Gary Grigsby/Joel Billings interview

Gary Grigsby's strategic level wargame covering the entire War in the Pacific from 1941 to 1945 or beyond.

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Nikademus
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Post by Nikademus »

Originally posted by Von Rom
I wonder if alarm bells would have been rung. By July, 1942, Germany had about 331 U-boats in operation. At the end of 1941, they had 236 U-boats.

Even though the Battle of the Atlantic had been raging for more than two years, and the threat of the U-boat had been clearly established with at least two hundred German subs prowling the waters, the US was still defenseless, and was caught off guard in Operation Drumbeat - for 6 months.


Hard to say as, along with the idea of the Germans attempting to build 300 Uboats in secret, we now travel down the murky road of pure speculation. On a conservative note, The US might not have been so willing to part with some of it's destroyer fleet as it did historically. On a more liberal note......news of such a massive program might have reversed the the order of priorities set forth in the Two Ocean navy plan by the US with ASW assets bumped up on the scale along with a faster acceptance of the British design for the original "Liberty ship"

One thing that remains constant however, again, is the technology gap and no redress of the German naval build program would have touched that, nor Doneitz's under-appreciation for Allied sonar, radar or and most importantly "HUFF-DUFF" (radio detection and triangulation)
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Torpedos

Post by mogami »

Hi, And we've all just decided to cure the German torpedo problem. The USN had 29 Subs around PI (one of the largest concentrations of subs in the world in Dec 41)(About equal to the total number of German subs deployed in Sept 39) And they did diddly squat because of the training, cautiousness, and bad torpedos. (I know of at least 2 occasions where a USN sub fired 12 or more torpedos at a single target to no effect)
Didn't Prien come back from Scapa Flow cursing the bad luck of firing more duds then working torpedos? (With a few curses directed at the Torpedo program)

Unless we assume the Germans have working torpedos the number of U-boats is not important. Now by the time the US enters the war we can say the problem is fixed. But is it fixed in time to defeat the Royal Navy?

Also none of these quoted works seems to pay any attention to my oft stated statistic.

The Germans came out behind in the required tonnage sunk simply by adding neutral fleets to the allies. (never mind production)

If at the start you need to sink x tons per month and attain y total
but after 6 months you add more tons to the allied total then you have sunk to date you have lost ground. (now you need to sink x+q per month. All the while your window of victory is smaller.)
In Dec 1941 the Germans have to start all over again. (and the totals are much higher now then in Sept 39)

I also liked the Allied planners using the word inadequate for Allied landing craft. They only had enough to land 5 div in 1 day in Europe. (I mean the allied idea of what would have been adequate must have been enormous. The Germans or Japanese would have been very happy to have landing craft enough to land 5 div in one day in June 1944. (Allied spare change. I believe 5 coke bottling plants were landed at Normandy)(I can see the Japanese officer planning an invasion requesting shipping for 5 pop bottling plants)
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Post by Von Rom »

Originally posted by Nikademus
Well this article really does not address the points Blair brings up and makes some weighty but vague claims on the impact of the uboats on the Allied war effort.....claims that Blair's books dispute with a heavy dosage of statistical data and a high level of detail. Neither does this article address the challenges faced by the Uboats at war's start nor the ever increasing technology gap that furthered the odds against them. Challenges that simple increased numbers cannot address if one is expecting strategic and decisive results

But you hardly need to take my word for it. I recommend his books highly though be forewarned that they are very heavy reading


Hi :)

I have read Blair's books. Yes, they contain a lot of data and stats and facts. . .

But one thing his books do not contain is the psychological impact of the U-boat campaign. The U-boat was a terror weapon.

The Allied leaders were men with human emotions, who read lists of ship sinkings and of dead soldiers and sailors. They had to take into account the lives of their men, something historians do not have to do. These men were also the product of their times: they lived through some of the darkest days of the 20th Century.

I believe Churchill over any historian, when he stated, "The only thing that ever frightened me during the war was the U-boat peril". He lived through every day of the war; he had access to all the in-coming reports; the secret intelligence, etc.

It is one thing to say to a merchant Captain in 1941: "Hey, the German U-boat can now only sink two ships per day." It is quite another to tell him: "One of those ships that might be sunk could be yours."
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Post by Nikademus »

forget the neutrals :) , here's a scary statistic just from the American camp, May 42 - sept 42 during "The Happy Time"

Tonnage sunk = 2,813,370
Tonnage built = 2,634,000

add to that 1.3 million tons of new shipping built by the UK during 1942 and 1/2 million tons built by the Canadians. You start to get the picture. It was a whole different ball park in WWII and as in all other areas, the Axis faced a serious pitfall due to the sheer industrial might of the Allies. A gulf that only widens as the US economy and ship industry gears up.

an oft not considered factoid as well was that the new ships averaged 7,300 tons whilst the older shipping sunk tended to average around 4,900 tons, so less 'new' shipping was required to equal or surprass the tonnage of older shipping lost.
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Post by Von Rom »

Originally posted by Nikademus
Hard to say as, along with the idea of the Germans attempting to build 300 Uboats in secret, we now travel down the murky road of pure speculation. On a conservative note, The US might not have been so willing to part with some of it's destroyer fleet as it did historically. On a more liberal note......news of such a massive program might have reversed the the order of priorities set forth in the Two Ocean navy plan by the US with ASW assets bumped up on the scale along with a faster acceptance of the British design for the original "Liberty ship"

One thing that remains constant however, again, is the technology gap and no redress of the German naval build program would have touched that, nor Doneitz's under-appreciation for Allied sonar, radar or and most importantly "HUFF-DUFF" (radio detection and triangulation)


Hi again :D

I didn't say that 300 U-boats could be built in secret. What I did say was that Hitler should have switched building priorities, to put more emphasis in the production of U-boats.

When one considers the impact that a few U-boats had on the war, especially in the first few years, then one has to consider what even more U-boats would have accomplished.

The discussion has been very interesting. A lot of good points have been raised. But I think we have high-jacked this thread long enough. :D

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Post by HMSWarspite »

Originally posted by Von Rom
Before 1935, at least 14 U-boats were built abroad in Spain, Holland, Turkey, Finland etc as well as 6 being built secretly in German shipyards. This does not include the training schools, torpedoes, parts, infrastructure, etc, etc that were being developed and tested abroad, which had essentially placed Germany years ahead in U-boat construction.
I do not have records of the foreign boats you mention. The only operational foreign boats were all captured after the war began. (1 UK, 2 Norwegian, 5 Dutch, 1 French (+2 more never completed) 4 It (after the surrender), and one Turkish taken over whilst building in Ge)Most of these never did war patrols. If boats were built abroad prior to 1935, they were not operational types. I think you are overestimating the effectiveness (in terms of Boats at sea) of the pre1935 preparations.
So much research and testing had been done prior to 1935, that within one year of renouncing the Versailles treaty, Germany was able to launch 36 U-boats in 1935-36. If Hitler had placed priority on U-boat construction, then, building 30 U-boats per year, gives us a total of: 36 (1936) + 30 (1937) + 30 (1938) + 30 (1939) = 126 U-boats in 1939 (or double what it initially started with).
The 36 boats you mention from 1935-6 were all laid down in 1935 or later, and took from 4 months to just over 1 year to build and commision. The yard was knocking out Type 2 U Boats in c 4 months, but never built a type 7 in less than 10 months (average 11). I do not see much evidence of the effect of pre1935 preparation on build. The preparation gave them the first designs, not a head start in building.
Here are the rates of laying down of the boats in 35-36 (by month)
Type 1: 1 in June35, 1 in Aug 35
Type 2: Feb35 (6), Mar (2), Apr(2),May(2), June(1),Jul(4), Aug (2), Sept(1), Mar36(2), Apr(2),
Type 7: Jan35(1), sept(2), dec(1), Jan36(1), Feb(1),Mar(4),
Type 9: 0 Nil Nada.

The rates of commissioning of boats (by year), in order Type 1, 2, 7, 9 are:
1935: 0, 14, 0, 0
1936: 2 (took a long time to build the type 1s!),10, 9,0
1937: 0, 0, 1, 0
1938: 0,2,4,3
1939: 0,5,7,6 (63 in grand total - some commissioned after 9/39)

The key thing to note is the type 7 and 9 rates, only 7 type 7 boats in 1939 entered the fleet, and 6 type 9. They did commission 10 type 7 in 1936 and early 37. But then they stopped building, and changed from 7A to 7B. The main difference between the 7A and 7B was fuel tankage. In my book that means that trials/peacetime experience showed they needed more range, and a design change. A much more realistic maximum rate build up really doesn't allow the rate to increase the ocean going boats much from where it was - or if they did, they would have built say 9 Type 7A per year (1936-9). This might actually hinder the tonnage war, by delaying the 7B and C boats, and still only gives 36+9=45 ocean boats (vs the 30 they had). Better but not 300 boats!
I think it ultimately came down to priorities: Hitler squandered so many resources and time on outlandish projects such as battleships, etc; rather than focus attention on the U-boat fleet. By the time this was being done, it was already too late.


This is true, BUT RELATES TO THE 1940-1944 period. I maintain that the Germans were not going to have many more boats than they actualy did. Say they doubled the type 7 and 9 output (not realistic for the reasons above) - this gives 60 ocean boats, and 33 coastal (93 boats....still nowhere near 300).

The answer to a 'what if' war is the employment of the boats they did have in 1940-41, enigma, radar etc.etc. The numbers game just wont wash, especially in a sort of 1939-1940 bull rush approach. If (by some miracle) the Germans did build even 200 boats before the war, the UK would have countered.
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Post by HMSWarspite »

Originally posted by Nikademus
forget the neutrals :) , here's a scary statistic just from the American camp, May 42 - sept 42 during "The Happy Time"

Tonnage sunk = 2,813,370
Tonnage built = 2,634,000

add to that 1.3 million tons of new shipping built by the UK during 1942 and 1/2 million tons built by the Canadians. You start to get the picture. It was a whole different ball park in WWII and as in all other areas, the Axis faced a serious pitfall due to the sheer industrial might of the Allies. A gulf that only widens as the US economy and ship industry gears up.

an oft not considered factoid as well was that the new ships averaged 7,300 tons whilst the older shipping sunk tended to average around 4,900 tons, so less 'new' shipping was required to equal or surprass the tonnage of older shipping lost.


Scary statistic indeed, and shows the issue for the Germans. In the most effective part of the war, when the u Boats had a field day, they gained less than 200000 tons on the US, and came nowhere near the Allies total builds. Scary, but not a war winner. Bad news for the crews involved, but this needed to be kept up, and exceeded quarter after quarter for a year or more....

Sinking this sort of rate in 1940 now...much different issue (but just scaling the U Boat numbers doesn't hack it for me! - see elsewhere)
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Post by Kitakami »

Much has been said so far, with quotes from scholars to back it up.

I am not a military scholar, so my comments on the subject will be merely the opinion of a layman. But what if Germany had not built the Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, Bismarck and Tirpitz had never been built, and the Graf Zeppelin had never been laid down, and all those resources had been directed at building U-boots?

We are talking about some 170 thousand tons of displacement or so, that could have been poured into the U-boot fleet. I strongly believe that would have had a serious impact on the War for the Atlantic.

Another thing I would like to comment on, is that if more U-boots had been available, the percentage of losses would probably have diminished, as they would have put a bigger strain on Allied ASW defenses.

But as I said, I am not serious scholar, so take all this with a grain of salt.
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Post by Mr.Frag »

Tonnage sunk = 2,813,370
Tonnage built = 2,634,000


Missing the point really ... yes, the Allieds almost caught up in building compared to losses but those ships sunk were also full of supplies. Just because you replaced the losses ship wise barely, doesn't mean the supplies got to the Uk and Russia. If they had, the war would have been over years sooner.

Just looking at it from a weight perspective, assume a Sherman + ammo = 50 tons ... thats over 30,000 tanks that could have make it accross the shores to fight that didn't. Pretty dramatic for a handful of U-Boats.

This is with the old crap boats, which were really not up to the task by submarine standards. Had Germany had the XXI designs soon enough to enter the war (the first real submarine), I have to wonder if the building capacity would have even mattered.
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Post by Von Rom »

Originally posted by Kitakami
Much has been said so far, with quotes from scholars to back it up.

I am not a military scholar, so my comments on the subject will be merely the opinion of a layman. But what if Germany had not built the Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, Bismarck and Tirpitz had never been built, and the Graf Zeppelin had never been laid down, and all those resources had been directed at building U-boots?

We are talking about some 170 thousand tons of displacement or so, that could have been poured into the U-boot fleet. I strongly believe that would have had a serious impact on the War for the Atlantic.

Another thing I would like to comment on, is that if more U-boots had been available, the percentage of losses would probably have diminished, as they would have put a bigger strain on Allied ASW defenses.

But as I said, I am not serious scholar, so take all this with a grain of salt.


Long before the war, Doenitz had a plan for his U-boats - the Wolfpack concept was a long-held concept for him. He had a strategic grasp of the use of his U-boats.

Hitler, on the other hand, being a land animal, failed to grasp the real use of U-boats until it was too late. He was always fixated on the east.

Some historians focus on the U-boat campaign in isolation, without realizing the incredible potential the U-boat offered. Doenitz always understood this. But as always everything came too late.

There is a reason why Churchill feared the U-boat.

Let's look at the Med Camp.

If Hitler had built more U-boats (and the infrastructure, etc was already there), and had NOT attacked the USSR in 1941 (but delayed it for a year), and instead focused on North Africa, then it would have been a different situation.

With an additional 50-60 U-boats in the Med alone, to isolate Malta and to sink convoys ferrying troops/supplies to Tobruk/Alexandria along with the addition of a couple more panzer divisions, Hitler could have taken all of North Africa, captured the oil fields, AND allowed for another avenue of attack against the USSR from the south.

If just 12 U-boats along the east coast of the USA could sink 585 ships, then imagine what 25, 50 or 100 U-boats could have accomplished. Incidently, 100 U-boats was the number Doenitz wanted to send. He was the architect of Operation Drumbeat.

By mid-1941, Germany was at the height of its power. But for some incredibly short-sighted and stupid actions, and some incredible luck, Germany had the potential for success.

There is much talk that any of Germany's actions or anything it built could be countered, etc. But politics, human nature, and the facts of history run counter to this thinking.

A few examples:

1) Britain barely had time to build more fighters before the Battle of Britain began. Yet, for years Churchill had warned the people about Germany's secret aircraft construction and the danger this posed to Britain's security. For all his tireless efforts, Churchill was scorned and vilified. Even the British Gov't, which knew better, lied to the people. It was a close-run thing, and almost led to disaster.

2) In 1942, even after Pearl Harbour, even after 2 1/2 years of war, and even after being warned by British Intelligence, America was STILL unprepared to deal with the U-boat when it struck along the east coast, and sank almost 600 ships.

3) Stalin, despite the overwhelming evidence to the contrary, believed Hitler would not attack him, even as German troops were poised to strike on June 21, 1941.

To believe that any and all threats will be/would be countered, simply runs counter to most human thinking, to the problems posed by politics and human nature, as well as to the ample evidence of history.

It took 4 years before the U-boat threat had been dealt with. Four years. The Allies were lucky they had four years. They were lucky Hitler made some incredible mistakes.

Evolutionists are fond of saying, if given enough time, a monkey can pound out a coherent letter on a typewriter.

But occasionally, there may not be enough time. . .

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Post by TIMJOT »

Originally posted by Von Rom


There is much talk that any of Germany's actions or anything it built could be countered, etc. But politics and human nature run counter to this thinking.





I would also add, that where as the Kriegsmarine could have easily cancelled the 2 BCs, 2 BBs, 4 CAs and 2 CVs to make the construction of 300 Uboats possible. Britain on the otherhand cound NOT have correspondingly cancelled the 3 KGIVs BBs, 3 Indomitibles CVs, and 6 Southhamptons CAs to make room for the matching ASW construction. The Royal Navy was a World Navy with World commitments. Even if they knew exactly how many Uboats were being constructed (doubtful). At best they could have increased production as they did for A/C and AFV, but would not be able to overtake or even match it.

Personally I doubt that 300 uboats could win the war, but I do agree that regardless Germany could have built them if they had so wished and Britain could not have effectively countered them if they tried. Unless perhaps if the US had transfered many more 4 pipers which were available.
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Post by Apollo11 »

Hi all,
Originally posted by Von Rom


<snip>

By mid-1941, Germany was at the height of its power. But for some incredibly short-sighted and stupid actions, and some incredible luck, Germany had the potential for success.

<snip>

First of all I would like to say that the world was lucky that Germans didn't
succeed and that lunatic Hitler was leading them.


The other thing is that their peak of power was not in summer of 1941 but in
summer of 1940.

After the success in the west (against France, Belgium and Netherlands) they
were the strongest. But Hitler then demobilized some units and never prepared
for total war he wanted to lead (i.e. war against Russia).

The state of German armed forces in summer of 1941 (war with Russia) was not
better than in summer of 1940 (successful finish of war in the west France /
Belgium / Netherlands).

The number of units did increase but this was mostly on paper (i.e. newly
created units on behalf of weakening of existing ones).

The weapon systems also didn't improve much at all.

All in all Hitler practically lost the war during this almost 1 year period...


Leo "Apollo11"
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Germany

Post by mogami »

Hi, While I agree things could have been much harder I doubt Germany could have ever forced the USA out of the war. Without a Navy to cross the Atlantic and occupy Washington D.C. It becomes simply a question of how long will it take the USA to mount their invasion of Europe. (assuming the wildly improbable surrender of British Empire)

We know the U-boats will be castrated in 43. We know the USA will begin producing their bombs in 45. The USA has enough non European Allies to make things rough in the mean time. (The USA would clobber Japan faster)

The USA out produced every other Nation combined. The USA gave away more equipment then Germany and Japan combined produced.

It's not a question of "IF" but of "when"

I often wonder why people just assume the USA is some kind of punk nation. (It's always proved once you wake it up your screwed)

By the end of 1940 the world had learned a hard lesson. This was simply you could not surrender to Germany.
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Post by juliet7bravo »

The Brits could not, and would not, have reacted in any meaningful way to an increase in the number of operational U-boats during the pre-early war years. They initially refused (shades of WW1) to institute an convoy system. They refused to place long range bombers on ASW patrol/release them to Coastal Command. Their ASW measures stank. Period. The first 2-3 aircraft to attempt to bomb surfaced U-boats literally shot themselves down when the bombs bounced off and hit the AC. The Brits would have did nothing. They didn't have the will, the money, or the technology. Vitually everything needed to wage war was imported via ship. Say what you want about Lend-Lease...but the POTUS made sure he'd stripped the Brits of just about every portable asset they had first. This includes gold reserves and making them sell off US based assets at fire sell prices.

The US went through EXACTLY the same gyrations once they entered the war. These are the biggest sins laid on Ernie Kings doorstep. The POTUS had to literally order him to start producing PC's as King flatly refused to do so.

Both the Brit's and USN initially tried using Hunter/Killer groups to hunt U-boats...a totally failed concept, that only became effective once the escort carrier became widely used, and the weapons, tactics, and doctrine was worked out. The techniques, tactics, and technology used to successfully negate the U-boat threat were developed over a period of time, and under the pressure of survival. This wouldn't have happened pre-war, mostly because they'd (those guys) "decided" that the submarine threat had been totally negated by the invention of ASDIC, aircraft, and treaties aginst "unrestricted submarine warfare". Overlooking the fact that ASDIC really isn't that effective, most of their "ASW" didn't have it anyway, their DC's were mostly useless, and they wouldn't release AC for ASW (Gotta bomb the Reich!).

The Germans COULD have increased the numbers of U-boats available. They were planning for war in '45 (Plan "Z"?). Hitler, in his infinite wisdom had other plans. They had the capability, the limiting factor was that Hitler wouldn't give them the resources needed. Don't forget, this is the period when Hitler was ordering them to use concrete bombs, and bombs made from gas cylinders because they'd failed to prep for the war. Hitler never put the German economy on a war footing. During the early war period, Germany had the highest standard of living in Europe, possibly in the world. At peak production, the 3rd Reich never reached war material production levels reached during WW1.

You can talk about the German torpedo problems...but one look at the tonnage sunk shows that it wasn't exactly a show-stopper. If they'd been more reliable, it woulda been...for the Brits. The US out-produced everyone combined...but they weren't during the peak U-boat threat period. They were just getting warmed up, for that matter, the US economy was just peaking when the war ended. When the US entered the war, the Brits were about one convoy from throwing in the towel. Historical fact, not speculation.
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Post by HMSWarspite »

I do not doubt that it was well within the bounds of possibility for Ge to win the European war and (by keeping the US out), hence the world war. However, I still believe the way to do it is not some hypothetical 300 sub building programme from 1935-39. I do not understand why no one is following the much easier arguement about the more effective use of what they had. The U Boat arm was crippled by their lack of knowledge of Allied HF/DF, centimetric radar, and most importantly the penetrations of Enigma.
By 1941, the U-Boats had basically not changed their equipment (excepting the Torpedoes), the UK was using (experimentally or in service) centimentric radar, improved Asdic(sonar), forward throwing weapons, HF/DF, systematic training 'games' for ASW training of task forces, etc etc, and most importantly reading U Boat traffic for significant periods from May for the rest of the year, Referring to 'British Intelligence in the Second World War' (the official history), and 'Enigma The Battle for the Code' (High Senag-Montefiore)
"Enigma's greatest contribution to the war at sea occurred when it helped Britain to defeat the U boats in the Atlantic between October and November 1941. ... If sinkings of merchant ships supplying Britain had increased proportionately with the number of new U boats coming in to service during the second half of 1941 and the early part of 1942 - as would probably have been the case had Enigma not been broken - who knows what might have been the result?". Granted the UK convoy codes were penetrated, but that was at least corrected.
An interesting exercise: plot losses (monthly) to U Boats, vs the periods where the U Boats codes were being read fairly continuously. Now exclude all those periods, and fill in the gap with the average losses whilst the codes were not being read (scaled by the Uboats at sea). Now see what the total shipping losses were. I have never seen this done, and may get around to it one day.

As for Drumbeat.. impressive but irrelevant to the U Boat war. As soon as the US came in, the writing was on the wall. In one way, the 1942 happy time did the Germans no favours: sank a lot of replaceable ships, and masked from them to an extent the fact that they were not winning the U Boat war. By 1943, it was all over. Yes there were some horific convoy battles (HX229&SC122 for example), but in terms of pure shipping sunk, 1943 showed it was all over. I think that 1942 might have given them the stimulus to improve were it not for Drumbeat (racy theory, but why not?)
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Post by Von Rom »

Originally posted by Apollo11
Hi all,



First of all I would like to say that the world was lucky that Germans didn't
succeed and that lunatic Hitler was leading them.


The other thing is that their peak of power was not in summer of 1941 but in
summer of 1940.

After the success in the west (against France, Belgium and Netherlands) they
were the strongest. But Hitler then demobilized some units and never prepared
for total war he wanted to lead (i.e. war against Russia).

The state of German armed forces in summer of 1941 (war with Russia) was not
better than in summer of 1940 (successful finish of war in the west France /
Belgium / Netherlands).

The number of units did increase but this was mostly on paper (i.e. newly
created units on behalf of weakening of existing ones).

The weapon systems also didn't improve much at all.

All in all Hitler practically lost the war during this almost 1 year period...
Leo "Apollo11"


In June, 1941 Operation BARBAROSSA began with over 3 million German soldiers, 3,300 tanks and 2,000 aircraft, organized into three Army Groups.

This is not an insignificant number. But I know exactly what you are referring to. :)

When I mentioned the summer of 1941, I was referring to the peak or extent of their success before Barbarossa began.

And you are very correct - Germany actually de-mobilized troops in '41, and cut back on production.

Germany did not reach Total War production until 1943-44 under Speer, and this during the height of the Allied bombing offensive.

For several years, Germany had unused capacity in all areas, including armour, infantry and U-boats.

Had full industrial capacity (or close to it) been implemented just prior to, and after, Sept 1, 1939, things might look a bit different.

This goes hand-in-hand with the U-boat building from 1935 on. . .

In 1936, Germany built 36 U-boats. In 1937 only one was built; in 1938 only 13 were built; and in 1939 only 18 were completed.

This clearly indicates unused building capacity. Again, had only 30 U-boats been built each year between 1936 up to 1939, Germany would have begun the war with 126 U-boats (including the 36 commissioned in 1936), and not 65.

I believe had greater priority been given to the U-boat arm, even this number might have been exceeded, considering ALL research, design, testing, parts, training, prototypes, shipyards, etc, had been completed in secret years prior to 1935.

It is the potential of what might have been that is of concern here, had the German High Command realised from the beginning what could be accomplished with the U-boat.
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Re: Germany

Post by Von Rom »

Originally posted by Mogami
Hi, While I agree things could have been much harder I doubt Germany could have ever forced the USA out of the war. Without a Navy to cross the Atlantic and occupy Washington D.C. It becomes simply a question of how long will it take the USA to mount their invasion of Europe. (assuming the wildly improbable surrender of British Empire)

We know the U-boats will be castrated in 43. We know the USA will begin producing their bombs in 45. The USA has enough non European Allies to make things rough in the mean time. (The USA would clobber Japan faster)

The USA out produced every other Nation combined. The USA gave away more equipment then Germany and Japan combined produced.

It's not a question of "IF" but of "when"

I often wonder why people just assume the USA is some kind of punk nation. (It's always proved once you wake it up your screwed)

By the end of 1940 the world had learned a hard lesson. This was simply you could not surrender to Germany.


The situation must be looked at in its entirety. The U-boat could not win the war on its own; but it was, and could have been, a fundamental tool in its prosecution.

What I also mentioned was the series of mistakes that Hitler made that led to Germany's downfall.

A few of them:

1) Failure to produce large numbers of U-boats leading up to 1939, and afterwards.

2) Failure to bag all the Allied troops at Dunkirk (over 330,000 were allowed to escape). Guderian was ordered to stop.

3) Failure to seize North Africa before the attack on the USSR.

4) Hitler's incredibly stupid declaration of war on the USA in Dec, 1941.

5) Failure to gear the economy for Total War.

6) And on, and on, and on. . . .

The failure to produce more U-boats is just part of the over-all picture of the lost potential Germany had to achieve greater success.

In many ways, the Allies received some incredibly lucky breaks. In others, Hitler's own stupididty led to disasterous situations (Stalingrad anyone?).

Had Hitler left the war in the hands of his most capable officers, I am afraid of what might have happened between 1939 and 1941 - even before the USA was dragged into the war.

If Britain had been knocked out of the war - what then?
Chiteng
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Re: Re: Germany

Post by Chiteng »

Originally posted by Von Rom
The situation must be looked at in its entirety. The U-boat could not win the war on its own; but it was, and could have been, a fundamental tool in its prosecution.

What I also mentioned was the series of mistakes that Hitler made that led to Germany's downfall.

A few of them:

1) Failure to produce large numbers of U-boats leading up to 1939, and afterwards.

2) Failure to bag all the Allied troops at Dunkirk (over 330,000 were allowed to escape). Guderian was ordered to stop.

3) Failure to seize North Africa before the attack on the USSR.

4) Hitler's incredibly stupid declaration of war on the USA in Dec, 1941.

5) Failure to gear the economy for Total War.

6) And on, and on, and on. . . .

The failure to produce more U-boats is just part of the over-all picture of the lost potential Germany had to achieve greater success.

In many ways, the Allies received some incredibly lucky breaks. In others, Hitler's own stupididty led to disasterous situations (Stalingrad anyone?).

Had Hitler left the war in the hands of his most capable officers, I am afraid of what might have happened between 1939 and 1941 - even before the USA was dragged into the war.

If Britain had been knocked out of the war - what then?



In 'Lost Victories' Manstein states his opinion that the ONLY
way to end the war on German terms was to invade and defeat
England. He goes into great detail about all the other options,
and NONE of them, result in victory on German terms.
Not even the defeat of the USSR.
“It is clear that the individual who persecutes a man, his brother, because he is not of the same opinion, is a monster.”

Voltaire

'For those with faith, no proof is needed. For those without faith, no proof is enough'

French Priest

"Statistic
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Von Rom
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Post by Von Rom »

Originally posted by HMSWarspite
I do not doubt that it was well within the bounds of possibility for Ge to win the European war and (by keeping the US out), hence the world war. However, I still believe the way to do it is not some hypothetical 300 sub building programme from 1935-39. I do not understand why no one is following the much easier arguement about the more effective use of what they had. The U Boat arm was crippled by their lack of knowledge of Allied HF/DF, centimetric radar, and most importantly the penetrations of Enigma.
By 1941, the U-Boats had basically not changed their equipment (excepting the Torpedoes), the UK was using (experimentally or in service) centimentric radar, improved Asdic(sonar), forward throwing weapons, HF/DF, systematic training 'games' for ASW training of task forces, etc etc, and most importantly reading U Boat traffic for significant periods from May for the rest of the year, Referring to 'British Intelligence in the Second World War' (the official history), and 'Enigma The Battle for the Code' (High Senag-Montefiore)
"Enigma's greatest contribution to the war at sea occurred when it helped Britain to defeat the U boats in the Atlantic between October and November 1941. ... If sinkings of merchant ships supplying Britain had increased proportionately with the number of new U boats coming in to service during the second half of 1941 and the early part of 1942 - as would probably have been the case had Enigma not been broken - who knows what might have been the result?". Granted the UK convoy codes were penetrated, but that was at least corrected.
An interesting exercise: plot losses (monthly) to U Boats, vs the periods where the U Boats codes were being read fairly continuously. Now exclude all those periods, and fill in the gap with the average losses whilst the codes were not being read (scaled by the Uboats at sea). Now see what the total shipping losses were. I have never seen this done, and may get around to it one day.

As for Drumbeat.. impressive but irrelevant to the U Boat war. As soon as the US came in, the writing was on the wall. In one way, the 1942 happy time did the Germans no favours: sank a lot of replaceable ships, and masked from them to an extent the fact that they were not winning the U Boat war. By 1943, it was all over. Yes there were some horific convoy battles (HX229&SC122 for example), but in terms of pure shipping sunk, 1943 showed it was all over. I think that 1942 might have given them the stimulus to improve were it not for Drumbeat (racy theory, but why not?)


There seems to be some misunderstanding. Donitz had wanted a 300 U-boat fleet, but had planned to have it by 1942, the year Hitler had promised his High Command that war would be started. Hitler jumped the gun.

And if Hitler had waited until 1942, Germany would have been even stronger (with a U-boat fleet 5 times the size of the one it had in 1939), while the USA, in all probabilty, would have remained isolationist and ill prepared.

As things stand, I see no reason why Germany could not have started the war with about 120 U-boats (or twice what it started with), given the available capacity it had. It did build 36 U-boats in 1936.

The U-boat could not have won the war all by itself. However, if used in larger numbers, with a better strategy in mind, and in concert with all the other tools Germany had, then the situation would have been bleak indeed.

Operation Drumbeat irrelevant? A dozen U-boats sink 585 ships. The single most successful U-boat operation of the war. Irrelevant?

Cheers!
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Von Rom
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Re: Re: Re: Germany

Post by Von Rom »

Originally posted by Chiteng
In 'Lost Victories' Manstein states his opinion that the ONLY
way to end the war on German terms was to invade and defeat
England. He goes into great detail about all the other options,
and NONE of them, result in victory on German terms.
Not even the defeat of the USSR.


During the darkest days of the Battle of Britain, Churchill considered that Britain would fall. In that event, he had instructed the Monarchy and the Royal Navy to be sent to Canada. And from there continue the prosecution of the war. Churchill, himself, had decided to stay and fight.

We soon forget that Britain and her Commonwealth stood all alone against the German juggernaut. And how close the war hung in the balance. . .

If Britain had been knocked out of the war before the USA entry into it, what then?

Gone would be the unsinkable island carrier from which the Allies launched the invasion of Europe.

Yes, things would look very different. . .
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