Geez buddy, bend over, pull the corn cob out of your as* and try to have a civil discussion.
That's your free cheap shot. I usually let people get away with one. After that I give 'em payback. Nikodemus long ago used up his.
You make interesting points, but in a manner that is off putting and and uncivil. Keep to the facts and drop the name calling.
It's uncivil also to completely misrepresent someone's claims to the point of making them up of whole cloth and attributing them to someone else. Which is pretty much s.o.p. for Nik. It's what he (and to a lesser extent, Chez) does when the facts don't support their claims.
That's all the explanation I'm offering on that.
Coral Sea and Midway "Yet in direct confronations between the two fighters, fifteen zeroes succombed as opposed to ten F4Fs" (p.4. The First Team and the Guadalcanal Campaign by John Lundstrom).
At Coral Sea, VF2 entered the engagement at low power settings (120 knots) and lost 3 F4Fs to two A6Ms shot down (The First Team (vol 1) pp.238-243) in the attack on Shokaku.
As for claims made in this thread about Wake Island:
One raid was aborted in January 1942 because a supporting fleet oiler was sunk by I-72. In the second raid in February (Lundstom V1 p.111-117 where V1 is "The First Team" and V2 is "The First Team at Guadalcanal" no F4Fs were lost to enemy fire. Several were lost operationally. More were lost operationally in the Marcus raid on 4 March.
Versus other highly maneuverable Japanese types losses were low.
On 1 February 1 F4F fought 3 A5M4s, destroying 2 with no loss. Other engagements (no losses to either side) included 3 F4F vs 3 A5M4s, 1 F4F vs A5M4, and 8 A5M4 vs 1 F4F. USN combat losses were 5 SBDs. Japanese other combat losses were 3 Type 97 flying boats and 2 Type 96 bombers.
As to USN perception of Japanese fighters in February 1942, I'll let "Japanese VF Stinks" (Lundstrum V1 p.77) do.
At Bougainville on 20 February there were 2 F4F that engaged 2 ype 97s, destroying both without loss, and another instance of 2 F4Fs vs only 1 Type 97, destroying it without loss. In the aborted Rabaul strike, 14 F4Fs fought 17 G4Ms, shooting down 15 for the loss of two F4Fs.
I only mention these because rumours of an early war Wake Island raid that featured F4Fs shot down by anything, much less A6Ms, are disproven, and speak to the quality of background knowledge of the person who made the claim.
Chez was correct in noting that the Japanese had a signal success on 7 August. Nine of 18 engaged F4Fs were shot down intercepting a mixed strike of A6Ms and bombers. The US pilots shot down six bombers and two A6Ms (both from the 2nd Chutai). One of the F4Fs shot down was Southerland, who was exiting the fight and out of ammunition by the time Sakai caught up with him. (The A6M losses do not include Sakai, who survived an aft-attack on a flight of SBDs but with severe injuries).
As I noted before, F4Fs were easier to shoot down when they were busy attacking bombers. (About 1/3 of the F4Fs lost to Zeroes during the Guadalcanal campign were shot down as they were engaging bombers). The F4Fs stationed at cactus had their own lopsided victory somewhat later, when the Japanese feinted with a bomber formation and hit the F4Fs with a "fighter sweep."
The total of fighter vs fighter losses during the campaign was 31 F4Fs to 25 A6Ms.
As to whether or not USN training placed any emphasis on deflection shooting, or whether or not the Aleutians Zero was materially germane to the period of critical combat during which F4F soundly defeated Zeroes, "As in the first six months of the war, the Guadalcanal Campaign demonstrated the effectiveness of U.S. naval fighter doctrine, particularly deflection shooting and team tactics." (Lundstrom V2 p.530)
Show me a fellow who rejects statistical analysis a priori and I'll show you a fellow who has no knowledge of statistics.
Didn't we have this conversation already?