Oh, and I forgot to mention that the best thing to do might just be to run forward, engage the enemy and get inside the buffer zone. If you are assaulting and already have numerical superiority, you stand a much better chance of coming out on top against infantry than you do against artillery. Also, retreating can lead to traffic jams, bunching, contagious disorganization (running into other units and disrupting them), etc.
Omaha Beach springs to mind. Everyone gets pinned and slowly chewed up while the reality is that the attackers far outnumber the defenders. Of course, experienced commanders will know that it is better to move forward. You just have to hope that there are some around.
Another point is fatigue. All that running is going to tire the hell out of your men. Especially if they are loaded down.
The last point is terrain. WWII vets often stated that they were safer in an open field than in broken terrain because the shrapnel mostly went high or was absorbed by the soft earth. Broken terrain was more dangerous because shrapnel would bounce all over the place and concussive waves would create more shrapnel from rocks and other debris. Obviously the worst is to be in a treed area where airbursts and flying bits of wood can really make a mess.
Cheers
Paul
"Running" from artillery
Moderator: Arjuna
RE: "Running" from artillery
Someone take my wife, please?
-
JJKettunen
- Posts: 2293
- Joined: Tue Mar 12, 2002 6:00 pm
- Location: Finland
RE: "Running" from artillery
ORIGINAL: cabron66
Obviously the worst is to be in a treed area where airbursts and flying bits of wood can really make a mess.
It is kinda strange that treebursts seem not have been a factor in the Finnish front, where forests are plenty, at least never mentioned in Finnish military history I've read (and I've read it a lot), whereas the effects of broken terrain to artillery fire have been explained in detail. However we were taught in the army to avoid deploying right next a timberline, because direct fire weapons would cause treebursting, but nothing was said about indirect fire causing it (although I'd imagine VT type of fuses might). I had only basic infantry training so I'm not an expert on this field though.
Still it is my personal opinion that the effects of treebursts have been traditionally overstated in western literature, maybe because Americans had so tough time in Huertgen Forest, I don't know. The areas in and around Finland were perfect "laboratories" for these effects but nothing about treebursts is mentioned. I think the heavier shells at least, without any special fuses, tended to go through canopies, and they certainly did remove forests bit by bit, and generated general hell, but not by exploding in the treetops making them more lethal.
Then again I may just have a selective memory. [:D]
RE: "Running" from artillery
Tree-burst effect does seem to have high priority in American reports but doesn't feature that much in British writings. Could be the difference between fighting in the desert and fighting in the bocage ... [;)]
Ray
Ray
RE: "Running" from artillery
ORIGINAL: Keke
It is kinda strange that treebursts seem not have been a factor in the Finnish front, where forests are plenty, at least never mentioned in Finnish military history I've read (and I've read it a lot), whereas the effects of broken terrain to artillery fire have been explained in detail. However we were taught in the army to avoid deploying right next a timberline, because direct fire weapons would cause treebursting, but nothing was said about indirect fire causing it (although I'd imagine VT type of fuses might). I had only basic infantry training so I'm not an expert on this field though.
Still it is my personal opinion that the effects of treebursts have been traditionally overstated in western literature, maybe because Americans had so tough time in Huertgen Forest, I don't know. The areas in and around Finland were perfect "laboratories" for these effects but nothing about treebursts is mentioned. I think the heavier shells at least, without any special fuses, tended to go through canopies, and they certainly did remove forests bit by bit, and generated general hell, but not by exploding in the treetops making them more lethal.
Then again I may just have a selective memory. [:D]
No, I've noticed this too. Hard to say why though. I have seen plenty of documentation in American sources including the excellent green books and in theory it sounds perfectly logical.
Also, remember that I am talking about men caught without proper defensive positions. The Finns fought mostly defensive actions from prepared positions. Maybe that was the difference? I'm not sure.
Cheers
Paul
Someone take my wife, please?
-
JJKettunen
- Posts: 2293
- Joined: Tue Mar 12, 2002 6:00 pm
- Location: Finland
RE: "Running" from artillery
ORIGINAL: cabron66
Also, remember that I am talking about men caught without proper defensive positions. The Finns fought mostly defensive actions from prepared positions.
Not true for the offensive period of 1941 nor the withdrawal period of 1944 when the fighting was heaviest...and only partially true for the Winter War.
RE: "Running" from artillery
ORIGINAL: Keke
Not true for the offensive period of 1941 nor the withdrawal period of 1944 when the fighting was heaviest...and only partially true for the Winter War.
Oh, I'm sorry. My mistake. I thought you were only referring to the Winter War.
I'm at a loss then.
Cheers
Paul
Someone take my wife, please?
RE: "Running" from artillery
After much thought and discussion this is what I have come up with. First, there are a few conditions.
A. Dug-in troops are almost invariably better off staying put and riding out the barrage. If the barrage is big enough to dislodge entrenched infantry it is probably too big to run from. The only exception to this that I have found is the German system of preparing backup positions allowing them to escape the worst of artillery falling in a predictable pattern.
B. Troops assaulting are going to continue to assault unless obligated to stop. Reversing direction is a last resort which can lead to as much trouble as it is trying to avoid.
C. Troops not in close proximity to the enemy are far more likely to try to evade a barrage.
These are the steps that apply to troops not dug in.
1. Troops caught on the move must decide how to deal with every situation as it presents itself. The problem is that you never know what you are facing because arty can come in a hundred shapes and sizes. There is no way to know what direction to run or even if running is necessary until the barrage has started. This fact alone necessitates hitting the ground as an initial response. You get down and, if it is available, get to the best cover you can find.
Incidentally, experienced soldiers hit the ground faster than green soldiers. Inexperienced troops can make the mistake of running to cover or freezing. Lying down reduces the danger by a factor of around ten. The best way to go is to hug the earth and then worry about getting to better cover.
2. The next step is determined by the experience and leadership of the troops and the intensity/accuracy/density of the barrage. Simply, you decide whether or not to bug out, stay put or continue the advance.
Generally speaking, experience can make all the difference. A barrage that seems deadly to a green soldier may not even be taken seriously by a vet. Experience (and morale to a certain degree) will not only determine what decision is reached, but how long it takes to make that decision and how long it takes to get the appropriate orders out.
3. Ultimately the barrage itself is the chief factor. No matter what, the fire has to be violent enough to produce a strong or irrational reaction from the men it is aimed at. The more violent the barrage the more extreme the reaction to it and vice versa. Experience will act as a buffer, but at some point sufficiently dense fire will force any troops to react to save themselves.
Of course, the violence of the barrage is determined by a number of factors including shell calibre, density, duration and accuracy.
4. Reactions may vary, but the single factor governing them all is the degree to which those reactions are controlled and organized. Generally speaking, the more irrational the reaction the more unlikely it is that the unit will recover on its own.
A unit which recognizes the need to bug out and does so in good order will be able to quickly reorganize and get back into the battle. A unit which breaks and routs from the field will probably not return to fighting shape for a long while (if ever).
Similarily, a unit which is overwhelmed by enemy fire, may suffer from battlefield paralysis and simply refuse to move. Generally, the longer a unit remains paralyzed the harder it will be to get it moving again (even after the barrage has ended).
5. Casualties can cause an irrational reaction, but they are more frequently the result of one.
6. Artillery does not need to inflict casualties to be effective. Fatigue and loss of organization can remove a unit from the battle just as easily.
7. Getting up and running is always preferable to staying down and dying.
In game terms, artillery should probably pin its targets for at least a few minutes (which may not even be noticeable in HttR), but after that, retreat should be a fairly common response (not SOP but not uncommon either). However, retreat should, at the very least, cause the unit to lose significant organization (temporarily or permanently), gain fatigue and lose morale. Casualties will not necessarily become serious until a situation deteriorates into panic.
Assaulting troops should be more likely to stay put and ride out a barrage or continue the advance (however slowly), but never be above simply throwing in the towel and hightailing it to the rear. At the end of the day it is preferable to try again, to having men scattered all over the battlefield. If a unit becomes pinned and begins to take casualties, it will most likely retreat.
Units which have managed even light entrenchment should be far more likely to stay put. It should be a rarity to force a unit out of its holes with artillery alone.
In my opinion.[:)]
Cheers
Paul
A. Dug-in troops are almost invariably better off staying put and riding out the barrage. If the barrage is big enough to dislodge entrenched infantry it is probably too big to run from. The only exception to this that I have found is the German system of preparing backup positions allowing them to escape the worst of artillery falling in a predictable pattern.
B. Troops assaulting are going to continue to assault unless obligated to stop. Reversing direction is a last resort which can lead to as much trouble as it is trying to avoid.
C. Troops not in close proximity to the enemy are far more likely to try to evade a barrage.
These are the steps that apply to troops not dug in.
1. Troops caught on the move must decide how to deal with every situation as it presents itself. The problem is that you never know what you are facing because arty can come in a hundred shapes and sizes. There is no way to know what direction to run or even if running is necessary until the barrage has started. This fact alone necessitates hitting the ground as an initial response. You get down and, if it is available, get to the best cover you can find.
Incidentally, experienced soldiers hit the ground faster than green soldiers. Inexperienced troops can make the mistake of running to cover or freezing. Lying down reduces the danger by a factor of around ten. The best way to go is to hug the earth and then worry about getting to better cover.
2. The next step is determined by the experience and leadership of the troops and the intensity/accuracy/density of the barrage. Simply, you decide whether or not to bug out, stay put or continue the advance.
Generally speaking, experience can make all the difference. A barrage that seems deadly to a green soldier may not even be taken seriously by a vet. Experience (and morale to a certain degree) will not only determine what decision is reached, but how long it takes to make that decision and how long it takes to get the appropriate orders out.
3. Ultimately the barrage itself is the chief factor. No matter what, the fire has to be violent enough to produce a strong or irrational reaction from the men it is aimed at. The more violent the barrage the more extreme the reaction to it and vice versa. Experience will act as a buffer, but at some point sufficiently dense fire will force any troops to react to save themselves.
Of course, the violence of the barrage is determined by a number of factors including shell calibre, density, duration and accuracy.
4. Reactions may vary, but the single factor governing them all is the degree to which those reactions are controlled and organized. Generally speaking, the more irrational the reaction the more unlikely it is that the unit will recover on its own.
A unit which recognizes the need to bug out and does so in good order will be able to quickly reorganize and get back into the battle. A unit which breaks and routs from the field will probably not return to fighting shape for a long while (if ever).
Similarily, a unit which is overwhelmed by enemy fire, may suffer from battlefield paralysis and simply refuse to move. Generally, the longer a unit remains paralyzed the harder it will be to get it moving again (even after the barrage has ended).
5. Casualties can cause an irrational reaction, but they are more frequently the result of one.
6. Artillery does not need to inflict casualties to be effective. Fatigue and loss of organization can remove a unit from the battle just as easily.
7. Getting up and running is always preferable to staying down and dying.
In game terms, artillery should probably pin its targets for at least a few minutes (which may not even be noticeable in HttR), but after that, retreat should be a fairly common response (not SOP but not uncommon either). However, retreat should, at the very least, cause the unit to lose significant organization (temporarily or permanently), gain fatigue and lose morale. Casualties will not necessarily become serious until a situation deteriorates into panic.
Assaulting troops should be more likely to stay put and ride out a barrage or continue the advance (however slowly), but never be above simply throwing in the towel and hightailing it to the rear. At the end of the day it is preferable to try again, to having men scattered all over the battlefield. If a unit becomes pinned and begins to take casualties, it will most likely retreat.
Units which have managed even light entrenchment should be far more likely to stay put. It should be a rarity to force a unit out of its holes with artillery alone.
In my opinion.[:)]
Cheers
Paul
Someone take my wife, please?
RE: "Running" from artillery
Protection from indirect fire (taken from 2001 Finnish Army manual and freely translated):
"When advancing fastest way is to dive for cover"
then stuff about how to hold rifle and such
"If needed, be prepeard to move for better cover. Follow the squadleader's example and signals"
And in defense simply put:"Take cover in your foxhole."
This was extensively trained, at least in infranty.
When I dug up my other manuals (those which date WWII):
Squadleaders manual(finnish) from 1940 statets that(again freely translated):"Advancing in enemy's artillery fire:
Area facing strong artillery fire must be advanced as fast as possible. Enemy artillery's breaks must be used. When shells explode in near vicinity squad must take cover and immediately after that continue advance."
Aproximate the same sentence was found in Infrantry manual II2(also finnish), year 1932. Basic idea is to keep the attack going on and take cover when receiving direct hits.
I think this shows how we cannot compare what is done now and what was done then. And excuse any typos and mistakes.
"When advancing fastest way is to dive for cover"
then stuff about how to hold rifle and such
"If needed, be prepeard to move for better cover. Follow the squadleader's example and signals"
And in defense simply put:"Take cover in your foxhole."
This was extensively trained, at least in infranty.
When I dug up my other manuals (those which date WWII):
Squadleaders manual(finnish) from 1940 statets that(again freely translated):"Advancing in enemy's artillery fire:
Area facing strong artillery fire must be advanced as fast as possible. Enemy artillery's breaks must be used. When shells explode in near vicinity squad must take cover and immediately after that continue advance."
Aproximate the same sentence was found in Infrantry manual II2(also finnish), year 1932. Basic idea is to keep the attack going on and take cover when receiving direct hits.
I think this shows how we cannot compare what is done now and what was done then. And excuse any typos and mistakes.
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Lagen
Lagen