@Leo -
Do you really think the Sherman is superior to the Tiger.
I really think that word's like "superior" require a lot of fleshing out. Also, words like "Sherman." An M4 with a 75? Heck no. That's why I think you have to consider the 76 armed Sherman. "Superior?" Well, the Sherman was more reliable, more mobile, had a higher rate of fire, and had (with the 76) a gun that could kill Tigers out to about 800m. The tiger had a better gun any day. Correcting for slope the two had comparable frontal armor. Soo... defined ONLY by the gun, one can say the Tiger can penetrate a Sherman at any range. Not so a Sherman (even a 76 armed one) going to a Tiger's front armor. But then, how many engagements in France occurred with clear unobstructed LOS to 900m? Where terrain varies and ranges are often short the 76 armed Sherman has the firepower to do the job, better mobility, and in many cases a gyroed gun. The defender is still going to "win" a little more often because the defender, being not moving and often concealed, is not revealed to the attacker and the defender will get the first shot... usually.
Nik says:
If one is going chatise other people for not either backing up an argument with data, or using correct data, then one should ensure that their own 'data' is correct.
And mine is.
My source is Lundstrom.
Then perhaps you should have mentioned that rather than (Richard) Frank. I can only hold you accountable to the sources you cite. [;)]
You recall incorrectly.
Maybe so but not by much. I posted the detailed analysis here, twice, and at the time YOU, agreed, and IIRC a guy named Tristanjohn (who did not particularly believe me at the time) redid the analysis and came up with the same numbers.
Frank does not go into the same level of detail breakdown as Lundstrom, however it is Frank's analysis of the vital factors that led the battle going the way it did that are important.
OK. So the facts aren't as important as the interpretations? Let's throw in some vital factors. Much of the Japanese favorable overall fighter loss ratio in the LUNGA campaign stems from a late August combat in which the coastwatcher system failed and the radar was not yet operational. Tactical surprise occurred Aka "the bounce." If you eliminate that engagement because of "vital factors" that were not common in the later campaign, the VMF wildcats look better than the IJN Zekes. By October when the Japanese were using fighter SWEEPS to try to force unequal contests (Japanese numerical superiority) in situations where ONLY zeroes fought ONLY wildcats, the Japanese got trounced. Most of the Japanese minor successes occurred when Zekes shot down Wildcats that were engaging bombers. So as with ANY situation one can pick (I would say "cherry pick" when it comes to people who look solely at the adverse conditions that the Japanese faced) "vital factors" to suit their tastes.
Which is why I tend to work back to basic numbers. As to the rest. My numbers are correct. Asserting that they are "incorrect" doesn't make you correct. At the risk of sounding like Monty Python, I will add that's not a debate (an argument) it is just a contradiction. Considering the source (you) I'm not willing to accept a "correction." I'm right, you're not and never the twain shall meet I suppose.
The VF and VMF pilots at Lunga fought under a series of advantages greater than the VF's on the carriers did.
That is a meaningless statement. What is "greater than." Does having better radar on the carriers count? Does not having ANY radar for the first 18 days of the Lunga campaign AT LUNGA count? Does having little fuel and fewer spares at Lunga count? How about bad food, lack of sleep due to interruptions by things like IJA artillery, night combats, coastal TF bombardments and so forth?
Show me a fellow who rejects statistical analysis a priori and I'll show you a fellow who has no knowledge of statistics.
Didn't we have this conversation already?