The Role of India?

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IChristie
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The Role of India?

Post by IChristie »

I'm just reading the book "Turn of the Tide" which is kind of biograpy of Lord Alanbrooke (British Chief of the Imperial General Staff during most of WWII). I had not realized until now that the British were petrified in 1942 that the Japanese were going to seize India or at least control of the Indian ocean thereby putting their supply line to the Mid East in jeopardy. Or, worse yet, striking north and linking up with German drive south from Russia.

This appears, at the time, to have been a much greater concern than the invasion of Australia. I also wasn't aware that Colombo was attacked by Nagumo's carriers (in April '42) and may even have been targeted for invasion if resistance had been light (which it wasn't - thank you Admiral Layton "saviour of Ceylon").

So my question is: should this strategic importance of India be modelled in the game somehow. I think the British fear is quite credible. If Japan had concentrated on acting in concert with Germany - there is a very real chance that the Allied position could have been seriously compromised - Mid East and Africa fall, Russia defense compromised - etc.

My sense is (not substantiated by any experience with PacWar) that the China-Burma-India theatre is usually a bit of side show in most Pacific war games. Should there be some strategic benefit to the Japanese player for concentrating on it?

What do you guys think?
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Fred98
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Post by Fred98 »

After the initial wave of victories from December 1941 till early 1942 the Japanese were in 2 minds as to what to do next.

This was partly because their army and nave were in disagreement on most subjects.

When the Japanese task force (I think there was a carrier involved because the Japanese had aircraft available) attacked and defeated a British task force near Ceylon (now Sri Lanka) this happened because the Japans Navy was on a roll and didn’t want to stop. But they did stop otherwise they would have been over extended.

Should they attack south and stop the US fleets refuelling in Australia, or should they instead concentrate on India/Burma, thereby finishing the British influence in the region. And then using India/Burma as a jumping off point to finish the war in China?

If a player is forced to choose between these 2 it makes the game more interesting.
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Jeremy Pritchard
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Post by Jeremy Pritchard »

The Japanese were actually very disappointed in the actions in the Indian Ocean, which resulted in the loss of 1 Light Carrier, 2 Heavy Cruisers, 2 Destroyers, some Corvettes, Armed Merchant Cruisers, and many cargo vessels. The damage inflicted on British bases was generally minimal, with aircraft losses being about equal. However, the Japanese lost many aircraft not due to air-air combat, but due to missing their rondevu with IJN carriers. Many of the good pilots, and their bombadiers (in the case of torpedo and dive bombers) were lost in this indesisive incident, and the paranoia of 'where are the carriers' felt during this operation (they didn't know where the main British Fleet was during the entire engagement) remained during Midway. Actions in the Indian Ocean greatly effected those in the rest of the Pacific.

I would like to see the theatre spread even further then India, possibly reaching bases as far as Madagascar (which was invaded by the British because of fears of Japanese doing to it what they did to French Indo-China). With weather limitations, the creation of an accurate and important South East Asia is critical to the Pacific War. It should be a tempting decoy, much like China is, to draw attention from the Japanese away from their main enemy in the United States.

For years the Japanese had a policy of containment against the British, which worked very well (they had about 4 Divisions hold up the entire Indian Army). They attacked in 1944 because they needed a decisive victory, and thought that the Indians would, much like Russia, crumble once the door was kicked in.

Also, another thing I would like to see is the implementation of the Indian National Army. I created this force in Pacific War, but they just act like regular Japanese units. For this to really work effectively, there would be some sort of calculation to determine how to create INA formations and reserve troop pools. Most of the INA troops came from formations captured in Malaya, where the bulk of the POW's decided to join up instead of languish in prison camps, plus many agreed with the politics. It might be interesting that for every unit of Indian troops captured, a certain percentage will join the INA pool, eventually allowing the player to create formations of INA troops. This pool could only grow if Indian troops are captured, which could be an incentive to march further into India (as not only would your enemy lose men, you would gain men). The 1st INA Division had a very good reputation, but was destroyed in the offensive in 1944. The 2nd INA Division was deployed in Siam when the war ended, but were of poorer quality.

India should be very important for both the Allies and the Japanese. In reality, the Japanese had little chance in occupying India, but could have sparked revolution that would have taken England out of the war in the Pacific.
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Post by HMSWarspite »

Originally posted by Jeremy Pritchard
The Japanese were actually very disappointed in the actions in the Indian Ocean, which resulted in the loss of 1 Light Carrier, 2 Heavy Cruisers, 2 Destroyers, some Corvettes, Armed Merchant Cruisers, and many cargo vessels. The damage inflicted on British bases was generally minimal, with aircraft losses being about equal. However, the Japanese lost many aircraft not due to air-air combat, but due to missing their rondevu with IJN carriers. Many of the good pilots, and their bombadiers (in the case of torpedo and dive bombers) were lost in this indesisive incident, and the paranoia of 'where are the carriers' felt during this operation (they didn't know where the main British Fleet was during the entire engagement) remained during Midway. Actions in the Indian Ocean greatly effected those in the rest of the Pacific.

One of the main reasons why the raid was a failure was that the British picked up advanced warning via a cracked JN25 (IJN code) message of an attack on 'D', with an air raid on 'DG' planned for 2nd April 1942. The Japanese operators were having trouble with some of the codes, and one obligingly spelt out the target in phonetic Japanese characters - 'KO-RO-N-BO'. Somerville questioned the code breakers to check they were sure, then legged it to the Maldives. The raid didn't turn up, and the code breakers thought they might have blown their credibility, but a RAF Catalina spotted Nagumo's force on 4th April. It was shot down, but got off a message. Nagumo had delayed his attack til Easter Sunday in the hope of the target being off guard. Unfortunately, Somerville had already decided the code breakers were wrong, and Cornwall, Dorsetshire (CAs), Hermes (CVL) and Vampire (DD) were heading back to Ceylon to resume routine tasks. These ships, plus Tenedos (DD), Hector (AMC), and the odds and ends in port suffered. Nearly one of the first successful code breaks in the Indian Ocean. Saved the bulk of the Eastern Fleet though.

Details from 'The Emperor's Codes, by Michael Smith'.
IIRC Nagumo then raided the coast of India before returning to Singapore. Don't know why it wasn't tried again.
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CynicAl
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Post by CynicAl »

Originally posted by HMSWarspite

... Nagumo then raided the coast of India before returning to Singapore. Don't know why it wasn't tried again.
Immediately after Kido Butai returned from the IO, CarDiv5 split off to cover Operation MO, while CarDivs 1 and 2 began working up for Operation MI. CarDiv5 returned from the Coral Sea in bad shape, and of course CarDivs 1 and 2 were wiped out at Midway. By the time CarDiv5 got back to operational status, attention was focused on the new Allied offensive in the Solomons.
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Q-Ball
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Post by Q-Ball »

So my question is: should this strategic importance of India be modelled in the game somehow


Good question. To answer this, I wonder a) could the Japanese have logistically sustained the number of troops necessary to invade India? Invading India would have required a very large ground force, and as it was they were having difficulty keeping their 4 divisions in Burma supplied (hence the Burma Railway). They could have supplied a larger effort only by diverting large amounts of shipping from other theatres. In game terms, I would think India would be worth alot of VP's, but would not contribute alot of material to the Japanese war effort, at least not much fuel, which is what they needed most. b) I may be biased, but as a UV player I like planes and ships, and am not as interested in large land forces grinding it out. I guess we have to have that in Malaya and the Phillipines, but I hope to be too busy finding CV's to have to deal with 12 IJA divisions attacking India.

So, I would probably be against some extra changes to make India more strategically important. Yes, it probably was to the Brits, but I can't see how the IJA would really interdict Mideast supply routes. Also, if the Japanese did invade India, you can bet the British would have sent alot more ships, planes, and troops than they did historically, so how do you account for that?
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Post by mdiehl »

Changes vis a vis what? GG Pacific War?

I do not think there need to be any more strategic incentives than there were in Pacific War. Namely: (1) Conquest VP (2) Kill VP, (3) It basically eliminates all combat on one flank of the Empire, (4) The UK no longer contributes units to the battle (although I think it should be be permissible for UK units to stage to the Pacific via the US or Australia), and (5) if you control India you've completely out-flanked China, so they're gonna go too.
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IChristie
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Post by IChristie »

I guess my original question stemmed from the fact that I have always sort of regarded the pacific and Atlantic as separate theatres which were pretty much unrelated to one another except at a very high level in terms of logistics.

In reading Alan Brooke's memoirs I realized that for the British they were not as unrelated (at least early on). The British had a very deep seated fear that the Germans and Japanese would try to link up by Japan invading India and Germany pushing south through Southern Russia and Iran. I they had done so, the British defense of Egypt might well have collapsed and the Axis would have secured Caucasian and Middle East Oil fields.

Also, the Japanese and Germans would have been able to supply and reinforce each other.

Obviously, this kind of concerted behaviour was not the priority for either Japan or Germany. But it does make me wonder whether such a strategy might actually have held out more hope for the Japanese than the "expand and wait for the US tidal wave" approach.

I was just musing out loud about whether players should be given a large enough incentive to think about pursuing and alternative to the standard Japanese strategy of concentrating on the US in the Pacific
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Post by mdiehl »

I think I undertsood yoru question. My answer is that IMO no more incentives are necessary. If the UK is cut out of the equation and China falls, you free up a whole bunch more divisions, land based air, supplies, fuel etc. Basically it lets the Japanese focus all of the resources and economy on defending the Pacific edge against the US. More than enough time to run out the clock and do so in a swimmingly victorious fashion.

Personally, I don't think the Japanese could have invaded India successfully. They could not even supply their troops in Burma. There were no suitable logistical facilities for them until in India or Columbo, and then the local populace would mostly have been intolerant of the Japanese way of occupying nations. India would have been like China, only the resistance forces would have been better armed and better organized.
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John Carney
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Post by John Carney »

I am an avid player of VG Pacific War. Looking forward to a great computer game. I have delayed my attack on China in two Campaign games, in order to mount a large offensive on India, after the fall of Singapore. In the game that India fell I was able to quickly isolate and cause China's capitulation. Allowing the divertion of troops to further garrison the Pacific Islands, thus preventing the Bombing of Japan mainland by B-29's in 1945. This enabled me to meet Japan's Victory Conditions in the game.
The fall of India would have precipitated the inability of British units to operate in the Pacific, due to their need to protect the southern entrance to the Suez and supply routes to Egypt. Simulated in VG Pacific War by the removal of all British Air, Sea, and Land replacments for the remainder of the game. Units already in the theater of operation my supply from US and Austrialian bases and continue to fight.
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Post by mdiehl »

One of the reasons why VG Pacific War is a flawed system. There actually aren't any good ones. But WW2:PTO has the best *logistical* model available, and in that game invading India is nigh impossible. Had Japan landed a substantial army in India *historically* it would have been a great Tar Baby. Worse than the USSR was for Germany. With the added burden of Japan's logistical train stretched out from Japan to India, and no shipping to support operations *anywhere* else in the Pacific/Indonesia theater. So IMO if you actually did invade India you'd not be able to invade any of Indonesia, Burma, the PI, or other defensive perimiter holdings. And you'd still have a tiger by the tail.
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Jeremy Pritchard
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Post by Jeremy Pritchard »

One thing that everyone is forgetting is the comparatively small, but still not insignificant Indian National Army.

Although I am not sure of the actual dates of activiation, I do know that the 1st Indian National Army Division joined the IJA operation at Imphal and made a fairly good showing of itself. The 2nd Indian National Army Division was in the process of being formed at the end of the war. A very high proportion of Indian POW's joined the INA, possibly either due to the fact that they would get out of the POW camps, and due to the fact that they would be 'liberating' their nation.

Had the Japanese entered India, say in late 1942, they might have sped up the process of developing the INA. With the added Indian POW's that were bound to be captured in an invasion of India, plus gaining untapped civilian population, maybe the requirement for IJA Divisions would be much less if they left much of the operation to INA Divisions? This would really lesson the need for IJA garrison forces, as INA formations could take over. There indeed was a lot of support for the Japanese, or anyone who would get rid of the British, in India (Indian formations even served in the German army).

The INA is one of the little oddities in WWII. Although it was late in getting going, it did solve some of the manpower problems in Burma in 1944-45 (there were significant forces still in the field in 1945 preparing to devend Malaya and Siam). It was one of the only effective military organizations made from captured POW's (there were some good French formations in the German army in Russia, but these never reached the numbers in the INA).

So, using the INA, at least a partial invasion of India is possible, as the British were strapped for fighting formations in the region about as much as the Japanese. If the Japanese would have found it tough to secure their lines of communication in India, so too would the British (especially if they knew that an army of liberation was invading the country).
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Post by John Carney »

The way to break India with out delay in Malaya Operations, is to Bypass Ragoon initially. Secure Imphal with 55th and 33rd Div of 15th Army. Divert Southern China Divisions of the 22nd & 23rd Army to Attack weak and under trained Indian divisions in North India. This requires suspending South China Operations From 1941 to 1943. Delay attack on Ragoon until after May 1942, after Carrier and Bombbardment raides by Ozawa Malayan Fleet (2 CVL's and five old BB), utilizing Guard Div from Sigapore. Utilize the Invasion Fleet of the 56th & 18th Div of 15th Army, which landed at Rangoon in March, and land at Ducca India. Sieze the Port and Railroad head at Calcutta and complete the line from Mandalay to Chittagong. In 1941 India posses Five under strength Div and two British second line Div. With suspended South China Operations it is Possible to Succed with capture of northeast India. This will isolate supplies to China and allow the withering of any air cover over China and reduce military supplies to Chiang Kai-Shek. The rail and land routes to Burma could be opened. Ozawa raided and sunk 23 Merchants mid 42 at Vizagapatam, Cocanada, and Masulipatam India, while Nagumo's in effective raid only sunk 2 Cruisers 4 DE/SC and 5 merchants. Japan also operated two Div of fleet submarines in the Bay of Bengal to the Arabian sea during 42 and 43.
This is no garuntee of victory as I said of two attempts only once was it successful. VG Pacific War is not perfect as no game can be.
However Somerville almost lost the eastern fleet to Nagumo at Ceylon. Wavell constantly pleaded for troops from Australia ( flying to meet Churchill twice early in 42. And General Stillwill writes of the pure luck that Burma was the Dam that held Japan back in the west. You would think operation Shoestring had a glutten of supplies.
This is what makes the "what if" of India very Important to the game.
Do not forget the glutten of oil in Palembang Sumatra that Somerville was not willing to commit his Fleet too. As it would have been cut to ribbons by Ozawa and the IJN air squadrons based in Malaya. The South HQ at Saigon was strong enough to hold back the tide till 45. The interdication of merchants by US submarines in the South China Sea was the down fall of South HQ.
If Japan institutes Convoys and diverts DD's to Convoy duty can the South be held back through 1943. This is another important aspect of the war that I hope will be a factor in WITP. You seem to be able to effect the supply of Uncommon Valor. Only wish I had more time.
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Post by showboat1 »

I think John and Jeremy both make great points on the possibilities of an alternate strategy take out India, BUT wouldn't that divert form the true nature of the game, WAR IN THE PACIFIC. It's not War In The Indian Ocean (though that would be a cool add on game). Maybe its time to refocus for now and then develop the what-ifs after the initial game comes out as add-ons.
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Post by John Carney »

India, Burma, and Malaya are very Important in that they are the reason Britian drains Army supplies and troops from the Pacific. If the 17th Army is commited in Burma it will not be present in the Solomons.
It would be like ignoring China, which was a major drain on Army ground & air units, and a great training ground for IJN air wings early in the war (39-42).
The presence of Australia and New Zeland in whole also opens up the possible shifting of strategy to take those countries. How about raids on the West Coast. This game needs to include all possible Theaters for Japan to operate in.
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Post by mdiehl »

I did not see any significant INA contribution to the Japanese effort in the Burma campaign. I'll have to double check. I'm pretty sure that the most that Japan could ever have hoped for from the INA was small acts of sabotage. If they'd ever fielded a division *in India* the RIA would have eaten them (and any accompanying Japanese division) *entire.* You'd have Britain with superior armor and numerical and qualitative a/c superiority fighting on a short logistical line with interior lines and good terrain. In contrast to a badly supplied Japanese army, largely on foot, trying to take the offensive and fight a battle in terrain that favors mechanized/mobile units. Japan wasting divisions in India proper is the best thing that could happen to the Allies. And there remains the problem that supplying troops in India means that you have no sealift capacity to support ops in New Guinea, Phillippines, Indonesia, Borneo etc. (or you can have some sealift capacity for these areas and have no industrial production at home).
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Post by Sabre21 »

The Japanese never really seriously considered a full scale invasion of India, they knew they were at the end of their logistical capability in Burma. But the British paranoia about a possible Axis link up was real....it was mentioned earlier how the Brits occupied Madagascar to prevent the Japs from doing so to at least protect the supply lines going to Egypt. For the British, the CBI theater (primarily the Indian ocean part) was crucial in their overall war effort. The US on the other hand was more interested in keeping China in the war so as to tie up as many Jap army units as possible. So yes...the CBI had a tremendous impact on the overall Pacific War.

Lets look at a pretty valid "what if". The independence movement in India led by Ghandi was gaining momentum...what if the Japanese took the attitude that they were liberators rather than conquerors (many an asian country had that attitude early in the war) and used that to neutralize the Brits. India could have had a revolution and tied up badly needed British assets..I think if this had occured that the Brits what have been forced out of India, in which case India could very well have become a Japanese ally. This in turn would have cut off all lend lease to China and very probably forced Chiang Kai-shek to capitulate or at least seek an armistice. Ol' Chiang was using a lot of the American lend lease to bribe the various warlords to keep the focus against his buddy Mao and the Japanese. If these bribes dried up...so would most of Chiangs support. Then the Japanese could have moved many of their experienced divisions out to reinforce the pacific rim which in turn would have made the US effort much more difficult than it was. Not to mention the fact that if the Brits got pushed out of the Indian ocean area, a greater amount of US supplies and reinforcements would have been necessary to keep the European theatre from getting worse...draining resources that would have been available in the Pacific. So yes..India had a very important role to play..or at least could have.

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Post by Ranger-75 »

Originally posted by mdiehl
I did not see any significant INA contribution to the Japanese effort in the Burma campaign. I'll have to double check. I'm pretty sure that the most that Japan could ever have hoped for from the INA was small acts of sabotage. If they'd ever fielded a division *in India* the RIA would have eaten them (and any accompanying Japanese division) *entire.* You'd have Britain with superior armor and numerical and qualitative a/c superiority fighting on a short logistical line with interior lines and good terrain. In contrast to a badly supplied Japanese army, largely on foot, trying to take the offensive and fight a battle in terrain that favors mechanized/mobile units. Japan wasting divisions in India proper is the best thing that could happen to the Allies. And there remains the problem that supplying troops in India means that you have no sealift capacity to support ops in New Guinea, Phillippines, Indonesia, Borneo etc. (or you can have some sealift capacity for these areas and have no industrial production at home).
The Japanese actually tried this in 1944. They were getting tired of the air raids and wanted to close the link to China (still thinking that "solving" the China "incident" would resolve all their problems). The resulting Japanese offensive broke the back of the Japanese army in Burma and made it easier for the Britsh / Indian army to completely kick the Japanese out of Burma over the next six months.
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Post by mdiehl »

MMmmm. I'm gonna do something rarely seen on a listserv discussion board. I'm gonna retract a deterministically held belief, that Japan did not consider an amphibious assault in India, in the face of better information. I've been reading Barrier and the Javelin by Wilmott. It seems that invading India may have been one of the *better* options for Japan in the immediate post-Singapore, post-Indonesia campaigns, *in lieu* of the New Guinea, Solomons, and Midway campaigns.

I'm not saying it would work. I still think the Indian littoral is a lousy place for Japanese troops and a great place for British armor, and I still think Japan's logistical train would have been overtaxed, but it seems that the Japanese considered it prior to dismissing the idea (maybe for the reasons I mentioned).
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IChristie
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A Scenario Possibility

Post by IChristie »

Sounds like it might make an interesting scenario at least. See if the Japanese could capture India. Or at least make significant enough gains to dramatically threaten British interests and thus divert even more US resources to Europe.
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