Aircraft Weapons, their Pro Allied slant in WiTP

[Bradley7735]

ORIGINAL: BlackVoid

I do not want to hijack the thread.

Real life losses comparison is meaningless for this, because in the game encounters can be totally different. Whereas in real life US forces had the numerical advantage most of the time, a clever human player as Japan will not allow this and will concentrate forces.

Real life losses are definitely relevant. The game should be designed so that if all the factors (exp, numbers, supply, etc) are the same as the real war, the results would be the same as the real war. That way, when players change things from history, the results will be different than history.

[mlees]

I would like to quote for emphasis:

So yeah, I know what you are talking about. But I will say, these Americans who do that are a small, very vocal minority. People never remember the quiet visitors, only the loud, obnoxious ones. I think the vast majority of Americans appreciate what they have and feel no need to boast about it or belittle another country's people for not believing the same as they do.

This is not the only forum I "surf". This Forum is the most polite of the one's that I do, and the membership appears to be the most open to actual debate and discource. On the other forums I "surf", there is a lot of negative American stereotyping.

I was in the US Navy from 1983 to 1989. I was a "West Coast" sailor, and visited Japan, Korea, Hong Kong (then a British Colony), Singapore, Thailand, Phillippines, Australia multiple times each. Me and my shipmates did not behave as if we "owned the bar" ANY where we went. Usually we were vastly outnumbered by the local folks, and as such felt a little out of place and subdued. (We still sampled the local products and so forth, but we were not larger than life.) There is always some knucklehead that gets drunk and starts fights (an angry drunk, I guess), and ends up on Captains Mast. But these guys are the lower end of the bell curve, not the average.

[Mike Scholl]

ORIGINAL: BlackVoid

Real life losses comparison is meaningless for this, because in the game encounters can be totally different.

Sorry VOID, but this is a truely stupid statement. The ONLY "reality check" we have for the system is
the reality of History. If an analysis of the actual results of a couple dozen "equal" encounters with
F4F's vs. Zeros gives a statistical average result of 16% losses on both sides---and the game results
of a couple dozen "equal" encounters produce a 2:1 edge in losses for either side, then the game's system is out-of-whack and needs adjusting. Real World Results have to provide the "base line" for tuning the system. The more Historical results you can analyze, the better the information base will be for creating your "model". And what you SHOULD be attempting to model is "Historical Reality".

[mdiehl]

@Brady,

It's spelled "ethnocentrism" and that's not me. My position is informed by the ballistics. You want to make an argument that "per hit" the 20mm ROUND is more effective than the .50 that's a fair argument to make. It IS heavier and DOES have a bursting charge. The .50 doesn't. On the other hand, the ballistics of the .50 were better and the .50 carried more ammo. So now you have to ask "for the purpose" which one was better? If you want to bust up armored bombers a cannon is a MUST. 20mm or better still 30mm. If you want to down fighters, the .50cal was the better weapon in WW2. (These days, aircraft are considerably bigger and more robust, so no one in their right mind would arm a modern jet with .50cal for close in fighting against, say, well, really anything built after 1950). Now kindly jam it up your blowhole, sir. You always were an egregious distorter of others opinions, usually in ways that conform to whatever pro Axis slant you're peddling. This thread's title being your usual theme and your response to me your usual "best effort."

@Blackvoid,

I remember in another thread (maybe Combat Mission thread?), mdiehl argued that Sherman tank is better than Tiger. In his book, anything from the US is superior to anything else.

You remember incorrectly. I said that the Sherman was better than the Mark IV, and that the Sherman in some ways could be rated favorably to the PzVIA ('garden variety' Tiger) if you considered a late M4 with wet-stowage and a gyrostabilized 76mm gun, and the fact that the Tiger was mechanically less reliable. Rtrapasso got it.

Tiger vs 76 armed sherman: the winner is usually the vehicle that gets the first hit. That in turn depended on visibility, terrain, who's doing the attacking (rather than concealed) and who can load and shoot faster and more accurately. If you had 1000m with a Tiger defending and good visibility it sucks to be a Sherman. If you have the two vehicles moving at 500m with discontinuous lines of sight (interrupted, say, by hedges, buidlings, or stands of woods) it sucks to be the Tiger. Especially if you have to reverse.

[mdiehl]

Real life losses comparison is meaningless for this, because in the game encounters can be totally different. Whereas in real life US forces had the numerical advantage most of the time, a clever human player as Japan will not allow this and will concentrate forces.

It's true that "philosophy of game design" can render historical facts less important. A game is not "just" a simulation therefore must allow deviation from historical efforts. This would of course include allowing units stationed where none were, or more aircraft or personnel committed to locations, theaters, or campaigns than were historically used.

The US did in fact NOT have the numerical advantage in 1942. In the Coral Sea and Midway campaigns the ratio of carrier aircraft was roughly 1:1. Throw in the land support from Rabaul and the Japanese had favorable numbers. Throw in the US land support at Midway and the US had favorable numbers. During the Guadalcanal campaign the Japanese usually had numerical superiority over Guadalcanal because Rabaul was simply a much bigger, better developed base of operations.

Much of early war Japanese success that has been attributed to "better pilots" is, IMO, and this is just a working idea, more correctly attributed to Japanese numerical superiority in SE Asia, the Java-Borneo area, and the Philippines, as well as better strategic positioning (with Japan at the approximate geographic center of its operations and the Allies having to move reinforcements and supplies along the perimiter of the combat theater). Under the circumstances (more preparation for war, numerical superiority, interior lines, and fighting logistically isolated Allied positions) one would expect the Japanese to get better results, even without such outstanding tactical successes as the surprise attack on PH and the ground-elimination of USAAFFE at Clark Field.

[Damien Thorn]

ORIGINAL: mdiehl
You remember incorrectly. I said that the Sherman was better than the Mark IV, and that the Sherman in some ways could be rated favorably to the PzVIA ('garden variety' Tiger) if you considered a late M4 with wet-stowage and a gyrostabilized 76mm gun, and the fact that the Tiger was mechanically less reliable. Rtrapasso got it.

I must remember incorrectly too then because I remember you saying that the Sherman was superior to the Tiger. Certainly your general tone in the thread was that the Sherman was the preferred tank to have. To me, that is the same as saying that it was "better".

[mdiehl]

I must remember incorrectly too then because I remember you saying that the Sherman was superior to the Tiger. Certainly your general tone in the thread was that the Sherman was the preferred tank to have. To me, that is the same as saying that it was "better".

You do remember incorrectlty. I suspect it is because you derived a "tone" rather than simply sticking to the details of the argument.

I don't make arguments as shallow as "X is better." Because usually such arguments are based solely on one factor as though all combat situations are identical and therefore one and only one factor always is deterministic in the outcome. Combat is context dependent. Defending a ridge in Tunisia with a basically unlimited view, who WOULDN'T want an 88mm gun?

[Apollo11]

Hi all,

ORIGINAL: mdiehl

You remember incorrectly. I said that the Sherman was better than the Mark IV, and that the Sherman in some ways could be rated favorably to the PzVIA ('garden variety' Tiger) if you considered a late M4 with wet-stowage and a gyrostabilized 76mm gun, and the fact that the Tiger was mechanically less reliable. Rtrapasso got it.

Tiger vs 76 armed sherman: the winner is usually the vehicle that gets the first hit. That in turn depended on visibility, terrain, who's doing the attacking (rather than concealed) and who can load and shoot faster and more accurately. If you had 1000m with a Tiger defending and good visibility it sucks to be a Sherman. If you have the two vehicles moving at 500m with discontinuous lines of sight (interrupted, say, by hedges, buidlings, or stands of woods) it sucks to be the Tiger. Especially if you have to reverse.

There was _NEVER_ such tank as "PzVIA ('garden variety' Tiger)"... [;)]

There was "Panzerkampfagen VI Ausf E (Sd Kfz 181).


And comparing PzVIE to Sherman is, well, ridiculous... we did it several times in WitP forum history and you were the only man who wanted us all to acknowledge something that is historically wrong (it's like comparing apples and oranges)...


Leo "Apollo11"

[Speedysteve]

[mlees]

The US did in fact NOT have the numerical advantage in 1942. In the Coral Sea and Midway campaigns the ratio of carrier aircraft was roughly 1:1. Throw in the land support from Rabaul and the Japanese had favorable numbers. Throw in the US land support at Midway and the US had favorable numbers. During the Guadalcanal campaign the Japanese usually had numerical superiority over Guadalcanal because Rabaul was simply a much bigger, better developed base of operations.

Simple numerical comparisons only tell part of the story. Rabaul, especially in '42, was the largest and most well developed base in the theatre. But any flights to Guadalcanal from there had to cover some (then) grueling flight hours, as well as being at a long distance from emergency landing fields (for damaged aircraft and wounded personnel) and search and rescue forces. The Allied forces on the Canal actually benefitted more from having an airbase (as rough as it was) so close. The Japanese, because of the distance, suffered more than the numerical comparisons would have indicated.

[Speedysteve]

For what its worth give me a Tiger. Compared to a Sherman based on armour and firepower I know what I would want.

[mlees]

And comparing PzVIE to Sherman is, well, ridiculous... we did it several times in WitP forum history and you were the only man who wanted us all to acknowledge something that is historically wrong (it's like comparing apples and oranges)...

Correct, I think. The true value judgment placed on a weapon system should be restricted to "How well did the system perform in the role it was designed to fill?"

Anything else, like how that weapon was actually used, or whether or not that weapon design reflected the actual needs of the theatre is more of a leadership and planning question.

[Bradley7735]

ORIGINAL: mlees

And comparing PzVIE to Sherman is, well, ridiculous... we did it several times in WitP forum history and you were the only man who wanted us all to acknowledge something that is historically wrong (it's like comparing apples and oranges)...

Correct, I think. The true value judgment placed on a weapon system should be restricted to "How well did the system perform for the role it was designed to fill?"

Anything else, like how that weapon was actually used, or whether or not that weapon design reflected the actual needs of the theatre is more of a leadership and planning question.

Comparing a sherman to a tiger is apples to apples.

Some of you are answering the question like there are no other variables besides two tanks, one at each end of a football field and deciding which one will destroy the other. Don't forget to take into account things like: how many can you produce with the same materials and manpower. How many can you get to the field with the same transport. can you field repair them when they get damaged. Will they break down easily.

Sure, if you're the guy in the turret, you want a tiger. If you're the supreme commander, you want the 10 shermans that can be fielded with the same effort that you can field 1 tiger.

Ask yourself this question: Would you rather have one Yamato or two Iowas? It's the same question about whether you want a Tiger or a sherman. You just have to take into account how many shermans you get for the price of a tiger.

[Nikademus]

ORIGINAL: BlackVoid

I do not want to hijack the thread.

Real life losses comparison is meaningless for this, because in the game encounters can be totally different. Whereas in real life US forces had the numerical advantage most of the time, a clever human player as Japan will not allow this and will concentrate forces.

Quoting approximate losses is indeed meanlingless without factoring in the circumstances which led to them. However if one's going to strip statistics, one should at least get them right. Adding the four carrier battles together, the approx A6M to F4F loss ratio was 1.13:1 in favor of the Zero. The approx ratio for the Lunga campaign came out to about 1.2:1 in favor of the Zero. Frank clearly stated that the Japanese fought the campaign under a series of impediments that greatly helped the US. I have found in general, that in air campaigns, the ratio rarely leaves 3:1 in favor of any one side. The only real exception to this may have been on the Eastern Front. If a player plans his campaign correctly, i have no problem with him achieving a different kill ratio.

sticking with WitP (for those who actually own it)....the two planes generally are well matched...however it's a matchup of killpower due to high gun values for both planes. Myself...i'm trying to make it so that the design philiosophy of the 1st Gen Japanese and American planes is more pronounced. This may not be possible however because of the relationship of all the variables. stay tuned. [:D]

[mdiehl]

There was _NEVER_ such tank as "PzVIA ('garden variety' Tiger)"...
There was "Panzerkampfagen VI Ausf E (Sd Kfz 181).

That's correct. If recalling a letter wrong is the worst error I make I've got you beat any day.

And comparing PzVIE to Sherman is, well, ridiculous...

Horse hockey. They're both AFVs. They both served in the same theater. They engaged each other on the battlefield. Circumstances invite comparison, even if you consider that the Tiger was a heavy and the Sherman a medium. If you don't like the comparison, ignore the thread.

we did it several times in WitP forum history and you were the only man who wanted us all to acknowledge something that is historically wrong (it's like comparing apples and oranges)...

I did not ask anyone to acknowledge anything that is wrong. I asked people to back up their claims with facts and simple statements such as stating some set of criteria for evaluating what makes something good. Typically you are unable to do either. At the time I also recall hearing from people who simply agreed with me but refused to participate in the discussion, because people like YOU can't rebut an argument without attacking the person making the argument.

[mdiehl]

However if one's going to strip statistics, one should at least get them right. Adding the four carrier battles together, the approx A6M to F4F loss ratio was 1.13:1 in favor of the Zero. The approx ratio for the Lunga campaign came out to about 1.2:1 in favor of the Zero.

If one is going to correct someone else's stats one ought at least to read the argument. The overall loss ratio of F4Fs to A6Ms (from Frank) slightly favored the Zero, but that's losses to all combat causes including F4Fs shot down by bombers and in surface attack, and all A6Ms shot down to other means as well. To get the details of direct conflicts between A6Ms and F4Fs you have to get a source that matches up the AARs from both combatants with their respective loss records. The only person who goes into THAT level of detail (that I know of) is Lundstrom.

If you just go by the tally in Richard Frank's book you get about 1.13:1 (IIRC) F4Fs lost vs Zeroes lost, but that is a pretty meaningless number since it does not consider what shot what else down. Going solely by overall losses, the total airplane loss ratio substantially favored the Allies. Going solely by US VF (rather than VMF) F4F losses in direct engagement with Zeroes you get about 1.2:1 favoring the Allies. But to get there you have to look at the details in Lundstrom's book, not the appendix in Frank's book.

In part that may mean that US carrier pilots were slightly better than US Marine pilots, or it may mean that other circumstances (like better facilities on a CV than at Lunga, or the absence of any US early warning system at Lunga for the first several weeks of the campaign) adversely affected the VMF pilots.

[Big B]

ORIGINAL: mdiehl

However if one's going to strip statistics, one should at least get them right. Adding the four carrier battles together, the approx A6M to F4F loss ratio was 1.13:1 in favor of the Zero. The approx ratio for the Lunga campaign came out to about 1.2:1 in favor of the Zero.

If one is going to correct someone else's stats one ought at least to read the argument. The overall loss ratio of F4Fs to A6Ms (from Frank) slightly favored the Zero, but that's losses to all combat causes including F4Fs shot down by bombers and in surface attack, and all A6Ms shot down to other means as well. To get the details of direct conflicts between A6Ms and F4Fs you have to get a source that matches up the AARs from both combatants with their respective loss records. The only person who goes into THAT level of detail (that I know of) is Lundstrom.

If you just go by the tally in Richard Frank's book you get about 1.13:1 (IIRC) F4Fs lost vs Zeroes lost, but that is a pretty meaningless number since it does not consider what shot what else down. Going solely by overall losses, the total airplane loss ratio substantially favored the Allies. Going solely by US VF (rather than VMF) F4F losses in direct engagement with Zeroes you get about 1.2:1 favoring the Allies. But to get there you have to look at the details in Lundstrom's book, not the appendix in Frank's book.

In part that may mean that US carrier pilots were slightly better than US Marine pilots, or it may mean that other circumstances (like better facilities on a CV than at Lunga, or the absence of any US early warning system at Lunga for the first several weeks of the campaign) adversely affected the VMF pilots.

If we are going to talk pilot quality, how does one justify the four super IJN CV's having crew ratings in the 90s when they didn't fight enough CV battles to even leave a record (against opposition - not surprise raids against undefended targets)?

B

[panda124c]

This brings up the sighting of the .50 cal guns two schools of thought were practiced, the most common was to bore sight all guns to a range of about 400 yards, the other was to parallel the bore sighting. The first formed a very hot spot for 6 to 8 .50 cal mgs (enough to sink steel barges) the other was the shotgun method. This practice was not used in the P-38 (special case). So what we have is 6 to 8 .50 mgs concentrating their fire in a small area, compared to 2 to 4 20mm cannons which I do not believe were bore sighted to converge even if they were the number of rounds delivered to the target was lower, because the time on target is usually the same. And the important factor is rounds on target, hence the Vulcan Cannon.

Oh by the way the Germans determined that it to 20 to 30 20mm hits to bring a B-17 down, that a lot of hits in a very short time.

Also note that the space taken up by 6 .50 cal (12.9mm) guns is the same as 4 20mm guns with less ammo.

Just my poor humble opinion. In a game things are adjusted to give results similar to the real world results. This means that sometimes you just have to fudge it.

[Nikademus]

ORIGINAL: mdiehl

If one is going to correct someone else's stats one ought at least to read the argument.

If one is going chatise other people for not either backing up an argument with data, or using correct data, then one should ensure that their own 'data' is correct.

To get the details of direct conflicts between A6Ms and F4Fs you have to get a source that matches up the AARs from both combatants with their respective loss records. The only person who goes into THAT level of detail (that I know of) is Lundstrom.

My source is Lundstrom.

If you just go by the tally in Richard Frank's book you get about 1.13:1 (IIRC)

You recall incorrectly. Frank does not go into the same level of detail breakdown as Lundstrom, however it is Frank's analysis of the vital factors that led the battle going the way it did that are important.

Going solely by US VF (rather than VMF) F4F losses in direct engagement with Zeroes you get about 1.2:1 favoring the Allies. But to get there you have to look at the details in Lundstrom's book, not the appendix in Frank's book.

Incorrect.

In part that may mean that US carrier pilots were slightly better than US Marine pilots, or it may mean that other circumstances (like better facilities on a CV than at Lunga, or the absence of any US early warning system at Lunga for the first several weeks of the campaign) adversely affected the VMF pilots.

The VF and VMF pilots at Lunga fought under a series of advantages greater than the VF's on the carriers did.

[mlees]

Some of you are answering the question like there are no other variables besides two tanks, one at each end of a football field and deciding which one will destroy the other.

You quoted me directly, and I can only assume that your statement of "considering no other variables" was directed at me. But my statement alludes to the fact that there are variables other than blueprint qualities to be considered. Please don't confuse me so early in the AM...

Don't forget to take into account things like: how many can you produce with the same materials and manpower. How many can you get to the field with the same transport. can you field repair them when they get damaged.

Those questions, it seems to me, are not "design" specifications, but strategic considerations that ought to be figured into planning war production and logistic support. Therefore, any shortcomings here are "planning" errors, not a failure of the tank design itself.

Will they break down easily.

That definately is a design issue.

Sure, if you're the guy in the turret, you want a tiger. If you're the supreme commander, you want the 10 shermans that can be fielded with the same effort that you can field 1 tiger.

But if you have a manning problem, finding the crews for a single Tiger may be easier than 10 Shermans. Depends on circumstances, really. I agree that the tank crews themselves will want as much protection, firepower, and reliability as can be fielded.

The apples to oranges, for me, is that in acuality, the two vehicles had different design philosophies. The Sherman was primarilly intended for an infantry support role, ease of mass production, field reliability. It filled these roles well. It was only when it had to face an armored vehicle like the Tiger and Panther that it was found laking. (But again, it was not designed with those opponents in mind.)

The anit-tank vehicle, as initially developed, was the (M10?) Wolverine. This vehicle, where the design stage was in the thirties, was provided with a higher velocity 76mm gun (as opposed to the lower velocity 75mm on the Sherman). Combat experience versus the Tiger and Panthers showed that this vehicle was not quite up to the task, and so the Shermans had to be modified with longer barreled weapons. The adaptablilty of the Sherman proved to be sufficient for the demands placed on a tank to do a task that it was not be designed for.

The Tiger and Panther were designed from the get-go to be superior in firepower and protection to any (known) enemy tank design. As designed, these tanks were that. The low reliability of the engine was a design bug, but one that was eventually worked out too late to make any difference.

The fact that these designs put an enormous strain on production and supply systems is not a design failure, but a philosophy failure. This might be seen as splitting hairs, but if the strategic planning leadership overestimated their ability to keep these machines running (or failed to take into account the fuel need, transport needs, repair needs), it is not the machines fault...

Ask yourself this question: Would you rather have one Yamato or two Iowas? It's the same question about whether you want a Tiger or a sherman. You just have to take into account how many shermans you get for the price of a tiger.

The problem, again, not a fault of the ship design itself. Both (Yamato and Iowa) were excellent designs. But Japan could not, in the long run, afford the demands on scarce shipbuilding and fuel rescources like the Allies could. The Japanese war planners should have had "clearer vision" on what to spend their limited rescources on. That is not the Yamato's fault.