logistic analysis

[Yamato hugger]

India had an army of 1 million. It was the 4th largest army in the world at the time. I am guessing that when he said "160 bns" (which would be nearly 20 divisions) he was actually refering to Indian army units which had British leaders. And yes, there is no way the Brits sent 40 brigades to India.

[el cid again]

India had an army of 1 million. It was the 4th largest army in the world at the time. I am guessing that when he said "160 bns" (which would be nearly 20 divisions) he was actually refering to Indian army units which had British leaders. And yes, there is no way the Brits sent 40 brigades to India.

Actually, probably they did. This is NOT how history is usually taught in the west, but see The Atlas of Revolutions, and especially Total War by Calvocoressi et al (there being three or four authors, depending on the edition). They were not necessairily in the form of brigades, and for occupation duty independent battalions might be better form. In the British system, you get a "regiment" which may have several different battalions, in several different places. Also, it is not clear to me these must mean white British units. The Ghurkhas certainly were trusted, and there were many others in a less elite category but still regarded as reliable troops. The point is that a major amount of war potential was tied down to keep India from declaring independence and going neutral, trading with Japan. India is just now starting to deal with this issue - Bose was made a national hero just in the last administrion - and a few books with material on the two different Indian National Armies have come out in the last few years. [Did you know that Bose actually administered part of Indian territory during WWII? Japan transferred the Andaman islands to Insian nationalist rule. But we don't usually talk about that - or the Burmese regiment that defected to Japan.]

[Captain Cruft]

el cid I strongly suggest you download the CHS scenario and Andrew Brown's map. All the problems you are mentioning have been known about for ages. Using the newer modded stuff will act as a much better starting point for your analysis. Not perfect, but much better ...

BTW all these discussions would better be placed in the Scenario Design/Editor forum. Support is just supposed to be for bugs.

[Yamato hugger]

ORIGINAL: el cid again
Actually, probably they did.

Name the units please and the source you used. Thanks.

[Andrew Brown]

ORIGINAL: Captain Cruft

el cid I strongly suggest you download the CHS scenario and Andrew Brown's map. All the problems you are mentioning have been known about for ages. Using the newer modded stuff will act as a much better starting point for your analysis. Not perfect, but much better ...

As you say there is still a lot of stuff that could be improved, both on my map and in CHS, as well as my own scenario conversions. Especially for the Japanese side. I would be very interested to see any good information on CD units in Japan, for example.

[el cid again]

I guess you didnt read the part where I said: " Now seems to me your REAL complaint is that they didnt break these 2 type of supplies into 2 or possibly more groups." It was the very next line after the one you quoted. A little UNDER 50% of the Jap supplies in the game come from the supplies generated at resource centers. I read somewhere once that the amount of supplies for a US soldier in WWII was something like 26 tons of supplies per month IIRC. Jap supply/troop wasnt near this high (about 6 tons/month?), and I would estimate that number is so low because nearly 1/2 of the Jap supplies were indeed food and/or "local commodities" which would be adequately represented by the current game system.

In WWII, the German amry, somwhat of a cross between largely motorized Western armies and the generally unmotorized Soviet army, required an average of 28 pounds per day per man. [That would be 840 pounds per man per month, or less than half a ton. Something is wrong with your data.] Some 40% was ammunition, 38% was fuel, and the remainder rations and spares. That is to say, the amount which could be supplied by a local colonial economy was less than one fifth of the requirement, probably on the order of one tenth.

[el cid again]

n l

Go back and read the forum. Hardly a week goes by that someone doesnt make a comment about some aspect of the supply system. It isnt perfect. We all know and understand that. The question isnt "does this part of the game work right". If you are going to pick 1 aspect of the game and put it under a microscope, then of course it doesnt work right. The question is "does the game work as a whole". And by and large, yes it does.

Logistics are the heart of military operations in general. They also are the heart of the grand strategy of Japan, which was to establish an autarky. It was probably possible to do that, but they didn't come close. By not addressing logistics realistically, it becomes impossible to engage in any meaningful operational strategy.

Actually, the Uncommon Valor system on which WITP is based has a remarkable system. It may be the best air combat model of all time. It is also very unusual for an air-naval system insofar as it gives land units - even small ones - a vital role - one it is fatal to ignore. This is a rather fine vehicle for teaching integrated military and strategic concepts. I fail utterly to see the point of trying to get right the very names of unit commanders and fighter pilots, and track every last .30 cal hit, theater wide, and then ignore something vital like logistics. Until I give the designers a fair chance to correct it, I refuse to assume they will not. If they won't, I will, or I will join others who will. It is silly to play the game with such false elements as a bad map - when it is such a fine concept. Just fix the incorrect elements.

As for "there wasn't a rice paddy in that hex" - if you don't worry about that you cannot see WHY Yamashita was a genius and MacArthur a fool. The present map of Luzon does not make apparent what is obvious if you but go look around. Defending Bataan was insane, and defending Baguio something that could have lasted many years. Just because of things like where the rice paddys were, and where the malaria and dengue fever were not. To which add mountains to make defense very feasible. And the map of Japan gives the impression Mt Fuji is a flat plain, when it is the highest in the country. You would never guess where the highest mountains are (measured from base to peak) from this map - they are on Formosa - right where that fine road system is if you believe the map.

[el cid again]

Industry centers in the game not only make supplies, but HI points as well. The proposal you submit would "break" this aspect of the game. Industry centers in the game require oil. Not all manufacturing plants do. The plan as you submit would require an increace in oil production to offset these "non-historical" oil costs that you would add to the Jap player.

First of all, virtually all manufacturing plants do require oil. The most critical kind of oil is lubricants, and they are the thing you get least of when you refine oil. You must refine a lot of oil to get a little lubricant, but without it, you have virtually no industrial activity at all. Second, I didn't require an increase in oil production. I just want to turn off supply point production at resource centers. I understand about HI points and left them alone as well.

The ORIGINAL War In The Pacific (the SPI mechanical one) at least differentiated between "Northern" and "Southern" resource points. In this version, it is hard to see why Japan had to "strike south" at all? Why not just go into China, Manchuria, Korea and even Russia and live off the resource points from them? Liddle Hart lists 26 critical resources for war, and one of these is concentrated (well over 90%) on New Caledonia - yet it is not a resource center at all. I am not sure why you play games - but if you don't want resources where they were representing something close to what they meant - play an abstract game with an abstract map. No point pretending it is New Caledonia if it has nothing to produce. Not very much point taking it either - not unless the position is worth something to you. The largest copper mine in Asia is on Luzon - in a hex with no recource points at all. Oops - there is that rice paddy again.

[tsimmonds]

The ORIGINAL War In The Pacific (the SPI mechanical one) at least differentiated between "Northern" and "Southern" resource points. In this version, it is hard to see why Japan had to "strike south" at all? Why not just go into China, Manchuria, Korea and even Russia and live off the resource points from them?

Because if you do that you will all but run out of oil in about 6 months. Once that happens your production of HI will slow to a trickle, which means practically no more aircraft engines or airframes (no more airplanes), practically no more armaments or vehicle points (no more LCUs or replacements), practically no more naval or merchant shipbuilding points (no more warships or merchies). For IJ with no oil coming in from the SRA, the game would quickly slow to a crawl. Mercifully, it would not last nearly as long as it might otherwise.

Think of Oil and Resources as Southern and Northern resource points.

[Yamato hugger]

ORIGINAL: el cid again
In WWII, the German amry, somwhat of a cross between largely motorized Western armies and the generally unmotorized Soviet army, required an average of 28 pounds per day per man. [That would be 840 pounds per man per month, or less than half a ton. Something is wrong with your data.]

Not a thing wrong with my data. Just depends on how you analize the data. The 26 tons/man per month figured in all support. Artillery support, aircraft bombs to support him, ect. In other words, all aspect of supplies. Which is what you are trying to figure, no? All supplies going to an area, right? Makes your data on how much supplies a man carried seem kind of worthless, doesnt it?

As for "there wasn't a rice paddy in that hex" - if you don't worry about that you cannot see WHY Yamashita was a genius and MacArthur a fool. The present map of Luzon does not make apparent what is obvious if you but go look around. Defending Bataan was insane, and defending Baguio something that could have lasted many years. Just because of things like where the rice paddys were, and where the malaria and dengue fever were not. To which add mountains to make defense very feasible.

Well, Im certainly not going to defend Dugout Doug, but as to the logic of Defending Bataan: It is by far the most logical place to defend. If you assume 2 things: 1) You arent going to fight to the death. American thinking is to have everyone in the army walk away alive. 2) You will have reinforcements comming within a reasonably short period of time. All the supplies were stored here and fortifications dug here based on that. Yamashita defending the area had no forts at all, knew he had no prayer of getting reinforcements, and could also assume he was fighting to the last man. And all his delay tactics and running off into the mountains didnt slow the allied offensive, so to what end was he a "genius"? At least defending Bataan denied Manila to them for a few months. At least Doug did a better job than the boys in Singapore did. Japs capture the cities water supply, threated to poison it and the troops surrender rather than have hundreds of thousands of civil dead. Oh, there is Yamashita again, no?

Defending Bataan denied the use of Manila harbor, and threated Clark field until reinforcements could arrive in a few months. Defending Baguio doesnt threaten a thing except Lingayen. And what good is that when Manila is in enemy hands?

As for the present map. I have said time and time again it is a game. It is not history. And again I will say it: I defy you to find 1 thing about this game that does represent history. Guess you missed that point, eh?

BTW. Yamashita was executed as a war criminal in Feb 46. Real genius.

First of all, virtually all manufacturing plants do require oil. The most critical kind of oil is lubricants, and they are the thing you get least of when you refine oil. You must refine a lot of oil to get a little lubricant, but without it, you have virtually no industrial activity at all. Second, I didn't require an increase in oil production. I just want to turn off supply point production at resource centers. I understand about HI points and left them alone as well.

I already said it once:

Design your own game, produce it, and see how easy it is to impliment all you recommend.

You want to track every single aspect of supply? Plot out all the coal mines, going to need coal. Then tin. Going to need that. Iron ore next. Make sure you have enough iron for your ships, and tanks, and rifles. How much iron ore does it take to smelt it down to 1 tonne of steel plate for a Yamato class BB? How much steel is used making repairs to ships? Better include that stuff also, or someone will nit-pick you apart on that as well. Various chemicals next. Got to have gunpowder. Paper mills next. Dont forget have to have paper. Silk? Have to have that. Rubber of course, have to have that shipped where it can be used for tires.

Now was that 714 million tonnes of rice used for military use only, or did they feed some civilians with it too? I know, lets include every person in the world. Makes the supply thing easier, and makes it better for tracking kills when you firebomb a city. Did that person just NE of Saigon have a ho-ho or a ding-dong with dinner? Have to keep the supplies right. God knows what would happen if 1 thing was out of order. Where does it stop?

You have to draw a line and say "this is it". Doesnt really matter what you do, it will never be enough for some people until it gets to the point where it is too much. The current system is too much for some people.

WitP is a game. Games are ment to be fun - Yamato hugger

Sure is easy to sit in the cheap seats and whine, isnt it?

Oh, where is your info on these 160 battalions the Brits sent to India? Havent seen that yet either.

[Mike Solli]

I'm a proponent of the logistics aspect of this game. I'm also a military logistician in real life. I love dealing with all of the issues the Japanese have in this game. I also realize that this enough to make the point the designers are trying to make. Has anyone here ever tried to play SPIs Campaign for North Africa? I have, several times. That game has four brands of supply: ammo, fuel, water and stores. Ever try to get everything you need in the right place at the right time in the right quantities? It's practically impossible. It'll drive you nuts. You should have seen the spreadsheets I created (before I owned a computer) to track that stuff. I agree with the designers. Supply should include all of the food, ammo, paper, etc. needed. It's difficult enough in this game the way it is. All of us crazies who enjoy this stuff can create all of the spreadsheets or other tracking mechanisms we could ever dream of to keep us happy.

[el cid again]

Not a thing wrong with my data. Just depends on how you analize the data. The 26 tons/man per month figured in all support. Artillery support, aircraft bombs to support him, ect. In other words, all aspect of supplies. Which is what you are trying to figure, no? All supplies going to an area, right? Makes your data on how much supplies a man carried seem kind of worthless, doesnt it?

Not right. We need to know how many supplies it takes PER UNIT. When we add land units, air units, naval units and support units up, we do get all the supplies in an area, but we don't do it on the average per man. We do it on the average per unit type. Thus, an airman in an air unit needs a lot more supplies than a ground soldier. And sailors are in between. More than that, your data is flawed at its root: not even air units consumed anything like your "tons per day" figure. There is quite simply something wrong with it. In fact, even today, in the much more supply happy US forces, we still don't consume anything like that many supplies. Wrong is wrong. For a basic set of numbers from both eras, see J.F. Dunnigan's How to Make War. For a more formal review of the history of supply, see Supplying War.

There is a saying: "amateurs talk tactics - professionals talk logistics" - logistics is the primary determinant of what is operationally possible. Many games have units doing all sorts of things that are operational nonsense - because the supply requirements are abstracted out. But even though logistic constraints are severe, they are not as severe as your data would indicate. Not even in the desert (where they are worse because you must move water in quantity).

[el cid again]

as to the logic of Defending Bataan: It is by far the most logical place to defend. If you assume 2 things: 1) You arent going to fight to the death. American thinking is to have everyone in the army walk away alive

Boy are you confused. Defending Bataan is a death sentence. 100% of the troops on Bataan got both dengue fever and malaria - and that dibilitated them and shortened their lives directly. Defending Bataan when there were not anything like enough food stocks also was a way to insure starvation over any significant time. Compare that with defending Baguio. Not only do you have a series of mountain ridges to fall back on, you have no malaria, no dengue fever, and food PRODUCING areas to generate food even if you don't have any at all.

The strategic consideration SHOULD be "close Manila Bay to enemy shipping and have as much of the army survive until relieved as possible." Stocking food at Fort Drum ALONE closes the bay. [When Gen Waynewright surrendered, the officers at Ft Drum considered NOT honoring the order - in spite of the awful conditions that implied for the prisoners - Waynewright ordered ALL units to surrender because of Japanese threats. They surrendered anyway because they had no food. EVERY system at Ft Drum was functional.] And Yamashita showed an army could survive in the North. It was easier to get him written orders from Hirohito than to beat him in the field - something he correctly felt was required because Japanese law forbade surrender. There is nothing whatever to commend putting a hundred thousand men on Bataan when you knew relief would not be coming in a few weeks.

[el cid again]

2) You will have reinforcements comming within a reasonably short period of time. All the supplies were stored here and fortifications dug here based on that.

More bad data. See The Philippine Army. Mac himself cancelled the War Plan Orange practice of storing supplies at Bataan. For years NONE were moved there. What was left was inadequate, and also old, stores, which had been put there BEFORE Mac cancelled the practice. Further, the "fortifications" do not defend Bataan - they defended Manila Bay (and in one case Subic Bay). The ONLY fortifications were coast defenses - and obsolete coast defenses of little value in the age of air strikes. Fort Drum excepted, the fortifications were not protected from land type high angle artillery or from bombs - and they were all badly hurt by both. Fort Drum "the concrete battleship" was also obsolete, but not ineffective, and in fact it worked, and was sufficient by itself to keep shipping from being able to usefully use the Port of Manila or the yard at Cavite. So - stock the fort with food - and defend either Manila or Baguio - or both - depending on your understanding of politics and logistical situations.

[el cid again]

At least defending Bataan denied Manila to them for a few months. At least Doug did a better job than the boys in Singapore did. Japs capture the cities water supply, threated to poison it and the troops surrender rather than have hundreds of thousands of civil dead. Oh, there is Yamashita again, no?

Singapore suffered from too little defense - even the heavy guns were not turretted (although they look like turrets, one has 50 mm of armor and the rest have none) - there were no defenses along the north side of the island against landings - the guns had no HE - just AP shells not useful against troops. Singapore also had a fool in charge - he is probably correctly rated at 10% and 20% effectiveness in critical skill areas by WITP. And, no, Yamashita did not threaten to poison the water supply. His chief of operations wrote a book about the op - it was published with an introduction by the Australian chief of staff - called Japan's Greatest Victory- Britain's Greatest Defeat. At the moment the Brits surrendered, the Japanese were in deep logistical trouble - and within about a day of suspending operations altogether! Yamashita went in with only three divisions although five were assigned - on the basis he could not supply more than three - a rare case of Japanese logistic finesse on more than a small scale. Yamashita was probably Japan's only great captain, and it is good for us he was sidelined after Malaya - until late in the war when he was sent to the Philippines - then not permitted to defend properly by orders to fight at Leyte - squandering his strength.

[el cid again]

I have said time and time again it is a game. It is not history. And again I will say it: I defy you to find 1 thing about this game that does represent history.

Say it until it becomes your mantra - it does not make you correct. It is designed to be, advertised as, and played as a historical simulation. This is not Risk. If you want an abstract system unrelated to history, then play Risk or even chess. Don't try to tell me it is a map of the Pacific and you can't get the Alaska Railroad right. [A road to Nome? There is STILL no road to Nome.] This game is a real chance to use automation to examine a major proposition - might Japan have been able to establish an autarky? - and it could be used (as I intend one day to use it) to train people in strategic fundamentals. But you can't do that with a false map or grossly exaggerated logistics.

Just because you don't think the game designers or players are right - and just because you don't care if there is any history that is right - does not make it true. This game would not sell if it was "War in the Pantry" and it would never have the following it does either. All that magnificent work on names, art, locations, etc implies a real dedication to history. It is technical insanity to deny what is true, by the way.

[el cid again]

BTW. Yamashita was executed as a war criminal in Feb 46. Real genius.

What a shallow exposure to history you have. On the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the end of the war, I was in Manila. The Manila Times carried as its lead (and second) stories material exhonerating Yamashita - nominally executed for war crimes in the Philippines. No less a legal authority than the US Supreme Court ruled in the matter - at the request of his laywers - at the time. While the court found it had no jurisdiction over a Commander In Chief in the Field in wartime - and that should have been the end of that - it felt morally obliged to set the historical record strait - so it ruled on the merits of the case, point by point, even though it could not (because it had no jurisdiction) affect the outcome. You have to think the Filipinos are wrong AND the highest US legal authorities are wrong - not to mention every single historian I ever read on the subject - to think Yamashita was justly convicted. The case could not have been done in Tokyo - Mac wrote special rules for the trial - rules permitting hearsay testimony from a man known to have lied during the war - and it is probably the very worst case in US military history in terms of objective justice. Not even Donitz (who got Adm Nimitz to testify in his defense) is as clear a case of an error at a war crime's tribunal. Reasoning by assumption is dangerous. Yamashita was, in fact, the Japanese Rommel. He is the ONLY Japanese general who is still remembered by the Chinese for his humane behaviors in the field (from the days he led a division up the Yellow River). He assembeled the entire Imperial Guards Division to dress down its commander for permitting five soldiers to loot in Singapore - and then broke the division into parts (to dilute it with men not tainted by its history - which is why there is more than one Imperial Guards division post Singapore). No one told him he had to act at all (well - his chief of staff actually did tell him - but he didn't have to listen). It was not normal for a Japanese commander to behave that way. We do ourselves no credit not to honor the good as well as to condemn the bad. We should be ashamed of Cdr Morton (instead of giving him the Navy Cross), and in particular of executing a Japanese sub skipper for doing exactly what Morton did, only on a smaller scale. Justice is not justice unless we are honest and fair about it.

[el cid again]

Oh, where is your info on these 160 battalions the Brits sent to India? Havent seen that yet either.

I get it now - you don't really read. I posted it twice. I am disinclined to post it again. At least I didn't assume it - like that "he was executed as a war criminal so he must have been guilty" assumption you made. You probably were unlucky there - it is probably the worst case of all time for your assumption - usually it would not be quite so clearly wrong. But nevertheless, it is better to avoid assumptions when the facts are not hard to find. The Brits are not really hiding their misconduct in India much any more - it is in a good deal of drama and literature. But you must read at least European (better still Indian) authors if you wish to understand it re India. I am not going to argue about this any more: WITP is a fine system and it diserves to have its errors fixed so the great amount of work done on it can be used with some meaning. If you love it as written, just don't ever install any upgrades, and you can be happy forever.

[Kereguelen]

el cid again
Yamashita was, in fact, the Japanese Rommel. He is the ONLY Japanese general who is still remembered by the Chinese for his humane behaviors in the field (from the days he led a division up the Yellow River).

The trial of Yamashita certainly wasn't a fair trial. He was mainly tried because of the destruction of Manila by forces of the IJN who disobeyed his orders to withdraw to the mountains. But he was the commander in charge, thus be bears some responsibility for that what happened, even if it was not ordered by him and this was known to the court. Other generals of WW2 were somewhat luckier in that regard. By applying the same measure, most higher ranking German generals would have been candidates for death penalty too.

He assembeled the entire Imperial Guards Division to dress down its commander for permitting five soldiers to loot in Singapore - and then broke the division into parts (to dilute it with men not tainted by its history - which is why there is more than one Imperial Guards division post Singapore). No one told him he had to act at all (well - his chief of staff actually did tell him - but he didn't have to listen).

1st Imperial Guards Division was formed in 1943 from the Guards Brigade that had been left behind at Tokyo. There's no relationship (in this regard) to the (2nd) Imperial Guards Division in Malaya. The Guards Brigade at Tokyo had been left behind when the rest of the Imperial Guards Division left for China in first place. 3rd Imperial Guards Division was raised later with newly formed regiments.

Justice is not justice unless we are honest and fair about it.

True enough! There's a big difference between the Nuremburg Trials against the German leadership and the trials against Japanese leaders in this regard.

[Yamato hugger]

ORIGINAL: el cid again

Not right. We need to know how many supplies it takes PER UNIT.

What is this "per unit" thing? Where do you dream this up? Yes a B-29 group is going to consume more supplies than an infantry squad. So what? Doesnt diminish the amount of supplies that have to come to support them as a whole. So this means we have to take into effect all the food to feed the troops. All the bullets they shoot. The artillery shells and naval gun ammo they used. The daily amount of bombs dropped, not just in this battle here, but everywhere. How many tonnes of av gas does 1 plane use on 1 sortie average? How many sorties per day? How many depth charges used in a day? And not only in combat. You have to train units in this game also.

If you think it only took 800 and some POUNDS of supply per month per man average to fight in a total war situation you are nuts. Food and water use alone comes to somewhere around 200 pounds per man per month! Gas is 6 pounds per gallon. How many gallons per month does any given unit use? My unit on active duty had a fuel allocation. A monthly total of how much fuel and oil we were allotted. Our "fuel ration" averaged out to 750 POUNDS per man in the unit alone! This was for a medical company, not a tank unit or air unit. A rear area medical unit.

Edit: This allocation was an average of our monthly use. And this is peacetime. Wartime, our allocation would have been double.

You are only right about 1 thing. We dont use as much supply now as they did then. We dont have nearly the numbers under arms as they did then either. We dont have the sorties per day they did then. We dont have the numbers of ships they had then. But then, we arent exactly in a total war situation either.

Edit 2: As for Bataan, you need to learn a few things about defense. It does no good to defend something the enemy doesnt need. What is the purpose of taking the PI? Manila harbor, and Clark field. Doesnt matter where you defend really if you dont deny these to the enemy you may as well not even be there. A lot more casulties were caused (on both side) by disease than bullets and shells. That happened in the fields of France as well as the malaria ridden areas of the Pacific. If you dont think any of Yamashitas men died of disease in the mountains, you are nuts.

As for "Japans Rommel". He seemed to have a lot of people that dis-obeyed his orders doesnt he? Cant think of a time that Rommel was disobeyed to the point where he would have had to defend his actions to a war crime trial board.