Yamamoto's Plan in action

[el cid again]

Two days after Pearl Harbor (first reported in English in a history of Hawaii which got the material from the Official History which has never been translated and which took forever to write) Adm Yamamoto concluded he should have adopted the planning (which dates to 1910) to invade rather than raid Hawaii. [For details see Hawaii Under the Rising Sun by University of Hawaii Press - essentially a collection of translations and summaries of documents in Japanese - and not the history which first reported his change of mind]

This is very hard to do in terms of WITP mechanics - and IRL because of the coast defenses and significant military defenses of Oahu. [One historian said Gen Short would look better in history if the Japanese had landed] One thing is clear - the AI is not up to a proper defense. It sends in the carriers piecemail - one at a time. Even together, they have problems - and should only strike at opportune moments - regardless of what that means. The way to do it is very similar to real world: take airfields, built them up, isolate the place - and pound it until it is less of a problem. This is very hard to do. BUT it DOES guarantee the US fleet and air forces are focused on that area - and make no trouble anywhere else. It is a great strategic pinning op - win lose or draw in itself - it means the carriers and long range bombers are not making problems for other Japanese offensives. In fact, to the degree the US fights with ships and planes - it is pretty much going to lose them for some time. It may or may not lose Oahu - but the value as a base is much less when surrounded by Japanese air bases. The Central Pacific offensive - to take them back - must occur - wether or not Oahu itself actually fell. Until then, the lines of communication become impossibly long to be effective - and a few island attacks can isolate the US from Australia altogether - except by the Atlantic or Antarctic routes. Over such distances the tons per day delivered are greatly reduced - so the fighting forces at the front much be much less effective.

[el cid again]

After establishing a firm beachhead on the "lower" islands (Southeast of Oahu), the Japanese withdrew to Johnston Island to refuel and pick up phase two invasion convoys. Although the airfields were able to be restored on Oahu, the air units were not - so the second phase is doomed to be much easier than the first. This will occupy the "upper" islands (Northwest of Oahu) and put significantly larger engineering groups as well as combat formations. Phase one has only the 1st Guards Mixed Brigade supported by a single SNLF, a single air support unit, a single AAA regiment, and one CD unit. Phase two puts a 2 regiment division and a reinforced division with 3 regiments plus a tank battalion ashore, engineers, and the first of the heavy fire support units. More critically, it will land hundreds of thousands of tons of supplies, and build up a number of airfields, which will be used to pound Oahu until it no longer has those 114 coast defense guns and almost unlimited supply.

To the extent the US fights during these early phases - due to concentration of force it is doomed to lose its air and naval units. If it does that, the time to come back is significantly increased. But if it does not do that, the enemy build up of air bases near Oahu occurs sooner. When the Americans come back - they do not face a similar problem - not one heavyly defended island - but five significant islands (and two minor ones) with a network of air bases. There is no bomber base in range to the East - so taking down all the airfields will be difficult. Even if Oahu never falls, four major island bases preventing its use wholly changes the nature of the Central Pacific campaign.

[Mike Scholl]

"Two days after Pearl Harbor (first reported in English in a history of Hawaii which got the material from the Official History which has never been translated and which took forever to write) Adm Yamamoto concluded he should have adopted the planning (which dates to 1910) to invade rather than raid Hawaii. [For details see Hawaii Under the Rising Sun by University of Hawaii Press - essentially a collection of translations and summaries of documents in Japanese - and not the history which first reported his change of mind]".


This is the very defination of "20/20 hindsight" on Yamamoto's part. Everything went well, suprise was achieved, losses were within "acceptable", and substantial damage had been inflicted. So now he's musing to his aides "Maybe we should have tried an invasion?". But is he being realistic? Or just playing everybody's favorite game of "What if?".

A decision to actually try such a thing would have had to been made months before 12/7. First the shipping would have had to be rounded up (either delaying actions in the real theatre, or stealing even more from the economy) Then you would have to convince the IJA that sending a reinforced Army of at least 3 Divisions on a probably "certain death mission" to the Central Pacific was a good idea (I say "certain death" because supporting or withdrawing such a force (IRL) was beyond Japan's capabilities in the long term). And those Divisions would have to come from somewhere else..., and the IJA had made it pretty plain the resources it was willing to devote to "the Navy's War" were very much limited to what was used in the opening advance on the SRA. Not to mention getting this massive, slow-moving, convoy across the Pacific unobserved.

Then there are the "intangibles". Nobody on the Japanese side KNEW (as gamer's do) how the rules worked and what the other side's limitations and restrictions were. A number of us playing have had that PH result of "Bad Weather/no attack", or a truely dissapointing PH result (partial strike). We can always re-run the first turn and hope for better (Has anyone ever "played out" a bad start? I know no-one who's had an outstanding result has said "Let's do it over."). Even the Japanese Navy regarded PH as a very high risk opperation..., Yamamoto had to threaten to resign to get it implemented at all. And you can bet the IJA would have heard from some of the opposition if they were dragged into the planning (as they would have had to be).

It's an entertaining "what if?", but very much a long shot in reality. Out there with "Short and Kimmel staging a full scale readiness exercise (with live ammunition) that weekend --- just to shake the complacency from their commands." Or lot's of other possibilities that could have made the Japs plans more difficult. Fun to speculate..., but to be fair if a player want's to implement it in a game he should also be faced with a lot of "possibilities" on the Allied side as well. Something that would make it the "toss up" the Japanese thought it would be, instead of the relatively "sure thing" the game makes it.
We all tend to be a lot "bolder" in games than commanders are generally willing to be in real life --- because the consequences just aren't there for failure. The "loser"'s home won't be bombed, nor his family enslaved, nor his nation brought to ruin. So when the planning (in the game) get's much bolder than it was in real life, the game needs to "up the stakes and chances" for failure by increasing the chance that the other side won't be where you think he is...., or will be ready when you think he isn't. In other words, that "Murphy" will show up and make a mess of your carefully laid plans. The farther off "the historical path" the option is, the greater the chance needs to be of failure. That would make for more realistic (and fun for both sides) scenarios....

Just my thoughts...

[witpqs]

Definitely would have been far higher risk than the already risky attack that was carried out. Of course, all that naval traffic would have been much easier to spot, especially as it would not have taken the sparsely traveled northern route (with its lucky bad weather part of the way). Also, the amount of overall preparation quite possibly would have resulted in an intelligence catch for the US (speculating here), even if the political fighting sure to have been encountered hadn't.

[el cid again]

[quote]ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

"Two days after Pearl Harbor (first reported in English in a history of Hawaii which got the material from the Official History which has never been translated and which took forever to write) Adm Yamamoto concluded he should have adopted the planning (which dates to 1910) to invade rather than raid Hawaii. [For details see Hawaii Under the Rising Sun by University of Hawaii Press - essentially a collection of translations and summaries of documents in Japanese - and not the history which first reported his change of mind]".


This is the very defination of "20/20 hindsight" on Yamamoto's part. Everything went well, suprise was achieved, losses were within "acceptable", and substantial damage had been inflicted. So now he's musing to his aides "Maybe we should have tried an invasion?". But is he being realistic? Or just playing everybody's favorite game of "What if?".


REPLY: Maybe. Maybe not. Japanese planning dated from 1910, and some staff strongly advocated it. The problem was political as well as logistical/operational: how could he have ever sold it to the high command BEFORE Pearl Harbor? But the planning and the staff advocation means it was on his mind. Then of course he had been thinking intensely about the matter during those few days. So perhaps that is when it all came together. Too bad we don't have his memoir to read about what his thinking was in detail. The closest we have is the diary of Admiral Ukagi - his chief of staff and successor. Ukagi ordered this material destroyed - but it was not - and now you can read it in English (Fading Victory).

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

"Two days after Pearl Harbor (first reported in English in a history of Hawaii which got the material from the Official History which has never been translated and which took forever to write) Adm Yamamoto concluded he should have adopted the planning (which dates to 1910) to invade rather than raid Hawaii. [For details see Hawaii Under the Rising Sun by University of Hawaii Press - essentially a collection of translations and summaries of documents in Japanese - and not the history which first reported his change of mind]".


This is the very defination of "20/20 hindsight" on Yamamoto's part. Everything went well, suprise was achieved, losses were within "acceptable", and substantial damage had been inflicted. So now he's musing to his aides "Maybe we should have tried an invasion?". But is he being realistic? Or just playing everybody's favorite game of "What if?".

A decision to actually try such a thing would have had to been made months before 12/7. First the shipping would have had to be rounded up (either delaying actions in the real theatre, or stealing even more from the economy) Then you would have to convince the IJA that sending a reinforced Army of at least 3 Divisions on a probably "certain death mission" to the Central Pacific was a good idea (I say "certain death" because supporting or withdrawing such a force (IRL) was beyond Japan's capabilities in the long term). And those Divisions would have to come from somewhere else..., and the IJA had made it pretty plain the resources it was willing to devote to "the Navy's War" were very much limited to what was used in the opening advance on the SRA. Not to mention getting this massive, slow-moving, convoy across the Pacific unobserved.

I pretty much agree with your last paragraph exerpted here, except for the shipping part. I once did a more elaborate game (60 players or so, manual working out logistics, mostly professional military players) and invaded Hawaii with six divisions - and both won the battle and lost the war - due to the shipping impacts. I ended up concluding three divisions was sufficient - and doable - BEFORE the Japanese history was published indicating staff there came to the same conclusion. There is no reason the ships cannot return the divisions when they return from the campaign. Logistically this must be done out of Kwajalein. And it absolutely must use Johnston as a forward base - with other Hawaiian islands as forward forward bases. But every ship not in use is idle in Japan (or Japanese possessions) by Dec 8 Japan time - a conclusion known BEFORE the fact because of signal analysis by RN at Singapore - and communicated (against the instructions of Churchill) to Adm Hart at least. Strangely, most of the suitable passenger ships were forced into civil service (and AKs used for trooping) - so the fraction of idle ships is mainly most suitable for this operation. I think that you write off a division - leave it and naval troops as garrison to fight when/if the enemy returns - and remove the other two for operations in the South Seas - which should have begun well before they did. Cut Australia from the US West coast not only by taking Hawaii - but Christmas Island and other islands which block the route. No matter what, the US must address these moves - and it buys time to set up autarky and stockpile resources and oil. Probably it also costs naval and air units to such a degree that also costs time to create an effective comeback force. Finally - what is left is "pinned" to defend the US West coast and Canada and Alaska - in case the Japanese are "Nemoesque" and decide to invade somewhere else. Virtually nothing is available to send to the far Western Pacific/Australia area - and whatever does go gets fed a much smaller fraction of supplies (= less operational effectiveness). In the mechanical campaign, for which one participant got 32 credits from the University of Washington (he should have a future in sales, and is now running for Congress), we defeated the first attempt to take Hawaii back - against a gigantic invasion fleet which actually had a viable plan. The commander chickened out AFTER successfully surpressing the air bases on Oahu (our defenses did not have major air units on outlieing islands) - and he decided to divert to Midway as a secondary objective. He got himself between the Kiddo Butai and land bases, and lost decisively an air battle he should have won to an inferior force. The player who got the 32 credits went on to become a US Army officer who just retired this year as a Colonel - and he never lost his cool. I simply sent every long range aircraft in the empire to back him up. A different Army officer - running the Southern area offensive - CONTINUED to advance WITHOUT fighter cover or long range bombers! He simply used air transports to attack forward points, and the enemy kept assuming he would never do so without the air power to back it up! I have never seen such a shoestring offensive, but the context - great victories everywhere - had imposed a defeatest mindset - even on real US military players - very like happened to many officers in the USAFFE command. [One commander thought it was advisable to ABANDON Hawaii - to insure we had the ability to defend the West Coast.]

[Mike Scholl]

ORIGINAL: el cid again
REPLY: Maybe. Maybe not. Japanese planning dated from 1910, and some staff strongly advocated it. The problem was political as well as logistical/operational: how could he have ever sold it to the high command BEFORE Pearl Harbor? But the planning and the staff advocation means it was on his mind. Then of course he had been thinking intensely about the matter during those few days. So perhaps that is when it all came together. Too bad we don't have his memoir to read about what his thinking was in detail. The closest we have is the diary of Admiral Ukagi - his chief of staff and successor. Ukagi ordered this material destroyed - but it was not - and now you can read it in English (Fading Victory).

Point was that he hadn't tried to force such a decision before the war. Possibly because he knew he could never get the Army's co-operation, possibly because he knew Japan didn't have the shipping, possibly because it was one thing to try to sneak a small, highly trained, and high speed naval TF to Oahu, as compared to a large, slow, unwieldy mass of merchant ships and support an invasion would call for. To say "a plan" existed really says nothing at all..., War Plans Divisions of every nation's General Staff churn these things out by the hundreds. We had one to fight Great Britian (like that was gonna happen....). You are right that no-one will ever know for certain what Yamamoto thought about doing --- but we do know what he did do...., and he didn't choose to try this. We can only assume he had good reason for not doing so.

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

[Then there are the "intangibles". Nobody on the Japanese side KNEW (as gamer's do) how the rules worked and what the other side's limitations and restrictions were. A number of us playing have had that PH result of "Bad Weather/no attack", or a truely dissapointing PH result (partial strike). We can always re-run the first turn and hope for better (Has anyone ever "played out" a bad start? I know no-one who's had an outstanding result has said "Let's do it over."). Even the Japanese Navy regarded PH as a very high risk opperation..., Yamamoto had to threaten to resign to get it implemented at all. And you can bet the IJA would have heard from some of the opposition if they were dragged into the planning (as they would have had to be).

Absolutely correct. In order to do EOS/AIO - which is frankly a rationalization for a dream once described by Joe Wilkerson for a "Japan enhanced scenario" - we wanted to help "balance the game" for the sake of a more even contest and, also in some cases, for players who cannot do human for various reasons, and must face the AI (AI needs all the help it can get). So the rationalization is that we have a shifting of seats in IJA/government. Tojo was not the top dog at the time - but a servant who eventually managed to get real power - only to lose it midwar due to the horrible events which occurred (and he was actually retired when the war ended). Tojo was a rival of Yamashita, and he did all he could to insure Yamashita didn't cover himself in glory again after Malaya (cleverly sending him to Manchukuo where he built a tank army - a vital front that also was a backwater at that time). By cutting some sort of deal in which Yamashita replaces Count Teruchi (who IS one of the triumverate that rules IJA/Japan) in charge of the Southern offensive - we get Tsuji's planning team doing the whole offensive - not just Malaya. And we get it "months before" the war. The decision to fight was made in July 1941, and the committee formed then (on Formosa). Yamashita and Tsuji were unusual in being joint minded (not just Army Navy, but Army Navy Civilian) - and in being flexable enough to change the original plans when data indicated that was appropriate. Yamashita was probably Japan's only great captain, and Tsuji was probably IJA's best staff officer (who strangely got along with naval officers, and when he met Yamamoto, they practically fell in love). That rationalization means we can do things more or less sensibly for the whole offensive area, not just for Malaya as IRL. And if we barely have time to get anything new for the start of the war, we DO have time to get operations planned, and some new things start producing near then in time.

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl


It's an entertaining "what if?", but very much a long shot in reality. Out there with "Short and Kimmel staging a full scale readiness exercise (with live ammunition) that weekend --- just to shake the complacency from their commands." Or lot's of other possibilities that could have made the Japs plans more difficult. Fun to speculate..., but to be fair if a player want's to implement it in a game he should also be faced with a lot of "possibilities" on the Allied side as well. Something that would make it the "toss up" the Japanese thought it would be, instead of the relatively "sure thing" the game makes it.
We all tend to be a lot "bolder" in games than commanders are generally willing to be in real life --- because the consequences just aren't there for failure. The "loser"'s home won't be bombed, nor his family enslaved, nor his nation brought to ruin. So when the planning (in the game) get's much bolder than it was in real life, the game needs to "up the stakes and chances" for failure by increasing the chance that the other side won't be where you think he is...., or will be ready when you think he isn't. In other words, that "Murphy" will show up and make a mess of your carefully laid plans. The farther off "the historical path" the option is, the greater the chance needs to be of failure. That would make for more realistic (and fun for both sides) scenarios....

Just my thoughts...

I am very sympathetic with Short and Kimmel. There appears to have been a successful effort to exhonerate Kimmel by his son - and it has convinced many or most in the Navy. And nothing I know of Short - who is the commander defeated on Dec 7 because Oahu is an Army defense responsibility - indicates he did anything horrible other than assemble his planes in a way making them vulnerable to air attack (for what he thought was good cause). The defenses of Oahu - meaning the Hawaii Separate Coast Artillery Brigade backed up by the former Hawaii Division and Hawaii National Guard (now two composite divisions) - was formidable. Not as formidable as code mechanics make it - but nevertheless very very strong. One historian wrote that "Short would look a lot better if the Japanese had invaded" - and he meant no matter the outcome - it was going to be a glorious fight - and one Short might well have won. For example, and against horrible opposition, he forced USAAF ground crews to learn how to feed coast guns and align pointers. The coast defenses had guns but not enough men - and what amounts to centralized and electric control - so the fire control centers could have directed them IF someone loaded rounds and lined up the aiming pointers. He figured he would run out of planes at some point - and put all those men into making the ground/naval defense stronger. Not a bad idea really, but can you imagine USAAF officers coming to terms with it?

On the other hand, I do not think there was any chance the US itself would be occupied by Japan (or Japan and Germany) or its population enslaved. Japan - however - might have been depopulated - and a US Cabinet member (Blumenthal I think is his name) wanted just that. The politics of the pre war era are hard to grasp: the US was a colonial power - not just in the Philippines - but in China - we even had "legal" opium runners on the China scene (opium was not outlawed in Hong Kong until 1954 or 1956). We were unwilling to back China in 1935 or 1937 - or even later in 1939 or 1940. Strong opposition might even have worked in the early years - Japan was not ready and IJA would have backed down - angrily no doubt. [As it was, the GOVERNMENT NEVER decided for war - it was more or less orchestrated by hotheads in IJA who were quite illegally acting in ways that amounted to treason] At the same time, there was a big division in IJA itself, and the faction that itself orchestrated taking over Manchuria OPPOSED invading China - regarde itself as moral and even pan racist (having attracted ethnic Chinese and Russians and Koreans and Japanese by the millions to its "new country" - which was based on small enterprise - the eight Zaibatsu were forbidden by law to enter the area). When the political fight was lost, the general in charge of the faction - entering retirement - said "idealism has lost." Tsuji was his deciple, and he writes extensively in his less well known book about this - from personal knowledge. Next - we have ROC scholarship working on declassified ROC archives - indicating ROC intel MANIPULATED the US into the war by manipulating US China policy. The case is persuasive because they decide to go for a policy BEFORE we adopt it- time after time. The US was "the last, best hope" for China - to save it from domination by IJA. And we have a corrupt set of IJA leaders who won't even honer each other - so you have SEPARATE commands in China - run more for the benefit of the commander than for Japan's national interests. [Tojo was a former Kempeitai commander who had successfully brought a faction to heel - and could have been sent to do that again in China] A very complicated situation. It by no means had to sort out as it did IRL.

[JeffroK]

Very interesting, if WITP wasnt such a monster it would be interesting to mod this & other Alternate approaches.
 
I would approach this one by disabling a large (50%+) portion of the Hawaiian defenses, as mentioned it was a Sunday and the forces were not at the highest readiness.
 
As for finding the Japanese forces, some of the Phillipines, Malaya bound Divs could be redirected in an effort for a true knock-out blow, leave enough to push back the Brits/Phillipines armies with extra units coming later.  Plus the push into the New Guinea/Solomons area delayed.
 
Japan would have to take Midway & Johnston Is, plus push to Dutch Harbour. I suppose commit 100% to the HI rather than capture the South Pacific
 
 

[witpqs]

ORIGINAL: JeffK

Very interesting, if WITP wasnt such a monster it would be interesting to mod this & other Alternate approaches.

Already done by Sid. The EOS variant of RHS.

[Mike Scholl]

"I am very sympathetic with Short and Kimmel. There appears to have been a successful effort to exhonerate Kimmel by his son - and it has convinced many or most in the Navy. And nothing I know of Short - who is the commander defeated on Dec 7 because Oahu is an Army defense responsibility - indicates he did anything horrible other than assemble his planes in a way making them vulnerable to air attack (for what he thought was good cause). The defenses of Oahu - meaning the Hawaii Separate Coast Artillery Brigade backed up by the former Hawaii Division and Hawaii National Guard (now two composite divisions) - was formidable. Not as formidable as code mechanics make it - but nevertheless very very strong. One historian wrote that "Short would look a lot better if the Japanese had invaded" - and he meant no matter the outcome - it was going to be a glorious fight - and one Short might well have won. For example, and against horrible opposition, he forced USAAF ground crews to learn how to feed coast guns and align pointers. The coast defenses had guns but not enough men - and what amounts to centralized and electric control - so the fire control centers could have directed them IF someone loaded rounds and lined up the aiming pointers. He figured he would run out of planes at some point - and put all those men into making the ground/naval defense stronger. Not a bad idea really, but can you imagine USAAF officers coming to terms with it?"


The air raid on PH and the damage or loss of so many BB's would have cured Short's CD manning problems. Lots of trained Naval Gunners could have been seconded to the Coast Artillery for the next few months. They'd have had to learn some new techniques, but they had plenty of basic experiance in shell and powder handling. Given a few weeks, several dozen 5"/25's and other mountings from damaged ships could have been added to the defenses (remember the Konigsbergs guns being trundled all over East Africa?).

[Knavey]

Somewhere in these forums I found a rather lengthy study done on this subject.  It was a fascinating read although I have no idea of the credability of the author.


http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... ade+hawaii

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: JeffK

Very interesting, if WITP wasnt such a monster it would be interesting to mod this & other Alternate approaches.

I would approach this one by disabling a large (50%+) portion of the Hawaiian defenses, as mentioned it was a Sunday and the forces were not at the highest readiness.

As for finding the Japanese forces, some of the Phillipines, Malaya bound Divs could be redirected in an effort for a true knock-out blow, leave enough to push back the Brits/Phillipines armies with extra units coming later.  Plus the push into the New Guinea/Solomons area delayed.

Japan would have to take Midway & Johnston Is, plus push to Dutch Harbour. I suppose commit 100% to the HI rather than capture the South Pacific

Dutch can wait - but Midway and Johnson are essential - they are the approaches and provide vital land air bases and refueling points for ships. The logistic keystone is Kwajalien - already a major base complex - with nearby supporting bases.

There is no need to divert divisions from other operations in the South - the IJA was very large and there are plenty of formations in the North.

[Mike Scholl]

ORIGINAL: el cid again
Dutch can wait - but Midway and Johnson are essential - they are the approaches and provide vital land air bases and refueling points for ships. The logistic keystone is Kwajalien - already a major base complex - with nearby supporting bases.

There is no need to divert divisions from other operations in the South - the IJA was very large and there are plenty of formations in the North.

I think you are oversimplifying here Cid. The Dutch can't wait very long, because they are the source of the oil that is going to refill Japan's shrinking reserves. And (IRL) the Japanese know that there really isn't any reason they and the Brits can't totally destroy those oil fields starting on 12/08/41. Only "the game" prevents that---and the Japanese weren't playing "the game".

Logistically, going for Hawaii would have been a much bigger operation than the historical Midway Attack. It would require most of the major units of the Home (Battleship) Fleet plus Kido Butai to spend months "on station" at the end of a very long logistical train. Japan started the war with approximately a 53,000,000 ton oil reserve..., and the IJN alone used over 30,000,000 in the first year (totally exceeding all "professional" estimates). An large, extended operation in Hawaiian waters could easily double that usage, without even considering the demands of industry and civilian usage. And unless the Japanese are suffering from a huge pineapple and sugar deficiency I've never heard about, Hawaii solves none of the "stragic resource needs" that drove them to war.

And you speak airily about "the IJA was large and could have used extra units stationed in the North for the Hawaiian attack". Truth was it was akin to "pulling teeth" to get the IJA to allocate even the limited forces sent to sieze the SRA in reality. All of the ideas in this string of posts are the kind of "pencil and paper" exercises beloved of "armchair strategists"...., the kind that drive the military nuts when political folks try to interfere with their operations. Again, while it's fun to speculate looking back, it's not very realistic from the viewpoint of those who had to plan a war while only being able to "guess" at the future.

[DuckofTindalos]

I continue to find it amusing how far Sid is willing to go outside the possible and probable when he has no qualms attacking other people for putting forward unrealistic ideas.

[Mike Scholl]

I'm not trying to "attack Cid". I'm simply pushing to inject a large Hypodermic of "reality and common sense" into some of the wilder flights of fancy that players seem willing to engage in on the forumns. Fun's fun..., but there were real world reasons why most of these things were rejected.

[Mike Scholl]

"You can't spell 'Who Cares' without HR" - Catbert


Just as an aside, I really hate the use of "Human Resources" when applied to the "Personnel Dept." Too much "truth in advertising". A resource is something you exploit. You mine coal, drill for oil, clear-cut timber, etc. While I know deep down "the company" wants to "extract" my labor as effeciently as possible, I kind of liked the delusion that they cared about me while they were doing so. "HR" is just a constant reminder of the reality that I'm there to be used and discarded.

[Andrew Brown]

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl
Logistically, going for Hawaii would have been a much bigger operation than the historical Midway Attack. It would require most of the major units of the Home (Battleship) Fleet plus Kido Butai to spend months "on station" at the end of a very long logistical train. Japan started the war with approximately a 53,000,000 ton oil reserve..., and the IJN alone used over 30,000,000 in the first year (totally exceeding all "professional" estimates).

I think that should be barrels, not tons, for the reserve figure.

Mike - out of interest, where did you get the figure of 30,000,000 [presumably barrels, not tons] used by the IJN in the first year of the war? Is that for ships only? Or all uses by the Navy? That is information I have been looking for recently...

Thanks,
Andrew

[DuckofTindalos]

Deleted.