Were I the US, in the event of a Japanese assault on India, I would not take the heat of the UK by sending resources to Europe. With Combined fleet and Kido Butai strike force 1 tied up in India, and the *entire* supply train there as well (which is a realistic estimate of what it would take, and why the Japanese Army opposed the endeavor), I'd divert US resources to the PTO and strike immediately for the CenPac. The readiness of Japanese CenPac bases would be low, they'd be low on supplies, men, fuel and munitions. The US might easily walk straight through to Saipan and Guam (the defenses in early 1942 would have been minimal, with few if any fortifications). Then I'd load up the B17s and start pounding the snot out of Japan. Japanese fighters in 1942 are perhaps the one plane in which unescorted strategic bombing by B17s and B24s might have a prayer of success without enduring horrendous losses to the heavy bomber groups.
That'd bring the IJN running but they'd be fighting in waters controlled by the USN and under a substantial American land-based air umbrella. The attrition on the IJN would be somewhere between crippling and outrageously fantastic.
The Role of India?
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Jeremy Pritchard
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Any attack in India would primarily be an Imperial Japanese Army zone of operations, which would realistically mean that operations in New Guinea would suffer, but those in the Central and South Pacific would remain the same. The Japanese would have not advanced their defensive perimeter as far, nor would have been quite as wreckless with their carrier fleet with an attack on Midway primarily because this war tactic calls for a defensive war in the East and an offensive war in the West.
The IJA had its own supply fleet (about 1/3 of all Japanese merchant shipping) and even a few ships (some very bad CVE's). They probably could have supplied their own forces without drawing on the IJN for supply and support. When the IJA needed more troops from 1937-39 during their war against China they sent formations from quiet areas (homeland) and raised new units to replace them. The 4 Divisions on duty in the Home Islands would probably have been shipped to make up for units sent to India, with new ones raised for home garrison duty.
The Royal Navy would probably not cause much of a fuss, due to comitments in the vital Medeterranean (the British could lose the Bay of Bengal, but not the Medeterranean) and the Atlantic. British Infantry and Armour would probably be diverted as well as more Indian Forces being raised. The Indians did have an Armoured Division in India until 1944 when it was converted into an Airborne Division. Only token IJN forces had to exist in the Bay of Bengal to keep the small forces of the RN out and guard IJA convoys, leaving the rest to react to American moves.
Realistically the USN probably could not have done much until late 1942 or early 1943, due to limitations of aircraft, sufficient forward bases and the amphibous fleet they had in 1944 but not in 1942. The US was not in a position for a lighting war in 1942. The IJNAF still had a lot of quality in it, and the bases in the Central Pacific were still sufficiently defended by air and ground forces. The USN Carrier TF's could not put up enough cover to counter the strong forces in the Marshall Islands (which would have to be taken before invading the Marianas). Until the IJN Carriers were neutralized and the IJNAF was attritioned the US could not have reached Saipan.
This move might have been historically better for the Japanese, since it separates the two feuding military arms to either end of the Pacific, resulting in less reduntant supply routes (the IJN and IJA had different convoys going to the same region which resulted in easy pickings and a waste of transport). The IJN woud probably have had to raise more Land forces, and might have fielded something comparable to the USMC Divisions, or at least Brigades. The IJN showed a real lack of interest in the Indian Ocean, and would not have spent much of their resources in it when their enemy was in the other end of the Pacific. The Imperial Army would be fighting in their terrain as well, which is similar to that of China instead of New Guinea and the Solomans. They could not have been neutralized as they were in the Pacific through island hopping and would have had to be defeated in the field, which probably was not possible until late in the war.
What would Japan gain?
Probably knocking China out of the war as an effective opponent since all heavy supplies would have been cut off (even air supply would not reach them). The Threat of the Chinese army would dwindle, and the USAAC could not use Chinese bases for operation, which would have eliminated the need for late war operations and as many high quality Land units, which could be replaced by Garrison troops.
The IJA had its own supply fleet (about 1/3 of all Japanese merchant shipping) and even a few ships (some very bad CVE's). They probably could have supplied their own forces without drawing on the IJN for supply and support. When the IJA needed more troops from 1937-39 during their war against China they sent formations from quiet areas (homeland) and raised new units to replace them. The 4 Divisions on duty in the Home Islands would probably have been shipped to make up for units sent to India, with new ones raised for home garrison duty.
The Royal Navy would probably not cause much of a fuss, due to comitments in the vital Medeterranean (the British could lose the Bay of Bengal, but not the Medeterranean) and the Atlantic. British Infantry and Armour would probably be diverted as well as more Indian Forces being raised. The Indians did have an Armoured Division in India until 1944 when it was converted into an Airborne Division. Only token IJN forces had to exist in the Bay of Bengal to keep the small forces of the RN out and guard IJA convoys, leaving the rest to react to American moves.
Realistically the USN probably could not have done much until late 1942 or early 1943, due to limitations of aircraft, sufficient forward bases and the amphibous fleet they had in 1944 but not in 1942. The US was not in a position for a lighting war in 1942. The IJNAF still had a lot of quality in it, and the bases in the Central Pacific were still sufficiently defended by air and ground forces. The USN Carrier TF's could not put up enough cover to counter the strong forces in the Marshall Islands (which would have to be taken before invading the Marianas). Until the IJN Carriers were neutralized and the IJNAF was attritioned the US could not have reached Saipan.
This move might have been historically better for the Japanese, since it separates the two feuding military arms to either end of the Pacific, resulting in less reduntant supply routes (the IJN and IJA had different convoys going to the same region which resulted in easy pickings and a waste of transport). The IJN woud probably have had to raise more Land forces, and might have fielded something comparable to the USMC Divisions, or at least Brigades. The IJN showed a real lack of interest in the Indian Ocean, and would not have spent much of their resources in it when their enemy was in the other end of the Pacific. The Imperial Army would be fighting in their terrain as well, which is similar to that of China instead of New Guinea and the Solomans. They could not have been neutralized as they were in the Pacific through island hopping and would have had to be defeated in the field, which probably was not possible until late in the war.
What would Japan gain?
Probably knocking China out of the war as an effective opponent since all heavy supplies would have been cut off (even air supply would not reach them). The Threat of the Chinese army would dwindle, and the USAAC could not use Chinese bases for operation, which would have eliminated the need for late war operations and as many high quality Land units, which could be replaced by Garrison troops.
Wilmott has discussed this in Barrier and the Javelin. There's no way a campaign occurs by the IJA in India if it is not substantially supported by the IJN with respect to CV and BB covering forces, and a lengthy and highly vulnerable waterborne supply train. Taking India requires every ship and army division that Japan can devote to the task. Probably why the Japanese did not try. The IJA merchant suplpy system was adequate for China because they only had to traverse the Sea of Japan and a wee part of the S. China Sea. About 1/10 as far as they'd have had to go to support a campaign in India. The IJA logistical system failed miserably at supporting a campaign in Burma, even with the presence of a good port (Rangoon) and an adequate number of airfields to cover it.
It would have been an incredible gamble and it would likely have failed. But, Wilmott suggests, it might have been a better use than attriting the Japanese naval air fleet and the surface forces in the New Guinea, Midway, and Solomons campaigns. One way or the other it would have been decisive.
"and the bases in the Central Pacific were still sufficiently defended by air and ground forces. The USN Carrier TF's could not put up enough cover to counter the strong forces in the Marshall Islands (which would have to be taken before invading the Marianas). Until the IJN Carriers were neutralized and the IJNAF was attritioned the US could not have reached Saipan."
That is largely incorrect. I apologize for being so blunt, but in March 1942 (which is when the IJN and IJA would have to start an amphibious campaign against India to have a prayer of success), Guam, Saipan, Wake, and Rabaul were minor backwaters with few troops and fewer naval air units. In February the best that Rabaul could muster against a Lexington air raid was a counterstrike by 17 Betties... of which 11 were shot down by F4Fs and 6 that never came close to the CV. Substantial naval air presence at Truk was only increased as a result of the early-war USN CV raids. Since an invasion of India presupposes the use of Kido Butai in the Bay of Bengal, there's no IJN CV counterforce that could threaten a US TF. Sorry that's just the way it is. Japanese LBA could scarcely reach Rangoon. In theory, unprotected Betties could reach the northeast coast plain in India, unescorted, with a very small bomb load. Even a small contingent of lend-lease P40s would have wrecked, in a few days any long range air campaign against India. The only way Japan projects sufficient airpower to even covering the invasion is to send all of Kido Butai to teh Bay of Bengal.
Even then it would be hell on the IJN. IIRC, (Wlmott again), Japanese naval air lost 315 a/c prior to April 1942 in their various attempts to cover land campaigns and interdict Allied ship movement, against opposition that was for the most part outnumbered, isolated, and undersupplied. The Japanese would not have had anything approaching favorable numbers or conditions in India.
It would have been an incredible gamble and it would likely have failed. But, Wilmott suggests, it might have been a better use than attriting the Japanese naval air fleet and the surface forces in the New Guinea, Midway, and Solomons campaigns. One way or the other it would have been decisive.
"and the bases in the Central Pacific were still sufficiently defended by air and ground forces. The USN Carrier TF's could not put up enough cover to counter the strong forces in the Marshall Islands (which would have to be taken before invading the Marianas). Until the IJN Carriers were neutralized and the IJNAF was attritioned the US could not have reached Saipan."
That is largely incorrect. I apologize for being so blunt, but in March 1942 (which is when the IJN and IJA would have to start an amphibious campaign against India to have a prayer of success), Guam, Saipan, Wake, and Rabaul were minor backwaters with few troops and fewer naval air units. In February the best that Rabaul could muster against a Lexington air raid was a counterstrike by 17 Betties... of which 11 were shot down by F4Fs and 6 that never came close to the CV. Substantial naval air presence at Truk was only increased as a result of the early-war USN CV raids. Since an invasion of India presupposes the use of Kido Butai in the Bay of Bengal, there's no IJN CV counterforce that could threaten a US TF. Sorry that's just the way it is. Japanese LBA could scarcely reach Rangoon. In theory, unprotected Betties could reach the northeast coast plain in India, unescorted, with a very small bomb load. Even a small contingent of lend-lease P40s would have wrecked, in a few days any long range air campaign against India. The only way Japan projects sufficient airpower to even covering the invasion is to send all of Kido Butai to teh Bay of Bengal.
Even then it would be hell on the IJN. IIRC, (Wlmott again), Japanese naval air lost 315 a/c prior to April 1942 in their various attempts to cover land campaigns and interdict Allied ship movement, against opposition that was for the most part outnumbered, isolated, and undersupplied. The Japanese would not have had anything approaching favorable numbers or conditions in India.
Show me a fellow who rejects statistical analysis a priori and I'll show you a fellow who has no knowledge of statistics.
Didn't we have this conversation already?
Didn't we have this conversation already?
3 gambles
Using my Pacific War experiences, the Japanese player has several offensive options (Hawaii/Australia/India), two of which can be combined. Once the East Indies have fallen, the Allies are split and it is almost impossible to reinforce the Indian Ocean from the Pacific. Thus a brief opportunity exists for the conquest of Ceylon and thus isolation of India. I do not know the rail network of India in 1942, but is it safe to assume if Ceylon was captured by IJN/IJA, then the British in Calcutta and Burma would be isolated? If so, as in PacWar, then the IJA can invade with support from land based air in Rangoon and Ceylon and old BB's to provide naval support. Once British are conquered, China is also isolated and their conquest is assured. Once those divisions are freed up, Australia becomes a target assuming the Japanese have captured New Caledonia and surrounding islands. This all must be accomplished by end of '43 of course. PacWar does not realistically consider the occupation forces required to hold such a vast area of populous land of course.
Other considerations:
1. A national liberation (Pro-Axis) India Army that might have rose up given the chance?
2. Axis concentration in Mediterranean, possible conquest of Med/Eqypt/Arabian oil fields would have made a strategic difference in Allies defense options in Indian/Pacific oceans.
3. Possible Auto-victory conditions reflecting India or Commonwealth suing for peace, to include Australia/New Zealand?
There are many strategic possibilities if the designer give us the maps and OOB we will make the scenarios.
Other considerations:
1. A national liberation (Pro-Axis) India Army that might have rose up given the chance?
2. Axis concentration in Mediterranean, possible conquest of Med/Eqypt/Arabian oil fields would have made a strategic difference in Allies defense options in Indian/Pacific oceans.
3. Possible Auto-victory conditions reflecting India or Commonwealth suing for peace, to include Australia/New Zealand?
There are many strategic possibilities if the designer give us the maps and OOB we will make the scenarios.
"I propose to fight it out on this line if it takes all summer."-Note sent with Congressman Washburne from Spotsylvania, May 11, 1864, to General Halleck. - General Ulysses S. Grant
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Jeremy Pritchard
- Posts: 575
- Joined: Thu Sep 27, 2001 8:00 am
- Location: Ontario Canada
Well, the Japanese may have not have been able to defend these islands, but the United States was also not in a place to take them, and defend them. In order for the US to have suceeded in the Central Pacific the IJN CV TF must be neutralized, or they face a very strontg counterattack. The Marshall Islands were attacked in 1944 because this was the earliest time they could be attacked and secured. In 1942 the Americans did not have the men or the means in which to take and secure the Central Pacific in 1942 without leaving themselves open to disaster.
The IJA actually used significantly small numbers of men and material in the Solomans and New Guinea Theatre in 1942. There were some IMB's, the 2nd and 38th Infantry Divisions along with some other detachments. These Infantry formations would not have been needed in the attack on India, as sufficient forces could be brought in from other theatres. The IJA was not heavily involved in the Central and South Pacific until late 1942
The key to this debate has nothing to do with the United States and their ability to exploit what was open to them, but wether or not an attack in India would succeed. By the time the US could really have done anything (early 1943) the Japanese would either have won or have been defeated in India.
Along with the 4 Divisions in Burma (18th, 33rd, 55th and 56th) the formations garrisoning the Home Islands (52nd, 53rd and 54th) that eventually served (except for the 52nd that went to Truk) in Burma could have been sent to the Indian front (there were sufficient Depot Divisions and men to raise new formations for Home Defence). The Use of the 2nd Guard and 5th Divisions could have been possible because their defensive positions would have become redundant had an offensive in the Indian Ocean have taken place. So, here you have 9 possible Divisions which the Japanese could have used to invade India that was very lightly defended in both men, equipment and morale.
After being kicked out of Burma, the defence of India was pretty pitiful. Ceylon was defended by the 34th Indian Division that was forming up, the Burma-India border was defended primarily by the 23rd Infantry Division, with the 17th Division, 1st Burma Division and 7th Armoured Brigade short on men, equipment and morale. The 14th, 25th and 26th Divisions were in the Process of forming, and the 70th British Division, fresh from its stay at Tobruk and Operation Crusader, was being sent. Any ground that the British lost in 1942 could not have been won back for at least 2 years. It was feared that Ceylon would be invaded, and would only have taken one Japanese Division to do so. The entire country was garrisoned by batallions whose duty was primarily to keep the population in order, much like the KNIL.
It would not have taken the entire IJN to defend the Bay of Bengal as well. The Royal Navy was streched thin all over the world. The Germans still had 3 Battleship/Battlecruisers ready to break out which still required the use of modern British Battleships and Battle Cruisers to escort Convoys. There really would not have been much of a threat to Japanese shipping as you propose, as the British could not afford to lose valuable military shipping on commerce raiding.
So, the Japanese had a force that would not only outnumber their opponents, but also had better quality and quantity of equipment (most Indian Armoured formations would not have their tanks for another 6 months). The Indian formations also had a very low morale, after being critically defeated in Burma, with heavy losses, and also not particularly liking the defending power. The Royal Navy was kicked out of the region and did not have sufficient forces and logistic support in which to maintain a strong presence in the area (it was withdrawn to East Africa in May 1942, as this was seen as to be the only safe port for the Eastern Fleet).
The IJA actually used significantly small numbers of men and material in the Solomans and New Guinea Theatre in 1942. There were some IMB's, the 2nd and 38th Infantry Divisions along with some other detachments. These Infantry formations would not have been needed in the attack on India, as sufficient forces could be brought in from other theatres. The IJA was not heavily involved in the Central and South Pacific until late 1942
The key to this debate has nothing to do with the United States and their ability to exploit what was open to them, but wether or not an attack in India would succeed. By the time the US could really have done anything (early 1943) the Japanese would either have won or have been defeated in India.
Along with the 4 Divisions in Burma (18th, 33rd, 55th and 56th) the formations garrisoning the Home Islands (52nd, 53rd and 54th) that eventually served (except for the 52nd that went to Truk) in Burma could have been sent to the Indian front (there were sufficient Depot Divisions and men to raise new formations for Home Defence). The Use of the 2nd Guard and 5th Divisions could have been possible because their defensive positions would have become redundant had an offensive in the Indian Ocean have taken place. So, here you have 9 possible Divisions which the Japanese could have used to invade India that was very lightly defended in both men, equipment and morale.
After being kicked out of Burma, the defence of India was pretty pitiful. Ceylon was defended by the 34th Indian Division that was forming up, the Burma-India border was defended primarily by the 23rd Infantry Division, with the 17th Division, 1st Burma Division and 7th Armoured Brigade short on men, equipment and morale. The 14th, 25th and 26th Divisions were in the Process of forming, and the 70th British Division, fresh from its stay at Tobruk and Operation Crusader, was being sent. Any ground that the British lost in 1942 could not have been won back for at least 2 years. It was feared that Ceylon would be invaded, and would only have taken one Japanese Division to do so. The entire country was garrisoned by batallions whose duty was primarily to keep the population in order, much like the KNIL.
It would not have taken the entire IJN to defend the Bay of Bengal as well. The Royal Navy was streched thin all over the world. The Germans still had 3 Battleship/Battlecruisers ready to break out which still required the use of modern British Battleships and Battle Cruisers to escort Convoys. There really would not have been much of a threat to Japanese shipping as you propose, as the British could not afford to lose valuable military shipping on commerce raiding.
So, the Japanese had a force that would not only outnumber their opponents, but also had better quality and quantity of equipment (most Indian Armoured formations would not have their tanks for another 6 months). The Indian formations also had a very low morale, after being critically defeated in Burma, with heavy losses, and also not particularly liking the defending power. The Royal Navy was kicked out of the region and did not have sufficient forces and logistic support in which to maintain a strong presence in the area (it was withdrawn to East Africa in May 1942, as this was seen as to be the only safe port for the Eastern Fleet).
Jeremy, I think you and I covered most of this in the production thread. IMO a summary:
1. The first military problem is the provision of adequate air cover. To suppress the UK air bases in India requires all of the available fleet carriers, and probably all lighter carriers in the effort to keep teh fleet boys supplied. Even then, it's very dicey. [Also, you'd have to talk the navy into this plan. By April 1942 they'd lost 315 naval a/c, including land based air flotilla stuff, in combat, and about another 500 operationally. This campaign would probably completely eliminate the IJN CVs as an effective fighting force for at least two years, owing to want of pilots an airplanes.]
2. The second military problem is waging mobile war on the Indian littoral. Even a weak UK armored battalian of Infantry and Cruiser tanks would have been a huge threat to Japanese ops in India.
3. Removing the 4 divisions in Burma (canceling the Burma campaign: let's say for the sake of argument the Japanese keep Rangoon and a division there, because you don't want to leave an open flank in Rangoon) means that the UK is able to deploy in India all of the armor that they abandoned in Burma, plus a couple of fresh divisions not used in Burma.
4. By March 1942 the US had 16 divisions mobilized and ready to go if desperately needed. Three of these could have taken the Japanese CenPac holdings in March-June 1942, because the Japanese just did not have the defenses in place. The US had the shipping avilable, but in 1942 it was primarily tied up in moving aforementioned divisions to the UK, and later in op Torch. I submit that if India were seriously threatened, the US would have sent troops to India, invaded the CenPac, or both.
5. The threat to the Japanese logistical line is submarines. Even with crummy torpedoes, USN submarines achieved some success in 1942. Since an India operation requires all of Japan's sealift capacity to support, even modest damage to the Japanese line of supply would have serious consequences to troops in the field in India. I do not think as the US/UK that surface raiders would be the best way to attack this supply chain.
6. IN sum: India is a big tar baby. Probably not conquerable even allowing for great initial luck and pervasive savoir faire. Once the attack gets bogged down, as it will, there's no way to retreat. Along the way, the IJN ability to project naval air gets decimated, leaving no effective force to implement the planned campaign of attrition against a resurgent USN in the Pacific.
1. The first military problem is the provision of adequate air cover. To suppress the UK air bases in India requires all of the available fleet carriers, and probably all lighter carriers in the effort to keep teh fleet boys supplied. Even then, it's very dicey. [Also, you'd have to talk the navy into this plan. By April 1942 they'd lost 315 naval a/c, including land based air flotilla stuff, in combat, and about another 500 operationally. This campaign would probably completely eliminate the IJN CVs as an effective fighting force for at least two years, owing to want of pilots an airplanes.]
2. The second military problem is waging mobile war on the Indian littoral. Even a weak UK armored battalian of Infantry and Cruiser tanks would have been a huge threat to Japanese ops in India.
3. Removing the 4 divisions in Burma (canceling the Burma campaign: let's say for the sake of argument the Japanese keep Rangoon and a division there, because you don't want to leave an open flank in Rangoon) means that the UK is able to deploy in India all of the armor that they abandoned in Burma, plus a couple of fresh divisions not used in Burma.
4. By March 1942 the US had 16 divisions mobilized and ready to go if desperately needed. Three of these could have taken the Japanese CenPac holdings in March-June 1942, because the Japanese just did not have the defenses in place. The US had the shipping avilable, but in 1942 it was primarily tied up in moving aforementioned divisions to the UK, and later in op Torch. I submit that if India were seriously threatened, the US would have sent troops to India, invaded the CenPac, or both.
5. The threat to the Japanese logistical line is submarines. Even with crummy torpedoes, USN submarines achieved some success in 1942. Since an India operation requires all of Japan's sealift capacity to support, even modest damage to the Japanese line of supply would have serious consequences to troops in the field in India. I do not think as the US/UK that surface raiders would be the best way to attack this supply chain.
6. IN sum: India is a big tar baby. Probably not conquerable even allowing for great initial luck and pervasive savoir faire. Once the attack gets bogged down, as it will, there's no way to retreat. Along the way, the IJN ability to project naval air gets decimated, leaving no effective force to implement the planned campaign of attrition against a resurgent USN in the Pacific.
Show me a fellow who rejects statistical analysis a priori and I'll show you a fellow who has no knowledge of statistics.
Didn't we have this conversation already?
Didn't we have this conversation already?
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Adnan Meshuggi
- Posts: 532
- Joined: Thu Aug 02, 2001 8:00 am
Well well, the indian problem...
my 2 cent (euros)
1.) India disliked to be a colony of uk (really strongly)
2.) the indian troops, after loosing many men in burma, had no interest to doe for british "scum", well the brits, like all the time before, saved their own people if possible... and that is allways bad, if you loose.
3.) An japanese attack dosen´t need a full "liberation" from british influence, it is enough if the british bases are elliminated, india is in a civil war (or a liberation war, killing as much brits as possible) and no support station for china anymore. Also, if the brits want india back, they need a lot of troops (like the japanese, if they want to conquer, err, liberate, err conquer it....)
For the japanese, only some more luck in april and the british fleet is gone (like the hermes), so the support of the IJN is quite small, mostly convois with supplies for a "short" period. Sure, they will suffer, but at last less as if they try midway.... so in 20/20 it had been the best thing that japan could have done
If they are succsessfull, they elliminate their china-"problem", at last they minimize it, they kill the danger for their oil for a lot time... the support for allied attacks in indonesia is nil, so the allieds need a lot more manpower to do something here,
the germans have lesser problems in africa (because the brits need at last ONE open supply channel for stalin, and if the timing is bad, the pq17-desaster close exactly in time the northern route so the brits must hold open the persian way to russia)
The operation torch could be cancelled, because the low trained (at last with no battle knowledge) us troops will be thrown to ... india, to stabilize this revolution, because the brits couldn´t hold it and this means that the allieds have a lot lesser ships, troops, ammunition and weapons to attack in the solomons...
Sure, if it fail, war is over one year earlier, but, it had been an interesting variation, and for the game, for the japanese gamers, it would be a very interesting opportunity.... so bring it in, but make it difficulty, if the japanese player want to try it, he should risk a lot....
my 2 cent (euros)
1.) India disliked to be a colony of uk (really strongly)
2.) the indian troops, after loosing many men in burma, had no interest to doe for british "scum", well the brits, like all the time before, saved their own people if possible... and that is allways bad, if you loose.
3.) An japanese attack dosen´t need a full "liberation" from british influence, it is enough if the british bases are elliminated, india is in a civil war (or a liberation war, killing as much brits as possible) and no support station for china anymore. Also, if the brits want india back, they need a lot of troops (like the japanese, if they want to conquer, err, liberate, err conquer it....)
For the japanese, only some more luck in april and the british fleet is gone (like the hermes), so the support of the IJN is quite small, mostly convois with supplies for a "short" period. Sure, they will suffer, but at last less as if they try midway.... so in 20/20 it had been the best thing that japan could have done
If they are succsessfull, they elliminate their china-"problem", at last they minimize it, they kill the danger for their oil for a lot time... the support for allied attacks in indonesia is nil, so the allieds need a lot more manpower to do something here,
the germans have lesser problems in africa (because the brits need at last ONE open supply channel for stalin, and if the timing is bad, the pq17-desaster close exactly in time the northern route so the brits must hold open the persian way to russia)
The operation torch could be cancelled, because the low trained (at last with no battle knowledge) us troops will be thrown to ... india, to stabilize this revolution, because the brits couldn´t hold it and this means that the allieds have a lot lesser ships, troops, ammunition and weapons to attack in the solomons...
Sure, if it fail, war is over one year earlier, but, it had been an interesting variation, and for the game, for the japanese gamers, it would be a very interesting opportunity.... so bring it in, but make it difficulty, if the japanese player want to try it, he should risk a lot....
Don't tickle yourself with some moralist crap thinking we have some sort of obligation to help these people. We're there for our self-interest, and anything we do to be 'nice' should be considered a courtesy dweebespit
"1.) India disliked to be a colony of uk (really strongly)
2.) the indian troops, after loosing many men in burma, had no interest to doe for british "scum", well the brits, like all the time before, saved their own people if possible... and that is allways bad, if you loose.
3.) An japanese attack dosen´t need a full "liberation" from british influence, it is enough if the british bases are elliminated, india is in a civil war (or a liberation war, killing as much brits as possible) and no support station for china anymore. Also, if the brits want india back, they need a lot of troops (like the japanese, if they want to conquer, err, liberate, err conquer it....)"
In order:
1) Claim number (1) above is flawed by the premise that "India," as such, had any feelings on the matter at all. The castes had different perspectives, in general, and the ones who were most influential in the matter were either divided (the Brahmins) or pro-British (the military castes).
2) Claim number two is absurd. If you're talking about raiding the Indian Ocean to run down the remnants of Eastern Fleet you have a doable objective that will further deplete (but not to such a degree) Kido Butai. If you're talking about an Invasion of India, you need air cover. That means Japaense carriers, because the parts of India you want to conquer are far outside of effectiveescort range of Japanese fighters, and well within the easy interception range of RIAF and RAF land-based air. Then there's the problems of logistics and supply that you wish would not exist. In this regard, you seem very suited to be a Japanese operational planner.
3) Is a rant. Something about a huge inept American garrison in India. Neither required nor needed. The divisions committed to Torch were inexperienced. Amazing how quickly the US went from a decisive defeat (at Kasserine) to handing the Afrika Korps its head on a platter. IIRC Rommel made the same observation. The divisions (a marine division, and elements of a division formed by some top notch US National Guard regiments) committed to the G'canal campaign were better trained and better equipped than their IJA counterparts, and it showed.
"If it fail, war is over one year earlier..."
If it fail, Japan bombed out by end of 1943. Japanese navy hiding in Sea of Japan. Japanese Army and Navy in state of open civil war to deflect blame for India Disaster on the other service.
2.) the indian troops, after loosing many men in burma, had no interest to doe for british "scum", well the brits, like all the time before, saved their own people if possible... and that is allways bad, if you loose.
3.) An japanese attack dosen´t need a full "liberation" from british influence, it is enough if the british bases are elliminated, india is in a civil war (or a liberation war, killing as much brits as possible) and no support station for china anymore. Also, if the brits want india back, they need a lot of troops (like the japanese, if they want to conquer, err, liberate, err conquer it....)"
In order:
1) Claim number (1) above is flawed by the premise that "India," as such, had any feelings on the matter at all. The castes had different perspectives, in general, and the ones who were most influential in the matter were either divided (the Brahmins) or pro-British (the military castes).
2) Claim number two is absurd. If you're talking about raiding the Indian Ocean to run down the remnants of Eastern Fleet you have a doable objective that will further deplete (but not to such a degree) Kido Butai. If you're talking about an Invasion of India, you need air cover. That means Japaense carriers, because the parts of India you want to conquer are far outside of effectiveescort range of Japanese fighters, and well within the easy interception range of RIAF and RAF land-based air. Then there's the problems of logistics and supply that you wish would not exist. In this regard, you seem very suited to be a Japanese operational planner.
3) Is a rant. Something about a huge inept American garrison in India. Neither required nor needed. The divisions committed to Torch were inexperienced. Amazing how quickly the US went from a decisive defeat (at Kasserine) to handing the Afrika Korps its head on a platter. IIRC Rommel made the same observation. The divisions (a marine division, and elements of a division formed by some top notch US National Guard regiments) committed to the G'canal campaign were better trained and better equipped than their IJA counterparts, and it showed.
"If it fail, war is over one year earlier..."
If it fail, Japan bombed out by end of 1943. Japanese navy hiding in Sea of Japan. Japanese Army and Navy in state of open civil war to deflect blame for India Disaster on the other service.
Show me a fellow who rejects statistical analysis a priori and I'll show you a fellow who has no knowledge of statistics.
Didn't we have this conversation already?
Didn't we have this conversation already?
This has been a very interesting discussion. It has certainly convinced me that the strategic importance of India should be emphasized in the game. The arguments against concentrating on India revolve around whether the strategy could have worked - rather than on the benefits of the strategy if successful. I'm hoping that WITP will give us a simulation to put some of these theories to the test.
Looks like Mr Pritchard and Mr. Mdiehl are just going to have to settle this one mano a mano once the game is ready.
I'm looking forward the after action reports
Looks like Mr Pritchard and Mr. Mdiehl are just going to have to settle this one mano a mano once the game is ready.
I'm looking forward the after action reports
Iain Christie
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"If patience is a virtue then persistence is it's part.
It's better to light a candle than stand and curse the dark"
- James Keelaghan
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"If patience is a virtue then persistence is it's part.
It's better to light a candle than stand and curse the dark"
- James Keelaghan
Pritchard and I aren't disagreeing about the results of a Japanese victory in India. If India goes, that's Really Bad News. Pritchard and I are disagreeing (slightly) about the effort that would have been required, historically, had the Japanese tried. (We weren't debating its "doability" in the game). I think Jeremy has agreed that you need much of Combined fleet and all of Kido Butai to do the job. Adnan Whoever seems to think you need a Japanese CV, a few Kampetai, and an infantry brigade.
The problem with settling it mano a mano is that it requires that Matrix make an accurate assessment of the resources available to both sides, and the effort required to do the job. In GGPW it was routinely possible to take all of India. I advocated the same to a friend of mine, and accomplished it several times. It also rarely had an adverse effect on Combined Fleet's combat strength (although, hehe, against a human opponent I did once hand Kondo his head on a Royal Navy 15" pike when a fellow attempted to invade the Andaman Islands). And there was almost no Japanese pilot combat attrition, and no operational attrition, and the effort did not much tax my effort to supply the operation, when I played it as the Japanese. Because of these considerations, I concluded that GGPW was critically flawed and I stopped playing it against human opponents.
So, unless WitP gets the model right from the get go, nothing about our points of disagreement will be solved. And I will not purchase a game unless its playable against people. I've yet to see a satisfying AI, and won't play a game where the Ai corrects for a blunder by arbitarily deciding that all 40 of my SBDs diving on Shokaku missed.
The problem with settling it mano a mano is that it requires that Matrix make an accurate assessment of the resources available to both sides, and the effort required to do the job. In GGPW it was routinely possible to take all of India. I advocated the same to a friend of mine, and accomplished it several times. It also rarely had an adverse effect on Combined Fleet's combat strength (although, hehe, against a human opponent I did once hand Kondo his head on a Royal Navy 15" pike when a fellow attempted to invade the Andaman Islands). And there was almost no Japanese pilot combat attrition, and no operational attrition, and the effort did not much tax my effort to supply the operation, when I played it as the Japanese. Because of these considerations, I concluded that GGPW was critically flawed and I stopped playing it against human opponents.
So, unless WitP gets the model right from the get go, nothing about our points of disagreement will be solved. And I will not purchase a game unless its playable against people. I've yet to see a satisfying AI, and won't play a game where the Ai corrects for a blunder by arbitarily deciding that all 40 of my SBDs diving on Shokaku missed.
Show me a fellow who rejects statistical analysis a priori and I'll show you a fellow who has no knowledge of statistics.
Didn't we have this conversation already?
Didn't we have this conversation already?
Well, part of my motivation for starting this thread was to get exactly these kinds of informed opinions to ensure that they are accounted for as the game develops.
You can rest assured that I, for one, will be looking at the India strategy as the game proceeds through testing. I had a feeling that it might have been a neglected part of the game until now and I wanted to see if that can be corrected.
You can rest assured that I, for one, will be looking at the India strategy as the game proceeds through testing. I had a feeling that it might have been a neglected part of the game until now and I wanted to see if that can be corrected.
Iain Christie
-----------------
"If patience is a virtue then persistence is it's part.
It's better to light a candle than stand and curse the dark"
- James Keelaghan
-----------------
"If patience is a virtue then persistence is it's part.
It's better to light a candle than stand and curse the dark"
- James Keelaghan
Re: 3 gambles
1. The Indian Army was very loyal and was not part oh the British concern regarding any revolt or unrest. Remember the "INA" was formed from captured prisoners and most "joined" it only to escape the cruel treatment that they received as Jaspanese prisoners.Originally posted by brisd
Other considerations:
1. A national liberation (Pro-Axis) India Army that might have rose up given the chance?
2. Axis concentration in Mediterranean, possible conquest of Med/Eqypt/Arabian oil fields would have made a strategic difference in Allies defense options in Indian/Pacific oceans.
3. Possible Auto-victory conditions reflecting India or Commonwealth suing for peace, to include Australia/New Zealand?
There are many strategic possibilities if the designer give us the maps and OOB we will make the scenarios.
2. Hitler, who you might recall as being in charge in Europe, did not understand the sea, and refused to commit anything to Africa that would weaken his to the death struggle with the Soviets. Even sane minds were against additional forces being sent across the Med, Kesselring himself told Rommell that the existng units couldn't be adequately supplied. Lastly there was no global axis "cooperation" not even much German-Italian cooperation. Britain's supply line was extremely secure by comparison, even if meant going the long way around Africa and up through the Gulf of Suez.
3. Are you for real? The British weren't giving up even as London was being bombed daily. What makes you think they get all soft if India was threatened. They had a large RAF force in India along with large (and slowly improving) Indian Army. Units in England could Canada would have been sent if needed as well as US units. Australia and New Zealand were concerned, but they would not have sought any separate peace with the Japanese, especially since any move on India would have meant abandoning any drive on Aus/NZ. The Japanese Army refused to support any attempt at capturing Australia because it would have required more forces than they had.
Also note: the first larege air to air losses that the Japanese navy sufferred was at the hands of the RAF in Ceylon when Nagumo tried to repeat the Pearl Harbour raid against Columbo. No more chinese pilots in old russian fighters here. Tough Hurricanes with experience RAF pilots.
The Japanese only tried 2 opposed landings in the entire war. Their first attempt was thrown back into the sea by US Marines at Wake Is. The second was also at Wake, with a much larger Japanese element still being roughly handled.
Supply by ground was VERY difficult. Burma is not like anything you or I have ever seen. there were NO paved roads, the few dirt roads turned to mush in the rain. There was only one major rail line. and there was a strong lack of motor transport in the Jspanese Army. I don't need toremind everyone (but I will since I'm leaving for 3 weeks) of the fact that there were only 2 armies that were fully motorized for WWII the US and British armies. Japan built some 40,000 trucks in 1940, that would have equipped about 3 US or British divisions. Only 2 divisions in the Japanese army were motorized, 1 in Malaysia and 1 in China. (Later they raised 2 armoured divisions for homeland defence in 1945). The US built what some 4,000,000 in the same year.
The main allied problem was not in getting forces into India for its defence, but rather getting them moved about and positioned to effect events outside of India, like re-capturing Burma, and re-opening the land route to China. The Indian railway system was a mess until the US esentially took it over. That was where they failed for many and varied reasons for 2 years, until the Japanese obliged and attacked thereby self destructing their army in Burma.
Still playing PacWar (but no so much anymore)...
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John Carney
- Posts: 65
- Joined: Mon Jul 01, 2002 5:16 am
- Location: Tampa FL
The rapid conquest of Allied British forces in Hong Kong (25 December 1941), Siam, Malaya (15 February 1942), and Dutch East Indies (9 March 1942) by IJA forces encouraged the IJN to commit to offensive action in the Bay of Bengal. The IJN with Admiral Ozawa’s Malayan Fleet (2CVL’s, and 5CA’s) and Admiral Nagumo’s First Air Fleet (5CV’s, 4BB’s, and 2CA’s) commenced offensive operations April 1942 to coincide with IJA attack from Ragoon under General Ioda’s 15th Army (18th Div, 56th Div, 33rd Div, and 55th Div) to occupy Burma. The raid was not the success the IJN hoped for, Somerville had warning and withdrew his inferior force of 2 CV’s, 1 CVL (Hermes Sunk), 5 BB’s, and 9 Cruisers (two Sunk). Without surprise the British fleet survived, and the IJA made no further commitment to the Burma Campaign in as far as only to assist in the conquest of China.
The question of Australian invasion was not a serious one since offensive operations in China continued and British units were available in India.
Had the raid on Admiral Somerville been a success, with the possible losses of the CV Formidable CV Indomitable CVL Hermes BB Resolution BB Warspite BB Ramilles BB Royal Sovereign BB Revenge CA Cornwall CA Dorsetshire CL Durban CL Dauntless CL Emerald CL Colombo CL Ceres CL Enterprise CL Mauritius, due to the British Admiralty not releasing the intercept of Nagumo’s First Air Fleet movement to the Bay of Bengal. This was a distinct possibility, since Japan might determine that the codes had been compromised from an intercepted transmission to the fleet to retire. The IJN also found the operation unsuccessful due to the high pilot loss from planes not returning because of getting lost in the open ocean searching for the British Fleet. If the raid on Tricomalee would have found the British Eastern Fleet at home, the attack could be a great success and First Fleet would return to the Pacific to deal with the US. While Ozawa’s Malayan Fleet ruled the Bay of Bengal.
Then the IJA would have had a real choice to suspend the Offensive in China and mount a serious invasion of India. In April India had seven under strength Indian Divisions (7, 14, 19, 20, 23, 25, & 26) and two combat ready Divisions (9 & 17) with the British 18 Infantry Division and 7th Armor Brigade.
This choice of operations is a must for the diversity of the game. If your are locked into the historical choices then a grand game is nothing more than a string of smaller games together.
I agree that the IJA must be limited and forced to garrison conquests to move supplies to the forward area. But clearly early in 1942 it might have been possible for the IJA to attack and conquer India, for if not why did Britain wait until late 44 to commence offensive operations. I also agree that other than the 8th Army Area the rest of the Pacific (not China) would be unaffected by this strategy. Also if Coral Sea opportunity is missed and the IJN succeeds in invasion of Port Moresby. 8th Army Area is Secure and the battle is for the New Hibrides.
If Britain Capitulates in India, China withers on the vine and an Invasion or Isolation of Australia becomes a real concern for the Allies. Depending on losses and supplies a possible blockade of Australia and total commitment of forces against US. Remember that it is very unlikely that your Midway will occur until late 1943, if at all.
I also would like to see the ability to invade Hawaii and raid West Coast of US.
The question of Australian invasion was not a serious one since offensive operations in China continued and British units were available in India.
Had the raid on Admiral Somerville been a success, with the possible losses of the CV Formidable CV Indomitable CVL Hermes BB Resolution BB Warspite BB Ramilles BB Royal Sovereign BB Revenge CA Cornwall CA Dorsetshire CL Durban CL Dauntless CL Emerald CL Colombo CL Ceres CL Enterprise CL Mauritius, due to the British Admiralty not releasing the intercept of Nagumo’s First Air Fleet movement to the Bay of Bengal. This was a distinct possibility, since Japan might determine that the codes had been compromised from an intercepted transmission to the fleet to retire. The IJN also found the operation unsuccessful due to the high pilot loss from planes not returning because of getting lost in the open ocean searching for the British Fleet. If the raid on Tricomalee would have found the British Eastern Fleet at home, the attack could be a great success and First Fleet would return to the Pacific to deal with the US. While Ozawa’s Malayan Fleet ruled the Bay of Bengal.
Then the IJA would have had a real choice to suspend the Offensive in China and mount a serious invasion of India. In April India had seven under strength Indian Divisions (7, 14, 19, 20, 23, 25, & 26) and two combat ready Divisions (9 & 17) with the British 18 Infantry Division and 7th Armor Brigade.
This choice of operations is a must for the diversity of the game. If your are locked into the historical choices then a grand game is nothing more than a string of smaller games together.
I agree that the IJA must be limited and forced to garrison conquests to move supplies to the forward area. But clearly early in 1942 it might have been possible for the IJA to attack and conquer India, for if not why did Britain wait until late 44 to commence offensive operations. I also agree that other than the 8th Army Area the rest of the Pacific (not China) would be unaffected by this strategy. Also if Coral Sea opportunity is missed and the IJN succeeds in invasion of Port Moresby. 8th Army Area is Secure and the battle is for the New Hibrides.
If Britain Capitulates in India, China withers on the vine and an Invasion or Isolation of Australia becomes a real concern for the Allies. Depending on losses and supplies a possible blockade of Australia and total commitment of forces against US. Remember that it is very unlikely that your Midway will occur until late 1943, if at all.
I also would like to see the ability to invade Hawaii and raid West Coast of US.
Apart from Eastern Fleet (with or without a Japanese victory and substantial losses to eastern fleet), the problem with invading India is that it is (a) The World's Most Populated Unsinkable CV, (b) Rife with suiatble terrain for Allied airstrips of all kinds, and (c) primarily beyond the range of Japanese LBA except, perhaps, northeast India from Rangoon. So you need to keep the IJN CVs there, or, alternatively, you risk having your entire invasion TF involuntarily scuttled by Havocs, Bostons, Hurricrates, Vildebeests, Buffaloes, SBDs, Swordfishes, Martlets, cider, gravy, fruit bats, orangoutans, spam, and very small rocks.
Sure, you can try unescorted raids by Betties and Nells to suppress allied airfields. Imagine *every* Japanese raid turning out for the Japanese like 2nd Schweinfurt turned out for 8th AF.
Then there's the problem of (a) finding the troops to invade India (the IJA was hard pressed to scrape up the divisions for Burma), and (b) supplying same (the IJA was unable to maintain adequate supply for the divisions sent to Burma).
Sure, you can try unescorted raids by Betties and Nells to suppress allied airfields. Imagine *every* Japanese raid turning out for the Japanese like 2nd Schweinfurt turned out for 8th AF.
Then there's the problem of (a) finding the troops to invade India (the IJA was hard pressed to scrape up the divisions for Burma), and (b) supplying same (the IJA was unable to maintain adequate supply for the divisions sent to Burma).
Show me a fellow who rejects statistical analysis a priori and I'll show you a fellow who has no knowledge of statistics.
Didn't we have this conversation already?
Didn't we have this conversation already?
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John Carney
- Posts: 65
- Joined: Mon Jul 01, 2002 5:16 am
- Location: Tampa FL
Yes,
Those statements are true, but it was not a lack of manpower that limited the Burma offense. It was the political decision to hold Burma as the flank and commence operations in China. The Army felt the China question needed to be resolved to end the war. They thought that if China surrendered peace could be won.
We know this to be a false ideal. So if Britain can be illuminated can you fight the US to a draw?
That is the possible scenario. Since we know the answers to the political questions, they could only guess at. What if the IJN formed policy vice IJA, since the China incident percipitated the war.
Unfortunately I do not know how to factor this in to the UV, without altering historical deployments. Unlike A3R, there is not a way to effect political restrictions except by mutual house rules. I am eager to see how they deal with these side theaters.
Those statements are true, but it was not a lack of manpower that limited the Burma offense. It was the political decision to hold Burma as the flank and commence operations in China. The Army felt the China question needed to be resolved to end the war. They thought that if China surrendered peace could be won.
We know this to be a false ideal. So if Britain can be illuminated can you fight the US to a draw?
That is the possible scenario. Since we know the answers to the political questions, they could only guess at. What if the IJN formed policy vice IJA, since the China incident percipitated the war.
Unfortunately I do not know how to factor this in to the UV, without altering historical deployments. Unlike A3R, there is not a way to effect political restrictions except by mutual house rules. I am eager to see how they deal with these side theaters.
Interesting about the Burma divisions. I'll have to go back and take a closer look at Burma:The Longest War by Allen. Matrix must by now have an OOB about which divisions were available and when. I guess the India Invasion question comes down to:
(1) How much the Japanese can send, and whether it has any effective armor.
(2) Whether the Japanese can suppress the RAF/RAAF/RIAF/USAF airfields in India.
(3) Whether the supply train to support a sustained operation in India could be made available and properly protected.
(1) How much the Japanese can send, and whether it has any effective armor.
(2) Whether the Japanese can suppress the RAF/RAAF/RIAF/USAF airfields in India.
(3) Whether the supply train to support a sustained operation in India could be made available and properly protected.
Show me a fellow who rejects statistical analysis a priori and I'll show you a fellow who has no knowledge of statistics.
Didn't we have this conversation already?
Didn't we have this conversation already?
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John Carney
- Posts: 65
- Joined: Mon Jul 01, 2002 5:16 am
- Location: Tampa FL
For OOB matters.
1) 18 Infantry Division (British) had been destroyed at Singapore, I expect mention of the British division before was meant to be 70 (formed from RA forces in Egypt and Palestine, all those components fought in Egypt and were veteran even if formed from former 2nd line units).
2) 5 Infantry Division (British) also was in the India area in 1942 iirc (can look it up). This is also a RA unit with combat experience (France and iirc Norway).
3) In addition to units listed in most wargames, a number of Indian Army units of varying quality existed in India itself and would have been mobilised uppon invasion. Those units would have been weaker then their older cousins.
4) Some 5 Indian divisions were garrisoning Iraq at the time and would I am certain have been returned to India. Several of those units were veteran.
5) Several Indian and African (South, West and East, also North Rhodesian iirc) divisions were in East Africa and could have been used to relieve other units in the Mid East.
6) 56 Infantry Division (British) was also in the general area before it was shifted to Egypt (iirc). That unit was an unexperienced but well trained 1st Line territorial force.
7) Australian units returning ffrom Egypt might have been shifted to India instead if Australia itself was not threatened. Those units were among the best the Allies ever fielded.
8) In addition to regular Indian Army forces, uncountable State forces existed. Those seem to have varried from abominable to good in quality. They would have been of little use as front line troops, but garrison duty might have been an option (to free additional units from the IA).
I can look up exact formations of the British army (British and Colonial mostly drawn from Joslen's) in the general area. Unfortunatelly I have no good material on the Indian Army (maybe someone has a copy of the British official history for that war effort, if it's anything like Victory in the West for Europe its info would be very useful).
The Commonwealth had quite a few reserves left which would have been adequate for combat duty in India (vs. North Africa or Europe). In my list above I forgot to mention British forces used in Madagaskar (though I think they might have been drawn from other units I counted). I also did not list Indian units in Egypt (3+ divisions of highest quality). If the JA could shift forces to India, the Commonwealth could as well.
Marc aka Caran... really more of an ETO and MTO person
P.S.: Reducing US buildup in Europe on the other hand would have pissed Stalin of. I don't think it was ever an option, Torch at least had to happen to keep Stalin happy.
1) 18 Infantry Division (British) had been destroyed at Singapore, I expect mention of the British division before was meant to be 70 (formed from RA forces in Egypt and Palestine, all those components fought in Egypt and were veteran even if formed from former 2nd line units).
2) 5 Infantry Division (British) also was in the India area in 1942 iirc (can look it up). This is also a RA unit with combat experience (France and iirc Norway).
3) In addition to units listed in most wargames, a number of Indian Army units of varying quality existed in India itself and would have been mobilised uppon invasion. Those units would have been weaker then their older cousins.
4) Some 5 Indian divisions were garrisoning Iraq at the time and would I am certain have been returned to India. Several of those units were veteran.
5) Several Indian and African (South, West and East, also North Rhodesian iirc) divisions were in East Africa and could have been used to relieve other units in the Mid East.
6) 56 Infantry Division (British) was also in the general area before it was shifted to Egypt (iirc). That unit was an unexperienced but well trained 1st Line territorial force.
7) Australian units returning ffrom Egypt might have been shifted to India instead if Australia itself was not threatened. Those units were among the best the Allies ever fielded.
8) In addition to regular Indian Army forces, uncountable State forces existed. Those seem to have varried from abominable to good in quality. They would have been of little use as front line troops, but garrison duty might have been an option (to free additional units from the IA).
I can look up exact formations of the British army (British and Colonial mostly drawn from Joslen's) in the general area. Unfortunatelly I have no good material on the Indian Army (maybe someone has a copy of the British official history for that war effort, if it's anything like Victory in the West for Europe its info would be very useful).
The Commonwealth had quite a few reserves left which would have been adequate for combat duty in India (vs. North Africa or Europe). In my list above I forgot to mention British forces used in Madagaskar (though I think they might have been drawn from other units I counted). I also did not list Indian units in Egypt (3+ divisions of highest quality). If the JA could shift forces to India, the Commonwealth could as well.
Marc aka Caran... really more of an ETO and MTO person
P.S.: Reducing US buildup in Europe on the other hand would have pissed Stalin of. I don't think it was ever an option, Torch at least had to happen to keep Stalin happy.
Marc aka Caran... ministerialis
Posted by Caranorn
If Singapore was threatened as part of a Japanese sweep through Asia, the Australian government of the time would have demanded (as they did) that all Australian troops be released for the direct defence of Australia. Singapore was considered the British bastion that would defend against any Japanese drive south towards Australia (WRONG!!!). Thats why an Australian Division was part of its defence.
Its hard to see any Japanese move on India that would not at least indirectly threaten Singapore (unless they took China first and then somehow moved into India from there). The reality of the game though, if its anything like UV, would mean allied units can be freely deployed anywhere (unless they can't leave their own country - ie Northern Command).
7) Australian units returning ffrom Egypt might have been shifted to India instead if Australia itself was not threatened. Those units were among the best the Allies ever fielded.
If Singapore was threatened as part of a Japanese sweep through Asia, the Australian government of the time would have demanded (as they did) that all Australian troops be released for the direct defence of Australia. Singapore was considered the British bastion that would defend against any Japanese drive south towards Australia (WRONG!!!). Thats why an Australian Division was part of its defence.
Its hard to see any Japanese move on India that would not at least indirectly threaten Singapore (unless they took China first and then somehow moved into India from there). The reality of the game though, if its anything like UV, would mean allied units can be freely deployed anywhere (unless they can't leave their own country - ie Northern Command).
Have no fear,
drink more beer.
drink more beer.