Moderators: wdolson, Don Bowen, mogami
ORIGINAL: JWE
...If you don't think the whole country wouldn't be looking for the removal of the entire Japanese race from the face of the earth...
ORIGINAL: Terminus
Weren't there two batteries of 16-inch guns, each with two weapons?
ORIGINAL: Terminus
Weren't there two batteries of 16-inch guns, each with two weapons?
ORIGINAL: Terminus
Personally, I think a Japanese invasion would have shortened the war considerably. The Japanese would still lose, but their beatings would have begun earlier.
ORIGINAL: el cid again
The Japanese have no need for a fleet train on the scale the US had later. And they did have a fleet train of some significance - more appropriate to the size of their forces. The USN fielded over 60,000 vessels - and the US Army over 80,000 - by the later years of the war. An operation in 1941 does not require anything like the forces we needed to take on Japan in 1944 or 1945.
Who said anything about "operate continuously near Oahu?"
The idea - explicitly divided into phases - was to move forward - sieze ground - and move back; replenish, reorganize and recieve additional echelons on ships arriving from Japan; then move forward again, reinforce the islands formerly taken and take some more; repeat the process - three times - at which point the fleet does not have to be present "near Oahu" at all - except when operationally convient - until such time as the decision is made to go for the landing on Oahu itself.
Taking the White House is not an option: taking Oahu is - and the mere attempt probably forces the decisive battle early - which is the only time Japan is likely to win it desicively. The better (US) strategy is to AVOID a decisive battle early - in which Japan gets Oahu as a position and a bargaining chip - and the US SLOC starts on the West Coast instead of mid - ocean. This is a win win situation: EITHER you get the Decisive Battle at the one time you can win it OR you get Oahu and the American ability to project power is diminished - and its first projection will be at a predictable place - instead of somewhere that might be in bomber range of things Japan cares about. Yamamoto was a strategic naval thinker - and he was not wrong.
ORIGINAL: Nikademus
The idea - explicitly divided into phases - was to move forward - sieze ground - and move back; replenish, reorganize and recieve additional echelons on ships arriving from Japan; then move forward again, reinforce the islands formerly taken and take some more; repeat the process - three times - at which point the fleet does not have to be present "near Oahu" at all - except when operationally convient - until such time as the decision is made to go for the landing on Oahu itself.
ORIGINAL: Nikademus
ORIGINAL: el cid again
I agree we would block the Harbor in any competent defense. I agree there are problems of compatibility of some sorts - but these never stopped Japan from commissioning captured warships of US, British or Dutch (or other) origin. They would raise some hulks, repair some damaged or captured vessels - and they might well convert them in place - not that we could do that in the game. But IRL that is what Japan did - and would surely do. Somehow the fact the harbor is blocked is not a fact of nature has eluded some: the blockship can be removed - and it almost certainly would be. It is a TEMPORARY denial of the facilities. And it isn't critical - there are other ports - even at Honolulu itself - and on Oahu - and Lahaina was a true fleet anchorage in its own right.
There are problems of compatability of many sorts. There is a huge difference between salvaging a handful of small warships and refurbishing them in Japanese shipyards and attempting to service and repair a major fleet using the damaged and completely foreign shipyard of another. I don't seem to recall any such thing being acomplished in the 20th Century much less contemplated. The invading or advancing power had to use their own shipyards and bring forward their own logstical base.
Blockships can be removed...how quickly depends on the circumstances. In some cases they were not able to be removed. Other ports? So Japan in addition to a major assault on Oahu is going to capture the rest of the chain too? Honolulu and Lahaina have major shipyards and oil reserve storage facilities?
ORIGINAL: Nikademus
ORIGINAL: el cid again
[What is tripping you up is a difference in assumptions. You are assuming casualties are possible which, bluntly, were not short of the Japanese pulling their own seacocks. You are missing the operational point - ANY unit that is significantly damaged need not press on - and most of them will be saved if withdrawn. BECAUSE you don't have to take Oahu - just threaten it - to win - to establish CONTROL over the central Pacific area - you are NEVER required to risk truly heavy losses. You wait until those big guns are out - and if they never go out - you don't really have to go. Taking out two guns ought to be possible - and probably a list of secondary things as well. I am assuming competent leadership would NOT risk severe losses - period - and that isolating Oahu serves almost as well as occupation does. Ultimately - time is not on the side of the defense: like Versingetorex at Alecia Short likely will surrender - to save the women and children from starvation - if things are not resolved by military events sooner than that becomes a necessity.
<shrug> As i've previously said, the Japanese do have to take Oahu. "Threatening" it gives them nothing and isn't worth the cost and risk of the operation, much less the expense. Midway threatened Hawaii....as did the original Pearl Harbor raid. Both situations proved transitory and even the disablement of the battlefleet might have helped the US more than it hindered them in hindsight. It did not gain Japan anything dipolmatically nor did it much alter the time line of US recovery and advance. Time is almost always against the invader, esp where amphibious ops are concerned. The Japanese also needed Oahu/Hawaii secured to as to be used as a bargaining chip to secure a peace with the US that leaves Japan in a suitible post-war position. I'd say its you thats missing the opeational point. The hypothetical Hawaii operation was not some kind of grand demonstration.
ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl
ORIGINAL: ChezDaJez
Well according to a study entitled "Guarding the United States and Its Outposts" and conducted for the Center for Military History, U.S. Army, the northwestern shore was the most likely place for a landing.
Chez"The principal Army unit was the Hawaiian Division, activated in 1921; and its station at Schofield covered the Pearl Harbor base against an enemy landing on the northwest coast. It was only along this coast that the Army believed a hostile landing in force even remotely feasible."
That's the "key phrase". The South and Southeast were totally "under the guns" of the Coast Defenses, the North had less man-made protection, but terrible "natural protection" in the form of surf and mountains. The Northwest might offer some possibilities by being "between the fences". But even there feasibility was regarded as "remote". Not a "ringing endorsement" by any means.
The rest of the material is mostly a case of unreadiness on the morning of 12/07..., a problem that was pretty much under control on the morning of 12/08 when the peacetime restrictions and methods had been tossed out the window. But dragging that large invasion armada of transports into range to land on the 7th is virtually impossible---it's far too big, too slow, too easily spotted, and too vulnerable to risk in Hawaiian waters until some degree of air and sea control had been obtained. So Oahu WILL be ready when an invasion can be mounted. The initial landings would have to be made on other islands to establish even minimal forward bases.
REPLY: Just so. The Japanese knew that. In fact, they believed it was not really safe to put the actual divisions forward before Johnston was secured - so it was smaller units that got the initial job of taking ports on the lesser islands. The idea was to get at least one significant medium port/airfield combination. Only then - with land based air out of Johnston and out of one of the lower islands - would the first of the heavy units come forward. Again - the object was not Oahu - but taking still more bases - more islands - more places which could be used to isloate Oahu and insure that a single lucky strike could not take out a single critical base. Over weeks of time an entire Army (i.e. corps) would move in, along with an Air Brigade - and THESE would be used from the NON Oahu bases to insure air and sea control in the area. Once the air power on Oahu had been reduced to a minimal level - the real job could begin: that would be to start chipping away at those coast defenses - and probably other useful targets. Japan had no intention to land on Oahu on the first day of the war - nor in the first week of the war - nor in the first month of the war. Various plans were drawn up at various times - but all of them contemplated months of operations - and those would not end when Oahu fell. After that presumably - sooner or later - there would be operations against attacking US forces.
All of this is fun to talk about..., and totally irrelavent in reality. The Japanese simply lacked the resources and fleet train to pull off such an operation that far from home. Their Naval Staff may have discussed it longingly since 1910..., but their own limitations were a reality that couldn't be escaped. This is a nation that put it's civilian population on virtually starvation rationing more than 6 months BEFORE the war started, just to free up the transport needed for the historical offensive. Someday maybe someone will make a game of this conflict that accurately reflects logistical realities. Then players can begin to marvel at how much the Japanese actually DID achieve with what little they had, instead of positing pipedreams about what they might have done.....
ORIGINAL: Nikademus
Taking the White House is not an option: taking Oahu is - and the mere attempt probably forces the decisive battle early - which is the only time Japan is likely to win it desicively. The better (US) strategy is to AVOID a decisive battle early - in which Japan gets Oahu as a position and a bargaining chip - and the US SLOC starts on the West Coast instead of mid - ocean. This is a win win situation: EITHER you get the Decisive Battle at the one time you can win it OR you get Oahu and the American ability to project power is diminished - and its first projection will be at a predictable place - instead of somewhere that might be in bomber range of things Japan cares about. Yamamoto was a strategic naval thinker - and he was not wrong.
No, its not a win win scenario. First because, you cannot gurantee that the USN will provide Japan with the ready made Decisive Battle Yamamotto so badly wanted.
ORIGINAL: Nikademus
Taking the White House is not an option: taking Oahu is - and the mere attempt probably forces the decisive battle early - which is the only time Japan is likely to win it desicively. The better (US) strategy is to AVOID a decisive battle early - in which Japan gets Oahu as a position and a bargaining chip - and the US SLOC starts on the West Coast instead of mid - ocean. This is a win win situation: EITHER you get the Decisive Battle at the one time you can win it OR you get Oahu and the American ability to project power is diminished - and its first projection will be at a predictable place - instead of somewhere that might be in bomber range of things Japan cares about. Yamamoto was a strategic naval thinker - and he was not wrong.
No, its not a win win scenario. First because, you cannot gurantee that the USN will provide Japan with the ready made Decisive Battle Yamamotto so badly wanted. Assaulting Hawaii would not automatically lead to a rushed and hasty US response. Yamamotto had a weakness of planning his battles around the enemy doing what Yammamotto expected them to do. It led him to ruin at Midway, and hindered carrier battles afterwards. Secondly, a US avoidance of conveniently delivering itself onto Combined Fleet elements under conditions it wants and/or expects does not automatically concede Oahu to Japan.
Besides which, under your "idea", the Japanese fleet will attempt to invade Oahu as if conducting a gigantic scaled Tokyo Express. Impractical as that idea may be, it would thus make US efforts to reinforce Oahu all the easier. All during this alleged period, Japan is burning oil, supply and wearing out her fleet risking it far from her base of operations. Yamamotto was wrong about a good number of things. His idea that Oahu would make a good bargaining chip was one of them.
