It's not "statistically trivial" IMO. IN face to face encounters between the F4F and the A6M the F4F consistently won or achieved a draw. These include Coral Sea, Midway VMF, Midway USN, and 4 months of consistent air combat over Guadalcanal. The only clear cut victory was at Wake in Dec 1941. In light of the VMF F4Fs victory at Midway, I'd say that Wake and Midway VMF come out as a wash.
I've covered in some detail reasons why the USN did quite well. Better training at deflection shooting and better tactical doctrine being a big part of that. My suggestion all along has been that the flaws in the A2A model affects the game strategically because it makes risking Allied CVs against comparable numbers of Japanese CVs a very inadvisable idea. That is why I have suggested that part of the deal is to eliminate the Zero bonus.
From a result oriented POV you might strike a balance between the mystic cult of japanese superiority and the historical data by (a) leaving the ZB in, and (b) increasing the F4F EXP levels by 20 points across the board, (b2) put in a "Wildcat bonus" that has the net effect of reducing Wildcat vs A6M losses to about 1:1.
Now, if you want to impose the "ZB" because of results of RAF, USAAF pilots vs Japanese ones, I'd want to know what the historical kill ratios were of these aircraft. I'd also want to know why any early Japanese success are presumed a consequence of the mystic invincibility of the Zero rather than, say, the fact that most Allied a/c in Malaya, the PI, Indonesia, and for the first couple months at Port Moresby, were operating on a logistical shoestring from crummy airbases against a numerically superior foe that had the strategic initiative.
For ex many of the worst Allied army pilot defeats occurred because of "the Bounce" so to speak. At Darwin, for example, most of the P40s were shot down taking off from the airfield. I submit that Chinese pilots in Polikarpovs could have achieved the same result at Darwin had the Allied pilots been caught with their planes on the runway.
Wouldn't it make more sense to look at the performance of the A6M Zero against a variety of aircraft in the period of time specified
It might if the fighting doctrine of USN/USMC and USAAF were substantially the same. It is not clear to me that this is correct, even for prior to 7 Dec 1941. USN pilots were intensively trained at deflection shooting... far more so than their enemy counterparts. I have no information on USAAF pilots or RAF pilots. I imagine that the RAF Hurricane pilots were good at it by virtue of experience with the ME109s, but as I alluded before, in some ways "prior experience vs the ME109" was probably counterproductive when fighting the A6M. Indeed, it is for that reason that I think the only reasonable case for having a Zero Bonus at all is based on the results of Hurricane vs A6M engagements in continental SE Asia.
In a similar fashion, prior experience for Japanese pilots fighting Chinese pilots in China was probably counterproductive for fighting against USN pilots in F4Fs. One common veteran Japanese pliot mistake was to zoom too close within range of an F4F. While this was a great maneuver for a Zeke as an aircraft (because it could climb well and lost energy slowly even in a steep climb where enemy a/c would stall out), it was a lousy maneuver in front of an enemy pilot who could deflection shoot very well and whose guns could rip up a Zeke to pieces with a very small number of hits.
Show me a fellow who rejects statistical analysis a priori and I'll show you a fellow who has no knowledge of statistics.
Didn't we have this conversation already?
