No, I'm not engaging in any port or airfield building right now. Once he starts bombing Palembang I'll begin building Benkoenen and build a few inland airfields but right now I think Mike hasn't realised that Southern Sumatra is being turned into a veritable fortress.
Right now I think that Mike is buying the "Great Malaysian Deception". I have two more LCUs to finish evacuating ( mostly by air ) from Malaysia and once they're done I'll have left behind only about 90 AV of combat troops and a few perma-restricted engineer and AAA units. The only evacuable units which will fall with Malaysia will be the 2 Bns I've had delaying the Japanese advance down the west coast and central rail line. I am also seeing continuous evidence of IJN transport TFs unloading at Kuantan and it looks like another major TF is going to make for Mersing soon ( which is abandoned ) --- at least that's my assessment of the huge number of small transport TFs I've seen making for Camranh Bay over the past few days.
I'm quite looking forward to seeing Mike's reaction when he realises that he's been shuttling troops and artillery etc etc into Malaysia only to find them all being faced by about 1 Bde worth of troops.
Today my subs got their first major success of the war when a Dutch sub claims to have sunk the one of those Katori class CLs. My intelligence screen shows an Alf being destroyed on "the field" and since the Katori class carries an Alf I'm taking that to mean this CL went down.
My "run away north" plan has worked at Kwaj. I got away without any Bettys etc sortieing after me. I'll now make east to meet up with my replenishment TF and then sweep in just south of Tarawa before sweeping Fiji and seeing if I can catch any IJN snoopers. His CVLs don't appear to have been at Kwajalein so I'm betting they are either at Truk prepping for Rabaul or somewhere south of Kwajalein probing south looking for my shipping lanes. It'd be nice to catch a few CVLs so I'll try.
Merak- I don't have the ACMs to spare unfortunately, not in this region anyways.
My first reinforcements for Rabaul left Australia today. One Brigade should make a nice reinforcement against what he can muster right now. If given sufficient time I intend to bolster the Rabaul defences to a full division, but I'm splitting my released forces from Oz 50/50 between Timor/South DEI and Rabaul so it'll be a fortnight or so before Rabaul is fully safe. Some of the nice Australian armoured units are being eyed up with a view to forming the core of an extempore armoured division tasked with atoll assaults in the Pacific. I've been very impressed with just how effective tanks are against AT-weak IJA infantry.
Salutations and solicitations.... 1EyedJacks (J) vs Nemo (A)
Moderators: wdolson, MOD_War-in-the-Pacific-Admirals-Edition
RE: Salutations and solicitations.... 1EyedJacks (J) vs Nemo (A)
John Dillworth: "I had GreyJoy check my spelling and he said it was fine."
Well, that's that settled then.
Well, that's that settled then.
RE: Salutations and solicitations.... 1EyedJacks (J) vs Nemo (A)
“Not mastering metaphores is like cooking pasta when the train is delayed"
RE: Salutations and solicitations.... 1EyedJacks (J) vs Nemo (A)
January 8th...
The tiny diversionary invasion of Wake is about 3 days away... A single AVD is bringing in a platoon's worth of troops to take the island if it is undefended. If it isn't then the assault will fail and I'll run away, that's fine.
About 2 days from now 2 USN surface combat TFs should raid both Roi-Namur and the base just to its south while my 4 USN CVs sweep south and west towards Fiji in order to trap any IJN snoopers in the area. I have been making lots of submarine sightings in this region along my SLOCs towards the defensive bastions in the south Pacific ( Pago Pago, Canton, Baker, Fiji, Noumea ) and my spidey sense tells me that that CVL Mike seems to have sent into this area might be out there looking for targets. Since my CVs have to refuel anyways they might as well sweep the area for enemy snoopers.
The 2nd phase invasion force is loaded and the ships involved are hiding out at sea along with their escorts ( a TF with several modern, fast BBs and a hard-hitting SC TF centred on some cruisers and useful DDs ).
The 3rd phase invasion forces are still gathering. Gathering all this shipping and manpower is taking quite a while as the Allies begin the game so scattered.
In Malaysia the only non-permarestricted formations left in Malaysia are the 2 Australian Brigades and a Mountain Artillery Regiment. I am planning to pull the Australian Brigades out by air ( leaving the guns behind ) and will try to race some xAKs in to pull out the mountain artillery regiment. If the opportunity presents itself I'll also pull out the artillery of the Australian Brigades but my hopes aren't all that high as the area has been utterly flooded with Bettys and Nells for the past few days.
The IJNAF has begun sweeping Palembang but unfortunately for the Japanese they only began doing so the day after I completed my upgrade programme for the AVG:
1st AVG, Palembang - H81s ( 9 in the unit but with another 27 waiting to be added to the unit )
2nd AVG, Palembang - 27 P40Es
3rd AVG, Rangoon - 27 P39s ( this is my training cadre )
1st and 2nd AVG are filling out nicely with pilots with a minimum A2A experience of 60. 1st AVG is focussing on getting the pilots with A2A over 65 while 2nd is making do with pilots in the 60 to 65 range.
Today 27 A6M2s swept Palembang from Singkawang. A total of between 8 and 11 Zeroes went down ( depending on whom you believe ) in return for 4 Buffaloes ( flying low, slow and dumb ), 2 Hurricane IIs, 1 P40E and 1 H81. I'm actually achieving a slightly better than 1:1 loss rate when one includes the Buffaloes and B339s. When one excludes those truly obsolete airframes I'm achieving much closer to a 2:1 exchange rate in fighter vs fighter combat. I'm pretty happy with that as it bodes rather well for the outcome once I begin to get significant numbers of squadrons into action. Right now I only have 3 combat-capable squadrons in action ( the 2 AVG and the Hurricane II squadron ). In 3 weeks time I expect to have an additional 4 to 6 combat-capable fighter squadrons in action over Southern Sumatra.
Interesting SIGINT news today: " 19th Ind. Engineer Regiment is planning for an attack on Palembang "
Another interesting piece of data - KB showed up 180 miles east of Manilla again to plaster my ground forces south of Manilla. Fortunately it looks like most of them will make their escape into the fortress Manilla is rapidly becoming. Unfortunately it is also pretty clear that there's something weird happening with Manilla's supplies. Over the past 5 days supplies in Manilla have fallen from over 30,000 to just 15,000. They haven't transferred to any other base and they don't appear in units so I have no idea what has happened. Fortunately for me supplies won't be a problem in Southern Sumatra which currently has about 160,000 tons of supplies scattered between the two bases.
In other news Java is almost completely denuded of fuel and supplies while Darwin and Timor are filling up nicely. I've pretty much decided to try to pincer his Southern Borneon/Javan bases between Southern Sumatra and a collection of Dutch/Australian bases in Timor and nearby regions and am dumping supplies from Java into the first of these bases.
I think that in about 3 days time things should really start to kick off. It'll be interesting, that's for sure.
The tiny diversionary invasion of Wake is about 3 days away... A single AVD is bringing in a platoon's worth of troops to take the island if it is undefended. If it isn't then the assault will fail and I'll run away, that's fine.
About 2 days from now 2 USN surface combat TFs should raid both Roi-Namur and the base just to its south while my 4 USN CVs sweep south and west towards Fiji in order to trap any IJN snoopers in the area. I have been making lots of submarine sightings in this region along my SLOCs towards the defensive bastions in the south Pacific ( Pago Pago, Canton, Baker, Fiji, Noumea ) and my spidey sense tells me that that CVL Mike seems to have sent into this area might be out there looking for targets. Since my CVs have to refuel anyways they might as well sweep the area for enemy snoopers.
The 2nd phase invasion force is loaded and the ships involved are hiding out at sea along with their escorts ( a TF with several modern, fast BBs and a hard-hitting SC TF centred on some cruisers and useful DDs ).
The 3rd phase invasion forces are still gathering. Gathering all this shipping and manpower is taking quite a while as the Allies begin the game so scattered.
In Malaysia the only non-permarestricted formations left in Malaysia are the 2 Australian Brigades and a Mountain Artillery Regiment. I am planning to pull the Australian Brigades out by air ( leaving the guns behind ) and will try to race some xAKs in to pull out the mountain artillery regiment. If the opportunity presents itself I'll also pull out the artillery of the Australian Brigades but my hopes aren't all that high as the area has been utterly flooded with Bettys and Nells for the past few days.
The IJNAF has begun sweeping Palembang but unfortunately for the Japanese they only began doing so the day after I completed my upgrade programme for the AVG:
1st AVG, Palembang - H81s ( 9 in the unit but with another 27 waiting to be added to the unit )
2nd AVG, Palembang - 27 P40Es
3rd AVG, Rangoon - 27 P39s ( this is my training cadre )
1st and 2nd AVG are filling out nicely with pilots with a minimum A2A experience of 60. 1st AVG is focussing on getting the pilots with A2A over 65 while 2nd is making do with pilots in the 60 to 65 range.
Today 27 A6M2s swept Palembang from Singkawang. A total of between 8 and 11 Zeroes went down ( depending on whom you believe ) in return for 4 Buffaloes ( flying low, slow and dumb ), 2 Hurricane IIs, 1 P40E and 1 H81. I'm actually achieving a slightly better than 1:1 loss rate when one includes the Buffaloes and B339s. When one excludes those truly obsolete airframes I'm achieving much closer to a 2:1 exchange rate in fighter vs fighter combat. I'm pretty happy with that as it bodes rather well for the outcome once I begin to get significant numbers of squadrons into action. Right now I only have 3 combat-capable squadrons in action ( the 2 AVG and the Hurricane II squadron ). In 3 weeks time I expect to have an additional 4 to 6 combat-capable fighter squadrons in action over Southern Sumatra.
Interesting SIGINT news today: " 19th Ind. Engineer Regiment is planning for an attack on Palembang "
Another interesting piece of data - KB showed up 180 miles east of Manilla again to plaster my ground forces south of Manilla. Fortunately it looks like most of them will make their escape into the fortress Manilla is rapidly becoming. Unfortunately it is also pretty clear that there's something weird happening with Manilla's supplies. Over the past 5 days supplies in Manilla have fallen from over 30,000 to just 15,000. They haven't transferred to any other base and they don't appear in units so I have no idea what has happened. Fortunately for me supplies won't be a problem in Southern Sumatra which currently has about 160,000 tons of supplies scattered between the two bases.
In other news Java is almost completely denuded of fuel and supplies while Darwin and Timor are filling up nicely. I've pretty much decided to try to pincer his Southern Borneon/Javan bases between Southern Sumatra and a collection of Dutch/Australian bases in Timor and nearby regions and am dumping supplies from Java into the first of these bases.
I think that in about 3 days time things should really start to kick off. It'll be interesting, that's for sure.
John Dillworth: "I had GreyJoy check my spelling and he said it was fine."
Well, that's that settled then.
Well, that's that settled then.
RE: Salutations and solicitations.... 1EyedJacks (J) vs Nemo (A)
January 9th.
IJNAF efforts to close Palembang continue apace. Another 30 Zeroes swept the skies again but were roughly handled. 5 Zeroes were confirmed downed over Palembang with a large number more smoking and turning back to base in return for 2 Buffaloes and an H81 confirmed destroyed. I really don't see how people are finding it difficult to cope with Zeroes in-game in the early months of the war. Sure I don't have enough fighters to maintain a significant attrition but I am downing the Zeroes at 1:1 ( if one counts Buffalo losses ) and almost 2:1 if one excludes Buffalo losses. The plane I'm actually worried about is the Ki-43 Ic.
In other news significant aerial attacks on Singapore began today with 89 IJA bombers ranging overhead bombing the airfield and supply dumps. Despite the presence of only a single Heavy AAA regiment 54 of these planes were damaged. I'm really quite looking forward to the results of the FlAK trap at Palembang which is roughly 4 to 5 times more heavily defended by AAA.
The IJN continues to hit the forces south of Manilla with 250 strike aircraft from KB and an additional 100 level bombers basing out of the Phillipines pounding my forces as they retreat. One of my Phillipine divisions is down to 14 functional combat squads with over 130 disabled combat squads. Once I get them into Manilla they should recover quickly but his committment of KB to the area is certainly paying dividends.... the trick is to make those dividends not worth the overall investment.
One of the two SC TFs making for the Marshalls has been spotted. I'll press ahead though as either:
a) he won't believe the spotting report or
b) he'll believe it, send out what he has to combat me in terms of ships and planes and I'll get a good sense of what he can bring to bear in the area - a rather important piece of information should I choose to recommit my carriers there over the coming weeks.
With KB anchored off Manilla I am vectoring submarines into the area and am also beginning to think that my rather complex deception operations may have been utterly unnecessary. It looks like he is content to sit on the defensive in the Pacific. Well, if that's his plan then he's going to find himself pushed on to the backfoot rather more rapidly than he would like.
I don't have the orders file back yet so it looks like we'll have to wait a few more days for some action.
IJNAF efforts to close Palembang continue apace. Another 30 Zeroes swept the skies again but were roughly handled. 5 Zeroes were confirmed downed over Palembang with a large number more smoking and turning back to base in return for 2 Buffaloes and an H81 confirmed destroyed. I really don't see how people are finding it difficult to cope with Zeroes in-game in the early months of the war. Sure I don't have enough fighters to maintain a significant attrition but I am downing the Zeroes at 1:1 ( if one counts Buffalo losses ) and almost 2:1 if one excludes Buffalo losses. The plane I'm actually worried about is the Ki-43 Ic.
In other news significant aerial attacks on Singapore began today with 89 IJA bombers ranging overhead bombing the airfield and supply dumps. Despite the presence of only a single Heavy AAA regiment 54 of these planes were damaged. I'm really quite looking forward to the results of the FlAK trap at Palembang which is roughly 4 to 5 times more heavily defended by AAA.
The IJN continues to hit the forces south of Manilla with 250 strike aircraft from KB and an additional 100 level bombers basing out of the Phillipines pounding my forces as they retreat. One of my Phillipine divisions is down to 14 functional combat squads with over 130 disabled combat squads. Once I get them into Manilla they should recover quickly but his committment of KB to the area is certainly paying dividends.... the trick is to make those dividends not worth the overall investment.
One of the two SC TFs making for the Marshalls has been spotted. I'll press ahead though as either:
a) he won't believe the spotting report or
b) he'll believe it, send out what he has to combat me in terms of ships and planes and I'll get a good sense of what he can bring to bear in the area - a rather important piece of information should I choose to recommit my carriers there over the coming weeks.
With KB anchored off Manilla I am vectoring submarines into the area and am also beginning to think that my rather complex deception operations may have been utterly unnecessary. It looks like he is content to sit on the defensive in the Pacific. Well, if that's his plan then he's going to find himself pushed on to the backfoot rather more rapidly than he would like.
I don't have the orders file back yet so it looks like we'll have to wait a few more days for some action.
John Dillworth: "I had GreyJoy check my spelling and he said it was fine."
Well, that's that settled then.
Well, that's that settled then.
RE: Salutations and solicitations.... 1EyedJacks (J) vs Nemo (A)
Gentlemen,
there has been a lot of interesting information/discussion on „shaping the battlefield“ in this thread. I believe that there is an additional aspect that is hinted at slightly on occasional occasions, and which should deserve a bit more of a spotlight:
Shaping the enemy.
Look at the nice tools of mind-torturing laid out by Nemo, waiting/about to be applied (not sure, whether I hit the technical terms correctly, though – I’ll be glad to be corrected):
Frustration (e.g. running after the troops in Malaya to see that they are essentially all gone).
Disorientation (by facing something believed to be impossible, an early substantial Allied offensive, which will contribute nicely to mess up the enemy’s OODA-cycle, specifically the second “O” by increasing the amount of possibilities to be considered, negating the ability to reduce the complexity of the problem quickly by discarding "impossible" options, possibly backfiring to the first “O” by adding “ghost observations” generated by FOW).
Discontent (when/if the enemy realizes he just followed the leads provided by Nemo, thus rendering himself vulnerable).
Failure (when/if the Sumatra offensive gets bogged down).
Ah, the beauty of psy-war [8D] !
As always, just my inept view on things, maybe I'm all wrong and all that Psy-War-talk is just a long-term-effect of a trauma caused by having faced Nemo as an opponent for a while [;)]…
Hartwig
there has been a lot of interesting information/discussion on „shaping the battlefield“ in this thread. I believe that there is an additional aspect that is hinted at slightly on occasional occasions, and which should deserve a bit more of a spotlight:
Shaping the enemy.
Look at the nice tools of mind-torturing laid out by Nemo, waiting/about to be applied (not sure, whether I hit the technical terms correctly, though – I’ll be glad to be corrected):
Frustration (e.g. running after the troops in Malaya to see that they are essentially all gone).
Disorientation (by facing something believed to be impossible, an early substantial Allied offensive, which will contribute nicely to mess up the enemy’s OODA-cycle, specifically the second “O” by increasing the amount of possibilities to be considered, negating the ability to reduce the complexity of the problem quickly by discarding "impossible" options, possibly backfiring to the first “O” by adding “ghost observations” generated by FOW).
Discontent (when/if the enemy realizes he just followed the leads provided by Nemo, thus rendering himself vulnerable).
Failure (when/if the Sumatra offensive gets bogged down).
Ah, the beauty of psy-war [8D] !
As always, just my inept view on things, maybe I'm all wrong and all that Psy-War-talk is just a long-term-effect of a trauma caused by having faced Nemo as an opponent for a while [;)]…
Hartwig
RE: Salutations and solicitations.... 1EyedJacks (J) vs Nemo (A)
LOL! Hartwig, "Shaping the Enemy". Well, what you describe is the ideal. We'll have to see how far I can get Mike to buy into that..
Today things are ramping up nicely... A slow ratcheting up of pressure, allowing the enemy to draw one conclusion in a gentle manner and then switching it to something else begins....
January 10th:
IJNAF Bettys range over Palembang by night bombing indiscriminately. According to my reports they managed to hit the airfield 5 times and destroyed 2 planes - which would be tremendously bad luck. In any case it gives my RAF and RAAF Buffaloes a role. I'll try them on night CAP over Palembang. At the very least they should help scare the Japanese bombers into reducing their accuracy.
During the daytime Zeroes again ranged over Palembang and today I managed a 2:1 exchange rate, even counting the Buffaloes. Not bad.
At Kwajalein and Roi-Namur the 2 USN SC TFs ( the first centred around CA CHicago, CL Concord and 6 DDs, the second centred on CLs Raleigh, Detroit & Trenton and 6 DDs ) slammed into a number of small IJN TFs comprising, 6 DDs, 1 xAK and 2 PBs.
The 2 PBs were sunk as was the transport TF comprising the xAK Ryotaku Maru and DDs Minekaze and DD Asagao. Unfortunately the other SC TF of 4 DDs proved rather slippery and while one DD in this TF was hit several times, including with a 6 inch shell, that TF escaped largely unharmed. The USN TFs got away with a single shell hit on the CA Chicago and another hit on one of the CLs. None of the shells penetrated.
The next day found the USN TFs south of Kwajalein and multiple waves of Nells went after them. The CA Chicago and one of the CLs took a single torpedo each. I'll port them and then take things from there. I have more than enough CLs and CAs to replace these ships in the battleline.
My CVs hit Milli island - well, some of my CVs did, the others are still hunting enemy raiders down Fiji way... It turns out this was a fortuitous move on my part as these raiders showed up at Canton Island....
Morning Air attack on TF, near Canton Island at 153,143
Weather in hex: Clear sky
Raid spotted at 18 NM, estimated altitude 12,000 feet.
Estimated time to target is 7 minutes
Japanese aircraft
A5M4 Claude x 3
A6M2 Zero x 4
B5N1 Kate x 11
No Japanese losses
Allied Ships
TK Gulfhawk, Torpedo hits 2, heavy fires
DD Lawrence
DD Hatfield, Torpedo hits 1, and is sunk
Aircraft Attacking:
11 x B5N1 Kate launching torpedoes at 200 feet
Naval Attack: 1 x 18in Type 91 Torpedo
The TK and DD obviously both sank. I am reading the split between Claudes and Zeroes to imply that there are two CVLs down here operating around Canton... Could this be "mini-KB" ? I was thinking he might have a single CVL in the area for scouting purposes - zip in, hit a convoy, zip out, that sort of thing - but the presence of the Claudes makes me think I might be dealing with both his CVLs _ Ryujo and Zuiho. Hmm, I really want to corner these CVLs. Fortunately I have 3 CVs north of Canton and 1 CV west of Canton. Since I think he'll run north or west I'm quite hopeful that I might catch them. I'd even be comfortable letting a single CV take them on as I can concentrate most of my fighters on CAP and allow the bombers to take a few losses to enemy CAP whilst still having enough bombers left over to put a few bombs/torps into each enemy flat top.
KB, again, pounded my ground forces but this time the attacks went in against ground forces in Manilla itself. It appears that the fortifications helped tremendously as I suffered only 104 casualties and none of them was destroyed, just squad or device disablement. In return another 28 of KB's strike planes were damaged by FlAK. Every day he strikes my ground troops 20 or 30 strike planes are damaged by FlAK and 2 or 3 fail to return to his carrier. Even if only half of his losses result in a dead pilot my intel screen shows 100 combined losses of Kates and Vals. That's ruinous. Even assume that the losses are 2/3rds of that and only half of the planes lost result in dead pilots and that's still a CV's worth of elite pilots he's lost so far ( he lost about 18 Zeroes in sweeps and A2A combat over Manilla in the early days ). What a waste. I, of course, continue my slow move from saying that this is a total waste in my emails to him to bemoaning the losses and beginning to say that "Well, it's changing my views of ground attacks. In the end over a few days it can totally torch units. I'm switching many of my bomber training units over to training in ground attacks. It seems highly effective. "
So, battle is joined... I want those CVLs and am prepared to lose a bit of surprise in order to get them. I can even use this unplanned clash to sell the idea of drawing him south as my CVs and raiding TFs fade away into the mist before drawing him north with Marcus etc...
Today things are ramping up nicely... A slow ratcheting up of pressure, allowing the enemy to draw one conclusion in a gentle manner and then switching it to something else begins....
January 10th:
IJNAF Bettys range over Palembang by night bombing indiscriminately. According to my reports they managed to hit the airfield 5 times and destroyed 2 planes - which would be tremendously bad luck. In any case it gives my RAF and RAAF Buffaloes a role. I'll try them on night CAP over Palembang. At the very least they should help scare the Japanese bombers into reducing their accuracy.
During the daytime Zeroes again ranged over Palembang and today I managed a 2:1 exchange rate, even counting the Buffaloes. Not bad.
At Kwajalein and Roi-Namur the 2 USN SC TFs ( the first centred around CA CHicago, CL Concord and 6 DDs, the second centred on CLs Raleigh, Detroit & Trenton and 6 DDs ) slammed into a number of small IJN TFs comprising, 6 DDs, 1 xAK and 2 PBs.
The 2 PBs were sunk as was the transport TF comprising the xAK Ryotaku Maru and DDs Minekaze and DD Asagao. Unfortunately the other SC TF of 4 DDs proved rather slippery and while one DD in this TF was hit several times, including with a 6 inch shell, that TF escaped largely unharmed. The USN TFs got away with a single shell hit on the CA Chicago and another hit on one of the CLs. None of the shells penetrated.
The next day found the USN TFs south of Kwajalein and multiple waves of Nells went after them. The CA Chicago and one of the CLs took a single torpedo each. I'll port them and then take things from there. I have more than enough CLs and CAs to replace these ships in the battleline.
My CVs hit Milli island - well, some of my CVs did, the others are still hunting enemy raiders down Fiji way... It turns out this was a fortuitous move on my part as these raiders showed up at Canton Island....
Morning Air attack on TF, near Canton Island at 153,143
Weather in hex: Clear sky
Raid spotted at 18 NM, estimated altitude 12,000 feet.
Estimated time to target is 7 minutes
Japanese aircraft
A5M4 Claude x 3
A6M2 Zero x 4
B5N1 Kate x 11
No Japanese losses
Allied Ships
TK Gulfhawk, Torpedo hits 2, heavy fires
DD Lawrence
DD Hatfield, Torpedo hits 1, and is sunk
Aircraft Attacking:
11 x B5N1 Kate launching torpedoes at 200 feet
Naval Attack: 1 x 18in Type 91 Torpedo
The TK and DD obviously both sank. I am reading the split between Claudes and Zeroes to imply that there are two CVLs down here operating around Canton... Could this be "mini-KB" ? I was thinking he might have a single CVL in the area for scouting purposes - zip in, hit a convoy, zip out, that sort of thing - but the presence of the Claudes makes me think I might be dealing with both his CVLs _ Ryujo and Zuiho. Hmm, I really want to corner these CVLs. Fortunately I have 3 CVs north of Canton and 1 CV west of Canton. Since I think he'll run north or west I'm quite hopeful that I might catch them. I'd even be comfortable letting a single CV take them on as I can concentrate most of my fighters on CAP and allow the bombers to take a few losses to enemy CAP whilst still having enough bombers left over to put a few bombs/torps into each enemy flat top.
KB, again, pounded my ground forces but this time the attacks went in against ground forces in Manilla itself. It appears that the fortifications helped tremendously as I suffered only 104 casualties and none of them was destroyed, just squad or device disablement. In return another 28 of KB's strike planes were damaged by FlAK. Every day he strikes my ground troops 20 or 30 strike planes are damaged by FlAK and 2 or 3 fail to return to his carrier. Even if only half of his losses result in a dead pilot my intel screen shows 100 combined losses of Kates and Vals. That's ruinous. Even assume that the losses are 2/3rds of that and only half of the planes lost result in dead pilots and that's still a CV's worth of elite pilots he's lost so far ( he lost about 18 Zeroes in sweeps and A2A combat over Manilla in the early days ). What a waste. I, of course, continue my slow move from saying that this is a total waste in my emails to him to bemoaning the losses and beginning to say that "Well, it's changing my views of ground attacks. In the end over a few days it can totally torch units. I'm switching many of my bomber training units over to training in ground attacks. It seems highly effective. "
So, battle is joined... I want those CVLs and am prepared to lose a bit of surprise in order to get them. I can even use this unplanned clash to sell the idea of drawing him south as my CVs and raiding TFs fade away into the mist before drawing him north with Marcus etc...
- Attachments
-
- kwaj.jpg (106.73 KiB) Viewed 1143 times
John Dillworth: "I had GreyJoy check my spelling and he said it was fine."
Well, that's that settled then.
Well, that's that settled then.
RE: Salutations and solicitations.... 1EyedJacks (J) vs Nemo (A)
In other news we have a major change of plans... I was holding off posting my planning as I didn't want any leaks or innocent questions to Mike which would get him thinking. Unfortunately yesterday my use of the phrase "bug-hunting with nukes" ( a phrase I picked up around the time of Starship Troopers, the movie, and their use of nuclear grenades to immolate alien infestations underground ) to describe his use of KB around Manilla led 1EyedJacks to state that if he knew I was subscribed to his AAR he would have been more careful what he wrote there. It seems he said something about bugs being frequent in the Phillipines and him nuking my troops with KB ( he quoted me that bit of his AAR in an email to me ) so my using a similar phrase a few days later set his spidey sense tingling.
We spoke about this and fairly quickly he changed his mind and was quite agreeable about the fact that a random phrase which is similar to something he said doesn't necessarily mean I was cheating. I suppose that seeing the biggest strategic asset Japan has being misused to hit insignificant targets brings the word nuke and bug to more than just my mind as nuke has entered common parlance as a means of describing overwhelming force and bug has entered the parlance to describe insignificant yet difficult to eradicate units.
Anyways we're over this issue but all of my work in psychiatry has shown me that a person's past thought processes are the best guide to their future thought processes. If you read AARs here you'll find that a player who once finds that the game's model is biased against him will, over time, find multiple other areas of the game which are also biased against him. E.g. A player whose fighters don't fight properly is likely to be one whose bombers hit "nothing", whose ASW TFs serve merely as meat on the table and so on and so forth. Their imprecations do, as usual, say more about how they are than about how the game is. That's a truism which applies in a lot of other areas of life also. A player who greets setbacks and advances with equanimity is likely to continue to do so.
In any case this means that, in my opinion, there's a high chance that if 1EyedJacks would misinterpret a chance phrase and construe it as proof of cheating then he may well wonder if I'm cheating if, a few weeks down the road, this plan works and he gets to thinking how he was misled and misdirected. I have therefore decided, and told him I'm doing this, to post my plan here now such that if he gets to thinking along those lines there'll be some level of proof that things unfolded according to a plan and any disadvantage which accrued to him was the result of a plan and not just a result of me reading his AAR.
I will say that I do know people who read his AAR and on occasion I do get a friendly taunt or two from them about some ueber-invasion off the West Coast etc but that's just friendly scare-mongering and they either know enough to know not to say anything even slightly realistic or they know too little about wargames to actually comment much at all... I had to explain to someone, over the weekend, why I was interested about the use of KB to bomb the troops in the jungle. Their response was to sympathise with "the plight of those poor guys stuck there in the jungle. Can't you rescue them or something?" Awww [:D]
Anyways, below is the plan... I think it is important to recognise two or three things as you read it:
1. I began writing this plan on 25th December 1941 gametime and finished it on about 27th or 28th December 1941 gametime.
2. This plan began being written as a way to help me keep track of what could go where and as a means of checking I could bring sufficient force to bear. As such there's a fair bit of listing of "34th Combat Engineers go to x along with units y and z "
3. I don't METT it etc as I was just writing the plan as an aide memoire.
4. I've never previously written a plan for an invasion in WiTP or AE. The reason I needed it here is that this plan brings together such disparate forces that it truly couldn't all be contained in my head - I've done a rough count and it looks like the final invasions will involve just over 300 ships, that's a big armada for the Allies to launch in January 1942.
5. As time has gone by I've found a few small additional units which can be committed to the attack. I think they muster about a Brigade's worth of additional troops. I haven't rewritten the plan as:
a) I now have a firm operational concept in my mind and don't really need to refer to the plan myself anymore.
b) especially since yesterday I don't want to make any changes which could look like I'm benefitting from reading anyone's AAR.
Any comments or questions are welcome at all.
I'll also give a short executive summary of how I see the timeline going:
1. Marcus gets hit on 12th January. It is hit by a single AVD worth of troops. If it is undefended it will fall and I can fly additional troops in from Wake Island ( which currently has 2 USMC Defence Bns, level 4 fortifications, CD guns etc ) as I organise a small reinforcement convoy from the forces left in PH.
2. I am going to hit the four unoccupied islands south-west of Paramushiro jima. I have tiny fragments of an infantry Regiment loaded onto 4 x xAKLs and a more significant portion of this regiment loaded onto an x AK ready to land on a base which is lightly defended. This force is being accompanied by an SC TF of 2 x fast BBs designed to hit and fade and make him think that this might be a real invasion. If he doesn't react to this invasion then it'll be a relatively simple matter to sneak additional transport TFs in under cover of bad weather and build one or two of these bases up to be something real and threatening. And, yes, I'm aware it'll give him 8 additional regiments to play with but he'll have to buy them out from the Home Islands and even if he does commit them it'll take time and effort to retake the jimas. Right now time and naval assets are two scarce resources for Japan. He has boatloads of LCUs everywhere but he doesn't have enough time or naval units so giving him a few more LCUs at the cost of his two most precious assets is a good trade right now... not in purely attritional terms but I'm not fighting an attritional war here, I'm being more indirect.
3. Marshalls. Obviously my plan is to hit here but if I draw KB off on a wild goose chase into this region then I am more than prepared to load up my ships and send them scattering for safety while my CVs run off elsewhere to create havoc "wherever KB isn't". I can always return later to invade the Marshalls in a month or two when KB returns to the DEI or wherever.
4. This plan is the base for improvisation. It will NEVER be enacted as written but it does provide a framework for my overall strategic goals. If KB moves to the Marshalls then my strategic goal of robbing his invasion fleet of Southern Sumatra of carrier cover will be met and I'll quite happily abandon any attempt to invade the Marshalls until such time as I drag KB elsewhere.
The point is not what I actually do ( invading and/or holding Marcus, the Kuriles and the Marshalls ), the point is to get him to react to me and, ideally without realising it, lose the strategic initiative. No invasion has to succeed, he just has to react the way I want him to and I've achieved my goal. I want to be clear on that since I don't want a situation where he moves KB into the Marshalls in two weeks, I abandon my invasion and go raiding with the forces I've gathered and then am told that this failure to "follow the plan" proves I was reading his AAR or something. If he moves KB into the area I want it pinned for most of early 1942 ( that area being Truk/Kwaj ) then I'll have fully achieved my goals, will run into the DEI and begin raiding Palau, the area around the Phillipines etc, get him to react to me and then run elsewhere.
Ok so, plan outlines strategic goals and how they might be achieved but what matters is the strategic goals, not how they are acheived. The how is highly tentative and likely to be abandoned at a moment's notice.
I'll add a couple of comments in bold as we go to highlight things which have changed since I finished writing this a couple of weeks ago....
Operation Foxworthy
Department: UN Department of International (Cunning) Affairs.
Current Date: 25th December 1941.
Position of KB: 7 days steam at cruising speed from the Home Islands
Estimated date for KB to finish replenishing: 7th January 1942
Phase I A: Aleutians
A major fleet base is being built at Adak. I want a Level 8 port with significant airfields there and will use this as the centrepoint for a growing defensive deployment to the Aleutians. My goal here is to provide a base for future, later, movements aimed at the Kuriles and Sakhalin Island in the later portions of 1942.
My Aleutians naval committment comprises 2 BBs ( the Maryland and the British BB repairing in northern America ) as well as 6 DDs. Why? Simple, I want to run a bombardment run as part of my maskirovka operations. I want to make SURE he notices the force committment and draws the necessary conclusions, the best way of ensuring he sees the force is for them to bombard Paramushiro or another occupied base.
Phase IB: Singapore/Southern Sumatra.
My goal here is to withdraw 2 Divisions of Indian troops ( some 700 AV ) from Malaysia and into Palembang under cover of AVG & RAF/RAAF Buffaloes in such a manner as to make it obvious what I'm doing but be relatively impervious to anything other than the committment of major IJN LBA forces and KB.
My ground offensives in the Phillipines are designed to draw the IJN LBA bombers into action there and make it more likely that Mike will commit KB back into the DEI. I estimate that it can arrive and pummel Palembang and Singapore and the shipping in the area ( which will maintain its presence shuttling to and from Singapore even after the evacuation has been satisfactorily completed in order to provide a tempting target ) no sooner than 5th January if steaming at full speed or 8th January if cruising.
Once KB shows up and hits the shipping and bases in the DEI I will designate that date as D-Day. If they don't show up then I'll proceed along a timeline beginning with the invasion of Marcus on or about the 14th January 1942.
Well, this all went better than expected and, at present, it looks like all I'll leave in Singapore will be a few guns from 2 Australian Bdes and, possibly, elements of a mountain gun regiment. In terms of AV Singapore will be left with a defensive AV of about 70. Everything else on the Malaysian peninsula has been removed and shuttled to Palembang.
As to Marcus - Well it looks like I'll land on the 12th/13th so my timing wasn't too bad. A day early but not too far off.
Phase IC: Marcus Island
A very small Marine force will land and attempt to capture Marcus Island. I will time this landing to either coincide with the landings in the Kuriles as part of Phase II OR if KB shows no signs of showing up in the DEI in January to try to draw a reaction from KB, drawing it south before showing it a much larger invasion of the Kuriles as part of Phase II. The Marcus Island invasion only comprises a platoon or so of men on a fast transport. The plan is just to pinprick, not to hold or anything like that. If he has a naval garrison force there then it would take so much to overcome that it would leave Phase 3 fatally weak. So, I only pinprick.
Since KB is moored off Manilla I have decided to let the Kuriles invasion occur 1 week after Marcus instead of going in simultaneously. Draw him into the centre, then draw him north. With a little luck the addition of the action around the Marshalls might make him see a pattern whereby I'm drawing him away from the Kuriles. That certainly is something I'm going to try to sell him as part of the now-improvising deception plan. "See all these ships at the Marshalls drawing you here? Well, that put you out of position to stop that huge invasion of the Kuriles didn't it? I hope you enjoy my strategic bombing once the weather clears. Even a small bit of chat about the identified bottlenecks in Home Island production should sell him the idea of the Kuriles as a base he MUST defend and retake and draw his CVs north.
Phase II: Kurile Islands, D + 4.
4 xAKLs have split 1 Bn of 161st Infantry Regiment between them and will proceed west to land them on the 4 Japanese bases running from Onnekotan-jima to Shimushiri-jima. When Mike comments on this choice I will say that I am only planning to hold two of the bases ( need for mutual support etc ) and the other two are decoys designed to buy the two real bases time to fortify. Since I've attacked with elements of a single unit he won't know which bases are unloading extra AAA, Base Forces etc. Attacking with elements of a single unit also helps me protect the BFs, AAA, CD units etc from the harsh "winter invasion rule" losses. I'll tell him all this and since, by the time I begin these landings, KB will be back in Japan replenishing.
Paramushiro Jima will be bombarded by the 2 BBs and 6 DDs stationed at Adak. I believe that no Japanese commander would:
a) believe 2 BBs would be risked so close to the Home Islands without carrier cover
b) believe that BBs bombardment TFs and multiple island invasions with multiple amphibious TFs would be anything other than the beginning of a real offensive.
Pre-positioned Catalinas will fly fragments of other units in to each of the occupied bases such that when Mike mouses over them/recons them he will identify multiple "units" at each base and will more readily buy the lie I've told him about my reason for initiating the attack with small elements of a single unit.
I've shifted the Kuriles invasion back from January 18th to somewhere around January 20th in order to achieve the phasing I want now that he didn't co-operate by sending KB into the DEI and it only has to react from east of Manilla.
Phase III: Marshall Islands D + 12
Forces from Pearl Harbour, Australia, Britain, New Zealand, France and Fiji will all meet up at Canton Island (possibly Fiji depending on how quickly the US ships reach Canton ) and unload there before expanding the port as rapidly as possible. All Base Forces, AAA and CD units will be left at Canton to continue expanding that base while the combat units - 1 Marine Regiment, 1 US Army Regiment, 1 Tank Bn, 2 Combat Engineer Regiments, 2 Marine Defence Bns, 2 New Zealand Bns and various other small detachments from the French, American and Australian/New Zealand armies.
In total this comprises a force of some 550 AV but much of the force is poorly led, very poorly experienced and has little preparation time so I really am relying on numbers to overcome a lot of problems. 550AV is a vastly misleading number in terms of effective combat power generated.
This will be pushed back a little too. Instead of D+12 it'll probably only arrive on D+ 18 or so as unloading has been slower than I would have liked and I'm planning to take a more circuitous route to the Marshalls than I originally planned.
Why Canton/Fiji?
Ideally I wanted to amphibious-load all of my combat units and ship them right into the lion's den. That would save me 2 weeks of preparation. Unfortunately Pearl Harbour had FAR too few APs, xAPs, AKs and xAKs to enable me to load the troops such that they could all unload in a single day ( 250 points of troops will unload from an xAP or xAK in a day while 600 points will unload from an AP or AK ). So, a US Regiment will take roughly 10 x APs and 16 xAKs to fully unload unload in a single day. That number actually exceeds my sealift capability from Pearl right now ( although I do have transports hot-footing it there from Panama, CONUSA and the Aleutians as rapidly as possible ).
So, what I've decided to do is ship everything from Oz, NZ, CONUSA and Hawaii to Canton or Fiji, leave all the support troops at whichever base I choose and then use all the xAPs, x AKs and xAKLs I've gathered to combat-load ONLY the actual combat units. ( I may include a single BF for Roi-Namur but that'll be it. ) By pooling all of my xAKs, xAPs etc I will be able to get the maximum amount of sealift possible for my combat forces and have the best chance of loading them such that they can rapidly unload in a single day once they reach Roi-Namur and other targets.
I'd appreciate if someone could confirm to me that xAKs, xAKLs and xAPs all unload at a rate of 250 points of troops ( or cargo for the xAKs/xAKLs ) per day? If that can be confirmed that will help me ensure I get everything I need ashore on Day 1 for the atolls. My plan is to make up in sheer numbers of transports for the terrible unloading rates and to lift in my support units only after the invasions have occurred and the ships have moved back to Fiji to load those troops and ship them back to Marcus. Risky but the only way I can pull this off right now without crippling the assault waves.
US Forces from PH
1. 8th Marine Regiment (142 AV) + 193rd Tank Bn ( 60 AV ) + 34th Combat Engineers ( 63 AV )+ 19th Combat Engineers ( 63 AV ): Prepping for Roi-Namur. 2,4 at present. Important as it is a level 4 airfield and will prevent the Japanese basing Zeroes and Bettys into the midst of my Area of Operations.
2. 34th Infantry Regiment ( 125 AV ) + 6th Marine Defence Bn (60 AV ): Prepping for Ponape. 1,2 at present with unlimited troop basing. If I didn't take it it would be the obvious place for him to begin basing Bettyes and Zeroes with an Aviation HQ in order to begin interdicting my SLOCs into the Marshalls and supporting manoeuvre by KB against my holdings.
3. Palmyra Detachment ( 6 AV ) Prepping for Eniwetok. It is currently 3,1 and can be built to 5,1. Troop basing is limited to 6,000 troops but denying it as a base to the enemy is important. Put 50 Zeroes on CAP and it would provide an excellent shelter for his fleet after surface combat in the Marshalls.
4. 7th Marine Defence Bn prepping for Mili. A small base but one which can host seaplanes and even fighters. Worth trying to take on the cheap if at all possible.
NZ and French Forces:
1. Tahiti Detachment ( 6 AV )- Prepping for Kusaie island. 1,3 and unlimited troop basing. A hugely important island which I'm sure he won't have noticed yet.
2. Palmyra Defence Bn ( 10 AV ) Prepping for Makin 1,2 and 30,000 troops capacity. I still hold Makin but it'll be a nice fallback and 10 AV won't hold Palmyra against anything solid he cares to throw at it so it might as well go to taking the Marshalls out en masse.
3. 29th and 34th New Zealand Bns (70 AV combined but very low experience ) are prepping for Wotje.
4. New Caledonia Detachment prepping for Wotje
I've managed to find a few more units for the Assault from the US and Commonwealth forces. I'd say these additional units amount to maybe 2 regiments worth of troops so nothing amazing extra but still better than having two regiments less [:D]
Support Forces:
A. Ground Forces:
Hawaiian USAAF HQ. Comes with lots of torpedoes and support and will do better work here acting as a threat than back in PH.
2 Marine CD Bns and 4 AAA Regiments.
2 USAAF Base Forces with Aviation support for about 60 planes now, growing to 120 as they fill out.
D Detachment USN Port Service.
2 x Engineer Bn.
Field Artillery Regiment.
B. Aerial Forces:
Long-range support will be provided by B-17s flying from Wake which are being pre-positioned at Hawaii as we speak. The B-17s will be used to fly low-level ground attack missions against the defending forces and suppress them, in series, as the invasions go in. I expect the disruption they and the CV-based air will cause will be crucial to the success of the amphibious invasions.
Additionally some F4s will be taken aboard CVs as extra protection from enemy air attack. If this necessitates offloading of SBDs then those SBDs will be landed in the Marshalls to further improve their anti-naval firepower.
C. Naval Forces:
1. 6 x S-class submarines are establishing a picket line running from Eniwetok to Ponape to guard against intrusions from the direction of Truk.
2. ALL AOs, AEs, AGs, AVDs, AVPs etc are accompanying the fleet. I am not only carrying out this operation but also seeking to set the stage for post-Foxworthy operations... I will go into a little detail as to what those will be later.
3. The US Pacific Fleet will be committed to this operation. I WANT to show him strength and I WANT to provide him with a tasty target. I also want him to focus on my strength and length of committment to the Marshalls by keeping my surface fleet there as a lure long after my CVs have departed the area and are making their way to the first post-Foxworthy Operation ( which be called Operation Iron Shadow )
Operation Iron Shadow ( Phase 4 ).
Basic concept only for now....
Operation Iron Shadow is designed to take advantage of the CV and fleet refuelling and replenishment options in forward areas running from Midway through the Marshalls, the Rabaul/PM area, through Darwin and up through Java to Colombo.
Once I have his CVs localised to the Marshalls my CVs, which will have been running without naval search, radars etc ( basically under the tightest of EMCON ) will show up at another point on his perimeter where I will either:
a) have built a base to a level compatible with refuelling and reprovisioning them or
b) will have stationed such AOs and AEs etc as are required to refuel and reprovision them in the absence of a suitable base.
They will then reprovision and launch another spoiling attack from that base before retreating, refuelling and reprovisioning and heading elsewhere along the perimeter to dart in, launch a couple of raids and dash out again.
My goal is basically to use my exterior lines to my advantage by allowing redeployment safe from the fear of being spotted by his patrol planes and work along the perimeter of the "wheel" stabbing inwards along the "spokes" from time to time.
My guess is that for a period of time Mike will seek to pin my CVs down and cede me the iniative. Over time, however, he will certainly re-evaluate things and leave my CVs to their own devices ( using his LBA as a screen ) while his CVs cover invasions of his choosing. While that's certain it is also true that I think it will take him some time to re-adjust and re-evaluate things and that for that period of time he will be reactive rather than proactive. I also think that that period of time might grant me further opportunities to wreak havoc and if I can spot them and have the resources available to take advantage of them I might be able to destabilise him even more thus putting off the date he regains his equilibrium even further.
Do I know what those opportunities might be? Not really, this is manoeuvrist doctrine after all. It is all about uncertainty, change, chaos and the grasping of fleeting opportunities. I have an idea that the opportunities will lie either in destroying counter-offensives in one region unsupported by KB as it reacts to my CVs in another theatre OR that I may get the opportunity to push forces forward from Oz and CONUSA into the New Guinea or DEI areas before he can finish taking them.
Australia:
1. Port Development:
a) Townsville is being developed to a Level 7 port to aid embarkation of LCUs bound for the Rabaul / New Guinea front and, eventually, provide forward provisioning for CVs if force back from Rabaul.
b) Brisbane is being developed to a Level 7 port to become the main base supporting CV and battleline operations in the Rabaul area until such time as Rabaul can take over such support. In addition if Rabaul and Port Moresby fall then Brisbane will be my most forward CV base.
c) Darwin: Being developed to a Level 6 Port to help sustain BBs and below for combat in the Timor region when the time comes. Additionally TKs are running fuel to Darwin from the DEI so it can act as a one-stop refuelling base for my CVs in Phase 4. Subsidiary bases in Northern Australia are being abandoned with their troops making for Darwin to help speed its development.
d) Perth is developing into a Level 7 port and already has a TK/xAK ferry service established to Capetown. If disaster ensues and Northern Australia falls my shipping will have to use maximum speed to escape and will thus need significants amount of fuel for emergency refuelling before fleeing to Capetwon/India. They'll also need CV support in order to survive. Perth is being developed with this in mind.
2. Aerial deployments:
a) Mainly training, training, training.
b) Small deployments of Wirraways and Hudsons forward as it would be suspicious not to maintain some level of forward deployment but, really, the job of the RAAF is to train until such time as I can either commit it along the New Guinean/Timor axis or it must be committed to the defence of Darwin.
3. LCUs:
a) Australian Armoured units are making for Eastern Australia as I've been very impressed by armour's ability to cause huge casualties to Japanese infantry-heavy LCUs at little cost to themselves. I plan to seed the atolls I capture with these small Australian armoured units. Their tanks are often improvised and poorly armoured so they aren't of much use vs full-strength IJA divisions with significant artillery and anti-armour artillery. When facing up against enemy SNLFs and NLFs which have almost no heavy weaponry and are forced to Shock Attack I expect these improvised vehicles to do well.
b) Australian ground forces are concentrating at Perth, Brisbane ( secondary concentrations ) and Townsville and Darwin ( primary concentrations ). The concept is to have strong defences at Perth and Brisbane if things go horribly wrong whilst pushing the manoeuvre units I can afford to lose as far forward as possible to bases which are designated as debarkation points for the forward fight ( in Timor and around Truk/Rabaul/Marshalls ). As PP allow I will ship Bdes forward from Darwin and Townsville.
4. Emergency Replenishment:
Dutch, British and other AOs have been steadily fleeing to Australia with full loads of fuel over recent weeks. They are being held in reserve in a relatively well-guarded TF to refuel Allied CVs west of Java should KB intervene and Allied CVs be cut off from Darwin and Java/Sumatra. It is anticipated that if they were required it would be in a situation where Allied CVs and the Allied battleline would be fleeing, at high speed, from KB with the intention of fleeing to either Aden or Capetown. By allowing me an additional day's worth full speed steaming west of Java I expect to be able to outdistance KB even if surprised/outmanoeuvred around the DEI.
Burma
2 Chinese Corps are already in-theatre. Additional Allied forces are following them overland from India while transports are dumping supplies at the rate of 60,000 tons every 2 weeks into Rangoon. As far as I am aware Mike hasn't spotted these transports at all yet. His recon is very spotty.
Mike appears to be moving overland towards Moulmein both from the south and east. That suits me fine as I will establish my first line of defence at Moulmein and then draw further Chinese Corps out as that front stabilises. My goal is to deploy 2 Chinese Armies in the Burma Theatre by March 1942 with the first helping the Allies hold at Moulmein while the second takes the overland route via the trails south from Lashio.
By bringing additional pressure to bear on the land routes from Burma to Thailand I am hoping to continue drawing forces off from his Sumatran invasion force.
Rangoon now has over 100,000 tons of supplies. I can't figure out how to get this to flow into China though. Anyone got any ideas on that? I don't see a huge problem with getting the supplies in Rangoon to well over 300,000 by the end of January if I really want to but there's not much point doing that if I can't push the supplies into China. An additional 150,000 tons of supplies in China would be quite a gamechanger though so I'd like to do that if at all possible.
Force Committment
In the long run I think that between the Marshalls, the Aleutians, the forces required to besiege Manilla and what I can draw off into Burma he will be unable to generate the 5 divisions + needed to land and take Oosthaven or Palembang well into the end of March/April 1942, by which time my fortifications, preparation and experience levels will all have risen such that his force committment will also rise.
In short, the longer he waits, the more he has to commit and the less he has available to conduct other, simultaneous, operations.
Even in a worst case scenario I think Southern Sumatra will strengthen sufficiently that it will tie up the Malaysian and Phillipine forces for a month or more once Manilla and Singapore both fall. All of that additional time will buy the preservation of India and Australia.
This is the key. ALL of the above is designed to draw forces off from his invasion of Southern Palembang. If at any stage a portion of this plan needs to be ommitted in order to further that goal then it'll be ommitted. No point winning an operational victory at the cost of the strategic goal.
The longer I can keep him from landing in Southern Sumatra the more strongly entrenched my forces will be and the greater their experience. This translates into a need for even more IJA troops. At a certain point in time with the troops needed to take Sumatra climbing every day and diversionary operations going on in the Pacific and DEI drawing troops away from the spearpoint it may even be possible to reach a situation where he cannot, in the first half of 1942, meet all his various committments with the IJA and IJN assets available.
If he juggles them properly that situation will never arise but juggling them properly will require accepting a much greater rate of loss for a short time in order to lower the overall losses over a long period of time. It is the inverse of the choice made by the British in late 1944 in north-west Europe and the reason I think MOntgomery should be castigated. Forget about Normandy and Market Garden etc. His real treason against the Allied cause lay not in these battles but in his strategic narcissism which led him to refuse a more difficult "political sell" which was more strategically advantageous. Unfortunately so few discussions go into the impact of logistics on strategy and thus never get to the heart of the matter.
Anyways, I digress.... It is ALL about logistics and this is ALL about taking the initiative and using that to stretch the IJA and IJN more thinly in such a manner that they no longer quite have the assets available in the right place at the right time do do what THEY want in a timely manner.
So, there you have it, comments welcome. I caution again though that this is only an aide memoire for me and that as a plan it is merely intended to be the bedrock for improvisation. If anything turns out to happen in-game exactly according to the plan no-one will be more surprised than I. Fingerspitzgefeuhl ( sic ) and coup d'oeuil are the keys here, not long written plans.
We spoke about this and fairly quickly he changed his mind and was quite agreeable about the fact that a random phrase which is similar to something he said doesn't necessarily mean I was cheating. I suppose that seeing the biggest strategic asset Japan has being misused to hit insignificant targets brings the word nuke and bug to more than just my mind as nuke has entered common parlance as a means of describing overwhelming force and bug has entered the parlance to describe insignificant yet difficult to eradicate units.
Anyways we're over this issue but all of my work in psychiatry has shown me that a person's past thought processes are the best guide to their future thought processes. If you read AARs here you'll find that a player who once finds that the game's model is biased against him will, over time, find multiple other areas of the game which are also biased against him. E.g. A player whose fighters don't fight properly is likely to be one whose bombers hit "nothing", whose ASW TFs serve merely as meat on the table and so on and so forth. Their imprecations do, as usual, say more about how they are than about how the game is. That's a truism which applies in a lot of other areas of life also. A player who greets setbacks and advances with equanimity is likely to continue to do so.
In any case this means that, in my opinion, there's a high chance that if 1EyedJacks would misinterpret a chance phrase and construe it as proof of cheating then he may well wonder if I'm cheating if, a few weeks down the road, this plan works and he gets to thinking how he was misled and misdirected. I have therefore decided, and told him I'm doing this, to post my plan here now such that if he gets to thinking along those lines there'll be some level of proof that things unfolded according to a plan and any disadvantage which accrued to him was the result of a plan and not just a result of me reading his AAR.
I will say that I do know people who read his AAR and on occasion I do get a friendly taunt or two from them about some ueber-invasion off the West Coast etc but that's just friendly scare-mongering and they either know enough to know not to say anything even slightly realistic or they know too little about wargames to actually comment much at all... I had to explain to someone, over the weekend, why I was interested about the use of KB to bomb the troops in the jungle. Their response was to sympathise with "the plight of those poor guys stuck there in the jungle. Can't you rescue them or something?" Awww [:D]
Anyways, below is the plan... I think it is important to recognise two or three things as you read it:
1. I began writing this plan on 25th December 1941 gametime and finished it on about 27th or 28th December 1941 gametime.
2. This plan began being written as a way to help me keep track of what could go where and as a means of checking I could bring sufficient force to bear. As such there's a fair bit of listing of "34th Combat Engineers go to x along with units y and z "
3. I don't METT it etc as I was just writing the plan as an aide memoire.
4. I've never previously written a plan for an invasion in WiTP or AE. The reason I needed it here is that this plan brings together such disparate forces that it truly couldn't all be contained in my head - I've done a rough count and it looks like the final invasions will involve just over 300 ships, that's a big armada for the Allies to launch in January 1942.
5. As time has gone by I've found a few small additional units which can be committed to the attack. I think they muster about a Brigade's worth of additional troops. I haven't rewritten the plan as:
a) I now have a firm operational concept in my mind and don't really need to refer to the plan myself anymore.
b) especially since yesterday I don't want to make any changes which could look like I'm benefitting from reading anyone's AAR.
Any comments or questions are welcome at all.
I'll also give a short executive summary of how I see the timeline going:
1. Marcus gets hit on 12th January. It is hit by a single AVD worth of troops. If it is undefended it will fall and I can fly additional troops in from Wake Island ( which currently has 2 USMC Defence Bns, level 4 fortifications, CD guns etc ) as I organise a small reinforcement convoy from the forces left in PH.
2. I am going to hit the four unoccupied islands south-west of Paramushiro jima. I have tiny fragments of an infantry Regiment loaded onto 4 x xAKLs and a more significant portion of this regiment loaded onto an x AK ready to land on a base which is lightly defended. This force is being accompanied by an SC TF of 2 x fast BBs designed to hit and fade and make him think that this might be a real invasion. If he doesn't react to this invasion then it'll be a relatively simple matter to sneak additional transport TFs in under cover of bad weather and build one or two of these bases up to be something real and threatening. And, yes, I'm aware it'll give him 8 additional regiments to play with but he'll have to buy them out from the Home Islands and even if he does commit them it'll take time and effort to retake the jimas. Right now time and naval assets are two scarce resources for Japan. He has boatloads of LCUs everywhere but he doesn't have enough time or naval units so giving him a few more LCUs at the cost of his two most precious assets is a good trade right now... not in purely attritional terms but I'm not fighting an attritional war here, I'm being more indirect.
3. Marshalls. Obviously my plan is to hit here but if I draw KB off on a wild goose chase into this region then I am more than prepared to load up my ships and send them scattering for safety while my CVs run off elsewhere to create havoc "wherever KB isn't". I can always return later to invade the Marshalls in a month or two when KB returns to the DEI or wherever.
4. This plan is the base for improvisation. It will NEVER be enacted as written but it does provide a framework for my overall strategic goals. If KB moves to the Marshalls then my strategic goal of robbing his invasion fleet of Southern Sumatra of carrier cover will be met and I'll quite happily abandon any attempt to invade the Marshalls until such time as I drag KB elsewhere.
The point is not what I actually do ( invading and/or holding Marcus, the Kuriles and the Marshalls ), the point is to get him to react to me and, ideally without realising it, lose the strategic initiative. No invasion has to succeed, he just has to react the way I want him to and I've achieved my goal. I want to be clear on that since I don't want a situation where he moves KB into the Marshalls in two weeks, I abandon my invasion and go raiding with the forces I've gathered and then am told that this failure to "follow the plan" proves I was reading his AAR or something. If he moves KB into the area I want it pinned for most of early 1942 ( that area being Truk/Kwaj ) then I'll have fully achieved my goals, will run into the DEI and begin raiding Palau, the area around the Phillipines etc, get him to react to me and then run elsewhere.
Ok so, plan outlines strategic goals and how they might be achieved but what matters is the strategic goals, not how they are acheived. The how is highly tentative and likely to be abandoned at a moment's notice.
I'll add a couple of comments in bold as we go to highlight things which have changed since I finished writing this a couple of weeks ago....
Operation Foxworthy
Department: UN Department of International (Cunning) Affairs.
Current Date: 25th December 1941.
Position of KB: 7 days steam at cruising speed from the Home Islands
Estimated date for KB to finish replenishing: 7th January 1942
Phase I A: Aleutians
A major fleet base is being built at Adak. I want a Level 8 port with significant airfields there and will use this as the centrepoint for a growing defensive deployment to the Aleutians. My goal here is to provide a base for future, later, movements aimed at the Kuriles and Sakhalin Island in the later portions of 1942.
My Aleutians naval committment comprises 2 BBs ( the Maryland and the British BB repairing in northern America ) as well as 6 DDs. Why? Simple, I want to run a bombardment run as part of my maskirovka operations. I want to make SURE he notices the force committment and draws the necessary conclusions, the best way of ensuring he sees the force is for them to bombard Paramushiro or another occupied base.
Phase IB: Singapore/Southern Sumatra.
My goal here is to withdraw 2 Divisions of Indian troops ( some 700 AV ) from Malaysia and into Palembang under cover of AVG & RAF/RAAF Buffaloes in such a manner as to make it obvious what I'm doing but be relatively impervious to anything other than the committment of major IJN LBA forces and KB.
My ground offensives in the Phillipines are designed to draw the IJN LBA bombers into action there and make it more likely that Mike will commit KB back into the DEI. I estimate that it can arrive and pummel Palembang and Singapore and the shipping in the area ( which will maintain its presence shuttling to and from Singapore even after the evacuation has been satisfactorily completed in order to provide a tempting target ) no sooner than 5th January if steaming at full speed or 8th January if cruising.
Once KB shows up and hits the shipping and bases in the DEI I will designate that date as D-Day. If they don't show up then I'll proceed along a timeline beginning with the invasion of Marcus on or about the 14th January 1942.
Well, this all went better than expected and, at present, it looks like all I'll leave in Singapore will be a few guns from 2 Australian Bdes and, possibly, elements of a mountain gun regiment. In terms of AV Singapore will be left with a defensive AV of about 70. Everything else on the Malaysian peninsula has been removed and shuttled to Palembang.
As to Marcus - Well it looks like I'll land on the 12th/13th so my timing wasn't too bad. A day early but not too far off.
Phase IC: Marcus Island
A very small Marine force will land and attempt to capture Marcus Island. I will time this landing to either coincide with the landings in the Kuriles as part of Phase II OR if KB shows no signs of showing up in the DEI in January to try to draw a reaction from KB, drawing it south before showing it a much larger invasion of the Kuriles as part of Phase II. The Marcus Island invasion only comprises a platoon or so of men on a fast transport. The plan is just to pinprick, not to hold or anything like that. If he has a naval garrison force there then it would take so much to overcome that it would leave Phase 3 fatally weak. So, I only pinprick.
Since KB is moored off Manilla I have decided to let the Kuriles invasion occur 1 week after Marcus instead of going in simultaneously. Draw him into the centre, then draw him north. With a little luck the addition of the action around the Marshalls might make him see a pattern whereby I'm drawing him away from the Kuriles. That certainly is something I'm going to try to sell him as part of the now-improvising deception plan. "See all these ships at the Marshalls drawing you here? Well, that put you out of position to stop that huge invasion of the Kuriles didn't it? I hope you enjoy my strategic bombing once the weather clears. Even a small bit of chat about the identified bottlenecks in Home Island production should sell him the idea of the Kuriles as a base he MUST defend and retake and draw his CVs north.
Phase II: Kurile Islands, D + 4.
4 xAKLs have split 1 Bn of 161st Infantry Regiment between them and will proceed west to land them on the 4 Japanese bases running from Onnekotan-jima to Shimushiri-jima. When Mike comments on this choice I will say that I am only planning to hold two of the bases ( need for mutual support etc ) and the other two are decoys designed to buy the two real bases time to fortify. Since I've attacked with elements of a single unit he won't know which bases are unloading extra AAA, Base Forces etc. Attacking with elements of a single unit also helps me protect the BFs, AAA, CD units etc from the harsh "winter invasion rule" losses. I'll tell him all this and since, by the time I begin these landings, KB will be back in Japan replenishing.
Paramushiro Jima will be bombarded by the 2 BBs and 6 DDs stationed at Adak. I believe that no Japanese commander would:
a) believe 2 BBs would be risked so close to the Home Islands without carrier cover
b) believe that BBs bombardment TFs and multiple island invasions with multiple amphibious TFs would be anything other than the beginning of a real offensive.
Pre-positioned Catalinas will fly fragments of other units in to each of the occupied bases such that when Mike mouses over them/recons them he will identify multiple "units" at each base and will more readily buy the lie I've told him about my reason for initiating the attack with small elements of a single unit.
I've shifted the Kuriles invasion back from January 18th to somewhere around January 20th in order to achieve the phasing I want now that he didn't co-operate by sending KB into the DEI and it only has to react from east of Manilla.
Phase III: Marshall Islands D + 12
Forces from Pearl Harbour, Australia, Britain, New Zealand, France and Fiji will all meet up at Canton Island (possibly Fiji depending on how quickly the US ships reach Canton ) and unload there before expanding the port as rapidly as possible. All Base Forces, AAA and CD units will be left at Canton to continue expanding that base while the combat units - 1 Marine Regiment, 1 US Army Regiment, 1 Tank Bn, 2 Combat Engineer Regiments, 2 Marine Defence Bns, 2 New Zealand Bns and various other small detachments from the French, American and Australian/New Zealand armies.
In total this comprises a force of some 550 AV but much of the force is poorly led, very poorly experienced and has little preparation time so I really am relying on numbers to overcome a lot of problems. 550AV is a vastly misleading number in terms of effective combat power generated.
This will be pushed back a little too. Instead of D+12 it'll probably only arrive on D+ 18 or so as unloading has been slower than I would have liked and I'm planning to take a more circuitous route to the Marshalls than I originally planned.
Why Canton/Fiji?
Ideally I wanted to amphibious-load all of my combat units and ship them right into the lion's den. That would save me 2 weeks of preparation. Unfortunately Pearl Harbour had FAR too few APs, xAPs, AKs and xAKs to enable me to load the troops such that they could all unload in a single day ( 250 points of troops will unload from an xAP or xAK in a day while 600 points will unload from an AP or AK ). So, a US Regiment will take roughly 10 x APs and 16 xAKs to fully unload unload in a single day. That number actually exceeds my sealift capability from Pearl right now ( although I do have transports hot-footing it there from Panama, CONUSA and the Aleutians as rapidly as possible ).
So, what I've decided to do is ship everything from Oz, NZ, CONUSA and Hawaii to Canton or Fiji, leave all the support troops at whichever base I choose and then use all the xAPs, x AKs and xAKLs I've gathered to combat-load ONLY the actual combat units. ( I may include a single BF for Roi-Namur but that'll be it. ) By pooling all of my xAKs, xAPs etc I will be able to get the maximum amount of sealift possible for my combat forces and have the best chance of loading them such that they can rapidly unload in a single day once they reach Roi-Namur and other targets.
I'd appreciate if someone could confirm to me that xAKs, xAKLs and xAPs all unload at a rate of 250 points of troops ( or cargo for the xAKs/xAKLs ) per day? If that can be confirmed that will help me ensure I get everything I need ashore on Day 1 for the atolls. My plan is to make up in sheer numbers of transports for the terrible unloading rates and to lift in my support units only after the invasions have occurred and the ships have moved back to Fiji to load those troops and ship them back to Marcus. Risky but the only way I can pull this off right now without crippling the assault waves.
US Forces from PH
1. 8th Marine Regiment (142 AV) + 193rd Tank Bn ( 60 AV ) + 34th Combat Engineers ( 63 AV )+ 19th Combat Engineers ( 63 AV ): Prepping for Roi-Namur. 2,4 at present. Important as it is a level 4 airfield and will prevent the Japanese basing Zeroes and Bettys into the midst of my Area of Operations.
2. 34th Infantry Regiment ( 125 AV ) + 6th Marine Defence Bn (60 AV ): Prepping for Ponape. 1,2 at present with unlimited troop basing. If I didn't take it it would be the obvious place for him to begin basing Bettyes and Zeroes with an Aviation HQ in order to begin interdicting my SLOCs into the Marshalls and supporting manoeuvre by KB against my holdings.
3. Palmyra Detachment ( 6 AV ) Prepping for Eniwetok. It is currently 3,1 and can be built to 5,1. Troop basing is limited to 6,000 troops but denying it as a base to the enemy is important. Put 50 Zeroes on CAP and it would provide an excellent shelter for his fleet after surface combat in the Marshalls.
4. 7th Marine Defence Bn prepping for Mili. A small base but one which can host seaplanes and even fighters. Worth trying to take on the cheap if at all possible.
NZ and French Forces:
1. Tahiti Detachment ( 6 AV )- Prepping for Kusaie island. 1,3 and unlimited troop basing. A hugely important island which I'm sure he won't have noticed yet.
2. Palmyra Defence Bn ( 10 AV ) Prepping for Makin 1,2 and 30,000 troops capacity. I still hold Makin but it'll be a nice fallback and 10 AV won't hold Palmyra against anything solid he cares to throw at it so it might as well go to taking the Marshalls out en masse.
3. 29th and 34th New Zealand Bns (70 AV combined but very low experience ) are prepping for Wotje.
4. New Caledonia Detachment prepping for Wotje
I've managed to find a few more units for the Assault from the US and Commonwealth forces. I'd say these additional units amount to maybe 2 regiments worth of troops so nothing amazing extra but still better than having two regiments less [:D]
Support Forces:
A. Ground Forces:
Hawaiian USAAF HQ. Comes with lots of torpedoes and support and will do better work here acting as a threat than back in PH.
2 Marine CD Bns and 4 AAA Regiments.
2 USAAF Base Forces with Aviation support for about 60 planes now, growing to 120 as they fill out.
D Detachment USN Port Service.
2 x Engineer Bn.
Field Artillery Regiment.
B. Aerial Forces:
Long-range support will be provided by B-17s flying from Wake which are being pre-positioned at Hawaii as we speak. The B-17s will be used to fly low-level ground attack missions against the defending forces and suppress them, in series, as the invasions go in. I expect the disruption they and the CV-based air will cause will be crucial to the success of the amphibious invasions.
Additionally some F4s will be taken aboard CVs as extra protection from enemy air attack. If this necessitates offloading of SBDs then those SBDs will be landed in the Marshalls to further improve their anti-naval firepower.
C. Naval Forces:
1. 6 x S-class submarines are establishing a picket line running from Eniwetok to Ponape to guard against intrusions from the direction of Truk.
2. ALL AOs, AEs, AGs, AVDs, AVPs etc are accompanying the fleet. I am not only carrying out this operation but also seeking to set the stage for post-Foxworthy operations... I will go into a little detail as to what those will be later.
3. The US Pacific Fleet will be committed to this operation. I WANT to show him strength and I WANT to provide him with a tasty target. I also want him to focus on my strength and length of committment to the Marshalls by keeping my surface fleet there as a lure long after my CVs have departed the area and are making their way to the first post-Foxworthy Operation ( which be called Operation Iron Shadow )
Operation Iron Shadow ( Phase 4 ).
Basic concept only for now....
Operation Iron Shadow is designed to take advantage of the CV and fleet refuelling and replenishment options in forward areas running from Midway through the Marshalls, the Rabaul/PM area, through Darwin and up through Java to Colombo.
Once I have his CVs localised to the Marshalls my CVs, which will have been running without naval search, radars etc ( basically under the tightest of EMCON ) will show up at another point on his perimeter where I will either:
a) have built a base to a level compatible with refuelling and reprovisioning them or
b) will have stationed such AOs and AEs etc as are required to refuel and reprovision them in the absence of a suitable base.
They will then reprovision and launch another spoiling attack from that base before retreating, refuelling and reprovisioning and heading elsewhere along the perimeter to dart in, launch a couple of raids and dash out again.
My goal is basically to use my exterior lines to my advantage by allowing redeployment safe from the fear of being spotted by his patrol planes and work along the perimeter of the "wheel" stabbing inwards along the "spokes" from time to time.
My guess is that for a period of time Mike will seek to pin my CVs down and cede me the iniative. Over time, however, he will certainly re-evaluate things and leave my CVs to their own devices ( using his LBA as a screen ) while his CVs cover invasions of his choosing. While that's certain it is also true that I think it will take him some time to re-adjust and re-evaluate things and that for that period of time he will be reactive rather than proactive. I also think that that period of time might grant me further opportunities to wreak havoc and if I can spot them and have the resources available to take advantage of them I might be able to destabilise him even more thus putting off the date he regains his equilibrium even further.
Do I know what those opportunities might be? Not really, this is manoeuvrist doctrine after all. It is all about uncertainty, change, chaos and the grasping of fleeting opportunities. I have an idea that the opportunities will lie either in destroying counter-offensives in one region unsupported by KB as it reacts to my CVs in another theatre OR that I may get the opportunity to push forces forward from Oz and CONUSA into the New Guinea or DEI areas before he can finish taking them.
Australia:
1. Port Development:
a) Townsville is being developed to a Level 7 port to aid embarkation of LCUs bound for the Rabaul / New Guinea front and, eventually, provide forward provisioning for CVs if force back from Rabaul.
b) Brisbane is being developed to a Level 7 port to become the main base supporting CV and battleline operations in the Rabaul area until such time as Rabaul can take over such support. In addition if Rabaul and Port Moresby fall then Brisbane will be my most forward CV base.
c) Darwin: Being developed to a Level 6 Port to help sustain BBs and below for combat in the Timor region when the time comes. Additionally TKs are running fuel to Darwin from the DEI so it can act as a one-stop refuelling base for my CVs in Phase 4. Subsidiary bases in Northern Australia are being abandoned with their troops making for Darwin to help speed its development.
d) Perth is developing into a Level 7 port and already has a TK/xAK ferry service established to Capetown. If disaster ensues and Northern Australia falls my shipping will have to use maximum speed to escape and will thus need significants amount of fuel for emergency refuelling before fleeing to Capetwon/India. They'll also need CV support in order to survive. Perth is being developed with this in mind.
2. Aerial deployments:
a) Mainly training, training, training.
b) Small deployments of Wirraways and Hudsons forward as it would be suspicious not to maintain some level of forward deployment but, really, the job of the RAAF is to train until such time as I can either commit it along the New Guinean/Timor axis or it must be committed to the defence of Darwin.
3. LCUs:
a) Australian Armoured units are making for Eastern Australia as I've been very impressed by armour's ability to cause huge casualties to Japanese infantry-heavy LCUs at little cost to themselves. I plan to seed the atolls I capture with these small Australian armoured units. Their tanks are often improvised and poorly armoured so they aren't of much use vs full-strength IJA divisions with significant artillery and anti-armour artillery. When facing up against enemy SNLFs and NLFs which have almost no heavy weaponry and are forced to Shock Attack I expect these improvised vehicles to do well.
b) Australian ground forces are concentrating at Perth, Brisbane ( secondary concentrations ) and Townsville and Darwin ( primary concentrations ). The concept is to have strong defences at Perth and Brisbane if things go horribly wrong whilst pushing the manoeuvre units I can afford to lose as far forward as possible to bases which are designated as debarkation points for the forward fight ( in Timor and around Truk/Rabaul/Marshalls ). As PP allow I will ship Bdes forward from Darwin and Townsville.
4. Emergency Replenishment:
Dutch, British and other AOs have been steadily fleeing to Australia with full loads of fuel over recent weeks. They are being held in reserve in a relatively well-guarded TF to refuel Allied CVs west of Java should KB intervene and Allied CVs be cut off from Darwin and Java/Sumatra. It is anticipated that if they were required it would be in a situation where Allied CVs and the Allied battleline would be fleeing, at high speed, from KB with the intention of fleeing to either Aden or Capetown. By allowing me an additional day's worth full speed steaming west of Java I expect to be able to outdistance KB even if surprised/outmanoeuvred around the DEI.
Burma
2 Chinese Corps are already in-theatre. Additional Allied forces are following them overland from India while transports are dumping supplies at the rate of 60,000 tons every 2 weeks into Rangoon. As far as I am aware Mike hasn't spotted these transports at all yet. His recon is very spotty.
Mike appears to be moving overland towards Moulmein both from the south and east. That suits me fine as I will establish my first line of defence at Moulmein and then draw further Chinese Corps out as that front stabilises. My goal is to deploy 2 Chinese Armies in the Burma Theatre by March 1942 with the first helping the Allies hold at Moulmein while the second takes the overland route via the trails south from Lashio.
By bringing additional pressure to bear on the land routes from Burma to Thailand I am hoping to continue drawing forces off from his Sumatran invasion force.
Rangoon now has over 100,000 tons of supplies. I can't figure out how to get this to flow into China though. Anyone got any ideas on that? I don't see a huge problem with getting the supplies in Rangoon to well over 300,000 by the end of January if I really want to but there's not much point doing that if I can't push the supplies into China. An additional 150,000 tons of supplies in China would be quite a gamechanger though so I'd like to do that if at all possible.
Force Committment
In the long run I think that between the Marshalls, the Aleutians, the forces required to besiege Manilla and what I can draw off into Burma he will be unable to generate the 5 divisions + needed to land and take Oosthaven or Palembang well into the end of March/April 1942, by which time my fortifications, preparation and experience levels will all have risen such that his force committment will also rise.
In short, the longer he waits, the more he has to commit and the less he has available to conduct other, simultaneous, operations.
Even in a worst case scenario I think Southern Sumatra will strengthen sufficiently that it will tie up the Malaysian and Phillipine forces for a month or more once Manilla and Singapore both fall. All of that additional time will buy the preservation of India and Australia.
This is the key. ALL of the above is designed to draw forces off from his invasion of Southern Palembang. If at any stage a portion of this plan needs to be ommitted in order to further that goal then it'll be ommitted. No point winning an operational victory at the cost of the strategic goal.
The longer I can keep him from landing in Southern Sumatra the more strongly entrenched my forces will be and the greater their experience. This translates into a need for even more IJA troops. At a certain point in time with the troops needed to take Sumatra climbing every day and diversionary operations going on in the Pacific and DEI drawing troops away from the spearpoint it may even be possible to reach a situation where he cannot, in the first half of 1942, meet all his various committments with the IJA and IJN assets available.
If he juggles them properly that situation will never arise but juggling them properly will require accepting a much greater rate of loss for a short time in order to lower the overall losses over a long period of time. It is the inverse of the choice made by the British in late 1944 in north-west Europe and the reason I think MOntgomery should be castigated. Forget about Normandy and Market Garden etc. His real treason against the Allied cause lay not in these battles but in his strategic narcissism which led him to refuse a more difficult "political sell" which was more strategically advantageous. Unfortunately so few discussions go into the impact of logistics on strategy and thus never get to the heart of the matter.
Anyways, I digress.... It is ALL about logistics and this is ALL about taking the initiative and using that to stretch the IJA and IJN more thinly in such a manner that they no longer quite have the assets available in the right place at the right time do do what THEY want in a timely manner.
So, there you have it, comments welcome. I caution again though that this is only an aide memoire for me and that as a plan it is merely intended to be the bedrock for improvisation. If anything turns out to happen in-game exactly according to the plan no-one will be more surprised than I. Fingerspitzgefeuhl ( sic ) and coup d'oeuil are the keys here, not long written plans.
John Dillworth: "I had GreyJoy check my spelling and he said it was fine."
Well, that's that settled then.
Well, that's that settled then.
RE: Salutations and solicitations.... 1EyedJacks (J) vs Nemo (A)
Nemo121,
Well...this is all predicated that your opponent will dance to your tune. I have seen nothing here which suggests that your tune will play any louder than his own.
A steadfast approach, steely determination and cold clear analytical play would make your approach quite mute. For you are essentially laying a giant trap for your opponent to rush into. By their very nature, traps are plans which if spotted, can be avoided. True the better a trap is laid out, the harder it is to both spot and assess it.
I suspect you will get away with it on subjective grounds. On objective grounds, against another opponent, I would not be so sanguine.
Alfred
Well...this is all predicated that your opponent will dance to your tune. I have seen nothing here which suggests that your tune will play any louder than his own.
A steadfast approach, steely determination and cold clear analytical play would make your approach quite mute. For you are essentially laying a giant trap for your opponent to rush into. By their very nature, traps are plans which if spotted, can be avoided. True the better a trap is laid out, the harder it is to both spot and assess it.
I suspect you will get away with it on subjective grounds. On objective grounds, against another opponent, I would not be so sanguine.
Alfred
-
Central Blue
- Posts: 695
- Joined: Fri Aug 20, 2004 5:31 pm
RE: Salutations and solicitations.... 1EyedJacks (J) vs Nemo (A)
ORIGINAL: Nemo121
So, there you have it, comments welcome.
Why not delete all of the text that you haven't hit with bold font? Then you could use a regular font for your most important ideas. As your plan is written, you invite your readers to leap over huge chunks of text.
If all of that stuff in between the bold fonts is of any import, it could be scribbled in subsequent posts. For example, all of the speculation about your opponent's character and psychology deserves a chapter all of its own if it still makes sense to you after a night's sleep. It certainly tells a story about you as well as him.
well into the end of March/April 1942, by which time my fortifications, preparation and experience levels will all have risen such that his force committment will also rise.
If every squad leader is Chesty Puller you might get some of those troops north of forty by April if you don't change the location they are prepping for.
USS St. Louis firing on Guam, July 1944. The Cardinals and Browns faced each other in the World Series that year
RE: Salutations and solicitations.... 1EyedJacks (J) vs Nemo (A)
Alfred,
Of course you don't see anything which shows why my tune would drown out his. That's where actual play comes into action.
Steely determination, an unchanging devotion to a plan etc... Well, firstly I think the vast majority of people don't play like that and secondly such a play style comes with its own flaws. This plan is tailored to this person, if he played differently then a different plan would have been created. I'm surprised that the tailored nature of the approach ( which always applies as a plan must fit a situation and the people involved ) appears to have passed you by.
Central Blue,
Well, if people choose to leap over lots of text that's their choice. The Bolding is there to show what wasn't part of the plan as initially written down... and to enable the initial plan to be clearly discerned. Why? So that the initial plan is clear if any allegation of cheating occurs. As it is currently laid out it achieves its primary purpose - which was not ease of reading.
Well I don't expect them to exceed 40 by April. Sometime in April I expect them to begin getting into the 40s. Prior to April, if the Japanese land, simple combat experience will have to get them their experience increases.
Of course you don't see anything which shows why my tune would drown out his. That's where actual play comes into action.
Steely determination, an unchanging devotion to a plan etc... Well, firstly I think the vast majority of people don't play like that and secondly such a play style comes with its own flaws. This plan is tailored to this person, if he played differently then a different plan would have been created. I'm surprised that the tailored nature of the approach ( which always applies as a plan must fit a situation and the people involved ) appears to have passed you by.
Central Blue,
Well, if people choose to leap over lots of text that's their choice. The Bolding is there to show what wasn't part of the plan as initially written down... and to enable the initial plan to be clearly discerned. Why? So that the initial plan is clear if any allegation of cheating occurs. As it is currently laid out it achieves its primary purpose - which was not ease of reading.
Well I don't expect them to exceed 40 by April. Sometime in April I expect them to begin getting into the 40s. Prior to April, if the Japanese land, simple combat experience will have to get them their experience increases.
John Dillworth: "I had GreyJoy check my spelling and he said it was fine."
Well, that's that settled then.
Well, that's that settled then.
RE: Salutations and solicitations.... 1EyedJacks (J) vs Nemo (A)
Nemo, Alfred
are you sure we don't see anything that shows why Nemo's tune might prevail ? (Nemo, this is not my free question[;)], so you no need for a detailed and truthful answer)
I think I see something:
To me, this appears to be indicative of the fact that Nemo is -as always- trying to play the game as well (i.e. as close to the ideal) as possible and actually has some success. What state of mind do you have to be in in order to construct from a vague similarity of phrases used a breach of security/secrecy of your AAR ? Do you do that if you are content and happy with what is going on ? If you are successful and things are running according to plan ? Or rather if things don't quite develop as expected ?
No, I believe that this type of construction shows that Nemo a) must have some success on the map and b) has some success with the invasion of his opponent's mind. Or, said in other words, in the actual play, which involves both on-map and off-map aspects.
I may be sticking my head out too far, as I don't know Nemo's opponent and evidently I'm not Nemo, but let's swap the positions of Nemo and the opponent for a while. What would Nemo have done had he assumed that his AAR security had been compromised ? I assume he would have checked and potentially used that fact by addition of poisoned bits and pieces to the info provided in the potentially compromised AAR. Actually, I think one should read the plan as provided above by Nemo very carefully with this aspect in mind and perhaps also review the application of bold face in this context (I did not read it in detail so far, but definitely will do so) and consider whether an (as of yet unplanned) additional operation might be used to add another layer. In any case, the fact that his opponent seems to have chosen not to provide poisoned info in his AAR but to create an issue to be discussed may be another argument why Nemo's tune may prevail.
But hey, no need to speculate - we can just lean sit back in our comfortable chairs and see how this unfolds.
As always, feel free to contradict me!
Hartwig
ORIGINAL: Nemo121
Alfred,
Of course you don't see anything which shows why my tune would drown out his. That's where actual play comes into action.
Steely determination, an unchanging devotion to a plan etc... Well, firstly I think the vast majority of people don't play like that and secondly such a play style comes with its own
flaws. This plan is tailored to this person, if he played differently then a different plan would have been created. I'm surprised that the tailored nature of the approach ( which always applies as a plan must fit a situation and the people involved ) appears to have passed you by.
are you sure we don't see anything that shows why Nemo's tune might prevail ? (Nemo, this is not my free question[;)], so you no need for a detailed and truthful answer)
I think I see something:
Unfortunately yesterday my use of the phrase "bug-hunting with nukes" ( a phrase I picked up around the time of Starship Troopers, the movie, and their use of nuclear grenades to immolate alien infestations underground ) to describe his use of KB around Manilla led 1EyedJacks to state that if he knew I was subscribed to his AAR he would have been more careful what he wrote there. It seems he said something about bugs being frequent in the Phillipines and him nuking my troops with KB ( he quoted me that bit of his AAR in an email to me ) so my using a similar phrase a few days later set his spidey sense tingling.
To me, this appears to be indicative of the fact that Nemo is -as always- trying to play the game as well (i.e. as close to the ideal) as possible and actually has some success. What state of mind do you have to be in in order to construct from a vague similarity of phrases used a breach of security/secrecy of your AAR ? Do you do that if you are content and happy with what is going on ? If you are successful and things are running according to plan ? Or rather if things don't quite develop as expected ?
No, I believe that this type of construction shows that Nemo a) must have some success on the map and b) has some success with the invasion of his opponent's mind. Or, said in other words, in the actual play, which involves both on-map and off-map aspects.
I may be sticking my head out too far, as I don't know Nemo's opponent and evidently I'm not Nemo, but let's swap the positions of Nemo and the opponent for a while. What would Nemo have done had he assumed that his AAR security had been compromised ? I assume he would have checked and potentially used that fact by addition of poisoned bits and pieces to the info provided in the potentially compromised AAR. Actually, I think one should read the plan as provided above by Nemo very carefully with this aspect in mind and perhaps also review the application of bold face in this context (I did not read it in detail so far, but definitely will do so) and consider whether an (as of yet unplanned) additional operation might be used to add another layer. In any case, the fact that his opponent seems to have chosen not to provide poisoned info in his AAR but to create an issue to be discussed may be another argument why Nemo's tune may prevail.
But hey, no need to speculate - we can just lean sit back in our comfortable chairs and see how this unfolds.
As always, feel free to contradict me!
Hartwig
RE: Salutations and solicitations.... 1EyedJacks (J) vs Nemo (A)
ORIGINAL: Nemo121
....is ALL about taking the initiative and using that to stretch the IJA and IJN more thinly in such a manner that they no longer quite have the assets available in the right place at the right time do do what THEY want in a timely manner.
I buy this [:)] excellent back for a this sound plan of yours IMHO, will be watching
RE: Salutations and solicitations.... 1EyedJacks (J) vs Nemo (A)
ORIGINAL: Nemo121
Alfred,
Of course you don't see anything which shows why my tune would drown out his. That's where actual play comes into action.
Steely determination, an unchanging devotion to a plan etc... Well, firstly I think the vast majority of people don't play like that and secondly such a play style comes with its own flaws. This plan is tailored to this person, if he played differently then a different plan would have been created. I'm surprised that the tailored nature of the approach ( which always applies as a plan must fit a situation and the people involved ) appears to have passed you by.
No it hasn't passed me by. I can admire the technical virtuosity, which is what your tactical play will be when you refer to "actual play comes into action" without having the wool pulled over my eyes.
Your opponent seems to be still on his phase I objectives. Accomplishment of them would still be strategically far more important than responding to your plan. What is even far more important is what his phase II objectives will be.
Chosen well, his phase I and II objectives will be far more significant and need not be interrupted. In other words, in the worst case, he can allow you to accomplish your initial captures and only after he has accomplished his own, need he return to remove the lodgement.
Will he coolly analyse the situation, probably not, which my last sentence implicitly acknowledged your virtuosity, a compliment you seem to have overlooked.
Nor do I ever advocate an unchanging plan. Every plan/playing style has a flaw. In this instance, your plan is not so dangerous to Japan that he need be immediately deflected from pursuing his phase I and phase II objectives (provided of course he has chosen well). The combination of local enemy reserves and time before Allied materiel ramps up, will suffice to deal with the immediate situation he will confront.
Your real strategic plan which is worthy of praise is festung southern Sumatra. I reiterate what you are proposing to do is only a trap - one that benefits festung southern Sumatra only if he falls into the trap, but of no value if he sidesteps the trap, which upon cool analysis (think of Steinitz or Lasker), he would see that he can sidestep.
Alfred
RE: Salutations and solicitations.... 1EyedJacks (J) vs Nemo (A)
Will be interesting , your opponent is definetly a set piece battle reticent wing and aggresive wing and reinforce success type player. He is using KB to support his axis of attack and is using lesser forces to hold elsewhere.
I think he will just ignore your pacific actions aqnd in 3 -6 months time hit it in force this way he still hold the initiative where he attacks ....
I think he will just ignore your pacific actions aqnd in 3 -6 months time hit it in force this way he still hold the initiative where he attacks ....
Underdog Fanboy
RE: Salutations and solicitations.... 1EyedJacks (J) vs Nemo (A)
Alfred,
I see more clearly what you mean now. My view would be as follows... If Mike continues engaging in Phase I objectives ( Singapore, Manilla, DEI ) to the exclusion of all else then he gives me the opportunity to really shape the battlefield at will for Phase II - in which case his Phase II operations have a much higher chance of foundering.
So, I just don't buy the idea that a single-minded, unswerving devotion to Phase I objectives will necessarily yield great rewards. Sure, against someone who gets paralysed by the advancing monolith that might work but others may just note the Phase I objectives, thank the Gods for a predictable opponent and lay their plans so as to take advantage of neglected areas, disrupt Phase I as cheaply as possible and create strong defensive positions in order to scupper Phase II. Single-minded obsessive, stolid play does not necessarily lead to success, it can give a nimble opponent the opportunity to anticipate and sow the seeds of, later, destruction. Sure, Phase I is usually successful but it often heralds the failure of the overall strategy.
You're right that Mike may simply continue bombing Manilla, Singers and Sumatra and ignore the Pacific. That's fine, if he does that then I'll change my plans to account for an unreactive opponent.
If an opponent refuses to orient and make the appropriate decisions and actions then it is very simple to create plans which take advantage of such a failure. I truly fail to understand how you can view an unswerving devotion to a phased plan as being anything other than disastrous folly when facing a nimble opponent.... perhaps you are assuming that such a phased approach will face someone who gets sucked into meeting it head on? Well, I would suggest that poor players generally defeat themselves and that the seeds of victory lay not in the plan implemented ( and slavishly followed through ) but in the calibre of the opponent.
As to there being no strategic benefit if I achieve my objectives and he fails to react.... Certainly the Marshalls aren't a dagger into his vitals but they form the staging post for a real disemboweling thrust. Obviously I amn't about to elucidate that particular point at this time.
bklooste,
The initiative is a thing of questionable value. People seek out the initiative as though it is some nirvana which guarantees transcendence and victory. It does no such thing. If I give you the initiative and you use it to march right into a minefield then what matters it that you chose to march there of your own free will? You'll still be learning how to use a wheelchair 6 months from now. The initiative is only useful if wielded appropriately.
But, each to their own, I might be completely wrong and everyone'll get a chortle from seeing how Mike outfoxes me. If he does then it'll make for an interesting game also and a challenge for me so that's fine too.
I see more clearly what you mean now. My view would be as follows... If Mike continues engaging in Phase I objectives ( Singapore, Manilla, DEI ) to the exclusion of all else then he gives me the opportunity to really shape the battlefield at will for Phase II - in which case his Phase II operations have a much higher chance of foundering.
So, I just don't buy the idea that a single-minded, unswerving devotion to Phase I objectives will necessarily yield great rewards. Sure, against someone who gets paralysed by the advancing monolith that might work but others may just note the Phase I objectives, thank the Gods for a predictable opponent and lay their plans so as to take advantage of neglected areas, disrupt Phase I as cheaply as possible and create strong defensive positions in order to scupper Phase II. Single-minded obsessive, stolid play does not necessarily lead to success, it can give a nimble opponent the opportunity to anticipate and sow the seeds of, later, destruction. Sure, Phase I is usually successful but it often heralds the failure of the overall strategy.
You're right that Mike may simply continue bombing Manilla, Singers and Sumatra and ignore the Pacific. That's fine, if he does that then I'll change my plans to account for an unreactive opponent.
If an opponent refuses to orient and make the appropriate decisions and actions then it is very simple to create plans which take advantage of such a failure. I truly fail to understand how you can view an unswerving devotion to a phased plan as being anything other than disastrous folly when facing a nimble opponent.... perhaps you are assuming that such a phased approach will face someone who gets sucked into meeting it head on? Well, I would suggest that poor players generally defeat themselves and that the seeds of victory lay not in the plan implemented ( and slavishly followed through ) but in the calibre of the opponent.
As to there being no strategic benefit if I achieve my objectives and he fails to react.... Certainly the Marshalls aren't a dagger into his vitals but they form the staging post for a real disemboweling thrust. Obviously I amn't about to elucidate that particular point at this time.
bklooste,
The initiative is a thing of questionable value. People seek out the initiative as though it is some nirvana which guarantees transcendence and victory. It does no such thing. If I give you the initiative and you use it to march right into a minefield then what matters it that you chose to march there of your own free will? You'll still be learning how to use a wheelchair 6 months from now. The initiative is only useful if wielded appropriately.
But, each to their own, I might be completely wrong and everyone'll get a chortle from seeing how Mike outfoxes me. If he does then it'll make for an interesting game also and a challenge for me so that's fine too.
John Dillworth: "I had GreyJoy check my spelling and he said it was fine."
Well, that's that settled then.
Well, that's that settled then.
RE: Salutations and solicitations.... 1EyedJacks (J) vs Nemo (A)
I personally think the Southern Sumatra thing is a very good idea, particularly if you have an opponent who is asleep at the switch a bit, and allows you to evacuate. A prudent player would have set up a Netty base at Singkawang the first week and nailed any ships going in or out of Singapore, but you took advantage of that. There isn't much the Japanese can do about an air evac, so that's a pretty good idea.
Maybe it's just me, but if I saw early landings at Marcus, Kurlies, and Marshalls, I would be thinking "opportunity". Opportunity to destroy ground units, and opportunity to draw the USN into battle.
Ground units are a limiting factor for the Allies, so a worthwhile target for Japan to destroy.
Maybe it's just me, but if I saw early landings at Marcus, Kurlies, and Marshalls, I would be thinking "opportunity". Opportunity to destroy ground units, and opportunity to draw the USN into battle.
Ground units are a limiting factor for the Allies, so a worthwhile target for Japan to destroy.
RE: Salutations and solicitations.... 1EyedJacks (J) vs Nemo (A)
Q-Ball,
Well I just think that the concept of abandoning Singapore just never really occurred to him. Whatever chance it had of occurring to him was scuppered when he bought into my sacrificial xAKs which were empty and moving back from Singers and which I fed a portion of to his subs. When you see empty xAKs leaving Singers it is easy to draw the conclusion that they are leaving empty after unloading their troops.
Q-Ball as re: opportunity --- you'd be right. That is an opportunity he has but the way I view it is that in such a scenario the opportunities break in both directions --- which is infinitely preferable to what I'm facing now where I have very few opportunities to hit back. In addition in order to take advantage of this opportunity the Japanese would have to take naval, aerial and ground forces away from the DEI ( or follow-on echelons ) and send them to the Kuriles and Marshalls etc... Sending forces there to take advantage of this opportunity thereby weakens the forces which can be committed to the critical area at the critical time ( Southern Sumatra ) and serves my overall strategic goal.
So, if he sees an opportunity and decides to take advantage of it to kill my ships and troops etc then he'll play right into my hands and we'll get to see just how well I can conduct a retrograde movement in direct contact with the enemy. That's one of the most difficult things possible to achieve so I'm quite looking forward to the challenge if that's the course of action he takes.
In other news:
January 11th 1942
It seems that I-18 took a direct depth charge hit to the hull. Hopefully that puts her out of action for a little while.
My ground forces landed at Marcus but something weird seems to have happened and there was no shock attack. I think they must have just partially unloaded, all been disabled and thus there was no shock attack. That's my working hypothesis right now while I don't have the turn file and can't see precisely what happened.
Forces in the Phillipines continue to labour under the weight of 300+ IJN/IJA bombers daily. KB remains tethered 120 or so miles east of Manilla and losing a steady 2 to 4 strike aircraft per day - a cost which is utterly too great IMO. On the positive side I'll definitely get to know when or if he begins to move KB into the Pacific.
Over Singers multiple Zero Daitai continue to sweep away while IJA bombers are beginning to go after the port and airfield. It looks like Mike wants to prevent me building fortifications. Each day of bombing costs him 30 or 40 planes damaged though and a couple which crash on the way home. Since the bombing is utterly unnecessary - I can't imagine 70 or so AV will be all that difficult to overcome - I consider any losses incurred at all to be a victory for me.
Lastly it looks like IJA troops are landing at Jesselton. I may have left a sound detector or CD gun which wasn't air-transportable there but everything else is currently sitting in Southern Sumatra after having been airlifted out. If Mike is beginning to clear up the Borneon bases now I will detach a few SC TFs from my reserve in the region and commit them to counter-invasion action in the area. Wrecking a couple of invasion TFs while KB etc are occupied would be a useful addition to the plan. It'll cost me ships to air attack but that's life.
In other news... with the landings on Marcus begun - albeit in a strange manner - the invasion force for the Kuriles has begun sailing for its targets.
Around Canton the CVL hunt continues. I've formed an L-shaped line of CVs running from roughly 600 miles east of Tarawa to Fiji and am sweeping southward and east in an effort to catch the CVLs. Either way it should prevent his CVLs from finding the mass of my shipping at Fiji - I think spotting over 100 ships disbanded into the port and many more unloading at the docks would be a bit of a giveaway right now [8D]
Well I just think that the concept of abandoning Singapore just never really occurred to him. Whatever chance it had of occurring to him was scuppered when he bought into my sacrificial xAKs which were empty and moving back from Singers and which I fed a portion of to his subs. When you see empty xAKs leaving Singers it is easy to draw the conclusion that they are leaving empty after unloading their troops.
Q-Ball as re: opportunity --- you'd be right. That is an opportunity he has but the way I view it is that in such a scenario the opportunities break in both directions --- which is infinitely preferable to what I'm facing now where I have very few opportunities to hit back. In addition in order to take advantage of this opportunity the Japanese would have to take naval, aerial and ground forces away from the DEI ( or follow-on echelons ) and send them to the Kuriles and Marshalls etc... Sending forces there to take advantage of this opportunity thereby weakens the forces which can be committed to the critical area at the critical time ( Southern Sumatra ) and serves my overall strategic goal.
So, if he sees an opportunity and decides to take advantage of it to kill my ships and troops etc then he'll play right into my hands and we'll get to see just how well I can conduct a retrograde movement in direct contact with the enemy. That's one of the most difficult things possible to achieve so I'm quite looking forward to the challenge if that's the course of action he takes.
In other news:
January 11th 1942
It seems that I-18 took a direct depth charge hit to the hull. Hopefully that puts her out of action for a little while.
My ground forces landed at Marcus but something weird seems to have happened and there was no shock attack. I think they must have just partially unloaded, all been disabled and thus there was no shock attack. That's my working hypothesis right now while I don't have the turn file and can't see precisely what happened.
Forces in the Phillipines continue to labour under the weight of 300+ IJN/IJA bombers daily. KB remains tethered 120 or so miles east of Manilla and losing a steady 2 to 4 strike aircraft per day - a cost which is utterly too great IMO. On the positive side I'll definitely get to know when or if he begins to move KB into the Pacific.
Over Singers multiple Zero Daitai continue to sweep away while IJA bombers are beginning to go after the port and airfield. It looks like Mike wants to prevent me building fortifications. Each day of bombing costs him 30 or 40 planes damaged though and a couple which crash on the way home. Since the bombing is utterly unnecessary - I can't imagine 70 or so AV will be all that difficult to overcome - I consider any losses incurred at all to be a victory for me.
Lastly it looks like IJA troops are landing at Jesselton. I may have left a sound detector or CD gun which wasn't air-transportable there but everything else is currently sitting in Southern Sumatra after having been airlifted out. If Mike is beginning to clear up the Borneon bases now I will detach a few SC TFs from my reserve in the region and commit them to counter-invasion action in the area. Wrecking a couple of invasion TFs while KB etc are occupied would be a useful addition to the plan. It'll cost me ships to air attack but that's life.
In other news... with the landings on Marcus begun - albeit in a strange manner - the invasion force for the Kuriles has begun sailing for its targets.
Around Canton the CVL hunt continues. I've formed an L-shaped line of CVs running from roughly 600 miles east of Tarawa to Fiji and am sweeping southward and east in an effort to catch the CVLs. Either way it should prevent his CVLs from finding the mass of my shipping at Fiji - I think spotting over 100 ships disbanded into the port and many more unloading at the docks would be a bit of a giveaway right now [8D]
John Dillworth: "I had GreyJoy check my spelling and he said it was fine."
Well, that's that settled then.
Well, that's that settled then.
RE: Salutations and solicitations.... 1EyedJacks (J) vs Nemo (A)
ORIGINAL: Nemo121
bklooste,
The initiative is a thing of questionable value. People seek out the initiative as though it is some nirvana which guarantees transcendence and victory. It does no such thing. If I give you the initiative and you use it to march right into a minefield then what matters it that you chose to march there of your own free will? You'll still be learning how to use a wheelchair 6 months from now. The initiative is only useful if wielded appropriately.
I dont agree with it either I have defeated many players doing this , while a skilled person can do it they would use their reserve to react where needed many just blindly focus on their attacks , the fact he is using KB on the PI to bombard is a prime example he could be attacking Abon/Bali and put pressure on you . The tactics allow an inferior force ( the allies in 41) to launch attacks beyond their capability.
Underdog Fanboy
RE: Salutations and solicitations.... 1EyedJacks (J) vs Nemo (A)
Well, I said elsewhere that I'd post about the A2A combat in-game. Basically the reason behind this is that in some of the AARs there are players who are failing to get anything close to a 1:1 exchange rate. There's currently a discussion about whether this is due to the way the players play the game or the way the game is designed. Given the wide variability of exchange ratios being experienced it seems far more likely that the variation in games where Allied players are suffering disproportionate losses is due to to player issues and not game design issues.
If you look at the players who are getting poor exchange ratios there are several common factors:
1. They insist on putting Allied fighters into the air against the Japanese schwerpunkt, ensuring these Allied fighters are fighting against the most experienced Japanese pilots, flying the best planes and are usually outnumbered. These are the worst possible circumstances to obtain a 1:1 ( or better ) exchange rate.
2. Experience gain... The key pilot loss rate in WiTP was 3%. If you had a loss rate of less than 3% per sortie then your squadrons would, overall, gain experience. I@m not sure what the precise number is for AE but it is likely to be around 3% also. When using Allied fighters against the enemy Schwerpunkt the loss rate is likely to be on the order of 30 to 60% rather than 3%.
As such the oft-touted "training by fighting" routine which you see promulgated in some AARs is subtly sabotaged by the context within which these self-same players commit their Allied fighters. Training by fighting works but it doesn't work if the pilot loss rate per sortie is much greater than 3% ( again, from WiTP but likely to be within the ballpark for AE ) which is often what people experience when they try to match strength against strength.
3. Pilot training: In reading AARs and seeing some of the screenshots of squadrons posted I'm rather surprised to see the poor pilot quality in front-line units. Some of the AARs which feature the worst exchange rates also seem to feature hosts of Allied pilots being thrown to the wolves before they could be considered fully trained. In such a situation contending that the game is flawed because it doesn't recreate historical loss rates is rather obtuse.
Players have spoken about sending 40 Exp pilots into action against 70 and 80 Exp IJA/IJN pilots in mid-42 "because I have no other choice". This is patently false. Operational art is the art of stringing together a number of declinations and acceptances of battle in order to achieve operational success in the furtherance of strategic goals which are essential to the achievement of the nation's national policy objectives. You ALWAYS have the option of declining combat. If the ratio of fighters and experience greatly favours the enemy then maybe you should just pull back, let them bomb and just take the kills your AAA gets. In the meantime your pilots are training and becoming 50, 60 and then 70 Exp pilots who can meet the Japanese on equal terms.
In addition as you commit those 40 and 50 Exp pilots you lose your half-trained pilots and create a timegap in your training programme. Let us say that it takes 45 days to get from 40 to 55 Exp and then you send those pilots out to fight the 70 Exp IJN pilots of KB. Those pilots fight KB and are outnumbered 2:1 in the air. It is hardly surprising that the Allied pilots die in droves. In so doing they actually help increase the experience of the IJN pilots even further, making the next series of battles even more one-sided. In addition once you lost the half-trained guys you've got to wait 90 days to get anyone from 40 Exp straight from the flight school trained up to 70 Exp.
Since we're talking here about players who couldn't stand to decline this battle and lost their half-trained pilots at a disproportionate rate the odds of them keeping the next gaggle of trainees out of action for 90 days is next to non-existent. End result: they keep finding situations where they MUST fight and commit an endless stream of 55 Exp pilots, half-way through their training regime, to combat where those pilots take multiples of the losses they wouild take if they stuck with the training regime and graduated as 70 Exp pilots 45 days later. In taking these losses they effectively invert the "training by fighting" formula such that the Allied player ends up feeding the raw meat to the Japanese to let the Japs achieve a high kill ratio for a low loss ratio and gain more experience within the squadron than the squadron loses through dead pilots.
After 6 to 9 months of such mismanagement the Allied players have dug themselves holes in which they have a hug gap in their training programme, aren't graduating high Exp pilots and have essentially given the Japanese the ideal circumstances in which to train their initial cadres of graduates through combat to well beyond 70 Exp.
At this point in time they begin getting better numbers of fighters, which paradoxically results in them filling the fighters with even poorer quality half-trained pilots and sending them up against the IJA and IJN pilots who are now often of 80 or 90 Exp ( thanks to the easy training through combat the Allies have been providing for several months ). All this achieves is even greater disproportionality in exchange rates.
The bottom line is that by looking at the AARs you can see that the majority of people experiencing poor exchange rates have actually, through their play, created the situation which they complain of.
In a sense though they are correct in feeling that the context has created a situation in which they cannot but experience disproportionate exchange ratios. Their error lies in ascribing the context's origin to the game exclusively and ignoring the fact that their inputs have a major impact on the context within which they find themselves.
To be a bit clearer... By the time they complain about the loss rates they are usually so mired into the self-perpetuating system of sending half-trained pilots up against increasingly experienced ( via getting large numbers of kills ) Japanese pilots that until such time as they either:
1. change their A2A strategy entirely - almost certainly necessitating a virtual standing down of their air force over most of the map for 2 to 3 months
or
2. gain sufficient numbers of planes that even with the massively unfavourable situation under which they commit their pilots and planes to combat the sheer numbers begin to win the battle for them - obviously that's a hughly unskillful solution but, given the way the replacement rates etc work, an inevitable one.
Obviously the second solution is more likely as the first requires a degree of introspection, self-criticism, flexibility and subordination of tactics and operations to strategic requirements which is rarely seen... I post this here as the post is intended to outline some of the issues underlying this situation and isn't intended to apply to any particular game or player. In addition people would insist on mis-characterising this assessment of the operational and strategic situation as some sort of personal attack as it is much easier to take umbrage than it is to engage in self-reflection and criticism.
How does this apply to my game?
1. Phillipines... I haven't reinforced the Phillipine fighter squadrons. Instead I've allowed the P40s there to fly until they die (since they're perma-restricted ) and have then pulled their pilots out and assigned them to other training squadrons.
2. Singers --- I've only fought over Singapore as and when required in order to cover the evacuation from Singapore. When I did I found my squadrons being worn down at an alarming rate but still achieving a roughly 1:1 exchange rate. The key though is that:
a) I didn't go up against the schwerpunkt so wasn't facing the varsity
b) I only acceded to that battle in order to serve a greater strategic goal.
3. Southern Sumatra - Well, if he really tries sweeping Palembang then he'll find my forces pull back and begin basing out of other bases.
4. Everywhere else - no combat at all. There's no point engaging in combat unless it is either strategically necessary or the exchange rate is favourable.
So, basically, when the loss rates are hugely disproportionate one can usually find good strategic reasons why this is so which have less to do with the game design and more to do with individual choices which have created that context. Changing one's play is difficult, blaming the game, easy.
In other news.... Still waiting on the movie file from Mike. It has been over 24 hours and had a good chance of being a turn in which I managed to snag a few CVLs. So, fingers crossed.
If you look at the players who are getting poor exchange ratios there are several common factors:
1. They insist on putting Allied fighters into the air against the Japanese schwerpunkt, ensuring these Allied fighters are fighting against the most experienced Japanese pilots, flying the best planes and are usually outnumbered. These are the worst possible circumstances to obtain a 1:1 ( or better ) exchange rate.
2. Experience gain... The key pilot loss rate in WiTP was 3%. If you had a loss rate of less than 3% per sortie then your squadrons would, overall, gain experience. I@m not sure what the precise number is for AE but it is likely to be around 3% also. When using Allied fighters against the enemy Schwerpunkt the loss rate is likely to be on the order of 30 to 60% rather than 3%.
As such the oft-touted "training by fighting" routine which you see promulgated in some AARs is subtly sabotaged by the context within which these self-same players commit their Allied fighters. Training by fighting works but it doesn't work if the pilot loss rate per sortie is much greater than 3% ( again, from WiTP but likely to be within the ballpark for AE ) which is often what people experience when they try to match strength against strength.
3. Pilot training: In reading AARs and seeing some of the screenshots of squadrons posted I'm rather surprised to see the poor pilot quality in front-line units. Some of the AARs which feature the worst exchange rates also seem to feature hosts of Allied pilots being thrown to the wolves before they could be considered fully trained. In such a situation contending that the game is flawed because it doesn't recreate historical loss rates is rather obtuse.
Players have spoken about sending 40 Exp pilots into action against 70 and 80 Exp IJA/IJN pilots in mid-42 "because I have no other choice". This is patently false. Operational art is the art of stringing together a number of declinations and acceptances of battle in order to achieve operational success in the furtherance of strategic goals which are essential to the achievement of the nation's national policy objectives. You ALWAYS have the option of declining combat. If the ratio of fighters and experience greatly favours the enemy then maybe you should just pull back, let them bomb and just take the kills your AAA gets. In the meantime your pilots are training and becoming 50, 60 and then 70 Exp pilots who can meet the Japanese on equal terms.
In addition as you commit those 40 and 50 Exp pilots you lose your half-trained pilots and create a timegap in your training programme. Let us say that it takes 45 days to get from 40 to 55 Exp and then you send those pilots out to fight the 70 Exp IJN pilots of KB. Those pilots fight KB and are outnumbered 2:1 in the air. It is hardly surprising that the Allied pilots die in droves. In so doing they actually help increase the experience of the IJN pilots even further, making the next series of battles even more one-sided. In addition once you lost the half-trained guys you've got to wait 90 days to get anyone from 40 Exp straight from the flight school trained up to 70 Exp.
Since we're talking here about players who couldn't stand to decline this battle and lost their half-trained pilots at a disproportionate rate the odds of them keeping the next gaggle of trainees out of action for 90 days is next to non-existent. End result: they keep finding situations where they MUST fight and commit an endless stream of 55 Exp pilots, half-way through their training regime, to combat where those pilots take multiples of the losses they wouild take if they stuck with the training regime and graduated as 70 Exp pilots 45 days later. In taking these losses they effectively invert the "training by fighting" formula such that the Allied player ends up feeding the raw meat to the Japanese to let the Japs achieve a high kill ratio for a low loss ratio and gain more experience within the squadron than the squadron loses through dead pilots.
After 6 to 9 months of such mismanagement the Allied players have dug themselves holes in which they have a hug gap in their training programme, aren't graduating high Exp pilots and have essentially given the Japanese the ideal circumstances in which to train their initial cadres of graduates through combat to well beyond 70 Exp.
At this point in time they begin getting better numbers of fighters, which paradoxically results in them filling the fighters with even poorer quality half-trained pilots and sending them up against the IJA and IJN pilots who are now often of 80 or 90 Exp ( thanks to the easy training through combat the Allies have been providing for several months ). All this achieves is even greater disproportionality in exchange rates.
The bottom line is that by looking at the AARs you can see that the majority of people experiencing poor exchange rates have actually, through their play, created the situation which they complain of.
In a sense though they are correct in feeling that the context has created a situation in which they cannot but experience disproportionate exchange ratios. Their error lies in ascribing the context's origin to the game exclusively and ignoring the fact that their inputs have a major impact on the context within which they find themselves.
To be a bit clearer... By the time they complain about the loss rates they are usually so mired into the self-perpetuating system of sending half-trained pilots up against increasingly experienced ( via getting large numbers of kills ) Japanese pilots that until such time as they either:
1. change their A2A strategy entirely - almost certainly necessitating a virtual standing down of their air force over most of the map for 2 to 3 months
or
2. gain sufficient numbers of planes that even with the massively unfavourable situation under which they commit their pilots and planes to combat the sheer numbers begin to win the battle for them - obviously that's a hughly unskillful solution but, given the way the replacement rates etc work, an inevitable one.
Obviously the second solution is more likely as the first requires a degree of introspection, self-criticism, flexibility and subordination of tactics and operations to strategic requirements which is rarely seen... I post this here as the post is intended to outline some of the issues underlying this situation and isn't intended to apply to any particular game or player. In addition people would insist on mis-characterising this assessment of the operational and strategic situation as some sort of personal attack as it is much easier to take umbrage than it is to engage in self-reflection and criticism.
How does this apply to my game?
1. Phillipines... I haven't reinforced the Phillipine fighter squadrons. Instead I've allowed the P40s there to fly until they die (since they're perma-restricted ) and have then pulled their pilots out and assigned them to other training squadrons.
2. Singers --- I've only fought over Singapore as and when required in order to cover the evacuation from Singapore. When I did I found my squadrons being worn down at an alarming rate but still achieving a roughly 1:1 exchange rate. The key though is that:
a) I didn't go up against the schwerpunkt so wasn't facing the varsity
b) I only acceded to that battle in order to serve a greater strategic goal.
3. Southern Sumatra - Well, if he really tries sweeping Palembang then he'll find my forces pull back and begin basing out of other bases.
4. Everywhere else - no combat at all. There's no point engaging in combat unless it is either strategically necessary or the exchange rate is favourable.
So, basically, when the loss rates are hugely disproportionate one can usually find good strategic reasons why this is so which have less to do with the game design and more to do with individual choices which have created that context. Changing one's play is difficult, blaming the game, easy.
In other news.... Still waiting on the movie file from Mike. It has been over 24 hours and had a good chance of being a turn in which I managed to snag a few CVLs. So, fingers crossed.
John Dillworth: "I had GreyJoy check my spelling and he said it was fine."
Well, that's that settled then.
Well, that's that settled then.
RE: Salutations and solicitations.... 1EyedJacks (J) vs Nemo (A)
Joe's thread discussions on air power is quite interesting , Japan and the allies had little activity till 3/42 when a large trained allied pool confronted and beat the Japanese in Burma. The Japanese player is saying the game is a bit off , the allied player is saying the Japanese didnt attrition the allies enough.
Underdog Fanboy