Aircraft Weapons, their Pro Allied slant in WiTP

[Big B]

ORIGINAL: spence

Any military commander who is interested in a wartime "fair fight" ought to be courtmartialed.
Halsey just wanted a plane that was faster, more manueverable, better protected and carrying heavier firepower than the Zero. Seems like a reasonable sort of comment for any Allied commander to make. The fact it was after the Battle of Midway was probably coincidental.[:D]

WHAT HE SAID!

b

[mdiehl]

Halsay said after the battle of midway in his report that the 4f3/4f4 must be replaced as the zero was a better fighter!!

Actually he said this after the Eastern Solomons action on reviewing a assessment of air combat results in the 4 major cv engagements to day conducted by Thach. At the time, both Halsey and Thach were under the impression that F4Fs were shooting down three Zekes per F4F in direct engagements; so IMO that tells you far more about the expectations than it does about the merits of the planes. On paper the F4F was at higher airspeeds superior in every way. The problem is of course that combat burns energy, so airspeeds drop and aircraft if they stay in a battle for maneuver will wind up in circumstances that favor the A6M type.

[treespider]

I would have to argue that part of the F4F's exagerated kill ratio at Guadacanal was in part due to the 565 mile return trip the Japanese were making. Wherein even moderately damaged aircraft that normally survived did not because of the length of the return trip. I also just read an account where one of the field modifications to the Zero's at Rabaul included sawing off the radio mast and removing the radio to save weight for the trip.

[Mike Scholl]

ORIGINAL: spence

Any military commander who is interested in a wartime "fair fight" ought to be courtmartialed.
Halsey just wanted a plane that was faster, more manueverable, better protected and carrying heavier firepower than the Zero. Seems like a reasonable sort of comment for any Allied commander to make. The fact it was after the Battle of Midway was probably coincidental.[:D]

A typically American response... "What do you mean we are equal? We don't want to be equal. We want to be twice as good, and have 10 times as many. Get to working on it!"

[spence]

LET ME RESTATE:ANY WARTIME MILITARY COMMANDER INTERESTED IN A "FAIR FIGHT" SHOULD BE COURT MARTIALLED BEFORE HE LEADS HIS MEN INTO BATTLE.

A couple or relatively "fair fights" that come to mind: The Somme, Paschendaele, Verdun.

[Big B]

ORIGINAL: treespider

I would have to argue that part of the F4F's exagerated kill ratio at Guadacanal was in part due to the 565 mile return trip the Japanese were making. Wherein even moderately damaged aircraft that normally survived did not because of the length of the return trip. I also just read an account where one of the field modifications to the Zero's at Rabaul included sawing off the radio mast and removing the radio to save weight for the trip.

Huh?

B

[treespider]

ORIGINAL: Big B

ORIGINAL: treespider

I would have to argue that part of the F4F's exagerated kill ratio at Guadacanal was in part due to the 565 mile return trip the Japanese were making. Wherein even moderately damaged aircraft that normally survived did not because of the length of the return trip. I also just read an account where one of the field modifications to the Zero's at Rabaul included sawing off the radio mast and removing the radio to save weight for the trip.

Huh?

B

Just thought I'd stoke the fire...but I would suggest the kill ratio would have been substantially different if the Japanese didn't have to make a 565 mile return trip...

[mdiehl]

Wherein even moderately damaged aircraft that normally survived did not because of the length of the return trip

Some aircraft may have been lost that way it is true. Maybe even as much as 5%. The point is that one can cherry pick the conditions they want. Frank specifically was writing in the context of "things that could have gone better for the Japanese." Notably the assesment did not include the equivalent of "and I'd have gotten away with it were it not for you meddling kids!" ... that is, Frank does not say with a shorter round trip the Japanese certainly would have won the air campaign. He wasn't writing that summary chapter in the context of "things that could have gone better for the Allies" ... like having sufficient warning via the radar and coastwatcher net that the F4Fs could typically obtain positional advantage. When it worked, the warnings turned one sided "attacker has initiative and positional advantage" affairs into, essentially, meeting engagements.

Give the F4F pilots decent rest, good maintenance facilities, and good food, and the Japanese pilots would probably have lost regardless of the distance they had to fly to engage. Their plane wasn't up to battle damage nor were their training and tactics the right sort of training and tactics to deal with opponents who would not fight to the strengths of the Japanese planes.

[Big B]

ORIGINAL: treespider

ORIGINAL: Big B

ORIGINAL: treespider

I would have to argue that part of the F4F's exagerated kill ratio at Guadacanal was in part due to the 565 mile return trip the Japanese were making. Wherein even moderately damaged aircraft that normally survived did not because of the length of the return trip. I also just read an account where one of the field modifications to the Zero's at Rabaul included sawing off the radio mast and removing the radio to save weight for the trip.

Huh?

B

Just thought I'd stoke the fire...but I would suggest the kill ratio would have been substantially different if the Japanese didn't have to make a 565 mile return trip...

Got to hand it to you treespider! You know how to pour kerosene on the old campfire![:D]

B

[treespider]

ORIGINAL: mdiehl

Wherein even moderately damaged aircraft that normally survived did not because of the length of the return trip

Some aircraft may have been lost that way it is true. Maybe even as much as 5%. The point is that one can cherry pick the conditions they want. Frank specifically was writing in the context of "things that could have gone better for the Japanese." Notably the assesment did not include the equivalent of "and I'd have gotten away with it were it not for you meddling kids!" ... that is, Frank does not say with a shorter round trip the Japanese certainly would have won the air campaign. He wasn't writing that summary chapter in the context of "things that could have gone better for the Allies" ... like having sufficient warning via the radar and coastwatcher net that the F4Fs could typically obtain positional advantage. When it worked, the warnings turned one sided "attacker has initiative and positional advantage" affairs into, essentially, meeting engagements.

Give the F4F pilots decent rest, good maintenance facilities, and good food, and the Japanese pilots would probably have lost regardless of the distance they had to fly to engage. Their plane wasn't up to battle damage nor were their training and tactics the right sort of training and tactics to deal with opponents who would not fight to the strengths of the Japanese planes.

Where do you get the 5% figure???

Perhaps Japanese tactics would have been better if they weren't removing radios from aircraft to save weight for better fuel mileage for the long trip that you conveniently like to disregard.

Perhaps if Rabaul were 265 miles closer continous air coverage over Guadacanal could have been maintained.

Fortunately none of these "perhaps'" took place... I will grant that the F4F had a better survivability rate (in part becasue they rarely engaged at extended range) but as far as dogfighting ability the I would rate the Zero higher.

[treespider]

And in response to your heaven on earth at Rabaul...

" The harsh tropical environment added to the decline of the JNAF at Rabaul, for unlike their Allied counterpoarts, the Japanese failed to control the mosquito problem which devasted whole units with malaria. The Allies, on the other hand, sprayed and dusted their bases frequently with the insecticide DDT, which was unavailable to the Japanese. The latter also lacked quinine and its synthetic substitue Atebin."

Henry Sakaida, Aces of the Rising Sun, 1937-1945

[spence]

Seems to me that Japan lost the strategic initiative before more than a handful of the new and modern weapons produced by the Allies showed up on the battlefield. The Corsairs and Essexes served only to grind the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere to dust. It was the P-40s and Kittyhawks, F4Fs and SBDs, Treaty Cruisers and 6 original US CVs that ended the Japanese march of conquest and took the first steps back on the road to Tokyo Bay.

Seems to me that there are enough hard-coded rules/game mechanics to allow the Japanese Player (with the benefit of historical hindsight) to stretch Yamamoto's (estimate of) "running wild for six months to a year" well into 1943. IRL the Allies went toe-to-toe with the IJN from May 1942 on and were generally successful (without what was in the pipeline for 1943+ their victories might have proved Pyrrhic but a level playing field in production, at least; is one Japanese fantasy not entertained by the game). With the Zero Bonus, restrictions on Allied CV coordination, the uber-CAP capability of the KB (which, in a lot of the AARs I've read seems to be more effective than that of 1944 (real life) TF 38s), and the overrated durability of Japanese CVs (I know they had better armor but how come IRL none of them survived even 5 hits) all combine to make a head on challenge of the IJN by the Allied Player almost certainly suicidal. The forums are full of wait for this , wait for that.....THENNNNN... you can go after the Japs.

It's OK since it's a game. But some folks seem to be believing that's how it really was.

[treespider]

ORIGINAL: spence

Seems to me that Japan lost the strategic initiative before more than a handful of the new and modern weapons produced by the Allies showed up on the battlefield. The Corsairs and Essexes served only to grind the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere to dust. It was the P-40s and Kittyhawks, F4Fs and SBDs, Treaty Cruisers and 6 original US CVs that ended the Japanese march of conquest and took the first steps back on the road to Tokyo Bay.

Seems to me that there are enough hard-coded rules/game mechanics to allow the Japanese Player (with the benefit of historical hindsight) to stretch Yamamoto's (estimate of) "running wild for six months to a year" well into 1943. IRL the Allies went toe-to-toe with the IJN from May 1942 on and were generally successful (without what was in the pipeline for 1943+ their victories might have proved Pyrrhic but a level playing field in production, at least; is one Japanese fantasy not entertained by the game). With the Zero Bonus, restrictions on Allied CV coordination, the uber-CAP capability of the KB (which, in a lot of the AARs I've read seems to be more effective than that of 1944 (real life) TF 38s), and the overrated durability of Japanese CVs (I know they had better armor but how come IRL none of them survived even 5 hits) all combine to make a head on challenge of the IJN by the Allied Player almost certainly suicidal. The forums are full of wait for this , wait for that.....THENNNNN... you can go after the Japs.

It's OK since it's a game. But some folks seem to be believing that's how it really was.

You forgot to mention code breaking and internal squabbling between the IJA/IJN.

Some nice what if's that played into the Allied hands...What if the Japanese had not surrendered the field during the battle of the Coral Sea and pressed forward towards Pt. Moresby? What if Japan had not opted for Combined Fleet's Midway option and instead went with the Naval General Staff's plan for New Caledonia, Fiji and Samoa?...What if the Tone's catapault had not been malfunctioning on the morning of June 4, 1942? What if one of Chikumas search planes had not had a faulty engine forcing it to return earlier in its search route... What if the Japanese submarine cordon had not been delayed for one day in departing....What if Nagumo had carried out an earlier two-phase search, what if the observer in the Chikuma plane had been more watchful on the outward leg of his search?

A fair amount of plain old luck came together to help the Allies stem the tide when they did....

Of course it is a game and players do have the benefit of 20-20 hindsight.

[ChezDaJez]

... that is, Frank does not say with a shorter round trip the Japanese certainly would have won the air campaign.

No, he doesn't say that because, no matter what, the Japanese could not afford a war of attrition which is essentially what Guadalcanal became. After October, the Allies were in a much better position to replace aircrews and planes, especially pilots. Frank, Lundstrom, Francillon and Bergerud all do say that Japanese pilot losses probably would not have been as great had they built airfields closer to the battle. In fact, Bergerud and Lundstrom both agree that one of the major Japanese faults was their failure to develop those airfields.

He wasn't writing that summary chapter in the context of "things that could have gone better for the Allies" ... like having sufficient warning via the radar and coastwatcher net that the F4Fs could typically obtain positional advantage. When it worked, the warnings turned one sided "attacker has initiative and positional advantage" affairs into, essentially, meeting engagements.

The Japanese were very predictable in their attacks and could be counted on to arrive over Guadalcanal near the noon hour. Radar and coastwatcher warnings allowed allied aircraft to stay on the ground until the last minute but the allies always had a reasonable idea of the Japanese time of arrival overhead without them. Towards the end of December 1942, the Japanese shifted their attacks towards late afternoon but their operational losses went up as they attempted to return to their bases at night amidst the mountainous terrain.

The survival advantage always goes to the defender. If forced to bail out, US pilots had a substantially better chance of rescue than did Japanese pilots. American search and rescue efforts were much better organized. The US (and the Allies in general) put a great deal of effort into recovering downed pilots. The Japanese, on the other hand, paid little more than token attention to it. Unless he was fortunate enough to come down near a Japanese base, a downed Japanese pilot had little, in any, chance of rescue. Most Japanese fighters either didn't have radios or they didn't work so, in most cases, weren't able to broadcast their location for a rescue effort. And as the battle wore on, the waters around Guadalacanal and the southern Slot simply became too dangerous for Japanese flying boats or ships to operate in.

Chez

[ChezDaJez]

Seems to me that there are enough hard-coded rules/game mechanics to allow the Japanese Player (with the benefit of historical hindsight) to stretch Yamamoto's (estimate of) "running wild for six months to a year" well into 1943. IRL the Allies went toe-to-toe with the IJN from May 1942 on and were generally successful

That's true to a point, with the benefit of historical hindsight. But that's a double-edged sword. The allies can also play with the benefit of hindsight. If the Japanese player can avoid losing his fleet carriers in 1942 then, yes, the Japanese offensive can probably continue on to 1943. But to what end? If the Allies avoid an automatic Japanese victory at the end of 42, then the finale is clearly written. The Japanese can not win no matter how many carriers he has because sooner or later he has to commit them. And when he does, the allies can afford to trade carrier for carrier in a war of attrition.

And BTW, the Japanese Zero bonus is gone on 1 May 1942. There after, the Zero begins a long downward slide against better allied aircraft and pilots. I'm having a hard time against even the lowly P-39 and my PBEM is only in June 1942! Here's an example: (notice my bombers aborted!)

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Day Air attack on Koepang , at 28,77

Japanese aircraft
A6M3 Zero x 18
G4M1 Betty x 17

Allied aircraft
P-39D Airacobra x 41

Japanese aircraft losses
A6M3 Zero: 10 destroyed
G4M1 Betty: 2 destroyed, 13 damaged

Allied aircraft losses
P-39D Airacobra: 4 destroyed, 6 damaged

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Chez

[Sharkosaurus rex]

Here is a top ten list of things Japanese pilots started to use to increase their fuel consumption efficiency and make it easier for them to fly to Guadalcanal.

10 Only carry half ammo
9. Hacksaw off radio mast and discard radio
8. fly high to prevent air resistance
7. polish wing surfaces reduce friction
6. don't leave your chewing gum under wings
5. don't leave golf clubs behind seat in plane
4. don't drink and fly
3. only paint on the actual number of kills- not the claimed number
2. leave parachute at base
1. leave comfort girl at base

[treespider]

Chez wrote:

The Japanese were very predictable in their attacks and could be counted on to arrive over Guadalcanal near the noon hour. Radar and coastwatcher warnings allowed allied aircraft to stay on the ground until the last minute but the allies always had a reasonable idea of the Japanese time of arrival overhead without them. Towards the end of December 1942, the Japanese shifted their attacks towards late afternoon but their operational losses went up as they attempted to return to their bases at night amidst the mountainous terrain.

I assume the timing of the Japanese attacks were in part dictated by the 565 mile approach flight...

[mdiehl]

In fact, Bergerud and Lundstrom both agree that one of the major Japanese faults was their failure to develop those airfields.

I agree too. IMO the error was to put that labor Bn on Lunga rather than somewhere up on New Georgia.

The Japanese were very predictable in their attacks and could be counted on to arrive over Guadalcanal near the noon hour. Radar and coastwatcher warnings allowed allied aircraft to stay on the ground until the last minute but the allies always had a reasonable idea of the Japanese time of arrival overhead without them.

Nonetheless a squadron awaiting an inbound strike is on alert status whether or not a strike is on the way. A squadron not on a mission to Lunga is not. Thus an "no mission" day is a stand down day for the Japanese but not for the US pilots on Lunga. This is directly relevent to the subject of combat fatigue.

And yes the radar and coastwatchers often worked. Often they did not. At best the early warnings gave the F4F pilots just enough time to gain sufficient airspeed and altitude to avoid being "bounced." But it did not always turn out that the crude early warning net worked properly.

Towards the end of December 1942, the Japanese shifted their attacks towards late afternoon but their operational losses went up as they attempted to return to their bases at night amidst the mountainous terrain.

I always wondered why they did not launch at night and time their strikes to arrive earlier in the day.

The survival advantage always goes to the defender. If forced to bail out, US pilots had a substantially better chance of rescue than did Japanese pilots. American search and rescue efforts were much better organized.

That is definitely true. The "initiative" however goes to the attacker and that is a bit of an advantage if one has a hinky early warning system that occasionally breaks down. If you back out the late August major victory (in which the net did not work) the VMF has a slightly favorable kill ratio over the 11th AF.

The US (and the Allies in general) put a great deal of effort into recovering downed pilots. The Japanese, on the other hand, paid little more than token attention to it. Unless he was fortunate enough to come down near a Japanese base, a downed Japanese pilot had little, in any, chance of rescue. Most Japanese fighters either didn't have radios or they didn't work so, in most cases, weren't able to broadcast their location for a rescue effort. And as the battle wore on, the waters around Guadalacanal and the southern Slot simply became too dangerous for Japanese flying boats or ships to operate in.

All true. That said, when I did my original calculations on this two years ago I counted "downed and recovered" pilots as "shot down." In the long run this allowed the Allies to retain experienced pilots and worked against the Japanese, but does not directly affect any of the arithmetic tallies that we've been over in this thread.

That's true to a point, with the benefit of historical hindsight. But that's a double-edged sword. The allies can also play with the benefit of hindsight.

That's not really correct. The "bad realities" for the Allies are largely hardcoded. These include the Zero Bonus which should not under any circumstances be there, and the incorrect higher EXP ratings for Japanese naval pilots. Both the "looping maneuver" and the "greater airtime" were contravened by the use of poor doctrine, poor radios, poor tactical formations, and superior US doctrine (among naval and marine pilots) from the get go. The fact that the game selects for a "run and hide" US strategy rather than a "calculated risk" strategy rather indicates that as a simulation of the strategic choices facing the combatants it is greatly flawed. In WitP the US player KNOWS that he cannot engage KB on an equal footing; in WW2 the USN was willing to do so and was highly successful at times, and universally successful from the strategic POV.

The Japanese can not win no matter how many carriers he has because sooner or later he has to commit them. And when he does, the allies can afford to trade carrier for carrier in a war of attrition.

The fact that it's a carrier for carrier trade even in the late war (when USN command and control, pilot training, doctrine, aircraft, and operational planning were overwhelmingly superior) is a problem with the "simulation" aspect of the game.

And BTW, the Japanese Zero bonus is gone on 1 May 1942.

It should never have been written into the code in the first place.

I'm having a hard time against even the lowly P-39 and my PBEM is only in June 1942! Here's an example: (notice my bombers aborted!)

FoW on or off? Altitude? If that combat occurred at 10,000 feet there's nothing improbable about those results. The P39 was hell's bells at low altitude.

[mdiehl]

" The harsh tropical environment added to the decline of the JNAF at Rabaul, for unlike their Allied counterpoarts, the Japanese failed to control the mosquito problem which devasted whole units with malaria. The Allies, on the other hand, sprayed and dusted their bases frequently with the insecticide DDT, which was unavailable to the Japanese. The latter also lacked quinine and its synthetic substitue Atebin."

"

The USN and VMF pilots did not benefit from mosquito control, adequate antimalarials, or any less harsh a tropical environment until December 1942. In contrast, Japanese pilots at Rabaul benefitted from a base that was *otherwise* far safer, more comfortable, and more adequately supplied and with better facilities than the pilots at Lunga. No matter how you try to wiggle this there is absolutely no question that in every respect living conditions at Rabaul were far superior to the conditions at Lunga. In comparison with Lunga, Rabaul was indeed a "paradise" although I never suggested that it was a literal paradise.

[ChezDaJez]

I assume the timing of the Japanese attacks were in part dictated by the 565 mile approach flight...

Yep, its pretty easy to figure out the arrival time as sunrise occurs around 6-7AM during this time of year. Assuming a sunrise takeoff and 4 hour flight puts the Japanese overhead between 10 and 11AM at the earliest. They most often appeared between noon and 1PM. That allowed them to land back in the Rabaul area with about an hour of daylight to spare. The Japanese tried to avoid night takeoffs and landings with large forces if they could help it.

The sun sets just after 6PM in September (Forecast sunrise/sunset for Tulagi togay is 6:12AM and 6:12PM) and shortening as the fall progresses.

Chez