A2A musings...

[treespider]

Does anyone know how the code calculates operational losses?

Do any of the aircraft's values, such as durability, play a role in the calculation of operational losses?

I read through Nik's FAQ as well as some of the threads about A2A and a common theme seems to be the over abundance of A/C. I was wondering if a downward adjustment to a/c durability would result in an increase in operational losses? Of course this change would necessitate wholesale changes in other values.

[Ron Saueracker]

ORIGINAL: treespider

Does anyone know how the code calculates operational losses?

Do any of the aircraft's values, such as durability, play a role in the calculation of operational losses?

I read through Nik's FAQ as well as some of the threads about A2A and a common theme seems to be the over abundance of A/C. I was wondering if a downward adjustment to a/c durability would result in an increase in operational losses? Of course this change would necessitate wholesale changes in other values.

We already have very high ops losses for whatever reason. LBA not being able to make emergency landings is one culptrit. One of the reasons I think the AA is fine in stock scenarios. But something else is going on. In my PBEM vs Adm Halsey, he has lost 70 Sonias by mid March 42, all to ops losses and I rarely see them in combat. Must be using them vs subs or some such.

[treespider]

We already have very high ops losses for whatever reason. LBA not being able to make emergency landings is one culptrit. One of the reasons I think the AA is fine in stock scenarios. But something else is going on. In my PBEM vs Adm Halsey, he has lost 70 Sonias by mid March 42, all to ops losses and I rarely see them in combat. Must be using them vs subs or some such.

But is it high enough? I don't know but I have a feeling its not.

Quoting "Fire in the Sky" by Bergerud who quotes Frank ...p.429 "...the Americans during the guadacanal campaign, including all services and including the carrier battles, lost 264 aircraft in combat and 451 to operational losses." Bergerud goes on to quote a Thirteenth Air Force Fighter Command Report which reported in the period June 1 43 - Oct 1 43 32 fighters lost in combat as compared to 57 for operational reasons.

[witpqs]

treespider,

Very interesting take on things. Just a related thought - maybe the too bloody air to air combat is helping to bring the losses to realistic levels (by compensating for the ops losses being too low). I doubt people will want to hear that!

Just a side note, pry's scenarios and CHS both greatly reduce the production rates of Allied aircraft (not sure about Japanese a/c, but that player controls production anyway).

[treespider]

treespider,

Very interesting take on things. Just a related thought - maybe the too bloody air to air combat is helping to bring the losses to realistic levels (by compensating for the ops losses being too low). I doubt people will want to hear that!

Gaming Zen. Unfortunately when we see one plane shooting down another in A2A its difficult to translate that into 'a crash upon take-off'.

My thinking on this though is that perhaps instead of increasing values across the board as Nik has done that perhaps numbers get reduced across the board. In particularly if durability plays a factor in operational losses...such that reduced durability will result in higher ops losses. I just found a thread from this past October discussing this very topic...I think the thread was "Horde of Tonies". I'll try and provide a link.

Edit: fb.asp?m=960413&key=operational%2Closs

Unfortunately since code changes are unlikely we're stuck trying to modify A/c values....when what probably is in order would be changes to supply consumption rates, increased fatigue and a variety of other coded mechanisms that would serve to slow the pace.

[TheElf]

Ops losses are too low. If you took a snapshot of the south pacific at anytime during the War you'd be challenged to find a unit that was at full strength. Even when pulled from the front line for R&R. Conversely if you took a snap shot of any player who knew how to base his air units and support them properly you'd find PLENTY of units at full strength, AND in the combat zone.

The environment of the pacific was a caustic one, and aircraft didn't last long, even well maintained ones. Bad weather and primitive navigational instruments and methods further caused many aircraft to simply never return, sometimes in large numbers. Parts supply was problematic even for the Allies, never mind the Japanese.

Apart from redesigning the code to incur more ops losses the simplest, fairest fix, rather than altering aircraft duarbility is an across-the-board reduction in replacement rate. The end result would be more difficulty replacing aircraft. Which would simulate the result of more ops losses.

Lets say 25% reduction for any aircraft with a aggragate repleacement rate over 10/month?

The problem is that only works for the allies. The japanese production system rules out any tweaking of replacement rate.

[witpqs]

ORIGINAL: TheElf

The problem is that only works for the allies. The japanese production system rules out any tweaking of replacement rate.

And that makes it unworkable...

[Ron Saueracker]

ORIGINAL: witpqs

ORIGINAL: TheElf

The problem is that only works for the allies. The japanese production system rules out any tweaking of replacement rate.

And that makes it unworkable...

Ahhhhh, hello? Supply issue again.[;)] Reduce the massive loads of supply and voila, Japanese production gets a reality boot to the head.

[dtravel]

ORIGINAL: Ron Saueracker

Ahhhhh, hello? Supply issue again.[;)] Reduce the massive loads of supply and voila, Japanese production gets a reality boot to the head.

Ed Gruberman? Is that you?

[TheElf]

ORIGINAL: Ron Saueracker

ORIGINAL: witpqs

ORIGINAL: TheElf

The problem is that only works for the allies. The japanese production system rules out any tweaking of replacement rate.

And that makes it unworkable...

Ahhhhh, hello? Supply issue again.[;)] Reduce the massive loads of supply and voila, Japanese production gets a reality boot to the head.

So it IS workable [:)]

[treespider]

ORIGINAL: Ron Saueracker

ORIGINAL: witpqs

ORIGINAL: TheElf

The problem is that only works for the allies. The japanese production system rules out any tweaking of replacement rate.

And that makes it unworkable...

Ahhhhh, hello? Supply issue again.[;)] Reduce the massive loads of supply and voila, Japanese production gets a reality boot to the head.

So it being simply stated ... the code will not be re-written... how does one go about reducing the supply? If resources are slashed, supplies in turn would be cut, which in turn would create less of a demand for shipping (which is already probably overabundant).

Or here is a novel idea...Does supply and/or resources move from base to base if they are not connected via road or rail?... Perhaps if we broke the Home Islands up into isolated factories by cutting transportation links, so that Japanese home island bases are not connected via rail or road the Japanese are forced into using their shipping to supply each individual factory by ship as opposed to one port which then spreads out via rail. (EDIT: Of course if and when the Home islands needed to be defended it would take a month to move one hex, but how many games see Japan actually invaded?)

Possibly coupled with an across the board reduction in ship endurance and load capacity ...the first creates more of a fuel drain the second more of a demand for shipping.

Some other ideas...are the factory slots hard coded? Is it possible to create factories that will produce nothing creating a resource drain?

As I said earlier I am trying to think of unorthodox ways to use the tools that are available to "correct" the model.

[el cid again]

Having reviewed all Japanese aircraft, and now in process of reviewing Allied aircraft in a more limited sense (mainly to get altitude to a new standard, but also to check for errors), I find very few cases where pools/production rates are even close to correct. Just using the most historical data available is going to reduce aircraft rates in general - although in particular cases it goes the other way. But I think we should try the correct rates first - to get a sense of how that works - before we try reducing them.

Similarly, it appears that other things which affect aircraft are not really right. AAA was wrong in several ways: some guns were not defined with enough altitude - or even any altitude at all; some guns had too much altitude; redefining AAA correctly will result in more AAA losses, particularly at lower altitudes - especially if aircraft are restricted to realistic operating altitudes at the same time. Again, I think we need to try this with the best possible data set before deliberately tampering with it.

Other things wrong with aircraft which relate to casualties include ROC data, weapons range data (which is 100% wrong), and weapons effect data (which over values MGs and under values cannon. Only accuracy seems generally valid - with what errors that exist being small. Another factor is speed numbers - if knots are used the model will reduce the number of successful intercepts by 5 to 10%.

Now range might be fudged slightly. Proper ranges would virtually all be 1. But we could make those weapons with a 500-600 yard effective range be 1 and those with a 1000-1200 yard effective range be 2 - and anything a lot greater than that be 3. Even so, the result would be vastly different than when 30 cals have a range of 3 and other weapons 5 or even 6. If we combine a reduced range, correct effects, reduced speed, correct ROC and other data, we have such a set of changes it would take some time to know just how that works? Before concluding that artificial manipulation of data is appropriate we ought to find out what happens if we use the best possible data- which we have not yet done.

[treespider]

Having reviewed all Japanese aircraft, and now in process of reviewing Allied aircraft in a more limited sense (mainly to get altitude to a new standard, but also to check for errors), I find very few cases where pools/production rates are even close to correct. Just using the most historical data available is going to reduce aircraft rates in general - although in particular cases it goes the other way. But I think we should try the correct rates first - to get a sense of how that works - before we try reducing them.

The problem with the Japanese rates are that they can be defined by the player...which led to the discussion about supply and resources.

Interesting, juxtaposition...on the one hand people are complaining that the A2A model is too bloody on the other hand people are saying that there are too many aircraft. Both of which i agree with.

I agree that the A2A model is out of whack...but if the model is corrected then the overabundant aircraft become even more overabundant. So in addition to correcting the A2A model in the micro one also has to look at the environment in which it exists in the macro.

My suggestion would be to plug in the " realistic" numbers that Cid is working on to see the effect on the A2A battle in the micro. However. as operational losses are too low and Durability may have some impact on this game function perhaps a downward departure is necessary across the board to increase operational losses.

In the macro arena, changes to production and logistics would also have to be instituted to create additional stress so that players will have to take more care in husbanding their resources.

[jwilkerson]

Keep in mind that no matter how many aircraft there are on the Japanese side .. the primary bottlenecks for the Japanese are slots in the air OB and good pilots ... in all of my games ( 3 of which have reached 43 .. one of which has reached 44 ) .. the Japanese always have hundreds of spare planes "in the pool" ... in the '44 game ... my production is running about 25% higher than historical ... though it will rapidly fall behind history in 1944 because I will not be able to double my production ... but even if I could .. it would not matter because there are insufficient slots in the air ob to absorb more planes.

So I don't see too many aircraft being a key problem for the Japanese - in the game .. they can't use them even if they have them ...

[witpqs]

[Edit: to treespider]

But we don't even know what are the production numbers he is referring to yet. How much lower are they already?

Changing too many variables at once also leads to a lack of understanding of what change caused what. Better to first get a solid baseline of the best data practical and see what the result is.

[witpqs]

Joe,

I think it is relevant for the situation that treespider describes. He's talking about the fact that the supply of a/c should be such that the various groups/squadrons were most often at less than full strength on both sides.

The problem then is how to replicate that situation in the game? Production limits can be imposed on the Allies, but not on Japan. Making ops losses higher (or making air combat even more bloody!) coupled with lower production could be made to emulate that situation on the Allied side. However the Japanese player can simply increase production even more to make up for the additional losses.

Now, I would like to point out one thing. Players should get historical capabilities, etc. Some players will be better than historical at husbanding there resources, some worse.

My preference is to have the historical a/c availability and the historical rate of ops losses. If you stand down a/c then the ops losses for them goes way down (no crashes, only spontaneous combustion or whatever!) so it is the rate of ops losses that count, not the absolute number. I realize that the code might have to be changed to achieve this, and that probably will not happen. The problem with reducing production numbers (Allies only) to account for higher ops losses is that it will evenly affect players who are going wild with air assets and those who are husbanding them carefully (and who therefor should incur lower ops losses).

[jwilkerson]

Based on my experience with the game ... I'd expect to always have spare planes ... there will be point in time shortages of specific aircraft .. but overall .. even if the Japanese player does nothing to change aircraft production .. I'd expect to have spare aircraft .. hundreds of spare aircraft ... and even hundreds of GOOD spare aircraft ( not just NATES ) most of the time.

So, yes this does indicate OP losses are too low ... but are we suggesting reducing Japanese aircraft production considerably below the historical levels in order to compensate for OP losses being too low ??

On the subject of pilot training ( the other primary bottleneck for the Japanese ) ... multi-eng bombers are easy .. just use the "fly cargo from one end of the runway to the other" trick ... and you can reach the 80s in 2-3 months ... for single engine aircraft, they need a quiet sector to run the GS mission. And there needs to be enough "airbase" slots nearby to handle all the aircraft that will want to train. The steady state I see in 1943 and on into 1944 is that at any given point of time about half of the fighters ( Army and Navy ) will be training ( in China or elsewhere ) while the other half will be at the front waiting to die. Once the air units at the front decide to fight .. they will die .. and then the remnants will fly back to China ( or whereever ) and start the training process .. the erstwhile training fighters will then transfer to the front and await their opportunity to die.
Having 800-1200 fighters sitting around at the front waiting to die, actually does serve a purpose. It is an "apparent" threat .. and it does curtail unescorted 4EB missions which can be shreaded ( 100+ losses to the 4EB per mission ). But when you come up with 400 Fighters against 150 P38s .. then you ( the IJA/N ) will be shredded in turn .. it only takes 2-4 battles to lose 800 fighters .. so the fight doesn't last long ... on the other hand it takes 2-3 months to train the other half of the fighters up ( to 75 ) so you have to do a lot of waiting and stare-ing ... so you don't spend your fighters before the next group is ready. It is possible to train up to 80 but I usually only do this for a few units ... you can hit 75 much quicker than 80 ... and you generally need to do the rotation by the time you've hit 75 ...
But I did not increase air production much over what is already given ... zeroes yes ... but that was it mostly .. and the bulk of the fighter defense is done by the Army Fighters ... I save the zeroes to operate with the Nell/Betty/Frances aircraft is the strike escort role.

The Japanese can lose the planes faster if they wish .. but tossing away 800+ VP more often than once every 2-3 months is not a very attractive proposition. If it wasn't for the VP .. I would probably engage in more attrition, but if I want to pay any attention to the VP .. that stops Japan from wanting to engage in attrition. I usually only fight defensive air battles in conjunction with fleet and LBA naval strike operations ( what we might call everything operations ) .. the fighters try to defense some airbases and distract the 4eb from the strike bases ... the carriers also are usually oeprating in more of a distraction mission .. the primary strike force is the Betty/Frances/Zero arm ... if they can find a hole in the cap they can trash transports or even warships and cause delays to the current invasion.

But I am one who believes that we either need to fix a2a or play in such a way that uber air battles don't happen ... uber air battles are a problem in the system as it stands now. VPs are a constraint and if you reduce Japanese production considrably that would be a constraint .. but it still won't fix uber air battles ... they will still happen in most games ... and they will still be a problem ...

[Andrew Brown]

ORIGINAL: jwilkerson
So, yes this does indicate OP losses are too low ... but are we suggesting reducing Japanese aircraft production considerably below the historical levels in order to compensate for OP losses being too low ??

I have been reviewing a lot of the resource, oil and supply generation data for the Japanese bases for the next CHS update. At the moment, the effects of my changes would be:

- Concentration of more resources in Japan as opposed to other locations (especially Manchukuo), which should result in more supply being generated in Japan as opposed to elsewhere.
- Reduction in HI output of up to 5% (haven't got the final numbers completed yet - it will be about 5% or less, and I can adjust it upwards again).

What effect would a worst case reduction of 5% to the Japanese industry output do to their economy? Aircraft output? Ship production? I haven't played Japan so I need to know what the effects would be. The worse the effects the more careful I need to be to not make damaging cuts to the Japanese economy, by tweaking the revised figures upwards.

Andrew

[witpqs]

ORIGINAL: jwilkerson

So, yes this does indicate OP losses are too low ... but are we suggesting reducing Japanese aircraft production considerably below the historical levels in order to compensate for OP losses being too low ??

I believe that the suggestion is to reduce aircraft production of both sides to compensate for ops losses being too low. I am arguing against it.

[el cid again]

- Concentration of more resources in Japan as opposed to other locations (especially Manchukuo), which should result in more supply being generated in Japan as opposed to elsewhere.

This seems quite wrong. Japan is an astonishingly resource poor country - more than any other significant power - and Manchukuo was a really major source of iron ore, coal, non-ferris minerals, timber, soy and other things - and a modest producer of oil in three different senses (oil from wells, shale oil and artificial oil from coal and natural gas). The need to ship these resources TO Japan is a significant user of Japanese shipping - and an opportunity for submarines, mines and bombers - maybe even surface vessels - to disrupt. IF you do this, probably the shipping needed ALSO should be removed from the Japanese - so they are in effect "forced" to use the ships - but then they cannot be stopped except by bombing or capturing the resource centers in Japan.

I recommend eating some of the excess supply in manchukuo. And also letting some survive - Manchukuo really makes supply points! Even ammunition. Let Japan have to move both resource points and supply points FROM Manchukuo - and also worry about what happens if it is taken by an enemy? And also have to defend it from bomber raids.