Aircraft Weapons, their Pro Allied slant in WiTP

[DFalcon]

ORIGINAL: Nikademus

... That interconnected issue again.

Aye, there is the rub, you are a braver man than I for trying. Keeping the change to only the air to air weapons at least cuts out what ever effect durability changes have on AA, airbase attacks, repair etc. Then balancing the fighter bomber thing might be tweeked with manuverability.

[Nikademus]

ORIGINAL: DFalcon




Aye, there is the rub, you are a braver man than I for trying. Keeping the change to only the air to air weapons at least cuts out what ever effect durability changes have on AA, airbase attacks, repair etc. Then balancing the fighter bomber thing might be tweeked with manuverability.

Well i've been with this baby for 2+ years now and i'm stubborn. It is hair pulling at times. I get numb from doing test after test to the point where i dont want to play the game itself for a while. Course with three WitP PBEM's going along with one BTR....dont have much choice [;)]

If this works, the changes will include the air to air weapons along with everything else i've fiddled with. I'd hate to have to redo the AA values again. Have you tried the current version of my mod? what do you think?

[mdiehl]

Yer going to have to get your spin consistent, nicks. First you said you were working from Frank, then when contradicted by my observations from Lundstrom, said you were working from that, then when claiming to have quoted Frank, you didn't.

P.612, in quotes here so that one is not confused between what you imagine Frank to have said and what he wrote, is offered here:

"In addressing the reasons for the outcome of the air campaign we must divide it into two parts. The initial and decisive phase extended from the date of the landing to the end of the Naval Battle of Guadalcanal. During this period the Japanese enjoyed almost continuous numerical superiority both in seagoing and shore-based aircraft. Thus, their failure may not be ascribed to a disparity in numbers. What did account for this result was their fundamental error of negligently or recklessly accepting battle under serious handicaps. .. The 565 miles separating the Japanese aviators objectively introduced a series of impediments. It effectively halved the Zero escort force by precluding the use of the model 32 Zero. Second, the long time consuming flights impelled... a routine that simplified the defenders' tasks. Third, the long hauls created excessive wear on aircraft and crews." (Frank 1990:612).

That all is the good news for your claims. "Franks own words" is, in the case of your claim, a bit of a stretch when the only common element between your, err, replies, and his text is the use of one word -- "impediments."

The bad news is of course that you selectively decontextualized one quotation from the rest of the book and offered it up as though it is the only substantive factor that Frank considered in his summation. Your usual "I must be able to find at least one sentence in here that sounds like it supports my argument" rhetorical form. Reading on a bit we get to...

"From the American perspective, several factors stand out. .. Their [the coastwatchers'] warnings, supplemented by radar equipment later, prevented the Wildcat's modest climbing characteristics from fatally undermining the defense of Henderson Field. We nust again note that the thirty-five to forty-minute alerts of impending raids [I will add, WHEN these were available, such a window was not always available as anyone who reads the text will note] allowed just enough time for the Grumman fighters to achieve the altitudes from which they could effectively intercept the omber formations and deal defensively with the Zero escorts." (Frank 1990:612-613).

In short, with decent alert time, combat did not routinely result in the F4Fs at Henderson being caught with their britches down. It gave them a chance to fight on equal terms, position wise.

"Next come the clever dive-and-climb, overhead pass tactis, originated by Major Smith and copied with success by subsequent units, that maximized the Wildcats' capabilities. [My note here: boom and zoom, not the beam defense. And yes, Virginia, American aviators were tactically sophisticated and "experienced" enough pilots to fight the Zero on terms that gave the F4F an edge. That's training and doctrine in action, not a situational condition unique to Lunga.] the sturdiness of Wildcats earns a place on this list [note: that's a comment on the design of the plane, not a situational condition unique to Lunga], and the tireless work of the ground crews and supporting personnel who kept the planes of the Cactus Air Force serviceable under appallingly primitive conditions also merits attention." (Frank 1990:613).

Clearly when he says "appallingly primitive conditions" that is a stark contrast to the comfortable, clean, large, well serviced, threat free complex that was Rabaul. For every Japanese impediment, the defense suffered impediments of equal concern. Pilots being shelled by army and shipborne artillery, infiltrators, and overall a significant logistical disadvantage (relative ot the IJN pilots living in Rabaul).

Now I have elsewhere posted the detailed plane by plane losses of F4Fs fighting A6Ms as derived from the works of John Lundstrom. These were borrowed books not presently in my inventory. Lundstrom himself in The First Team at Guadalcanal on or about page 16 notes that in direct confrontations between F4Fs and A6Ms at Coral Sea and Midway the loss ratio favored the Wildcats. Anyone can feel free to quote the exact phrase here if they want.

You, on the other hand, Nicklademus, have claimed that in the four engagements (Coral Sea, Midway, Santa Cruz and Eastern Solomons) the F4Fs took a drubbing. That was not the result stipulated in either of Lundstrom;s works as I recall. We can look at the tabular results from Santa Cruz and Eastern Solomons for a summary of aircraft lost from carriers in combat. From Appendix 4 (Frank 1990:645), Carrier air group losses in air to air combat: Japanese Zeroes 43, Vals 58, Kates 35. US F4Fs 31, SBDs 11, TBFs 7. Thats a 4:3 ratio favoring the Wildcat in general in air to air combat strictly between aircraft carriers (which means we can ignore all your bullshit about operational circumstances consistently favoring the Allies since these battles were fought at ranges of about 200 miles or less and in circumstances where the F4F was operating near the limits of its tactical radius and the A6Ms were not). I won't extend that to the dive bomber and TBF losses because surely naval AAA must account for a bunch of those. I think we can fairly write off naval AAA vis the A6Ms and F4Fs since they were not employed in the naval attack role.

In land based forces, (aircraft stationed on Henderson vs the 11th Air Flotilla at Rabaul) the losses were 72 Zeroes, 11 Vals, 95 Betties, versus 70 F4Fs, 24 SBDs, 2 TBFs, 13 P400s, and 7 B17s. (Lundstrom 1990:646). Again roughly a 1:1 fighter loss ratio although again, obiously, multiple aircraft lost to multiple causes. Overall the loss ratio was, as I stipulated earlier, greatly in favor of the US. 116 combat aicraft lost vs 178 lost. Considering that the vast majority of Zekes and Betties killed in the campaign were downed by F4Fs, that gives the Wildcat pilots (despite multitasking the job of intercepting bombers and fending off fighters, occasionally with little to no warning) a kill ratio of approximately 167 (Betties and Zeroes) to 70 or about 2.2:1.

Now, being unsatisfied with that, I tabulated and presented in these forums the Wildcats shot down by Zeroes and the Zeroes shot down by Wildcats, because IMO the gross tabular numbers in Frank's Appendix 4 contain some ambiguous cases. To do this I used Lundstrom as a source, counted all F4Fs forced to land as "kills," counted A6Ms observed to crash (not "missing, presumed lost in combat") as kills, and came up with a slightly favorable kill ratio for the Zekes facing VMF (USMC) piloted F4Fs. About 1.1:1. In that ratio you have to consider that not every raid was spotted by coastwatchers, and in some circumstances the positional advantage thus achieved by the Japanese was deterministic. And as is noted by Lundstrom, in carrier-based air to air combat the F4F pilots consistently bested the A6M pilots. Lundstrom in *his* summary noted that much of that was owed to the use of sophisticated tactics such as boom and zoom and, in the final CV battle of 1942, the beam defense, and to superior USN training at deflection shooting. In short, Allied VF pilots had sufficient expertise and training to beat the Zero on its own terms in CARRIER battles (not, as you would like people to believe, solely when the Zero was handicapped by a long duration flight).

We've been here and done this before. Your assertion that I am mistaken is an egregious lie, not merely an error of judgement, because I've posted this information before and you damned well know it. Just as you damned well know that Richard Frank did not characterize US pilots' success at Henderson as predominantly an outcome of unfavorable geographic circumstances pertaining to long Zero flight times.

[DFalcon]

I have only followed your mod here on the boards. I have a couple of PBEM games going and have not been able to get the time to do much experimentation. With winter coming that may change.

I like your approach to the issue and it would be nice to give it a go.

[Big B]

ORIGINAL: mdiehl
....

"In addressing the reasons for the outcome of the air campaign we must divide it into two parts. The initial and decisive phase extended from the date of the landing to the end of the Naval Battle of Guadalcanal. During this period the Japanese enjoyed almost continuous numerical superiority both in seagoing and shore-based aircraft. Thus, their failure may not be ascribed to a disparity in numbers. What did account for this result was their fundamental error of negligently or recklessly accepting battle under serious handicaps. .. The 565 miles separating the Japanese aviators objectively introduced a series of impediments. It effectively halved the Zero escort force by precluding the use of the model 32 Zero. Second, the long time consuming flights impelled... a routine that simplified the defenders' tasks. Third, the long hauls created excessive wear on aircraft and crews." (Frank 1990:612). .....

Well mdiehl, that's pretty impressive research.

I'm not going to get into the middle of that - AND I'm certainly not here to get into a tiff with anyone.

But I would really like to know (and might I add - innocentently) JUST HOW IN BE-JUSES are the Kaga Akagi Soryu and Hiryu airgroups rated at 90, as opposed to Shokaku and everyone elses rated at 80 and lower? -
I really am at a loss to understand how that is justified. And YES I think that has a huge impact on the game.

Side note: Almost Every post deals with th Scen 15/16 1941 - 1943 campaigns in progress, because that seems to deal wit the period in the war that everyones' most interested in. That being said - I think most allied players find themselves so out classed that most players will not do a lot of smaller actions that historically happened - because they know they cannot compete on anything like even terms...this in turn robs players of the fun of what most of us want - naval and air actions on a smaller scale than a Pacific Jutland.

I think WE would ALL have more enjoyment if the early allies weren't so hopeless in competing with the the Japanese on an individual scale.

Conversely, if the Japanese had the possability of doing well early - AND maintaing their supply lines so they could have somewhat decent pilots later (because they never had a resource shortage, and therefore could train pilots properly) - a lot more of us might be interested in playing the later war scenarios as well.

Just my thoughts..
B

[Nikademus]

ORIGINAL: mdiehl

Yer going to have to get your spin consistent, nicks. First you said you were working from Frank, then when contradicted by my observations from Lundstrom, said you were working from that, then when claiming to have quoted Frank, you didn't.

Nope. You were the one who mistakenly thought i was deriving the corrected kill ratios from a source other than Lundstrom. Lundstrom was the source used for the specific losses. I only mentioned Frank as an important source for analyising the important factors that influenced the air battle. From that point you began your duck and weave between the two sources.

That all is the good news for your claims. "Franks own words" is, in the case of your claim, a bit of a stretch when the only common element between your, err, replies, and his text is the use of one word -- "impediments."

Nope again. Frank's conclusions clearly state that the Japanese fought under disadvantagious conditions which was in direct contradiction to a claim you made a while ago in another thread that Japan fought over Lunga under advantagious circumstances. Thanks for proving my point for me.

The bad news is of course that you selectively decontextualized one quotation from the rest of the book and offered it up as though it is the only substantive factor that Frank considered in his summation. Your usual "I must be able to find at least one sentence in here that sounds like it supports my argument" rhetorical form. Reading on a bit we get to...

Horsehockey. Nice verbose duck and weave however. Besides which, i never decontextualized anything. I told people to read Frank's book for themselves with emphasis on Mr Frank's conclusions. You are the one attempting to dictate to people what they should reading, how they should read it and how they should interpret it.

In short, with decent alert time, combat did not routinely result in the F4Fs at Henderson being caught with their britches down. It gave them a chance to fight on equal terms, position wise.

Correct...only change "equal" to from a position of advantage.

"Next come the clever dive-and-climb, overhead pass tactis, originated by Major Smith and copied with success by subsequent units, that maximized the Wildcats' capabilities. That's training and doctrine in action, not a situational condition unique to Lunga.

Correct. However these tactics would not have been able to be implemented without advance warning alerting the pilots allowing them to climb into position to initiate these tactics. Knowing where and in most cases when the attackers were coming made it easier still. Recall Frank's words:

"Second, the long time consuming flights impelled... a routine that simplified the defenders' tasks."

add to that: "Their warnings [coastwatchers], supplemented by radar later, prevented the Wildcat's modest climbing characteristics from fatally undermining the defense of Henderson Field"

Thats called an advantage of geography and of early warning. Thats why Frank lists it in his paragraph where he defines the Japanese as accepting battle under serious handicaps.

Clearly when he says "appallingly primitive conditions" that is a stark contrast to the comfortable, clean, large, well serviced, threat free complex that was Rabaul. For every Japanese impediment, the defense suffered impediments of equal concern. Pilots being shelled by army and shipborne artillery, infiltrators, and overall a significant logistical disadvantage (relative ot the IJN pilots living in Rabaul).

lol...now here we see a true example of taking an author out of context. Frank lists the factors of the airbattle starting with the Japanese which he clearly states that they fought under disadvantagous conditions. Then in another paragraph where he focuses on the American viewpoint he lists the advantages from which they fought under he mentions that the ground crews indeed preformed heroically under primitive conditions, however this does does not distract from the simple fact that the pilots had the unquestionable advantage of waiting on the ground and scrambling into the air when the alert came in and thus were in the air for far shorter a period of time. Hence Frank's mention of the 500+ mile trip the Japanese had to make continuously. If you want to put forward the opinion that Rabaul was a "comffortable stress free" complex that negates the disadvantages that Frank lists...more power to you.

Now I have elsewhere posted the detailed plane by plane losses of F4Fs fighting A6Ms as derived from the works of John Lundstrom. These were borrowed books not presently in my inventory.

Thats a shame, because I own both sources along with Frank. The ratios you posted and then duck and weaved behind were incorrect.

You, on the other hand, Nicklademus, have claimed that in the four engagements (Coral Sea, Midway, Santa Cruz and Eastern Solomons) the F4Fs took a drubbing.

And you Diehl are a liar. Thank you for reconfirming the point. Please quote me in this thread where I stated that the F4F's took a drubbing.

Frank's appendix from which you are attempting to spin job do not break down losses by type. The figures I came up with were the result of recording F4F and A6M derived kills on a page per page basis using Lundstrom's volumes. As I said, anyone who doesn't want to take my word for it, can buy the books and do their own research. Lundstrom's own conclusion was that in the Lunga campaign the ratio was 1.2:1 in favor of the A6M when only factoring in A6M vs F4F kills against each other. Readers will recall this little factoid from when our buddy TristianJohn was last here a couple months ago stated it several times quoting Lunstrom and Frank. Only problem he, like you, got it backwards and stated it was a 1.2:1 ratio in favor of the F4F. whatever...

We've been here and done this before. Your assertion that I am mistaken is an egregious lie.

Nope....feel free to actually purchase and read Lundstrom and add up the numbers yourself.

Just as you damned well know that Richard Frank did not characterize US pilots' success at Henderson as predominantly an outcome of unfavorable geographic circumstances pertaining to long Zero flight times.

LoL...another classic Diehl misquote of another poster. I stated that Richard Frank highlighted in his conclusion that the Japanese fought the campaign under conditions that were disadvantagous, and he does. Thx again for posting the referenced page. People can judge for themselves as long as they can seperate Frank's text from your spin jobing.
Here's the revelent highlight seperated from your BS ducking and weaving:


What did account for this result was their [Japan's] fundamental error of negligently or recklessly accepting battle under serious handicaps.


Trying to play up the conditions by which the ground crews toiled and portraying the Japanese as relaxing in their lawn chairs back at Rabaul does not equate to a negation of these handicaps.

[Big B]

ORIGINAL: Big B

ORIGINAL: mdiehl
....

"In addressing the reasons for the outcome of the air campaign we must divide it into two parts. The initial and decisive phase extended from the date of the landing to the end of the Naval Battle of Guadalcanal. During this period the Japanese enjoyed almost continuous numerical superiority both in seagoing and shore-based aircraft. Thus, their failure may not be ascribed to a disparity in numbers. What did account for this result was their fundamental error of negligently or recklessly accepting battle under serious handicaps. .. The 565 miles separating the Japanese aviators objectively introduced a series of impediments. It effectively halved the Zero escort force by precluding the use of the model 32 Zero. Second, the long time consuming flights impelled... a routine that simplified the defenders' tasks. Third, the long hauls created excessive wear on aircraft and crews." (Frank 1990:612). .....

Well mdiehl, that's pretty impressive research.

I'm not going to get into the middle of that - AND I'm certainly not here to get into a tiff with anyone.

But I would really like to know (and might I add - innocentently) JUST HOW IN BE-JUSES are the Kaga Akagi Soryu and Hiryu airgroups rated at 90, as opposed to Shokaku and everyone elses rated at 80 and lower? -
I really am at a loss to understand how that is justified. And YES I think that has a huge impact on the game.

Side note: Almost Every post deals with th Scen 15/16 1941 - 1943 campaigns in progress, because that seems to deal wit the period in the war that everyones' most interested in. That being said - I think most allied players find themselves so out classed that most players will not do a lot of smaller actions that historically happened - because they know they cannot compete on anything like even terms...this in turn robs players of the fun of what most of us want - naval and air actions on a smaller scale than a Pacific Jutland.

I think WE would ALL have more enjoyment if the early allies weren't so hopeless in competing with the the Japanese on an individual scale.

Conversely, if the Japanese had the possability of doing well early - AND maintaing their supply lines so they could have somewhat decent pilots later (because they never had a resource shortage, and therefore could train pilots properly) - a lot more of us might be interested in playing the later war scenarios as well.

Just my thoughts..
B

Bump...lets get off the personal

[1275psi]

ALERT< ALERT<ALERT
Gawd

Thought we killed that troll...[8|][8|][8|][8|][8|]

the ugly one who is never wrong is back

I bet he still has not bought the game, or played it - remember guys this is the fellow who spent 6 solid months criticising UV -every little bit of it -it was basically all wrong -and then admitted he did not even own it

Arguing with this guy is like fighting quicksand

Best method -ignore him, do not reply to him -he only provokes for his own sadistic enjoyment of annoying and upsetting people.

Im going back to enjoying the game

[Big B]

Anyway.....

I'm not going to get into the middle of that - AND I'm certainly not here to get into a tiff with anyone.

But I would really like to know (and might I add - innocentently) JUST HOW IN BE-JUSES are the Kaga Akagi Soryu and Hiryu airgroups rated at 90, as opposed to Shokaku and everyone elses rated at 80 and lower? -
I really am at a loss to understand how that is justified. And YES I think that has a huge impact on the game.

Side note: Almost Every post deals with th Scen 15/16 1941 - 1943 campaigns in progress, because that seems to deal wit the period in the war that everyones' most interested in. That being said - I think most allied players find themselves so out classed that most players will not do a lot of smaller actions that historically happened - because they know they cannot compete on anything like even terms...this in turn robs players of the fun of what most of us want - naval and air actions on a smaller scale than a Pacific Jutland.

I think WE would ALL have more enjoyment if the early allies weren't so hopeless in competing with the the Japanese on an individual scale.

Conversely, if the Japanese had the possability of doing well early - AND maintaing their supply lines so they could have somewhat decent pilots later (because they never had a resource shortage, and therefore could train pilots properly) - a lot more of us might be interested in playing the later war scenarios as well.

Just my thoughts..
B

[Nikademus]

ORIGINAL: Big B

But I would really like to know (and might I add - innocentently) JUST HOW IN BE-JUSES are the Kaga Akagi Soryu and Hiryu airgroups rated at 90, as opposed to Shokaku and everyone elses rated at 80 and lower? -
I really am at a loss to understand how that is justified. And YES I think that has a huge impact on the game.

If you would like an innocent opinion on it, PM me and i'll give you one. Given that our favorite Troll is back, and given that my original intention of entering this thread was to ask Brady some WitP specific questions (and yes...since i own the sources in question to give the correct estimated kill ratios being bandied about here) I dont wish to post my thoughts here and have them taken out of context or attacked. Got better things to do with my time.

[Big B]

ORIGINAL: Nikademus

ORIGINAL: Big B

But I would really like to know (and might I add - innocentently) JUST HOW IN BE-JUSES are the Kaga Akagi Soryu and Hiryu airgroups rated at 90, as opposed to Shokaku and everyone elses rated at 80 and lower? -
I really am at a loss to understand how that is justified. And YES I think that has a huge impact on the game.

If you would like an innocent opinion on it, PM me and i'll give you one. Given that our favorite Troll is back, and given that my original intention of entering this thread was to ask Brady some WitP specific questions (and yes...since i own the sources in question to give the correct estimated kill ratios being bandied about here) I dont wish to post my thoughts here and have them taken out of context or attacked. Got better things to do with my time.

ok fine...

Hey! Let's all pour a cold one!

[Mike Scholl]

ORIGINAL: Nikademus

I'm close to a solution. I can produce results similar in number for the Allied side in a 4 on 4 carrier battle vs Zeros with the Axis version of a high gun value armament. However because everything is interconnected i cant just implement it because it causes the Japan side to suffer a huge kill ratio loss vs. the toughened Allied tactical bombers and fighters.

Currently testing an across the board change in gun armament value that combined with the changes i've already made, may provide an alternate solution to the uber number, uber losses exponential phenomenum that can impact the game. If it pans out it will be in 4.0 of my mod.

On a happier note...had a good encounter with B-24's facing 60 fighters. 6 bombers to 4 fighters downed over a two day period. Much better.

Seems at least someone is on the same page with me when I tell BRADY that you can't just focus in on ONE factor (like gun capabilities) when trying to bring some sanity to the air-to-air combat results. The system is a balancing act between many qualities---and as your efforts confirm not an easy one. Good Luck in your efforts.

[Mike Scholl]

ORIGINAL: Big B

I think WE would ALL have more enjoyment if the early allies weren't so hopeless in competing with the the Japanese on an individual scale.

Conversely, if the Japanese had the possability of doing well early - AND maintaing their supply lines so they could have somewhat decent pilots later (because they never had a resource shortage, and therefore could train pilots properly) - a lot more of us might be interested in playing the later war scenarios as well.

Just my thoughts..
B

Seems as if you are saying that BOTH sides have more capability than they should in the game. The Japanese can expand TOO FAR too fast (like India and the West Coast or Hawaii), and the Allies can drag TOO MUCH too far forward in defense too fast. The reality was that an equalibrium of abilities led to the stabilazation of the fronts in mid 1942. The Allies could get enough material and force forward to halt the Japanese at the Burma-India border, and the Japanese couldn't get enough forward over the lousy communication routes of SE Asia to push any more. Same thing occurred in the SW Pacific..., by the time Japan could build up enough base structure in the Rabaul/Papua region to push forward, the Allies had brought enough force and support into Eastern Australia/New Caledonia to face them. In the game, both sides can move too much too fast into areas they couldn't historically support. And I couldn't agree more.

[ChezDaJez]

Me and my shipmates did not behave as if we "owned the bar" ANY where we went.

Neither did I, nor did that vast majority of American sailors. That's why I said "a small, very vocal minority" that act that way. The unfortunate part (and the point of my statement) is that it is this small minority that gets remembered by the local populace, not the quiet guys who respect the local laws and customs.

This Forum is the most polite of the one's that I do, and the membership appears to be the most open to actual debate and discource.

And I agree, this forum has a great international flavor where everyone seems to check their opinions about politics, race, nationality, etc at the door. And members aren't afraid to say "Cool it" when someone starts down that road. And what's truely amazing about this forum is that those members who grow up speaking a language other than English actually write and spell English better than Brady does! (just couldn't resist, Brady)[:D]

Chez

[Nikademus]

Thx Mike.

Here's a sneak peak at what i'm cookin in the lab.

Pseudo "midway" (mind you, not "the" midway....just a similar # of carriers)

4 on 3. (USN has more planes, particularily fighters per carrier)

AFTER ACTION REPORTS FOR 05/07/42

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Day Air attack on TF at 65,98

Japanese aircraft
A6M2 Zero x 44

Allied aircraft
F4F-4 Wildcat x 18
SBD Dauntless x 29
TBF Avenger x 15

Japanese aircraft losses
A6M2 Zero: 2 damaged

Allied aircraft losses
F4F-4 Wildcat: 10 destroyed
SBD Dauntless: 8 destroyed, 13 damaged
TBF Avenger: 1 destroyed, 11 damaged

Japanese Ships
CV Hiryu, Bomb hits 1, on fire
CV Akagi, Bomb hits 1, on fire
CV Soryu, Bomb hits 1, on fire
CV Kaga

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Day Air attack on TF at 65,98

Japanese aircraft
A6M2 Zero x 38

Allied aircraft
F4F-4 Wildcat x 10
SBD Dauntless x 34
TBD Devastator x 15

Japanese aircraft losses
A6M2 Zero: 6 destroyed, 1 damaged

Allied aircraft losses
F4F-4 Wildcat: 1 destroyed, 8 damaged
SBD Dauntless: 6 destroyed, 22 damaged
TBD Devastator: 1 destroyed, 12 damaged

Japanese Ships
CV Kaga
CV Soryu, Bomb hits 3, on fire
CV Hiryu, on fire
CV Akagi, Bomb hits 1, on fire
DD Teruzuki


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Day Air attack on TF at 65,98

Japanese aircraft
A6M2 Zero x 30

Allied aircraft
F4F-4 Wildcat x 5
SBD Dauntless x 17

Japanese aircraft losses
A6M2 Zero: 1 destroyed, 1 damaged

Allied aircraft losses
F4F-4 Wildcat: 1 destroyed, 1 damaged
SBD Dauntless: 3 destroyed, 11 damaged

Japanese Ships
CV Soryu, on fire
CV Akagi, on fire
CV Kaga

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Day Air attack on TF at 65,98

Japanese aircraft
A6M2 Zero x 26

Allied aircraft
SBD Dauntless x 17

Japanese aircraft losses
A6M2 Zero: 1 damaged

Allied aircraft losses
SBD Dauntless: 2 destroyed, 13 damaged

Japanese Ships
CV Hiryu, Bomb hits 1, on fire
CV Kaga, Bomb hits 1, on fire
CV Soryu, Bomb hits 2, on fire, heavy damage

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Day Air attack on TF at 67,98

Japanese aircraft
A6M2 Zero x 8
D3A Val x 56
B5N Kate x 69

Allied aircraft
F4F-4 Wildcat x 48

Japanese aircraft losses
A6M2 Zero: 3 destroyed
D3A Val: 16 destroyed, 24 damaged
B5N Kate: 26 destroyed, 17 damaged

Allied aircraft losses
F4F-4 Wildcat: 1 destroyed, 4 damaged

Allied Ships
CV Enterprise, Bomb hits 5, Torpedo hits 1, on fire, heavy damage
CV Hornet
CA Chester, Torpedo hits 2, on fire, heavy damage
DD Grenville, Bomb hits 1, on fire


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Day Air attack on TF at 65,98

Japanese aircraft
A6M2 Zero x 27

Allied aircraft
F4F-4 Wildcat x 14
SBD Dauntless x 5
TBD Devastator x 12
TBF Avenger x 6

Japanese aircraft losses
A6M2 Zero: 1 destroyed, 2 damaged

Allied aircraft losses
F4F-4 Wildcat: 1 destroyed, 4 damaged
SBD Dauntless: 3 destroyed
TBD Devastator: 1 destroyed, 5 damaged
TBF Avenger: 1 destroyed, 4 damaged

Japanese Ships
CV Kaga, on fire
CV Akagi, on fire
CV Hiryu, on fire

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Day Air attack on TF at 67,98

Japanese aircraft
A6M2 Zero x 17
D3A Val x 27
B5N Kate x 22

Allied aircraft
F4F-4 Wildcat x 20

Japanese aircraft losses
A6M2 Zero: 1 destroyed
D3A Val: 3 destroyed, 21 damaged
B5N Kate: 5 destroyed, 12 damaged

Allied aircraft losses
F4F-4 Wildcat: 4 destroyed, 2 damaged

Allied Ships
CV Yorktown, Bomb hits 6, Torpedo hits 2, on fire, heavy damage
CLAA Atlanta


Actual a2a losses:

[Nikademus]

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[Nikademus]

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[Nikademus]

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[Nikademus]

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[Nikademus]

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