Yamamoto's Plan in action

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

ORIGINAL: Nikademus
The idea - explicitly divided into phases - was to move forward - sieze ground - and move back; replenish, reorganize and recieve additional echelons on ships arriving from Japan; then move forward again, reinforce the islands formerly taken and take some more; repeat the process - three times - at which point the fleet does not have to be present "near Oahu" at all - except when operationally convient - until such time as the decision is made to go for the landing on Oahu itself.

A big hole in this line of thinking is the need to actually "blockade" Oahu against US efforts to reinforce it while auxillary bases are siezed and built up in the other islands. One sizable convoy slipped in while the IJN has "moved back" to replenish, and the whole operation becomes impossible. Even the US CV's running in to within 3-400 miles and launching deckloads of Army Aircraft to replenish Hawaii would be a disaster to such plans. Getting a "mile long convoy" to the Philippines from the West Coast is one thing..., but to Oahu is a totally different story. The whole thing is a "pipedream"...., and the "pipe" is stuffed with some pretty potent weed.

Boy are you losing me here. Looks like no hole at all: how is a "sizable convoy" going to "slip in"? Large, slow targets, in range of recon for days - not likely. And what US commander would risk it? But - say - one did - maybe in fog -
why does that render anything "impossible?" What could a convoy bring that matters? Oahu has plenty of ammunition, troops, name it: only two things are short - food - and fighter planes unable to hop in from a great distance. Food may delay the day of rekoning in the sense of Short must surrender to avoid starvation - but things are unlikely to go anywhere near that long anyway. Fighter planes would be a problem - for a few days - but not a problem in a strategic sense. And less of a problem than on Dec 7 - when Japan had no nearby land based air.

Now the idea of running in fighters from carriers - can we do that in the game with Army fighters? - is more sound. Getting hundreds of miles away - approaching at night - running at high speed - is much more feasible. OTH - it means those fighters cannot defend the US itself. You play WITP - how many dare you (or any competent commander) send?
And what good does it do in the longer haul? They won't last even a week. Try this often enough - you are going to lose some of those rare carriers. Later in the war the US has carriers to burn. Not in 1942.

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: Nikademus

I agree. Without a serious blockade, the US fleet needn't risk falling into the "Decisive Battle" under unfavorable terms for fear of losing Oahu. Thus Japan must strike with maximum force, and maintain maximum pressure while attempting to secure Oahu. Anything less is a asking for disaster and failure.

Backtracking again? I thought the US could inflict major losses on this invasion fleet? I thought Oahu would not fall in any case? Why all this caution all of a sudden? And what do you mean by "serious blockade?" Oahu would be "seriously blockaded" - so perhaps you mean the whole US coast? Well - that certainly was beyond Japan's logistic reach - or force size potential. And - yes - you are agreeing with my reasoning here (sure you want to?) - the BEST the US can do is NOT give Japan a Decisive Battle. Because in early 1942 Japan will win.

[Andrew Brown]

Well, this discussion has certainly become lively!

But I will continue to contribute as long as it is still not getting out of hand...

Regarding my point that a Japanese attempt to invade Hawaii in December 1941 would result in a larger share of US resources being applied to the Pacific instead of Europe...

ORIGINAL: el cid again
It isn't a bad assumption. But IF we made that assumption, two problems present themself for WITP:

a) What would be sent to PTO earlier that was not? Related to that, might building plans be changed? For example, if pressed, might we build the Midways as Essex class - to get them in time for the war - instead of as a sort of trick to use war funding for post war ships? Oddly - that is in RHSEOS and RHSAIO - although not on this rationale.

I am no expert on US production or OOBs. But stating that we do not know exactly what would be sent to the PTO earlier is no reason not to try to account for it in such a "what-if" scenario. This sort of speculation is "bread and butter" to modders creating "what-if" scenarios, after all.

I still think my initial wild, uninformed guesses - a 50% increase in aircraft production and ground force availability, and an acceleration in ship arrivals of several months (on an increasing sliding scale as the war progresses) would not be far off the mark.

b) What would be the impact of NOT sending assets to ETO that were sent? What are the downstream impacts on PTO forces this would have? Since there are a range of possibilities, and we must lock in only one - we need the most probable impacts. I don't see Germany winning the war - but I do see it lasting longer - meaning a lot of things transferred from ETO don't get transferred in out years - that sort of thing.

I basically (if briefly) stated my thoughts on this in my initial post above.

Someone suggested above not doing Torch - and that might matter - assuming you think the offensive in Southern Europe had some impact other than to keep Stalin in the war. And then there is this: might the Russians make a separate peace? Not out of love, trust, or any other postive motive - but to punish the Western Allies - and buy time for a later war after it had built up again. Russia did do the Hitler - Stalin Pact - after all. And Russia did lose horribly gigantic forces - so no Torch might really have down stream impacts of great significance. On the other hand - I am not yet persuaded that Torch would probably be cancelled. But if not that - what is changed: you send fewer bombers to ETO? What?

It is the work of the scenario modder to decide what the increases to US production and reinforcements to be. But stating that you don't know what they are is no excuse not to account for them, in my opinion. To create such a "what-if" scenario, one should consider how things on both sides are affected, not just the Japanese. If you don't account for the likely US response to an attempted invasion of Hawaii, I think the resulting scenario would be lopsided and incomplete.

Regarding the Soviets, I certainly don't think they would ask for peace if the USA diverted more of its resources to the Pacific. I think that by December 1941 the writing was already on the wall as far as the Germans vs the Soviets was concerned, as long as the amount of Lend Lease going to the SU is maintained, and I have no reason to doubt that it would, and could, have been. The Germans are going to lose the war, it is only a question of when, not if.

[Mike Scholl]

ORIGINAL: el cid again
REPLY: This latter is wholly false. That is, 100% false. IF it were true the Japanese would not have planned to do it - and ultimately decided to do it. But they did both. At a minimum Japan believed it had the resources to do it. Even in 1942 - when it was a much more difficult problem to solve - incompetent US play could lose the game. There were high ranking officials who wanted to withdraw from Hawaii - and there were US officers from the Western Pacific recommending that to them. Nothing like not defending to insure you lose an attempt to take the place. But failing that - I don't think anything short of gross US incompetence would lose in 1942. 1941 is a different picture - in terms of start date. Japan does not need more than it has - it needs only a fraction of what it has. It can do this and still do the SRA with virtually the same forces. In fact, it probably would work out better than the raid did. The US would have lost its fleet - not for a couple of years - but forever. The US would not have lost Oahu as a functional base - not for a few days - but for a year or two - or forever. The whole strategic situation would be better for Japan. If you could run it ten times - in parallel universes - and know the outcomes - it is barely possible Japan would not be better off in nine of them - otherwise all ten.

Sorry Cid..., but that's one big barrel of baloney. The Japanese "planned" to conquer China---and look how well that was turning out! "Wishfull Thinking" was a major ingredient in many Japanese Plans and Estimates. For instance, when the Japanese Army-Navy Committee did it's initial estimates of "oil needs and production" in June of 1941, they started with a reserve for the whole nation of 61,045,000 barrels on hand. Adding in estimated production, and subtracting estimated usage, they ended up -4,405,000 (in the hole) in September of 1944.

The Navy didn't care for this result, and in August of 1941 they did another "estimate". Note that in two months of peace, the starting "reserve" has dwindled to 59,157.000..., but the reserve in September of 1944 has now grown to 25,236,000! Estimated consumption has gone down, while estimated production has gone up! The wonders of fighting your wars on paper....

The Japanese Planning Agency did a third set of estimates later that fall, running from December to December. Again note that the starting national reserve of oil has dwindled to 52,863,000 by December 1st, 1941. Using less wishfull thinking than the Navy, but more than the Army-Navy Committee, they concluded that the remaining oil reserve in December of 1944 would be 13,844,000 barrels.

Now the "estimated national consumption" in the first year of war shown in these studies ranged from 32,725,000 up to 37,760,000 barrels..., and all were wildly optimistic. Actual national consumption between December of 1941 and Dec. of 1942 was 51,919,000...., and this was without any massive Hawaiian operation. That's 98.2% of the entire national oil stockpile used in the first year---without the "Great Hawaiian Invasion Scheme". Even without it, the IJN had used 160% of it's share of the consumption estimates (and that's with an endless series of relatively easy successes the first half of the year)

Now given that you want to run the largest seaborne operation in Japanese History during the opening months of the war (before any SRA resources can be captured, let alone brought into use), and using every "idle asset" the IJN had plus forces borrowed from other operations; that 98.2% usage is looking grim. You are talking about hundreds of vessels sailing thousands of miles (Hawaii is far closer to the USA than it is to Japan) and operating for an extended period of time. It's baloney Cid..., and any "plans" that existed are baloney as well under the circumstances of 1941. It's fun to talk about..., but it's time to admit that it's nonsense.

[herwin]

My books are at home, but as I remember, the Pacific Theater of Operations got about half the Navy and something like a quarter of the Army. So double the naval reinforcements and triple the ground and air reinforcements. I'll check this evening.

[Mike Scholl]

ORIGINAL: el cid again
Boy are you losing me here. Looks like no hole at all: how is a "sizable convoy" going to "slip in"? Large, slow targets, in range of recon for days - not likely. And what US commander would risk it? But - say - one did - maybe in fog - why does that render anything "impossible?" What could a convoy bring that matters? Oahu has plenty of ammunition, troops, name it: only two things are short - food - and fighter planes unable to hop in from a great distance. Food may delay the day of rekoning in the sense of Short must surrender to avoid starvation - but things are unlikely to go anywhere near that long anyway. Fighter planes would be a problem - for a few days - but not a problem in a strategic sense. And less of a problem than on Dec 7 - when Japan had no nearby land based air.

The point is simple enough. The IJN can't sit back and conserve and still run a tight enough blockade to prevent US reinforcement of Oahu..., or even the "big island"...., especially for the first month or so while forward bases are being established. Kido Butai is the "strike force" both providing air support for these initial invasions and against any US reinforcement attempts. As to "risking it", look at the risks taken to keep Malta in the fight and ask yourself the same question. He11, look at the risks taken to smuggle supplies into Corregadore even when the Japanese occupied most of the Philippines. And additional parts, weapons, troops, and ammunition arriving in Oahu means the Japanese need additional forces (which they don't have) to deal with them. Just a few squadrons of fighters are going to make life very exciting (and short) for those recon flying boats you assume will provide plenty of warning of US activities.

You keep forgetting that Kido Butai"s airgroups are a "wasting asset"---maintaining any semblence of air superiority against an active defense is going to chew them up. And moving a Naval Air Fleet to Maui or somewhere is going to take time and preparation..., not to mention what it's absense is going to do in the SRA. Like I said.., the notion is fun, but it breaks down in the face of reality. It needs to be put back into whatever "plans file" it came out of. In the real world, it doesn't work.

[Nikademus]

ORIGINAL: el cid again


This seems to be becoming disconnected and irrational. You are reading too narrowly and too broadly at the same time. Only a gigantic salting with assumptions can explain this.

Wow....i'm too narrow AND too broad at the same time. Pass the pepper Travaethan.

a) I never said anything about "attempting to repair a major fleet using the damaged and completely foreign shipyard" - so why are you talking about it?

e

If you'll read the quote again, I specificially mention the word "servicing" as well as repair. Why am I mentioning it? Your quote:

I agree we would block the Harbor in any competent defense. I agree there are problems of compatibility of some sorts - but these never stopped Japan from commissioning captured warships of US, British or Dutch (or other) origin. They would raise some hulks, repair some damaged or captured vessels - and they might well convert them in place - not that we could do that in the game. But IRL that is what Japan did - and would surely do. Somehow the fact the harbor is blocked is not a fact of nature has eluded some: the blockship can be removed - and it almost certainly would be

Sounds major to me.

b) The smaller ships Japan repaired/completed WERE done in those foreign shipyards - at least usually - not in Japan itself. And it may have been easier to work on British hulls in a British port, Dutch hulls in a Dutch port, etc. for the very compatability reasons you cite. It is this activity I think almost certainly would occur if Oahu falls - some vessels - up to destroyer size - are likely to be put into service - eventually - not rapidly. Otherwise the yard might be used to put temporary patches on a damaged ship

You were speaking of assumptions. The French fleet scuttled itself nearly in it's entirty at Toulon. How many French ships did the Germans and Italians put back into service using their own materials and repair crews? You also assume the Americans will conveniently leave these repair facilities intact enough for these events to occur reletively quickly.

c) While obviously it depends on circumstances how long it takes to remove a ship - there is no case where a blockship was not removed from a harbor entrance. I guess you are saying some battleships were not removed. That isn't because they could not have been however. But they were not blockships.

It occured in France though it was not a complete blocking. The point being of course, which you are ignoring, is that depending on the circumstances, the blocking could be present for a long time given the distances from Japan.

d) This whole tangent seems bent on arguing that things must be horrible. That is not true. Whaever damage is done, experts would assess it, leaders would decide what was worth doing and what was too expensive, and then those choices would be implemented. It is all a matter of detail - cost - time - and priorities.

I thought you said the details didn't matter? Now they do. As for things having to be horrible. This is not a tangent. Its your invention again. I never said things must be horrible, however given your prosaic predictions that Japan MUST suceed and succeed rather easily, a good dose of reality was needed to be injected to give the interested reader a good idea of just how difficult this operation could be and how easily things could go wrong given the variables, not the least of which is the massive distance from Japan's center of operations. The assumptions that Japan would capture oil, supplies and now rather quickly put one of the US' major shipyard/repair yards back into service to work on the Japanese fleet and salavage sunken US ships approaches levels of sheer fantasy.

Ultimately the entire place would end up functional again, except to the degree it was not desired to make it so. The idea it could not be used - period - because there was a blockship - probably not certainly - in place is essentially false. No amount of verbage changes that.

Thats nice.....except that noone said the harbor being blocked would permanently blocked...PERIOD. Its highly probable the US would block the channel, its even probable the Japanese might attempt it themselves to bottle up the harbor. Either way it would impose serious delays on the harbor becoming magically declicious for the Japanse so far from their base of logistics.

[Nikademus]

ORIGINAL: el cid again


Basically you are getting it perfectly wrong! Reduced to first principles, all that really matters is to create the illusion of a credible threat to Hawaii writ large - and the strategic implications of that - combined with ignorance of the operational and tactical realities in place - combined with the relative intelligence advantage (which must be a fleeting one ONLY available when the war begins) - all conspire to all but guarantee the US Fleet will sortee to fight a battle it is going to not only lose - but not be able to be resurrected from (being about two miles under water).

If one is getting it wrong in regards to understanding you, its only because you keep meandering all over the map in your efforts to justify this scenario. What happened to the lunge, land the forces, then retreat option? You said earlier the Japanese fleet need not operate off Oahu in a sustained effort, now your speaking as if the whole operation is one big Midway type operation in disquise and that only a threat need to be delivered. Once again the US MUST lose this hypothetical setup, ignoring the realities that US intel would surely pick up on key elements of this setup or that the bulk of the US fleet would be in the harbor and if attacked as per history is not going to come charging out to be sunk by the conveniently waiting Imperial fleet.

The strategic point is to eliminate the fighting power of the US Navy in the Pacific for the period of the Southern Offensive. A major secondary point is that taking Hawaii Island, Molokai, Maui, Kuai and other smaller islands in the Central Pacific - and basing air forces and defense units on them - insures that the Central Pacific will be the first major battleground IF the Americans try to come back.

They did that with the Pearl Harbor raid. The strategic point of assaulting Oahu would be based on the theory that Hawaii would prove to be a bargainning chip in negotiations with the US and that denial of the base would hinder and channel US efforts to move across the Pacific.

Holding all those points insures Oahu itself is isolated, unsupplied and not useful as a fleet base/repair center/air nexus - assuming - it does not fall. It is more a question of when it will fall rather than if it will fall, however - as the US cannot contest the area in strength in anything like the time it can hold out.

Again you speak in absolutes, and that is my problem with your simplisitic connect the dots approach. As mentioned, I'm not in the camp that declares a Hawaii operation impossible, but I do believe it would be extremely difficult and given Japan's RL development history in other outer defense territories during the war I have even graver doubts that Japan would be able to adequately provision and utilize Oahu over a sustained period. Your presumptions largely rest on the US fleet acting the way Yamamotto always wanted them too, except that they didn't much of the time.

Ultimately this operation not only takes out much or all of the United States Fleet - it all but guarantees it will try to take back the Central Pacific Islands BEFORE it tries to do anything to places Japan needs. And if it loses those battles badly enough - the war can be won decisively.

It has been stated several times to you that an Oahu op would likely result in a single larger drive across the Central Pacific. This is not necessearily good news for Japan. Win the war decisively? Wishful thinking.

These battles would occur under circumstances similar to Guadalcanal writ large - too far from friendly bases - only "too far" in a sense vastly greater than was the case at Guadalcanal. The US decided that was a bad way to proceed - and that one should always have land based air in range of an amphibious objective. How could it achieve that re Hawaii? Only by going into the South Pacific and working up north - retaking Johnston - might it be able to do it [and in a game I saw US officers do exactly that - it may be smarter than a direct assault with no land based air support and no friendly point to patch up a ship].

Except that you ignore the same logistical challenges posed on the Japanese for sustaining and garrasoning Oahu.

I am beginning to get the impression you think that war - and history - are more or less set in concrete - that the decisions of players do not have any ability to change what happens in a major way. Further - I am getting the impression you must believe the Japanese were fools in every possible sense.

You can think what you want. I found your second set particularily amusing given that I often find myself defending the Japanese side. Here though, your best case scenario mussings and underestimation of US capabilities warrents a more cautious and realistic analysis.

[Nikademus]

ORIGINAL: el cid again

Well - if we listen to your reasoning - it sure sounds like almost a guarantee. You "know" the US had the ability to inflict a major defeat on the Japanese - you "know" Oahu is almost certain not to fall - so if US commanders "knew" what you "know" - why would they avoid a major battle?

Stating that the US has the potential to inflict harm on the Japanese and hold out successfully on Oahu is not the same as "knowing" that these things will happen. Please point out where I've been saying these things will happen absolutely.

On top of which, the US Navy more or less drilled for this contingency for a long time. US Navy training always assumes we will fight - and that the naval officers have the authority to defend US soil and/or themselves when attacked.

Every major naval power trains to fight. Every major power with battleships as the centerpiece of their navy trains to fight a Mahanian type battle. Yet circumstances nearly always consipired to prevent such a thing. A basic reason is caution. No power wants to lose its investment. My thoughts that the US won't blindly and foolishly rush to battle are not out of line. I guess i just have more respect of the institute than you do.

Are YOU now saying not to listen to what YOU said? Why would the US commanders NOT give Japan the Decisivet- being ignorant of Zero's - Long Lances - the lot??

I see your starting to pull out the bag of tricks here. Nice. How is the Zero going to win the battle for Japan? Tell me how successful Japanese long lance operations in the high sea, at standard daylight battle operations were?

[Nikademus]

ORIGINAL: el cid again


That was not his idea - it was an old idea. And in the context that we could not prevent the capture of Hawaii - and we lost attempts to retake it - it might appear a whole lot more attractive than it seems without those events happening first.

It was an old idea, and much of it's thinking in terms of US popular reaction was obsolete.

If you cannot come to terms with that - perhaps it is imagination you lack?

I've noticed a marked increase in your little personal jabs. Maybe if you'd construct a more plausible, more concisely written scenario, you'd aquire more converts.

AFTER losing Oahu - possibly the US Fleet along with it - and AFTER losing a battle (or two or three) trying to retake it - do you STILL think it would not be a bargaining chip to end the (losing) war?

If war were declared under conditions bereft of "suprise", and if everything fell into place as you've predicted it would, and if the world situation wasn't what it was in 41, possibly. Given the RL circumstances of the time. No, I don't.

Boy are you losing me here. Looks like no hole at all: how is a "sizable convoy" going to "slip in"? Large, slow targets, in range of recon for days - not likely. And what US commander would risk it? But - say - one did - maybe in fog -

<Shrug> Your the one who suggested that Japan would conduct the operation like a big Tokyo Express, with the Japanese fleet not being required to sustain operations in Hawaiian waters. That presents a sizable hole.

Backtracking again?

nope.

I thought the US could inflict major losses on this invasion fleet?

It could, especially if the Japanese fleet isn't around like you suggested.

I thought Oahu would not fall in any case?

Where did I say that?

Why all this caution all of a sudden? And what do you mean by "serious blockade?"

Do I really need to explain this to you?

- the BEST the US can do is NOT give Japan a Decisive Battle. Because in early 1942 Japan will win.

Yamamotto thought that at Midway too.

[herwin]

Play it out. Mod a 'realistic' scenario and see what happens. Make sure the initial logistics are right, too. I bet the Pacific Fleet gets in among the landing force. Remember, the US will move a lot more assets into the Pacific fast if the IJN shows up knocking at Pearl Harbor's door. Also, the transports will telegraph a warning, so the Pacific Fleet will be at Lahaina Roads, the Cruiser Force will be out hunting, and Halsey will be raiding your lines of supply.

[Hoplosternum]

The problem Herwin is that the WitP engine, however good it is in other areas, would enable this operation quite easily. It simply does not model the difficulties of the logistics well enough.

It is easy to land a full Division with just 6 or 7 4.5K APs or 10 3K ones (and you have scores of them). So 35 will land all 5 Divisions. Another half dozen transports will bring a base force or two needed and a few other support forces (HQ, SNLF to take a nearby island say etc.). KB on it’s own in WitP can operate for weeks on station as long as it only has to make a few attacks. The opps losses, speed of damaged aircraft repair etc. is just too low.

Plus if it runs low on anything vital a day at a minor island loaded with supply equips everything except ship-ship Torpedoes. Quite unrealistic but doable in WitP

The Divisions used could over power Pearl and be loaded back on the APs and headed for the rest of the Pacific before ’41 is over. Literally hundreds of LBA can be rebased and operational at Pearl the day after it’s capture.

The Pearl garrison and planes can live off captured supply or be fully supplied by a couple of transports a month (and Japan has 100s of these).

In short WitP just won’t model the difficulties of this well. It allows this and other complex long range invasions to be done on a shoestring. It’s too easy to supply, set up and repair bases. It would make a decent fantasy scenario though – but that of course doesn’t show much either way.

I agree with Nik that Sid has underestimated the difficulties of this, but that it is not beyond the realms of possibility that it could be pulled off. Sid mentioned it working 9 out of 10 somewhere if IIRC (??) I’d say more like one in five, but it would be a big prize if they got it.

While I think it would not knock USA out of the war it would massively change where and how the US fought. I suspect that ‘Germany first’ would go or at least be drastically reduced and the Japanese would find the US with a lot more forces early. It would be very hard for the US to mount a naval invasion to recapture Pearl as they lacked the means in ’42 to conduct huge long range naval invasions (Japan's possibility of success comes chiefly from surprise and a playing a high risk strategy). But I don’t think they would wait till ’44 when they have the amphibious forces to retake Pearl directly. I suspect the US could not really operate from the South Pacific with Pearl held against them, as they could not risk building up atolls/island chains to Oz and NZ with the Japanese fleet lurking on their entire northern flank. So the whole shape of the Pacific war would change. But there are bases and friendly territory aplenty in the Indian Ocean and that is where I’d expect the initial counter attack to come from. Arguably this would hit the Japanese where it hurt earlier (in the SRA).

[herwin]

ORIGINAL: herwin

My books are at home, but as I remember, the Pacific Theater of Operations got about half the Navy and something like a quarter of the Army. So double the naval reinforcements and triple the ground and air reinforcements. I'll check this evening.

My sources are at my condo in Fairfax. 8(

[el cid again]

[quote]ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl


[quote]ORIGINAL: el cid again
The Japanese "planned" to conquer China---and look how well that was turning out! "

[quote]

OK - I'll bite. When did Japan plan to "conquer China?" And where is that plan? Show - in the more than 100 volume official history preferably - where at any time there was a plan to conquer China? It might be said that Japan had big time problems BECAUSE there was NO national policy or plan about China, because a few hotheads set off to enrich themselves - and did just that - creating de facto feifdoms so separate they could not accept even a unfied command (the game has it wrong - there is no unified China command IRL) - China has two small countries, and two major Japanese army run sectors - all with different leaders. There was never a unified policy - and not even the most rabid believed Japan could conquer China. They wanted China to stop fighting and accept PARTIAL loss of its territory - never more than that. Or I missed something somewhere - which I gladly will learn about.

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: herwin

My books are at home, but as I remember, the Pacific Theater of Operations got about half the Navy and something like a quarter of the Army. So double the naval reinforcements and triple the ground and air reinforcements. I'll check this evening.

Doubling the navy - from half to 100% - seems complely impossible. Surely forces are required for ETO.

[el cid again]

Where is the estimate of REDUCTIONS in assets for PTO in out years? If Germany lasts longer - things transferred to PTO from ETO won't happen - or will happen x months later. What should x be?

And what portion of air assets must be sent to ETO that were not - in say 1944 - because the enemy industry was NOT broken by US bombing to the extent that really happened? That sort of thing.

[Mike Scholl]

ORIGINAL: el cid again
OK - I'll bite. When did Japan plan to "conquer China?" And where is that plan? Show - in the more than 100 volume official history preferably - where at any time there was a plan to conquer China? It might be said that Japan had big time problems BECAUSE there was NO national policy or plan about China, because a few hotheads set off to enrich themselves - and did just that - creating de facto feifdoms so separate they could not accept even a unfied command (the game has it wrong - there is no unified China command IRL) - China has two small countries, and two major Japanese army run sectors - all with different leaders. There was never a unified policy - and not even the most rabid believed Japan could conquer China. They wanted China to stop fighting and accept PARTIAL loss of its territory - never more than that. Or I missed something somewhere - which I gladly will learn about.

Love the way you "selectively" respond to things. But OK, I can't produce a 100 page document called "The Japanese Plan to Conquer China". Apparently on the day of the Marco Polo Bridge incident a major proportion of the Japanese Army just suddenly "did their own thing" together. "Every private his own Field Marshal"..., interesting concept.

I'm admittedly being facecious..., but whether or not a "Plan" can be found some planning existed. An the real point of the statement you're reacting to was that the existance of a "plan" does not mean that the troops, support, logistics, and other necessary ingredients are available as well.

[DuckofTindalos]

ORIGINAL: el cid again

OK - I'll bite. When did Japan plan to "conquer China?" And where is that plan? Show - in the more than 100 volume official history preferably - where at any time there was a plan to conquer China?

I see you stole a page from JWE's playbook and are now demanding that somebody provide documentation for a claim. You're obviously blind to the colossal hypocrisy in this situation.

[spence]

Play it out. Mod a 'realistic' scenario and see what happens. Make sure the initial logistics are right, too. I bet the Pacific Fleet gets in among the landing force. Remember, the US will move a lot more assets into the Pacific fast if the IJN shows up knocking at Pearl Harbor's door. Also, the transports will telegraph a warning, so the Pacific Fleet will be at Lahaina Roads, the Cruiser Force will be out hunting, and Halsey will be raiding your lines of supply.

If one were to play a Mod with a realistice scenario one would first have to hide the data bases from each of the players so that they would know very little specific about their enemy. The same mod might also call into question some of the original assumptions and subsequently adjust the morale and experience levels of various squadrons and land units. All the American air units start with relatively low experience and also low morale. Exactly what historical basis that has so far escaped me (that is not to say their morale might not have been low after the attack on PH).

The Japanese fighter and bomber pilots in the KB were undoubtably extremely well trained but shooting down biplanes piloted by virtually untrained neophytes in obsolete planes and dropping bombs on undefended cities in China wasn't the best sort of combat experience since it called for little learning/development from what the pilots got in their training. From what I've read of the opertions of the Chinese Air Force there was little difference for the Japanese between shooting at a Chinese fighter and shooting at a target sleeve.

American flight training was not some slipshod affair though it did tend to graduate pilots who were undoubtably less qualified than the Japanese.

So I'd say let the KB/invasion force sail into Hawaiian waters not knowing if the Americans are any good. Let them not know if the 1st turn surprise is on or off. Let their 1st raid hit an empty PH and run into a 50 plane CAP of 70exp/99 morale fighters (still same mix of types though) and then fend off a LB counterstrike of the same 70exp/99mor bombers.

And if the nascent Yamamoto gets his and his country's head handed to him make him play it out to the bitter end.

[JeffroK]

ORIGINAL: spence

Play it out. Mod a 'realistic' scenario and see what happens. Make sure the initial logistics are right, too. I bet the Pacific Fleet gets in among the landing force. Remember, the US will move a lot more assets into the Pacific fast if the IJN shows up knocking at Pearl Harbor's door. Also, the transports will telegraph a warning, so the Pacific Fleet will be at Lahaina Roads, the Cruiser Force will be out hunting, and Halsey will be raiding your lines of supply.

If one were to play a Mod with a realistice scenario one would first have to hide the data bases from each of the players so that they would know very little specific about their enemy. The same mod might also call into question some of the original assumptions and subsequently adjust the morale and experience levels of various squadrons and land units. All the American air units start with relatively low experience and also low morale. Exactly what historical basis that has so far escaped me (that is not to say their morale might not have been low after the attack on PH).

The Japanese fighter and bomber pilots in the KB were undoubtably extremely well trained but shooting down biplanes piloted by virtually untrained neophytes in obsolete planes and dropping bombs on undefended cities in China wasn't the best sort of combat experience since it called for little learning/development from what the pilots got in their training. From what I've read of the opertions of the Chinese Air Force there was little difference for the Japanese between shooting at a Chinese fighter and shooting at a target sleeve.

American flight training was not some slipshod affair though it did tend to graduate pilots who were undoubtably less qualified than the Japanese.

So I'd say let the KB/invasion force sail into Hawaiian waters not knowing if the Americans are any good. Let them not know if the 1st turn surprise is on or off. Let their 1st raid hit an empty PH and run into a 50 plane CAP of 70exp/99 morale fighters (still same mix of types though) and then fend off a LB counterstrike of the same 70exp/99mor bombers.

And if the nascent Yamamoto gets his and his country's head handed to him make him play it out to the bitter end.

I think the japanese had a very good idea about US Ground defenses, and pretty good intel about the USN (though they were expecting the CV's to be inport), the same goes for their intel about British & Dutch dispositions. This is often the advantage of the surprise attack, make sure you hit were they aint.
Exp/mor is always a gut call, based on the training & experience of the IJNAF they would rate as higher than USN/USAAC pilots who while well trained were inexperienced in combat, maybe morale stays high but exp lower. I think the Chinese, & Russian pilots were better than a target sleeve, and often gave a good account of themselves until the Zero-Sen arrived

I would be sure that the IJN would not have attacked PH if they knew a well trained and experienced force was waiting for them, with an integrated RADAR system providing early warning. As it was, the hit early on a Sunday mornng, agaonst a base that was at peace, with the USAAC in transition to a modern mix of aircraft and its RADAR coverage virtually non-existant (Maybe PH The movie, should have sent the star to a RAF Sector control room instead of a Fighter Sqn)

I love hypotheticals like this, it gives a chance for many views to be churned up and talked over, and often you pick out the fault of a plan (Maybe japanese logistics in this case) or see the perfect opportunity which was missed. It is using the advantage of "Monday Morning coaching" but, anything we talk about in relation to WW2 has that advantage.