CHS - Did allies get screwed in the air ?

[Yamato hugger]

Fuel for certain is never an issue with anyone.

Supply on the other hand is a different issue. Most Jap players experience a severe supply shotage in Apr-Jun 42. Probably because they are expanding all their bases at once.

Historically the Japs didnt start suffering from Supply issues until sometime in 43. Before one runs off and cuts supply at the faucet, maybe there is another cause. Jap merchant losses were up, but not that much to cause a severe drop in supplies. Could it be because Japan changed its emphisis from moving goods/material to moving troops?

[ChezDaJez]

Fuel for certain is never an issue with anyone.

Yamato Hugger:

That's not quite true. If the Japanese player does not capture the SRA intact, he will suffer a fuel shortage by the end of 42. As I posted in an earlier thread concerning oil production, I have enough fuel left for about 6 months. More importantly, I will be out of oil within 3 months and then not only will fuel supplies drop quickly but my HI will also dry up. I'm trying to repair Palembang now but the going is slow.

Chez

[ADavidB]

Okay, here is a link to a series of pages that attempt to piece together the data on Japanese aircraft production in WW II. Dig around in the links at the bottom and you will even find monthly production rates. I have no idea how good this is, but it seems reasonable to me.

http://users.belgacom.net/aircrstat/sta ... tml#230066

Dave Baranyi

[worr]

Arsenal of Democracy

Roosevelt called for 50,000 planes per year and the men to fly them. This was in January of 1940 already.

Roosevelt was way ahead of his time...and production grew right to this goal as stated.

http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/Dip/PaW/PaW-11.html

You really do not see a deviation from this plan throughout the war...and the numbers compared to Germany and Japan are staggering. They no capabilites let alone the vision of Roosevelt to plan on such production on an annual basis.

[Andrew Brown]

ORIGINAL: Andy Mac

OK I did a little simplistic analysis of CHS versus stock I dont think I missed anything but I may have.

Thanks, Andy. This is the kind of analysis we need. Of course it is only part of the picture. As others (and I) have already stated the questions are:

[ol]
[*]How does Allied production in CHS compare to stock? (You have partly answered that)
[*]How do both of these compare to Real Life? (rtrapasso is doing some work on P38s along these lines which will be very helpful).
[*]How does Japanese aircraft production compare to Real Life?
[/ol]

What will probably get modified in CHS, if anything, depends on the answers to these difficult (and time consuming) questions. I wish I had time to look at these questions myself but I do not.

Then there is the resources/oil/production questions - a whole new kettle of fish - but an area I have always been interested in and I want to keep looking at. I am still updating the CHS scenario, and the net area I will be looking at is resources and supply, specifically in China.

Any help from anyone for these questions is greatly appreciated, at least by me.

Andrew

[jwilkerson]

Note - read and heed what Andrew is saying. To a large extent, CHS is a group effort. A volunteer group effort. Hence the word C=Combined ... a number of people have combined their efforts to reduce the number of primary mods ( currently there are 4 threads of mods that seem to be played by multiple player groups .. in no particular order ... CHS ... Andrew's Stock mods for his map ... Prys and Niks ) but there might have been 2 or more additional ones, if not for CHS ( Lemurs! and Don's anyway ).

But many(12+?) people have subsequently contributed. So ... that is what is needed if we are to see this move forward. Who wants to review air replacements for both Allies and Japanese ? Lemurs! and Don did do this for 1.6 CHS .. resulting in reductions for the Allies in accordance with the data that reviewed at that time ( which is what started up this thread in the first place). The same level of review has not happened on the Japanese side yet - frankly because no one has been inclined to take that on. But if someone wants to volunteer, let Andrew know.

Another way of looking at CHS, is that it is an open source mod ... pretty much anyone on the forum can contribute .. but there should always be a gate keeper, a release manager .. whatever term you prefer ... open source usually has this ... and I think that is Andrew right now ( was Don for a while before that ). But there is no team of people working in the background ... covering all the bases ... continually at work ... like little elves ... cranking out new stuff ... there are people working independently for the most part ... like on art and OB things ... and they "donate" their efforts to CHS to reduce the total number of overall mods ... and give us a "combined" offering ... and their efforts come together in a "release" which does get some review by other team members, prior to it going public ... but there are no 100s of hours of play testing for example.

[JeffroK]

I am playing CHS1.06 (1.6?) on Andrews Basic map.

Against the AI, up to late November 1942, I FEEL the Allied Fighters are low on numbers.

It has been a struggle to keep the AVG in P40E's, I've even sent some West Coast FG's back the P-36 & P40B's

However there are plenty of Bombers around, 4 Bomber Groups each on Eniwetock & PM dont seem to have numbers problems.(B24's)

Would a solution to the total lack of variabilty to Allied Production be an ability to increase Production of a type(by percentage increments?) with a hefty Victory point penalty. We cannot say what the US reaction to the loss of the Hawaiian Islands but I'm sure a increase in priority to Pacific would be a given.

I feel the Japanese has too much ability to "tweak" production in their favour, in reality the world of manufacturing in Japan was a mess, add to this the rivalry between IJN & IJA which this game makes dissapear by having one "Supremo" running everything.

[eMonticello]

ORIGINAL: Yamato hugger

ORIGINAL: testarossa

Allies produced whatever they needed. If they would’ve needed 5000 more P-40E they would’ve produced 5000 more P-40Es. Same for B-17 and P-38.

Exactly. And thats the problem with any game really is it doesnt take this into effect. Same with CHS. If the fighting is heavier and the losses greater, the industrial machine that was the United States would have pumped out more to make up the losses. Look what happens when the Japs get too close to the US mainland. Reinforcements are speeded up 6 months and additional units deployed.

US industry wasn't in a position to pump out more stuff to make up for large losses in the Pacific, since they would have needed to shift the priority of other stuff that required the same scarce strategic resources. If there was any chance that it would have impacted the Allied policy of "Germany First" or further reduced civilian production, Roosevelt would have curtailed offensive operations in the Pacific.

[jwilkerson]

ORIGINAL: eMonticello

ORIGINAL: Yamato hugger

ORIGINAL: testarossa

Allies produced whatever they needed. If they would’ve needed 5000 more P-40E they would’ve produced 5000 more P-40Es. Same for B-17 and P-38.

Exactly. And thats the problem with any game really is it doesnt take this into effect. Same with CHS. If the fighting is heavier and the losses greater, the industrial machine that was the United States would have pumped out more to make up the losses. Look what happens when the Japs get too close to the US mainland. Reinforcements are speeded up 6 months and additional units deployed.

US industry wasn't in a position to pump out more stuff to make up for large losses in the Pacific, since they would have needed to shift the priority of other stuff that required the same scarce strategic resources. If there was any chance that it would have impacted the Allied policy of "Germany First" or further reduced civilian production, Roosevelt would have curtailed offensive operations in the Pacific.

One of King's major victories, was getting support for the Guadalcanal invasion in the first place ... but once he got it ... Roosevelt came to his rescue, when Guadalcanal got "into trouble" ... Roosevelt ordered all available weapons into the battle. Roosevelt couldn't abandon engaged son's of his voters. In theory there was a Europe first - in practice things were much more based on shorter term decisions and competing priorities.

[worr]

Yep, Guadalcanal was a political episode as much as a military one in the war. It wasn't supposed to happen.

This connects up with the fight for P-38s in theather. Hap Arnold argued that if all we are doing in the PTO is a holding action, than the 38 is too much for point defense....it's range is for offensive operations. Therefore any 38s going to the Pactific had political overtones to them as well. But the best defense is an offense was the counter arguement.

Worr, out

[eMonticello]

ORIGINAL: Yamato hugger

ORIGINAL: spence

In WitP, the 2nd-4th rate Japanese economy is given enormous flexibility. The 1st rate US economy is given none. JUST LIKE REAL[;)]

Matter of perspective. US economy was driven by politics and lets face it, the greed of the manufacturers. Jap economy WAS controlled by the military. Seems logical to me that the Jap can control his production and the allies cant.

Congress authorized the President to manage the war economy. In January 1942, Roosevelt created, by Executive Order, the War Production Board whose role was to manage the production and procurement of materials to both meet the military objectives as determined by the Allied leadership and keep the civilian economy in reasonably good shape. Politics and Greed had little to do with the war economy in WWII ... especially after the Truman Committee was created in early 1941.

[eMonticello]

ORIGINAL: rtrapasso
Until WW2 (i.e. around 1939), most production was in the hands of small business - it was something like 75% of manufacturing. After WW2 started going, the Roosevelt admin (which was Democratic) started awarding contracts in such a way that resulted in Big Business scarfing up the contracts in such a way that reversed the situation - i.e. Big Business ended up with about 75% of manufacturing. It has slowly slipped from this number.

It is hard to see how the Roosevelt admin could have done otherwise - they just went with the big players because (a) small business could not have ramped up to do the job fast enough; and (b) it was easier to negotiate with 100 or so big companies than 10000 small ones.

Actually, Roosevelt had nothing to do with handing the military contracts to large businesses. The Army had made that decision and they were using the 1936 Industry Survey to select primary contractors (most of which were, surprise, surprise, large businesses). Donald Nelson, the Chairman of the War Production Board, attempted to expand the use of small business in the procurement contracts, but, since he handed procurement to the military instead of keeping it within his organization, it fell upon deaf ears. Big business did use small manufacturers as sub-contractors when they had too much work themselves, but as soon as contracts were being cancelled as early as 1943, they would bring the work in house and cut the small business loose. Of course, they also complained to the Army that these small businesses should not be allowed to produce goods for the civilian market until the large businesses were free to compete.

[eMonticello]

ORIGINAL: worr

Arsenal of Democracy

Roosevelt called for 50,000 planes per year and the men to fly them. This was in January of 1940 already.

Roosevelt was way ahead of his time...and production grew right to this goal as stated.

http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/Dip/PaW/PaW-11.html

You really do not see a deviation from this plan throughout the war...and the numbers compared to Germany and Japan are staggering. They no capabilites let alone the vision of Roosevelt to plan on such production on an annual basis.

To support Worr's point further, the Victory Program, which was a report that outlined the military assets needed to win the war, was completed by September 1941. The Program was used by both the WPB (War Production Board) and the military to make decisions on resource allocation and procurement of military goods. Needless to say, there was little difference between planned and actual production at the macro level. (see page 345)

http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/wwii/csppp/ch11.htm

[eMonticello]

ORIGINAL: jwilkerson
One of King's major victories, was getting support for the Guadalcanal invasion in the first place ... but once he got it ... Roosevelt came to his rescue, when Guadalcanal got "into trouble" ... Roosevelt ordered all available weapons into the battle. Roosevelt couldn't abandon engaged son's of his voters. In theory there was a Europe first - in practice things were much more based on shorter term decisions and competing priorities.

Sure, Marshall shifted forces that were headed to Australia to support Guadalcanal and Nimitz was given more freedom to shift forces from the Central Pacific to the South Pacific. There were no troops committed to Europe that were sent to support the Solomons Operation. However, there's no question that if Europe needed additional troops, then they would have gotten them ... even from the Pacific. Roosevelt, Marshall, King, and Arnold all agreed with the Atlantic-first strategy. Of course, we all know one general who disagreed...

[Bliztk]

The problem is not the allied production, is the Japanese production. I ha ve a game where my opponent (japanese) has already lost more Zeros than the entire 1941+1942 production and we are in August 42.

If we want to boost the Allied options, maybe we can pay PPs to increase aircraft production, something in the tone of 150 PPs per 1 more aircradt per month, or something similar.

[worr]

ORIGINAL: Bliztk

The problem is not the allied production, is the Japanese production. I ha ve a game where my opponent (japanese) has already lost more Zeros than the entire 1941+1942 production and we are in August 42.

Grand total of Zero-Sen aircraft was 10,938 planes produced mostly by Mitsubishi.

IJN began the war with aoubt four hundered zeros...mostly model 21s. A6M3, or Zeke 32, 560 were built by Mitsubishi
alone.

How many did he lose?

[Blackhorse]

Well, I'm doing my part to unscrew the alleged allied plane shortage in CHS . . .

albeit, very late in the war.

For the next version of CHS I've sent Andrew the OOB for the Allied land and air reinforcements coming over from Europe in 1945 after V-E day. Seventeen divisions, x21 B24 Groups (converting to B29s) and x20 B17 Groups, as well as x5 groups of A26s, x6 of P47s and x2 of P51s. The 2,000 additional heavy bombers nearly triple the Allies strategic bombing force.

OK, so it's not much help when your P40 squadrons are at skeleton-strength in early '42 . . . but it's something to look forward to. [;)]

"Ask not what CHS can do for you . . . ask what you can do for CHS."

[Dereck]

ORIGINAL: eMonticello

ORIGINAL: jwilkerson
One of King's major victories, was getting support for the Guadalcanal invasion in the first place ... but once he got it ... Roosevelt came to his rescue, when Guadalcanal got "into trouble" ... Roosevelt ordered all available weapons into the battle. Roosevelt couldn't abandon engaged son's of his voters. In theory there was a Europe first - in practice things were much more based on shorter term decisions and competing priorities.

Sure, Marshall shifted forces that were headed to Australia to support Guadalcanal and Nimitz was given more freedom to shift forces from the Central Pacific to the South Pacific. There were no troops committed to Europe that were sent to support the Solomons Operation. However, there's no question that if Europe needed additional troops, then they would have gotten them ... even from the Pacific. Roosevelt, Marshall, King, and Arnold all agreed with the Atlantic-first strategy. Of course, we all know one general who disagreed...

King agreed in theory but he did everything he could to get troops and equipment into the Pacific - and once troops were IN the Pacific theatre they tended to stay there until the war was over.

Also, it should be noted that at the end of 1942 there were only 380,000 American troops deployed to Europe while there were 460,000 American troops deployed to the Pacific.

[Bliztk]

From the pages that ADavidB provided, Zero production (A6m2 and A6m3) for 1942 is 1250.

We are in August and he has lost 1300 planes of both types.

I think that the problem is the control of production that the japanese player has.

[worr]

ORIGINAL: Bliztk

From the pages that ADavidB provided, Zero production (A6m2 and A6m3) for 1942 is 1250.

But they were being produced before that also. I don't recall how many the game starts with....as the war was going on before Dec 7th, 1941.

How in the world did you destroy so many? Ground kills?