The Dumbest thing you ever did in WitP

[hawker]

I don't wanna start another crusade against 4E because you allied fan boy will crucify me[;)].

[EUBanana]

ORIGINAL: hawker

I don't wanna start another crusade against 4E because you allied fan boy will crucify me[;)].

[:D]

[hawker]

Dead to imperialists.

[hawker]

Ups,wrong spelling
Death to allied imperialists

[Mike Solli]

Here's the combat results for the Lexington:

AFTER ACTION REPORTS FOR 03/06/42

Day Air attack on TF at 95,106

Japanese aircraft
A6M2 Zero x 18
D3A Val x 44
B5N Kate x 36

Allied aircraft
F4F-4 Wildcat x 13

Japanese aircraft losses
A6M2 Zero: 2 destroyed
D3A Val: 3 destroyed, 17 damaged
B5N Kate: 5 destroyed, 23 damaged

Allied aircraft losses
F4F-4 Wildcat: 3 destroyed, 2 damaged

Allied Ships
CA Chester
CV Saratoga, Bomb hits 9, Torpedo hits 1, on fire, heavy damage
DD Phelps, Bomb hits 1, on fire
DD Porter
DD Dunlap, Torpedo hits 2, on fire, heavy damage
CA Astoria, Bomb hits 3, on fire
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

AFTER ACTION REPORTS FOR 03/07/42

Day Air attack on TF at 95,107

Japanese aircraft
A6M2 Zero x 8
D3A Val x 13
B5N Kate x 11

Japanese aircraft losses
D3A Val: 3 damaged

Allied Ships
CV Saratoga, Bomb hits 11, on fire, heavy damage

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

AFTER ACTION REPORTS FOR 03/08/42

Day Air attack on TF at 95,109

Japanese aircraft
A6M2 Zero x 28
D3A Val x 43
B5N Kate x 51

No Japanese losses

Allied Ships
CV Saratoga, Bomb hits 9, Torpedo hits 3, on fire, heavy damage

She then sank later in the turn.

[Przemcio231]

Heh i know that Jap Damage control was crappy "Taiho" blow up after just a torpedo[:D] becouse some genius ordered to open all hatches to let the air push out Fuel fumes but it resulted in the fumes spreading all over the ship and then a spark and presto...[:D] Any way i rember something better Shinano sunk hit by a single Torpedo... why?? becouse it was send in its way with no waterproof doors in the Bulkheads[:D][:D][:D] a tiny hole and presto [:D] but on the other hand the damage Control on Shokaku and Zuikaku was top Class[:D]

[rtrapasso]

I managed to hit Soryu with at least a total of 20 penetrating bombs in about 5 turns (including the first one that set off a fuel explosion). AFAIK, it didn't sink...

[Przemcio231]

Know the Pain once i put like over 20 Bombs + like 5 torps into Shoho and it was able to reach Gasamanta and sunk there but come on its a long way from the Coral Sea to the Base[:D]

[hawker]

Heh i know that Jap Damage control was crappy "Taiho" blow up after just a torpedo becouse some genius ordered to open all hatches to let the air push out Fuel fumes but it resulted in the fumes spreading all over the ship and then a spark and presto... Any way i rember something better Shinano sunk hit by a single Torpedo... why?? becouse it was send in its way with no waterproof doors in the Bulkheads a tiny hole and presto but on the other hand the damage Control on Shokaku and Zuikaku was top Class

I think that Shinano is hit with 3-4 torpedoes. I need to check.
She has protection of battleship but sunk because she steaming too fast and water breakthrough forward section.

[Przemcio231]

i Read that it sunk becous it had no Waterprof doors in the Bulkhead's so a small hole was suffiecent to sunk it as there was no way to stop the flooding[:)]

[hawker]

I forget,need to check but i am certain that she was hit with more than one torp.

[hawker]

ARCHERFISH (CDR J.F. Enright) left Saipan on November 11, 1944, to conduct her fifth war patrol. Out of Portsmouth Navy Yard in 1943, the submarine had met with indifferent luck thus far, and there was nothing in the cards to indicate a change. From Saipan she headed north to patrol in waters of "Hit Parade." Her assigned area lay about 150 miles south of Tokyo - a stretch of water due north of Hachijo Jima in the Nanpo Shoto chain.

Once an Empire main line from Japan to the Marianas, the Nanpo Shoto islands were now landmarks on the B-29 main line from the Marianas to Japan. ARCHERFISH's primery mission was to act as lifeguard for the first B-29 strikes on Tokyo. She was also to engage in offensive patrolling and shoot at any targets that came her way. But Enright was not anticipating much shooting. American Superforts droned in the sky. ARCHERFISH was not long out before she made contact with three friendly submarines. It could be assumed Japanese shipping would avoid this lively area. And the first days of patrol substantiated the assumption. Three small vessels came along, but they were too insignificant to warrant an expenditure of torpedoes. Enright and company watch the air show; otherwise submarining was slow in the Nanpo Shotos.

Early in the morning of November 28, ARCHERFISH received word there would be no air raid that day and she was therefore free from lifeguard duties until further notice. The day was a round of routine monotony. But that evening, when the submarine was about 12 miles off Inamba Shima, something happened. It happened at 2048 - radar contact at long range, bearing 028 T. Enright set the machinery in motion and started tracking from ahead.

Within an hour the target was identified as an aircraft carrier, on base course 210, making 20 knots and zigzagging. Only one escort could be located. The sky was overcast but bright moonlight seeped through the clouds, and visibility was good for about 15,000 yards. The horizon was dark to the north, so Enright started his approach on the enemy's starboard flank.

At 2230 an escort was sighted on the target's starboard beam. The position maintained by this escort conspired with visibility conditions to rule out a surface approach on the target from that side. Enright therefore changed course back to the base course. At 2250 the range was decreasing but ARCHERFISH was too far off the track to close in with a submerged approach. Range to the escort was 6,100 yards, and the carrier was 15,000 yards away. So, Enright held the submarine on the surface and drove in.

As the range shortened, he sent his lookouts below, and, awaiting gun flashes and splashes, braced himself on the bridge. He could now make out the target as a large carrier in a cordon of four escorts - one on either beam, one ahead and one astern. A surface attack seemed out of the question, but there was little chance of the submarine's regaining the ahead position required for a submerged approach.

Enright sent out a contact report, hoping to guide some other submarine into an intercepting position. The carrier group was making one full knot better than ARCHERFISH could do at her best. Strive as she would, Enright's submarine was slowly falling behind, and it was evident to her skipper that she would end up far in the rear unless the enemy made an accommodating zig or zag. As it was, the enemy was doing his best to accommodate, but his zags and zigs were not angular enough. However, by careful maneuvering and paralleling the base course, ARCHERFISH managed to hang on.

Many are the pros and cons with regard to zigzagging as a submarine defense. Obviously a target traveling on a straight course at a uniform speed presents the easiest fire control problem to the tracking submarine. On the other hand, zigzagging seldom baffles a well-trained fire control party with modern instruments. The chance that a sudden swerve by the target will adversely affect the submarine's position after she is all set for the attack is about offset by the chance that such a maneuver will improve the submarine's position.

There remains the possibility that the target will veer immediately after the torpedoes are fired. But such a course-change would amount to correct evasive action taken before torpedoes had been sighted. So the odds are about Even Stephen. But no navigator - certainly none of Japanese extraction - could deny that zigzagging increases the number of miles steamed in submarine waters, and thereby increases the chances of submarine attack.

Moreover, the reduction of target speed, caused by zigzagging, may be just sufficient to enable the submarine to gain an attack position when otherwise it would be left behind. Whatever the theoretical arguments, it remains a fact that ARCHERFISH's target would have escaped had the navigators main- tained a straight course.

At 2340 the target group made a radical course change - a change in the base course to the west. ARCHERFISH was now on the port flank and farther off the track than before. She hung on desperately as the "black gang" coaxed a few more turns from the overloaded engines. The chase went on through midnight and into the morning of November 29th. The enemy's zigzag plan allowed the submarine to pull ahead - slowly - slowly. But at 0241 it was obvious that if the carrier held to her base course of 275, the ARCHERFISH situation would be hopeless. Enright sent out a second contact report.

Then came the break. At 0300 the target group made another radical change in course, this time veering to the southwest. The range began to close rapidly, and ARCHERFISH was ahead. The long chase was nearly over. Patience and perseverance were about to move a mountain.

At 0305 Enright came to course 100 and ordered the submarine under. Range to the carrier when ARCHERFISH submerged was 11,700 yards. At 7,000 yards the target could be seen through the periscope. Wait - that baby was going to pass too close! Enright changed course 10-degrees to the left, and now the range shortened to 3,500 yards. At about this point the starboard escort approached the carrier to receive a blinker message. This caused the escort to pass ahead of ARCHERFISH at only 400 yards. The move also served to get the escort out of the way.

At 0316, the carrier zigged away from the submarine. This move put the queen right where Enright wanted her. ARCHERFISH had been a little too close to the target, and the zig gave her a nice position: 1,400 yards range with a 70-degree starboard track. Because of the late zig, Enright had to accept a larger than normal gyro angle. No matter. At 0317 he fired the first shot of a six-torpedo salvo - Mark 14's set for 10 feet and spread to smash into the target from stern to bow.

Forty-seven seconds later Enright saw and heard the first torpedo hit just inside the carrier's stern, near the propellers and rudder. A great glowing ball of fire climbed the vessel's side, Then another torpedo smashed home.

Enright ordered the submarine deep to evade the inevitable counter-attack. As ARCHERFISH went down, four more timed hits were heard. Breaking-up noises hissed and crackled in the sound gear. Fourteen depth charges boomed in the sea, the nearest some 300 yards away. The last charge thundered at 0345, but the clash and crackle of a great ship disintegrating deep under the sea continued for another 20 minutes. Finally, silence.

At 0614, Enright put up the periscope for a look. Nothing in sight. Four hours later a thunderous explosion was heard, it source a mystery. Whatever the origin, it came as a salute to the victors of the greatest undersea battle fought in "Hit Parade."

Enright identified the target as a vessel of HAYATAKA class and accordingly claimed credit for sinking a 29,000 ton aircraft carrier. The facts did not come to light until V-J Day. The Japanese super battleships YAMATO and MUSASHI, mounting 18-inch guns, were the largest men-of-war ever built by any nation. The allies were aware that the keel had been laid for a third behemoth of this class - a giant sister to the other two. The name and where abouts of this third monster remained unknown to the Allies until the cessation of hostilities. Then it was learned that the huge vessel had been converted into a super-aircraft carrier named SHINANO. And her whereabouts was latitude 32.00N, 137.00E, where ARCHERFISH had caught and sunk her in the waters of "Hit Parade."

Commissioned on November 18, 1944, SHINANO was torpedoed just 10 days later while on her maiden voyage to a safe port for fitting out. SHINANO had a standard displacement of 59,000 tons. Enright and company sank the largest man-of-war ever downed by a submarine. ARCHERFISH leads the hit parade in world history!

Here it is.So,six torpedoes[;)]

[Mynok]

Wasn't Shinano on her trials? Why would one base judgment on Japanese damage control from a ship that was sunk during her trials?

I've not played Allies yet, so I've little to compare, but I'm pretty comfortable with what I see from Japanese damage control. I'm not overly aggressive with my ships, so I don't get them hit very often, but they seem to function reasonably when they are.

[hawker]

Wasn't Shinano on her trials? Why would one base judgment on Japanese damage control from a ship that was sunk during her trials?

Read above[;)].

[hawker]

She was on her way to safer harbor,along the route she meets her destiny.

[rtrapasso]

I did a bunch of posts on this a while back. She was hit by multiple torps, but not all that the Archerfish claimed.

EDIT: Archerfish claimed 6 hits. IJN said it was actually 4 hits.


There were multiple problems that led to her demise including poor damage control and lack of gaskets for the water tight doors. However, even if a door isn't water tight, that by ITSELF would not be cause for its demise (unless there was no crew on board). Closing a hatch (even if not watertight) should slow down the flooding, and you can do other things after that to slow it more, and your pumps should keep up with the flooding - if you have a good damage control crew. If you don't, well - sayonara.

Shinano didn't have a good crew (as far as damage control went.)

[hawker]

I agree,she was not commissioned yet and maybe those crew are skeleton crew only. They did all wrong,with armor of Yamato,Shinano surely can stand few torp.

[rtrapasso]

Here is the Combined Fleet account:

29 November 1944:
At 0309 near position bearing 198 degrees 108 miles from Omae-zaki lighthouse struck by four torpedoes in the starboard side fired by USS ARCHERFISH. At first the damage - though severe -- is judged manageable, and the carrier is able to maintain speed and course. However, progressive flooding through incomplete fittings spreads, and a heavy list to starboard develops. Captain Abe orders the three outboard port boiler rooms flooded to take some of the list off. At dawn SHINANO had steamed 36 miles from where torpedoed and was still making 11 knots, when boiler feed water failed. At 0745 the SHINANO goes dead in the water. At 0850 HAMAKAZE and ISOKAZE take in tow, and building to 3 knots start to move toward Cape Ushio to beach her. However, the strain grows too great and the tow has to be abandoned. The list to starboard resumes and increases, and at 1018 Captain Abe gives the order to Abandon Ship. The YUKIKAZE comes alongside to starboard to remove the crew.

Sunk: At 1057 hours rolls over to starboard completely bottom up, then sinks by the stern in position 33-07'N, 137-04'E, taking down Captain Abe (by his choice), 1,435 officers and men, the 50 Ohka rocket bombs and 6 Shinyo suicide boats. Rescued are 55 officers, 993 petty officers and men, plus 32 civilians for a total of 1,080 survivors (including 3 of the Ohka pilots). In addition, the HAMAKAZE does recover the Imperial Portrait found floating on the sea.

When they say "watertight doors were not installed" - it is unclear to me whether they meant the actual hatches were not installed, or if they meant that hatches were installed but not made watertight (i.e. - no gaskets). I had read the latter (a long time ago.)

[hawker]

Japanese lost many CVs because of folishness and poor damge control,strange for nation of perfekcionists.

[bradfordkay]

As far as Lexington's loss is concerned, it was her loss that led to improved US damage control for the rest of the war. There was a gas leak from the AVGAS lines that led to the explosion which resulted in her sinking. After that, all AVGAS lines were filled with CO2 during combat to prevent this.

Are you saying that since one US carrier sank due to poor damage control techniques, then all should be subject to the same - even when historically from then on the problem had been corrected (and many US carriers which were even more heavily damaged than the Lexington were saved)?