution would be to increase the actual accuracy of the Long Lance (Type 96?) torpedo. I am not sure what will happen if we mess with the weaponry (it does some nasty things!), but, if you guys want to give it a try, and relay the relative success/failure of the modification we could look into making the changes 'official'.
Jeremy
In my opinion the Japanese need to wield a heavy hammer in 42 to have a chance against the Allies. If they don't and loose all their momentum in the first 6 months , it's really no use playing PacWar. They have to be able to fan out and with the current settings that's almost impossible.
Much of the success of the Nips rely on their supreme Long Lance torpedoes. In 43 the US found the solution to this menace. They used lots of cruisers with the latest fire controll radar and fired barrages at maximum ranges. You can take the battle of Empress Augusta Bay in November 43 as an example of this.
In my opinion PacWar is like it should be in 43, but in 42 the odds should be more decisive on the side of Japan.
The crudeness of early radar and the fact that Allied commanders didn't know how to use it in 42 is an excellent excuse here.
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John
Much of the success of the Nips rely on their supreme Long Lance torpedoes. In 43 the US found the solution to this menace. They used lots of cruisers with the latest fire controll radar and fired barrages at maximum ranges. You can take the battle of Empress Augusta Bay in November 43 as an example of this.
In my opinion PacWar is like it should be in 43, but in 42 the odds should be more decisive on the side of Japan.
The crudeness of early radar and the fact that Allied commanders didn't know how to use it in 42 is an excellent excuse here.
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John
"The problem in defense is how far you can go without destroying from within what you are trying to defend from without"
- Dwight D. Eisenhower
As a comment it is very easy to find engagements in 43 where the long lance again made life miserable. By this time Japan had their Type 22 radar which helped a little.
In the battle of Kula Gulf in July 43 10 Jap DD's met 3 of the new Helena type Cl's and 4 dd's. In this battle the Jap ships were hit by many torpedoes - all duds...The US crossed the enemies T but again the enormous advantage of their torpedoes saved the Japs. The Helena was sunk in exchange for one dd.
One week later at Kolombangara the 3 cruisers Leaner, Honolulu and St. Louis were hit by torps + 1 dd that sank in exchange for a the light cruiser Jintsu sunk by gun fire.
I've tried many many times to send multiple carrier groups against a single US cv group in 42. All the times I end up completely routed. If I use 4 carriers in one group, they will all sink. Send in 2 groups with two carriers in each, one group will be anihilated while the other one will sail past without launching counterstrikes.
So the enormous advantage of radar is even more important in CV battles than in surface engagements...
what can you do as Japan in June 42 after loosing your 4 largest fleet carriers in exchange for 0 US? ....Dig in and wait for the bomb : p
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John
In the battle of Kula Gulf in July 43 10 Jap DD's met 3 of the new Helena type Cl's and 4 dd's. In this battle the Jap ships were hit by many torpedoes - all duds...The US crossed the enemies T but again the enormous advantage of their torpedoes saved the Japs. The Helena was sunk in exchange for one dd.
One week later at Kolombangara the 3 cruisers Leaner, Honolulu and St. Louis were hit by torps + 1 dd that sank in exchange for a the light cruiser Jintsu sunk by gun fire.
I've tried many many times to send multiple carrier groups against a single US cv group in 42. All the times I end up completely routed. If I use 4 carriers in one group, they will all sink. Send in 2 groups with two carriers in each, one group will be anihilated while the other one will sail past without launching counterstrikes.
So the enormous advantage of radar is even more important in CV battles than in surface engagements...
what can you do as Japan in June 42 after loosing your 4 largest fleet carriers in exchange for 0 US? ....Dig in and wait for the bomb : p
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John
"The problem in defense is how far you can go without destroying from within what you are trying to defend from without"
- Dwight D. Eisenhower
An increase in the Jap naval commanders' aggressiveness combined
with a decent boost in the "to hit" chances of the Long Lance should
give a reasonable approximation of what we are trying to simulate here,
given the limits of the PW engine. I think it should be included in
2.2 and let's see how it works. Good idea for a work-around.
Is there a way to distinguish between day and night engagements to
give the Japs a positive combat modifier for night actions (this is a
separate issue from the above proposal)? It's been awhile, can you
order a TF commander to intentionally try to seek out night combat
over day combat?
I'm very much looking forward to WitP, because hopefully it will
have more granularity in how combat modifiers can be tuned for better
simulation of particular factors.
[This message has been edited by Dunedain (edited October 19, 2000).]
with a decent boost in the "to hit" chances of the Long Lance should
give a reasonable approximation of what we are trying to simulate here,
given the limits of the PW engine. I think it should be included in
2.2 and let's see how it works. Good idea for a work-around.
Is there a way to distinguish between day and night engagements to
give the Japs a positive combat modifier for night actions (this is a
separate issue from the above proposal)? It's been awhile, can you
order a TF commander to intentionally try to seek out night combat
over day combat?
I'm very much looking forward to WitP, because hopefully it will
have more granularity in how combat modifiers can be tuned for better
simulation of particular factors.
[This message has been edited by Dunedain (edited October 19, 2000).]
Don't increase the accuracy of long lances, there were plenty of battles where the IJN fired droves of them an missed, Since we're talking about the 'canal, consider all the shots fired at South Dakota that failed to contact.
Tassafaronga was a fluke. The IJN got lucky because the US TF commander withheld permission to fire from the US DDs who were in range and not-yet-observed by the IJN. 180 seconds difference there and history would probably record that America's torpedo doctrine was better than Japan's. (In such conversations the Axi-philes always manage to conveniently overlook the night battle at Balikpapan in which the US DDs torpedoed several ships and sailed away withoy ever being observed. So much for superior IJN night-fighting!)
Tassafaronga was a fluke. The IJN got lucky because the US TF commander withheld permission to fire from the US DDs who were in range and not-yet-observed by the IJN. 180 seconds difference there and history would probably record that America's torpedo doctrine was better than Japan's. (In such conversations the Axi-philes always manage to conveniently overlook the night battle at Balikpapan in which the US DDs torpedoed several ships and sailed away withoy ever being observed. So much for superior IJN night-fighting!)
Show me a fellow who rejects statistical analysis a priori and I'll show you a fellow who has no knowledge of statistics.
Didn't we have this conversation already?
Didn't we have this conversation already?
The reason that the USN was so successful at Balikpapan was the fact that a Dutch Submarine had just previously attempted an attack on the convoy, and the IJN escorts went after it, leaving the convoy open to the 4 USN DD's. When they saw the USN DD's torpedo's they assumed more subs were in the area and the remaining IJN escorts were looking for submarines, not destroyers.
Hi The surface battle in question was Adm Doorman vrs Adm Kurita. Allied air tracked the IJN TF down to Santa Cruz and Doorman who had been waiting there for 2 weeks on a react mission got surprise allowing him to shoot first. Adm Kurita was killed when allied gunfire struck a DD? I was amazed that Doorman did as well as he did (he gained a surface rating) Perhaps the IJN torps were hit in first round. Also 2 of the CA's in TF were not US and Doorman had several CL's carrying torps. If Doorman was in range to fire his torps then most surely IJN should have fired more. I have been unable to get IJN to achive surprise in about a dozen attempts. It used to be a axiom with me not to fight a surface battle as allies till after 1 Jan 42.
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I'm not retreating, I'm attacking in a differant direction!
[This message has been edited by Mogami (edited October 21, 2000).]
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I'm not retreating, I'm attacking in a differant direction!
[This message has been edited by Mogami (edited October 21, 2000).]
I'm not retreating, I'm attacking in a different direction!
-
Brian Sowman
- Posts: 10
- Joined: Sat Aug 26, 2000 8:00 am
- Location: New Zealand
[QUOTE]Originally posted by Major Tom:
Actually, through a lot of my readings state that early Allied shipborne radar was quite good, however, the Ship Commanders tended to not listen to the information! It wasn't radar's fault that historically USN TF commanders were incompetent when it came to the use of radar. Possible WitP should have some sort of rating for this?
So therefore why not make us of the operational radar station in Hawaii on Dec 7th 1941???
Actually, through a lot of my readings state that early Allied shipborne radar was quite good, however, the Ship Commanders tended to not listen to the information! It wasn't radar's fault that historically USN TF commanders were incompetent when it came to the use of radar. Possible WitP should have some sort of rating for this?
So therefore why not make us of the operational radar station in Hawaii on Dec 7th 1941???