Yamamoto's Plan in action

[spence]

I've fooled around with the 1st turn PH attack a bit just to see what happens if the Japanese don't achieve surprise - with about 20 run throughs using varying CAPs and escorting the PH bombers with various escorts (all with standard game exp/mor) the results are little different from Surprise ON. One bomb hit on an IJN carrier seems to be about all that can be expected. I've even surrounded the KB with PTs (which seem to effect KBs ability to retreat) and sailed the whole USN into the KB's launch hex with the most aggressive Adm I could find on the list in charge and still not managed to bang up the KB significantly. Basically the entire turn 1 outcome is chiselled in stone except for the number of US BBs that get sunk. The airbase is always closed down (apparently each of the 60-70 odd bombs dropped on all those airfields on Oahu are tactical nuclear weapons) with at least 75 runway and service damage. The Change Setup button does not appear to work (for CHS anyways) since the two available US CVs always start in the same hex and adding the one that can get close to KB usually increases the hits on IJN CVs by only 1.

Just wanted to make it clear that as the game is set up there is virtually no possibility that the Japanese can get seriously hurt by attacking Hawaii

[witpqs]

ORIGINAL: el cid again

Where is the estimate of REDUCTIONS in assets for PTO in out years? If Germany lasts longer - things transferred to PTO from ETO won't happen - or will happen x months later. What should x be?

And what portion of air assets must be sent to ETO that were not - in say 1944 - because the enemy industry was NOT broken by US bombing to the extent that really happened? That sort of thing.

I think that everybody talking about material allocation changes between ETO and PTO must remember that the US reduced production of many things when it was deemed there was enough, and that was even with an invasion of Japan envisioned. So, yes early on there could be/would be (in this scenario) diversion from ETO to PTO, but some of that (or maybe all of it, who knows?) would be made up for by continuing production or even increasing it further.

In the case of airframes, even the stock scenario and game mechanics fail to take into account that the US could have produced more fighters if it found that Japan was producing enormous numbers of newer front line fighter types, as some players manage to do. As the game engine works now the Allies are limited to whatever is pre-programed by the scenario designer.

[Mike Scholl]

ORIGINAL: spence
Just wanted to make it clear that as the game is set up there is virtually no possibility that the Japanese can get seriously hurt by attacking Hawaii..

In the GAME. Real life is something else....

[spence]

In the GAME. Real life is something else

AGREED. The game is unsuitable for a realistic investigation of this scenario.

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

ORIGINAL: el cid again
REPLY: This latter is wholly false. That is, 100% false. IF it were true the Japanese would not have planned to do it - and ultimately decided to do it. But they did both. At a minimum Japan believed it had the resources to do it. Even in 1942 - when it was a much more difficult problem to solve - incompetent US play could lose the game. There were high ranking officials who wanted to withdraw from Hawaii - and there were US officers from the Western Pacific recommending that to them. Nothing like not defending to insure you lose an attempt to take the place. But failing that - I don't think anything short of gross US incompetence would lose in 1942. 1941 is a different picture - in terms of start date. Japan does not need more than it has - it needs only a fraction of what it has. It can do this and still do the SRA with virtually the same forces. In fact, it probably would work out better than the raid did. The US would have lost its fleet - not for a couple of years - but forever. The US would not have lost Oahu as a functional base - not for a few days - but for a year or two - or forever. The whole strategic situation would be better for Japan. If you could run it ten times - in parallel universes - and know the outcomes - it is barely possible Japan would not be better off in nine of them - otherwise all ten.

Sorry Cid..., but that's one big barrel of baloney. The Japanese "planned" to conquer China---and look how well that was turning out! "Wishfull Thinking" was a major ingredient in many Japanese Plans and Estimates.

Lets be perfectly clear here:

You claimed Japan lacked the logistic ability to invade Hawaii -

and you are wholly ignoring that Japan DID invade Hawaii IRL - in 1942

The modified plan - coming in from the NE instead of the SE - was expanded to include invading the Aleutians and a carrier air strike on Kodiak, Alaska - hard proof of the logistic reach of Japan in 1942

According to the Official History, the divisions to invade Hawaii, and the ships to lift them, had been issued warning orders. The assets required either did sail - as part of the more than 200 ships involved in phase one operations - or existed and were standing up to sail in follow up echelons.

To say they could not do so is irrational. Reality is supposed to be the Supreme Court of rational people.

And note that this effort was made at a time the problem was much worse than it would have been at the beginning of the war: then most Japanese merchant ships were idle at anchor, with no jobs hauling things to or from the SRA; it was far more difficult to do this in 1942 than it would have been earlier - yet they still not only planned it - they tried to do it.
That they could do it is beyond reasonable argument.

I think you are thinking in terms of the way we do things instead of in terms of the way they did things. They did not need to do things on the same scale we did. Yet their way was more than adequate. The state of the art in 1941 and 1942 was such that Japan was technically ahead of us in amphibious operations. We did not come up with anything like the PRE WAR Shinshu Maru until a generation after WWII. She was more than a command ship - she was also a major logistic support ship - independent of the requirement for a port - and she could serve as an aircraft transport - and even could fit catapults if required for any reason. You will look in vein for any similar Allied vessels - not only in 1942 - but any time in WWII. And that is just one example. That the movements of this and other specialists ships were closely guarded secrets - are still closely guarded secrets - and that there is no glorious Hollywood movie about their exploits does not mean they didn't exist - it only means few know about them. The post above about the Marines developing amphib assault - alone of all powers - is also something I was told by Marines - but it isn't so. Only because of ignorance and assumption do we think it is so. What could be done - and what was actually done - were not done exactly the same way we would do it - but that is not the same as not as good. In some cases things were not as good - but still adequate. In others they were better - and we were not as good. But in no case was it "they could not do it."

[JeffroK]

ORIGINAL: el cid again

Lets be perfectly clear here:

You claimed Japan lacked the logistic ability to invade Hawaii -

and you are wholly ignoring that Japan DID invade Hawaii IRL - in 1942

The modified plan - coming in from the NE instead of the SE - was expanded to include invading the Aleutians and a carrier air strike on Kodiak, Alaska - hard proof of the logistic reach of Japan in 1942

According to the Official History, the divisions to invade Hawaii, and the ships to lift them, had been issued warning orders. The assets required either did sail - as part of the more than 200 ships involved in phase one operations - or existed and were standing up to sail in follow up echelons.

Que!

Is this another massive US cover up, Unless Wake is the outermost island of the Hawaiian chain (I thought Kure Is was).

Must be massive hidden graves, are there any active volcanoes where they might have been disposed of?

That crisp Alaskan air must be mind numbing!

[witpqs]

ORIGINAL: el cid again

Lets be perfectly clear here:

You claimed Japan lacked the logistic ability to invade Hawaii -

and you are wholly ignoring that Japan DID invade Hawaii IRL - in 1942

Sid,

This is false. Period. I understand what you mean because you explained it. Still, the statement is false. Planning a thing is not doing it. Even doing other things that were part of the plan is not doing it. They might have planned to invade Hawaii, they certainly did invade two Islands in Alaska (and I think intended to invade a third but were dissuaded by bad weather), and they certainly attacked Midway in an attempt to invade it (which failed), but they never did invade Hawaii.

[bradfordkay]

ORIGINAL: Terminus

How the hell would the Japanese gather together enough transports to sail 5 divisions to Hawai'i at once, anyway? "Unlikely" would be a polite understatement...

Well, it's late July 1942 in our game, and Chez just landed 5-6 divisions, 3 infantry brigades, 2 infantry regiments plus supporting troops at Darwin (CHS v2.08, scen 159).

[JeffroK]

ORIGINAL: bradfordkay

ORIGINAL: Terminus

How the hell would the Japanese gather together enough transports to sail 5 divisions to Hawai'i at once, anyway? "Unlikely" would be a polite understatement...

Well, it's late July 1942 in our game, and Chez just landed 5-6 divisions, 3 infantry brigades, 2 infantry regiments plus supporting troops at Darwin (CHS v2.08, scen 159).

I'm playing CHS 154 and am sailing 4Divs plus support to Midway as a first step to Hawaii, and still am invading the PI & Malaya (I only redirected the Davao & Wake invasion force)

[bradfordkay]

I find it difficult to believe a scenario that says Japan is going to surprise the US with an invasion of Oahu, after having invaded Johnson and Midway Islands, with invasions of the lesser Hawaiian Islands coming after the JI and MI invasions but before the Oahu invasion. Just what is the US doing in this meantime? Sitting on it's collective thumbs?

First of all, the invasion convoys to make this maneuver will not leave Japan undetected. You may recall that the Malayan invasion force was being tracked by the allies for some days. A much larger invasion force heading out from Japan may not be tracked all the way, but it's departure will not go undetected and the Hawaiian forces will not likely be asleep when it arrives the way they were on Dec 7, 1941. This is why I don't believe that the invasion you suggest is a sure thing. It could possible work, but it won't be because if tactical surprise.

Strategic surprise may be another thing. I believe that the US will rush all possible reinforcements to Hawaii as soon as Johnson Island is taken. The only question being is whether the available reinforcements would be enough...

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: witpqs

ORIGINAL: el cid again

Lets be perfectly clear here:

You claimed Japan lacked the logistic ability to invade Hawaii -

and you are wholly ignoring that Japan DID invade Hawaii IRL - in 1942

Sid,

This is false. Period. I understand what you mean because you explained it. Still, the statement is false. Planning a thing is not doing it. Even doing other things that were part of the plan is not doing it. They might have planned to invade Hawaii, they certainly did invade two Islands in Alaska (and I think intended to invade a third but were dissuaded by bad weather), and they certainly attacked Midway in an attempt to invade it (which failed), but they never did invade Hawaii.

Just because our official history was written in ignorance - decades before we had the Japanese official history - does not change the facts of real life: Japan decided to invade Hawaii - it launched the first phase operations leading to that end - and was forced to abort because of being decisively defeated in the Southern portion of that operation (the Northern phase was successful). This discussion is about LOGISTIC CAPABILITY - and the decision to IMPLEMENT the invasion strategy is history - not some fantasy. The ships existed, they sailed, and the additional ships and units involved were also standing up to sail on time tables for the next several months. The LOGISTIC CAPABILITY existed - and had it not - the battle would not have occurred. Now we can try this in some other language if you wish - but by dictionary definition - it is wholly false to deny they had a capability they actually had and used. Launching the op to invade Hawaii - never mind the outcome of it - shows the logistics to do it existed. Yes - at least three islands were in the invasion plan - just as the earlier plans also had at least three islands. The only change was that the islands changed from Midway, Johnston and Molokai to Midway, Attu and Kiska. Logistically speaking, supporting an invasion of the latter three out of Japan is far more difficult than supporting the earlier op out of Kwajalein - to which add the logistical burdon of the carrier raid on Kodiak. The actual op shows that the original concept was feasible - in a logistical sense. You are now reduced to quibbling about details - they had the ships, the fuel, the divisions and other units, and they decided to do the mission: it is not rational to say they could not have had - because we know they did.

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: bradfordkay


I find it difficult to believe a scenario that says Japan is going to surprise the US with an invasion of Oahu, after having invaded Johnson and Midway Islands, with invasions of the lesser Hawaiian Islands coming after the JI and MI invasions but before the Oahu invasion. Just what is the US doing in this meantime? Sitting on it's collective thumbs?

First of all, the invasion convoys to make this maneuver will not leave Japan undetected. You may recall that the Malayan invasion force was being tracked by the allies for some days. A much larger invasion force heading out from Japan may not be tracked all the way, but it's departure will not go undetected and the Hawaiian forces will not likely be asleep when it arrives the way they were on Dec 7, 1941. This is why I don't believe that the invasion you suggest is a sure thing. It could possible work, but it won't be because if tactical surprise.

Strategic surprise may be another thing. I believe that the US will rush all possible reinforcements to Hawaii as soon as Johnson Island is taken. The only question being is whether the available reinforcements would be enough...

The idea the Japanese might come out of their mandate bases was hardly a surprise. The US forces were looking for precisely such a move - and that is a big part of why they didn't find the KB on Dec 7 (US time) IRL. The idea that such an invasion would be a surprise on that particular day is certainly possible. It is difficult to overstate the lack of readiness and the peacetime mind set in place on Dec 7, 1941 - worldwide and in Hawaii. There was no ready ammunition. There was no manning of AAA positions or CD positions. There was no combat air patrol. There was minimal air and inshore patrol. Wether or not that means that the forces would reach all the way to Hawaii undetected is another subject entirely - and not an assertion anyone has made - least of all I.

I believe that at some point the forces are going to be detected by one means or another - patrol planes - submarines -
radar - or in the worst case - because their air strikes start attacking ships and/or bases. I don't think that means that the forces will be overwhelmed on that day - and only a Japanese force bent on suicide would attempt to land on Oahu on that day. Nothing we know indicates anyone expected that. What happens on that day is that Japan comes in and begins a CAMPAIGN which must last weeks and more likely will last months. Because of the relative size of forces, the relative readiness of forces, and the relative intel of both sides at the start of the war, it is all but certain that the day will be a grim one for US forces. But they will surely hold Oahu at its end - and there will surely be many aircraft left on that island at its end. ALL Japan can achieve is to BEGIN the process of siezing the forward bases, neutralizing land based air forces, and neutralizing the naval forces in the Central Pacific area. These are too numerous and too scattered all to be detected, engaged and sunk on that day. So, whatever the details, it will be a major battle, or a series of battles, and after that first day it isn't likely there will be any surprise at all. The main surprise is that the war began then. And it may not be an absolute surprise - it likely will be detected some time out. That is what the game engine is for - to figure out and report the details. Also - code permits players to have an input here - they can set the first turn surprise switch to either position - and I have not said they should do so any particular way. It depends on their assumptions - which might not be the same person to person.

So in the end - I find it surprising you think someone thought there would be some sort of absolute surprise. No one did. In a long term sense, this is something that was very much on people's minds, and more than a few US officers said they believed the Japanese were foolish not to have attempted an invasion given the state of things at that time.

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: JeffK

ORIGINAL: bradfordkay

ORIGINAL: Terminus

How the hell would the Japanese gather together enough transports to sail 5 divisions to Hawai'i at once, anyway? "Unlikely" would be a polite understatement...

Well, it's late July 1942 in our game, and Chez just landed 5-6 divisions, 3 infantry brigades, 2 infantry regiments plus supporting troops at Darwin (CHS v2.08, scen 159).

I'm playing CHS 154 and am sailing 4Divs plus support to Midway as a first step to Hawaii, and still am invading the PI & Malaya (I only redirected the Davao & Wake invasion force)

It probably is a mistake to send so many divisions. But while WITP needs too many ships per division (compared to IRL) - most forms of WITP have "AKs to burn" - no great need for most of them to be serving the economy. In RHS this is not so easy - half the AKs are absent (for technical reasons, represented by the half you have) - and the "free supply" situation has been substantially eliminated. You need your ships to move oil, resources, supplies and fuel - and trying to do that when you move too many troops is a much more difficult issue.

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: JeffK

ORIGINAL: el cid again

Lets be perfectly clear here:

You claimed Japan lacked the logistic ability to invade Hawaii -

and you are wholly ignoring that Japan DID invade Hawaii IRL - in 1942

The modified plan - coming in from the NE instead of the SE - was expanded to include invading the Aleutians and a carrier air strike on Kodiak, Alaska - hard proof of the logistic reach of Japan in 1942

According to the Official History, the divisions to invade Hawaii, and the ships to lift them, had been issued warning orders. The assets required either did sail - as part of the more than 200 ships involved in phase one operations - or existed and were standing up to sail in follow up echelons.

Que!

Is this another massive US cover up, Unless Wake is the outermost island of the Hawaiian chain (I thought Kure Is was).

Must be massive hidden graves, are there any active volcanoes where they might have been disposed of?

That crisp Alaskan air must be mind numbing!

When an enemy force involving hundreds of ships, an entire corps, and many other units, jumps off for a mission - it is not exactly rational to claim it lacked the capability to TRY to execute that mission - however badly the attack may have gone. This isn't very different than saying the Battle of Kafje was only the opening trick in a much larger attack: that the rest of it didn't happen is a function of what happened to the lead elements - not a function of the lack of forces or intentions or logistics available to the enemy. The arguement here is about LOGISTIC CAPABILITY - and IF Japan truly lacked the LOGISTIC ability to attempt the invasion - they would not have tired to do so. Since they did try - the first 100,000 men were actually sent out on more than 200 ships - there is no reasonable basis to say they could not do so. It is impossible to proove a negative assertion - but it takes only a single fact to show a negative assertion must be false. This is that fact.

[ChezDaJez]

I agree with you, Brad. Without tactical surprise, an invasion of Hawaii becomes a far more difficult undertaking.

The best hope of achieving an invasion of Hawaii with tactical surprise is if the Japanese attack Pearl Harbor as they did IRL AND simultaneously invade Wake and Midway followed immediately by an invasion of Hawaii. Alternately, an invasion of Hawaii followed shorty thereafter (2-3 days) by an invasion of Wake and Midway would also be possible.

We already know what happened at Wake on their first attempt and their second attempt was nearly unsuccessful too. I wouldn't expect a much different force composition for a Midway invasion force so a high potential for failure would also exist there.

And given that 2 US carriers were within a days steaming of Midway means that the Midway invasion force now must contend with attacks from carrier based aircraft. In addition, if the Hawaii invasion force took a southerly route, they could also be threatend by the US carriers. This puts KB in a difficult position... protect the Midway invasion fleet or protect the Hawaii invasion force... they can't do both. Either way, KB would not be able to exert sustained pressure on Hawaiian defences and this is absolutely critical because any lull gives the US forces a chance to regroup. Another consideration is that Saratoga, once ready for sea, could be in Hawaiian waters within 4-5 days steaming. Allowing 48 hrs for her to make ready for sea plus steaming time means she arrives within a week of being ordered out. And surely Yorktown and Ranger would immediately be sent to the Pacific followed shortly by Hornet when she becomes ready.

All of this presents many significant logisitical problems for the Japanese. Not only does Japan have to find the fuel to support sustained KB operations near Oahu, but she must also also find the fuel and transports for 3 separate invasion forces. She must provide a means of rearming KB with fuel, ordnance, food and replacement aircraft. With the closest possible base is the Marshalls and that is too far away to be tactically feasible. Plus that leaves Hawaii ungaurded. Japan certainly does not have the forces available to conduct her historical operations in Malaya and the PI plus an invasion of Hawaii. Something has to give. Which operation does she give up?

Chez

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: spence

In the GAME. Real life is something else

AGREED. The game is unsuitable for a realistic investigation of this scenario.

Why? There game is remarkably good for its simplicity. This scenario is not very different from any other.
It tracks ships, submarines, bases, land forces, air units, and their ability to detect and interact. It is wholly suitable to investigate it. And note that the scenario is a very hard one. Players have 20 20 hindsight impossible IRL - and the defense IRL could almost certainly not be as competent as any reasonably informed players defense will be. How do you make players pretend they don't know about Zeros, Long Lance Torpedoes, the fact the Japanese have seaborne amphibious command ships, name it??? You can't - so the defenders have every opportunity to play much wiser than the ignorant commanders IRL would have.

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: witpqs

ORIGINAL: el cid again

Where is the estimate of REDUCTIONS in assets for PTO in out years? If Germany lasts longer - things transferred to PTO from ETO won't happen - or will happen x months later. What should x be?

And what portion of air assets must be sent to ETO that were not - in say 1944 - because the enemy industry was NOT broken by US bombing to the extent that really happened? That sort of thing.

I think that everybody talking about material allocation changes between ETO and PTO must remember that the US reduced production of many things when it was deemed there was enough, and that was even with an invasion of Japan envisioned. So, yes early on there could be/would be (in this scenario) diversion from ETO to PTO, but some of that (or maybe all of it, who knows?) would be made up for by continuing production or even increasing it further.

In the case of airframes, even the stock scenario and game mechanics fail to take into account that the US could have produced more fighters if it found that Japan was producing enormous numbers of newer front line fighter types, as some players manage to do. As the game engine works now the Allies are limited to whatever is pre-programed by the scenario designer.

As WITP mechanics are cast in stone, no scenario designer can give the Allies control over their production. Nor - probably - should we tinker with different allocations between theaters. I don't think we can make good estimates of the impacts of that. Less escort and air assets defending ships not in PTO is going to increase the losses of ships - and those ships are never going to make the repeated trips they made IRL. The cumulative effects of this are going to be very severe at the front end of the supply line. It also might impact US production CAPACITY. USN teaches "there are 76 strategic materials not present in sufficient quantity to support the US economy which must be imported by sea" in basic training. If you lose the ships that are needed to bring in the tin from Peru or the Bauxite from Jamaica (or wherever) -
you are not going to be able to run the factories even as much as they ran IRL. Tinkering with this is a big can of worms -and WITP design was soundly based on the assumption "when things entered PTO is the time they enter in the game" - period. There is also the psychological/political dimension of the war - and this is not something I bet we will not be able to evaluate fairly - and achieve a consensus on. But at some point there are bound to be impacts of that sort: first of all - many nations that joined the Allies won't join (so for example we don't get the use of the Azores, maybe); second - more trade with the Axis is likely in the case of some countries; third - morale in many places is likely to have some political impacts. It is on the record that Gen Marshall and FDR worried about the impacts of casualties on US domestic politics. Lacking the ability to calculate when, if, and with what impact these sorts of changes might occur, I think it is much safer to stay with things more or less as they were - and the general principle that if the Allies cannot decisively win by the end of 1945 - they probably have been defeated in some sense.

Nevertheless - my question is being ignored: IF we DO agree to go this way - I tend to side with Andrew's view that "Germany still loses, but it takes longer." If "it takes longer" - what is the impact on UNITS that transferred ETO to PTO - in months? How much longer does it Germany tie up those units that did change theaters? Be careful here - you are evaluating the sacred cow of US strategic air power - and saying it lacks (as one did above) 2/3 of its bombers in ETO ought to mean something - unless it was a total waste of resources (see Freeman Dyson, wartime statistical analyst for Bomber Command - who holds the bombing cost several times MORE than it cost the enemy). There is also the matter of ships - logistics matter: not fighting subs means the subs sink more ships; not sending as many ships ADDS to the ships sunk - and that impacts total cargo delivered grossly in out years. What is the impact of delivering significantly lower aggregate cargo in out years? What is x - and why?

[DuckofTindalos]

ORIGINAL: bradfordkay

ORIGINAL: Terminus

How the hell would the Japanese gather together enough transports to sail 5 divisions to Hawai'i at once, anyway? "Unlikely" would be a polite understatement...

Well, it's late July 1942 in our game, and Chez just landed 5-6 divisions, 3 infantry brigades, 2 infantry regiments plus supporting troops at Darwin (CHS v2.08, scen 159).

Yeees, and the Japanese are over-endowed with transports in WitP.

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: spence

I've fooled around with the 1st turn PH attack a bit just to see what happens if the Japanese don't achieve surprise - with about 20 run throughs using varying CAPs and escorting the PH bombers with various escorts (all with standard game exp/mor) the results are little different from Surprise ON. One bomb hit on an IJN carrier seems to be about all that can be expected. I've even surrounded the KB with PTs (which seem to effect KBs ability to retreat) and sailed the whole USN into the KB's launch hex with the most aggressive Adm I could find on the list in charge and still not managed to bang up the KB significantly. Basically the entire turn 1 outcome is chiselled in stone except for the number of US BBs that get sunk. The airbase is always closed down (apparently each of the 60-70 odd bombs dropped on all those airfields on Oahu are tactical nuclear weapons) with at least 75 runway and service damage. The Change Setup button does not appear to work (for CHS anyways) since the two available US CVs always start in the same hex and adding the one that can get close to KB usually increases the hits on IJN CVs by only 1.

Just wanted to make it clear that as the game is set up there is virtually no possibility that the Japanese can get seriously hurt by attacking Hawaii

I have very similar results - surprise matters very little. It is the force size and positioning that matter. IF the Japanese do NOT hit PH - and they sometimes do not because they go after carriers - it varies a fair amount on the first day. But not by the end of the first week: US forces that engage are damaged or lost. This is entirely realistic, and any other outcome would be suspicious. Nick was wrong to say the Japanese can get badly hurt - they can take bad damage to ships - enough to break off and repair for a while - but they won't lose the fleet or be forced to end the campaign. A bigger problem is logistic: the Japanese will use all their fuel forward in about 21 days - and either they withdraw - send fuel forward - or a combination of both. This in RHS - which changed fuel capacity, ranges, rates of consumption - and made the Japanese ships less efficient than Allied ones (which was the case IRL but not in the game). You cannot sail to the West Coast, hang out for a month, return to Japan, and still have 2/3 of the fuel in your tankers in RHS!!! [I did that in my first CHS game; I returned to rebuild carrier air units - not because I lacked fuel or because of ship damage]

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: Andrew Brown

Well, this discussion has certainly become lively!

But I will continue to contribute as long as it is still not getting out of hand...

ORIGINAL: el cid again
It isn't a bad assumption. But IF we made that assumption, two problems present themself for WITP:

a) What would be sent to PTO earlier that was not?
I still think my initial wild, uninformed guesses - a 50% increase in aircraft production and ground force availability, and an acceleration in ship arrivals of several months (on an increasing sliding scale as the war progresses) would not be far off the mark.
It is the work of the scenario modder to decide what the increases to US production and reinforcements to be. But stating that you don't know what they are is no excuse not to account for them, in my opinion. To create such a "what-if" scenario, one should consider how things on both sides are affected, not just the Japanese. If you don't account for the likely US response to an attempted invasion of Hawaii, I think the resulting scenario would be lopsided and incomplete.

I do not understand your point about ship arrivals. How can they arrive earlier?

That said, in the scenarios so far with this scenario, we DO have Allied ships arriving earlier to some extent:

Midway class carriers arrive as Essex - sooner because they take less time to build

I think the last two Iowas were similarly turned into Essex class ships (the pair never completed IRL)

Alaska and Des Moines class gunships arrive as Baltimores - sooner because they take less time to build

Three CL are completed as additional Independence class CVLs - and that is also sooner because CL take longer to build

Vanguard is not built - and a CL that took longer than the war gets the funding, labor and metal required to finish her in time for the war

These sorts of things I can see being done. FDR wanted to build ALL Clevelands as CVLs !!! The Navy felt it was unwise not to have a "balanced fleet" - and I think that tension would still exist - but I think the proposal to convert an additional 3 might well have been approved - they arrive much sooner than the big carriers could.

The proposal that US DEs be "emergency DDs" - more speed - 5 inch guns - torpedoes - but half as many built because each gets twice the engines - which is implemented in RHSBBO - could also be adopted. Similarly - the pre war (and hotly debated during the war) idea of building medium sized SS could be adopted - and you get these vessels a few months earlier - the cumulative effect may be operationally significant.

What we do not have is lots of slots to play with. We will not be able to double the fleet, double the air units, or anything of that sort. Nor are such gross changes likely to be required. Implementing the DE proposal gets rid of half of them - so the other half's slots become available for other ships - for example. We have half the AKs 9999ed out - we can put some back in - if you think more would go to PTO - and the rest of those slots are also available. BUT - what are the IMPACTS of doing such things? You cannot send a lot less to ETO without adverse operational and economic effects. And eventually that is going to matter to PTO side of the world.