The key to carrier combat???

[dpstafford]

Originally posted by Toro
Good thing you corrected him, DSandberg, otherwise I was going to have to... lol.

Does your location, "16 miles SE of Hell", signal a damnation of Canada or Michigan. As an Ohio State grad, I can see that going either way.......

[pasternakski]

Originally posted by DSandberg


Bzzt! Okay, hold it right there ... sorry, but I'm going to have to take back your Trekkie merit badges.

1) The Romulan commander in TOS "Balance of Terror" said this, not Khan. (different character, different actor)

2) The actual quote is "We have him. Move toward him."

Live long and prosper.

- David

P.S.: as much as I enjoy Trek, I do much prefer an earlier version of the same story, as told in the WWII sub movie "The Enemy Below" (also more on topic!)

Now, wait a minute. Yeah, I think yer right about the "toward" thing, but I distinctly recall Ricardo Montalban (nice titties, rich Corinthian leather, and all) in Star Trek II saying this. Remember? They were playing cat and mouse and Spock was under the console fiddling around with something (and it wasn't Uhura, of course). He reached to pull himself up and hit one of those "goofy bridge" buttons and an alarm went off. Everybody looked at everybody else, then ...

Heh? Or is it that middle age short term memory loss again? Durn it if it is, durn it.

Oh, and you can keep the merit badges. I never really merited 'em in the first place.

--------------------------------

I will now proceed to entangle the entire area

[XPav]

Originally posted by pasternakski


Now, wait a minute. Yeah, I think yer right about the "toward" thing, but I distinctly recall Ricardo Montalban (nice titties, rich Corinthian leather, and all) in Star Trek II saying this. Remember? They were playing cat and mouse and Spock was under the console fiddling around with something (and it wasn't Uhura, of course). He reached to pull himself up and hit one of those "goofy bridge" buttons and an alarm went off. Everybody looked at everybody else, then ...

Errrrrrrrr.

Don't remember that part.

[mdiehl]

"I need some advice. My carriers in #17 are getting obliterated and I can't even seem to launch acounter strike. Are the japanese carriers that much more efficient? Is this reaslistic? Are the aircraft ranges of the Japanese planes longer that the US dive bombers and torpedo planes?"

The routine outperformance of IJN over USN in your campaign (and in the old GGPW) is completely unrealistic. Not only did the USN F4F+pilot outfly the A6M+pilot combination (VF - F4Fs shooting down more Zekes, at both Coral Sea and Midway) but US aerial recon was consistently superior, and USN dive bombing was consistently more accurate. Moreover, despite the longer range of IJN a/c, the three major carrier battles of 1942 occurred (1) well within the operational range of US a/c at Coral Sea, and (2) at the limit of US operational range at Midway, (3) within the operational limit of US a/c at Eastern Solomons.

USN deck handling of a/c was at least as good as Japanese deck handling, and you don't see dumb executive decisions that result in lots of improperly stowed ordnance lying around in vulnerable places, as in Kido Butai. US CAP coordination was consistently superior although neither can be said to have been very good prior to October 1942.

W/ respect to launch coordination, both sides launched very coordinated strikes at Coral Sea. At Midway, the US had trouble forming air groups: the Japanese weren't tested at Midway in this regard because their only launch that entailed much coordination was against Midway Island, and set-piece attacks were much easier to coordinate (since the target did not move, and the attacks would occur when and where you wanted them to). At Eastern Solomons, the Japanese coordinated two strikes, one of which wasted so much time grouping and chasing down phantom TFs that it never found a target.

With respect to carrier losses, you can "read the tale" just by looking at what was sunk. Coral Sea: 1 fleet carrier for the US, vs. 1 CVL for the Japanese. Note, though, that it could as easily have been 0 US (Lex[?] was sunk by a vapor explosion, long after the attack, so she was a damage control casualty), and 1 CVL + 1 CV for Japan (Shokaku was nearly done in at Coral Sea). At Midway the results are known and famous. At Eastern Solomons it was 1 US CV for no Japanese. Based on these instances one would expect the USN to consistently achiev a draw or do somewhat better than Kido Butai.

Bottom line: the USN 1st Team was at least as good as the IJN 1st Team, and in some respects considerably better. Any game that fails to reflect that historic reality has a built in degree of "handicap" favoring the Japanese player.

[thantis]

Training is one thing, actual combat experience is something else. Japanese naval aviators gained valuable experience in China, and the carrier commanders were also more experienced in the use of strike aircraft in both naval & land combat.

The US went in without a very good idea on the best utilization of carriers - whether or not they would be decisive on their own. Of course, Japanese naval doctrine had its own problems, but in the matters of operational & tactical carrier warfare, they were ahead of the US Navy.

[CynicAl]

Originally posted by thantis
Training is one thing, actual combat experience is something else. Japanese naval aviators gained valuable experience in China, and the carrier commanders were also more experienced in the use of strike aircraft in both naval & land combat.

Japanese experience over China was mostly irrelevant, and most of what wasn't irrelevant was actually detrimental to the Japanese. On the plus side, they managed to "blood" a good number of crews, and they figured out that bombers should always be escorted. Nearly everything else the Japanese aviators learned in China was inapplicable or just plain wrong. Keep in mind that IJN pilots over Pearl Harbor, even in the first wave, characterized the flak there as by far the heaviest they'd ever seen... from an enemy fleet that was caught by surprise, at anchor, in peacetime readiness condition. This alone is hardly conclusive, but it is at the least highly suggestive of the differences between the wars over China and the Pacific.

The US went in without a very good idea on the best utilization of carriers - whether or not they would be decisive on their own. Of course, Japanese naval doctrine had its own problems, but in the matters of operational & tactical carrier warfare, they were ahead of the US Navy.

IJN carrier doctrine got exactly two things right: massing CVs, and relatively large fighter complements. USN doctrine managed to miss the first (though some of the prewar exercises were leading that direction), was roughly equal on the second, and got several other things right, like the importance of scouting.

[ADavidB]

Originally posted by mdiehl

Bottom line: the USN 1st Team was at least as good as the IJN 1st Team, and in some respects considerably better. Any game that fails to reflect that historic reality has a built in degree of "handicap" favoring the Japanese player. [/B]

And that, my observant friend, is the fundamental issue with AI's in all GG games. Those of us who would like to have "historical" situations have to accept the "unhistorical" compromises that are put in to allow the AI to have a chance at winning. What this means in the end is that one must develop equally "unhistoric" strategies to compensate for the AI's advantages.

Yeah, and I know what all you pbem folks are about to say, but there are those of us out here who just find it most convenient to play aainst an AI.

Dave Baranyi

[denisonh]

Since my first experience with "react to enemy", I have found a few things that have made my PBEM SC #17 experiences positive (1-0-1 so far)

1. Do not seek a carrier battle early outside of friendly LBA range (that means the IJN has to b within LBA range). He has to worry about two threats, not just one, and any attack the LBA makes on his cariers rack up fatigue for his pilots, in addition to possibly damaging ships (although not likely).

2. Of course, no "react to Enemy" for your carriers and stay out of LBA range from Rabaul.

3. Always put a quality, aggressive commader such as Spruance or Sherman in charge of the US Carier TF (I think Sherman is the default).

4. Put the initial surface TF following the carrier group, as it gives the IJN pilots more targets that happen to not be carriers.

5. Avoid a "carrier duel" if you fighters are excessively fatigued (40+), as it lessens the effectiveness of your CAP. (like right after provided LRCAP for a number of turns).

No guarentees, but it has worked reasonably well.

[Drongo]

Posted by mdhiel

With respect to carrier losses, you can "read the tale" just by looking at what was sunk. Coral Sea: 1 fleet carrier for the US, vs. 1 CVL for the Japanese. Note, though, that it could as easily have been 0 US (Lex[?] was sunk by a vapor explosion, long after the attack, so she was a damage control casualty), and 1 CVL + 1 CV for Japan (Shokaku was nearly done in at Coral Sea). At Midway the results are known and famous. At Eastern Solomons it was 1 US CV for no Japanese. Based on these instances one would expect the USN to consistently achiev a draw or do somewhat better than Kido Butai.

Don't see how you can 'read the tale' and reach that conclusion.

The actual results for Coral Sea were
IJN : 1 CVL smashed and sunk ,1 CV (Shok) 3 bomb hits - hvy dam, couldn't operate aircraft but no danger of sinking.
USN : 1 CV (Lex) very heavy damage (2 Bomb, 2 Torp) but only sunk from internal explosions. Given US damage control at this time, the internal explosions shouldn't be considered an unusual result. I CV (Yor) Lt Damage (1 Bomb).

Based on actual head to head CV battle (8 May), I would have thought the best "average" result would be a draw for USN. (Lex Hvy internal structural damage and flooding - out 3 months? Shok Hvy sructural damage - out 3 months). The Shoho's destruction the previous day was relevant to the battle but not in measuring the comparative effectiveness the opposing forces in a head to head CV battle. The reality of the Coral Sea CV exchange on May 8 was that a smaller number of IJN a/c attacked a better defended and supported target and got same or better results than the slightly larger USN strike (which struck against 1 carrier (Shok) that was too far away from its mate (Zuik) to receive effective CAP support). The air losses were heavy on both sides overall (77 to 66 USN's favour?). Analysis I've read (web) rates the Japanese as having missed an excellent chance to do even better at Coral Sea due to poor command, co-ordination and planning. Regardless of poor job they did, I don't think there was anything wrong with their tools.

What I would read from Coral Sea is that if an equal head to head clash occured May 42 in UV and the game reflected the historical reality, I would conservatively expect the IJN to get a (best) minor victory, (worst) draw. This is regardless of whether the USN pilot capabilities were better than generally thought. The Japanese pilots weren't supermen and had many problems but in the South Pacific '42, they nearly always got results (despite the cost). I think there is a danger of incorrectly downplaying their achievements when attempting to show their USN counterparts in a proper light.

PS Midway and the Solomon Island CV battles are not being ignored deliberately (I have to get my PBEM turn going). I do feel however that an arguement along the lines of the Coral Sea results could also apply to the Eastern Solomons and Santa Cruz. Midway is a bit more complex to analyse due to the scope of circumstances involved and their impact on the battle.

[Drongo]

Originally posted by ADavidB

Yeah, and I know what all you pbem folks are about to say, but there are those of us out here who just find it most convenient to play aainst an AI.

Whether your playing PBEM or against the AI, if you think certain assumptions in UV are unhistorical, it will effect both. From reading the forums, I would think that the concept of what is historical/unhistorical is dependant on the individual.

Maybe we should be pushing harder for configurable play options like experience, tactics or even individual a/c charateristics to replace the difficulty settings (or get a better editor).

[mdiehl]

"Analysis I've read (web) rates the Japanese as having missed an excellent chance to do even better at Coral Sea due to poor command, co-ordination and planning. Regardless of poor job they did, I don't think there was anything wrong with their tools."

Mmm. Didna say there was anything wrong with their tools. But the missed opportunities not only included Coral Sea but also Santa Cruz (I know you did not address that one yet).

Also, when you see the consistently poor performance in recon, finding targets, bad command decisions, inadequate CAP etc. I do not see how one can rate the IJN as inherently better

My point was that Grigsby assumed in GGPW that the Japanese were inherently better at strike coordination and plane handling than the USN, and it's in the CV unwieldiness formula that he used there and in PW I guess. When in fact what you see from the IJN record is:

Coral Sea -- blown opportunity
Midway -- blundered plane handling
Santa Cruz -- blown opportunity

Coral Sea is one of those Great What If battles from the Allied POV not only because Lex might have been saved, but because Sho an Zui benefitted greatly from a front that developed over their position. Sans that front, I think they'd have lost both flattops and probably saved their CVL for another day. If the front had been over the US TF, and not ovr the IJN one, I think Lex and York would have escaped without damage, and the IJN would have lost Sho, Zui, the CVL, and several escorts.

[pasternakski]

Originally posted by Drongo
Posted by mdhiel


What I would read from Coral Sea is that if an equal head to head clash occured May 42 in UV and the game reflected the historical reality, I would conservatively expect the IJN to get a (best) minor victory, (worst) draw. This is regardless of whether the USN pilot capabilities were better than generally thought. The Japanese pilots weren't supermen and had many problems but in the South Pacific '42, they nearly always got results (despite the cost). I think there is a danger of incorrectly downplaying their achievements when attempting to show their USN counterparts in a proper light.

PS Midway and the Solomon Island CV battles are not being ignored deliberately (I have to get my PBEM turn going). I do feel however that an arguement along the lines of the Coral Sea results could also apply to the Eastern Solomons and Santa Cruz. Midway is a bit more complex to analyse due to the scope of circumstances involved and their impact on the battle.

A most intelligent, thoughtful, and useful analysis, I think. I note in addition that RL Japanese strategy at Coral Sea suffered from the hypercomplexity and lack of realistic assessment that often befouled their campaign planning. For example, splitting a weak unit like Shoho off for the purpose of "bait" or "diversion" when that carrier's fighter group was vital to effective air cover of the main CV force was questionable at best. You don't see the UV AI or PBEM players making this mistake.

I also think that MO was overly ambitious and possibly premature. Remember that the plan was to turn the Milne Bay corner and land at Port Moresby while dropping the initial contingent at Lunga hundreds of miles away. The total cover for this operation was two CVs, a CVL, and the four weakest CAs in IJN (six eight inchers per boat on vulnerable, obsolete platforms don't pack a lot of mail).

Altogether, I think that the historical result was better than the huge disaster that very well could have befallen the Japanese. The saner strategies followed by the AI and by the few PBEM players I have played against who were willing to take the IJN side tip the balance back in the Japanese direction some, but the early going is still a dicey time for both sides (I have had my big white butt kicked early on as the Americans despite my prudent, careful strategy of preserving strength and taking only those opportunities that present themselves without too much risk - okay, call me a "competent, cautious officer").

I try to remember, too, that Japanese carrier losses in the early going (especially Sho and Zui) hamstring later efforts substantially, even when IJN is receiving the Midway flattops. The bottom line for me when playing the Japanese in UV is that early aggression is necessary in order to establish the forward bases needed for the eventual defense that will have to be played and that the most has to be made of IJN assets in the early campaign, because later on, the Allies, human or AI, are really going to turn up the heat and you're going to be on the short end of the stick trying to hang onto what you need in order to eke out a victory on points (those blessed occurrences where the IJN is able to turn the tables and win a major carrier battle decisively after late 1942 just don't seem to come up very often for me).

All in all, it's a tough go for either side. The designers are to be congratulated for creating a product that presents such a dynamic, engrossing, balanced gaming situation.

One last thing - I think that the Coral Sea gaming situation tends to be analyzed vis-a-vis history more often than any other because it's the one that we are confronted with most often. If you play mostly campaigns like I do, by the time for historical Eastern Solomons or Santa Cruz comes along, the game situation has departed substantially from historical circumstances, so that there isn't a lot of crossover (and most times the Midway carriers are lurking about, which contributes to the fruitlessness of game-to-history comparison). I have tried to play the shorter scenarios that present these historical setups, but I just can't get into them (and my PBEM partners aren't interested, either) because the campaign is JUST SO MUCH MORE DOGGONE FUN!

So, game on, fellas. The balance is pretty good, I think.

-------------------------------

I will now proceed to entangle the entire area

[Drongo]

My point was that Grigsby assumed in GGPW that the Japanese were inherently better at strike coordination and plane handling than the USN, and it's in the CV unwieldiness formula that he used there and in PW I guess.

I agree with you on that one. Pilot experience, aircraft capabilities etc tend to take second place to strike coordination capability in terms of winning CV battles in UV. The sides should be a bit more even in terms of this. At the moment, it is too heavily weighted to the Japanese (even when their quality has dropped off over time).

Also, when you see the consistently poor performance in recon, finding targets, bad command decisions, inadequate CAP etc. I do not see how one can rate the IJN as inherently better

Not sure on recon. What I've read (not Lundstrom), would not have indicated a clear superiority of the USN in that area. I know both sides had different doctrines (CV scout squadrons vs cruiser launched sea planes). Is this what your referring to? I've read criticisms of both methods. CV scouts were a waste of good bombers and sometimes would prefer attacking over detailed reporting. The IJN cruiser scouts often mis-identified targets due to poor ship recognition ability and were sometimes difficult to get into the air when needed. Both sides used land based air recon (with the USN having an extra advantage in the Solomons with the ability of the catalina's to track and report at night - not always effectively though). As I understood it, in two (Coral Sea and Santa Cruz) of the South Pacific CV battles, both sides spotted and launched within an hour of each other. At Eastern Solomons, it was the catalina's reports that gave the USN the morning jump on the IJN. If it wasn't for a radar directed intercept of an approaching IJN seaplane, the IJN would probably have been launching stikes in the morning as well. The Allies certainly had the better theatre intel but I can't see any USN advantage on the day of battle from standard recon. What was your understanding of the USN advantage?

Poor command decisions occurred on both sides (ie Halsey at Santa Cruz). I would agree that the Japanese also made things harder for themselves by coming up with complicated and often inflexible operational plans.

In terms of CAP, the combination of Radar/air control teams should have been a huge advantage to the USN in 42. Apart from knowing an attack was imminent and being able to launching as many fighters as possible before hand, the fighter direction and control ability inherent in the combination was pretty much wasted by the USN in 42. All major IJN strikes got enough through to their targets to have an effect (although the survivors were normally decimated on the way out). Only the tardy (and less experienced) strikes really got hurt enough on the way in to compromise their strike. I agree that the IJN CAP was inadequate (it leaked like a sieve) but in the South Pacific '42, the USN couldn't stop a major strike getting through to its target either (but it could certainly make it pay).

For the sake of the arguement, I should clarify my position. Both sides had strengths and weaknesses in '42 (I'm using '42 as there were no CV vs CV in 43). You could fill a thread in trying to define them. You stated that the USN "First Team" was the equal OR considerably better than their IJN counterparts. Thats fine to argue that. In your post you stated that the carrier losses of the '42 battles bore that point out. Its this point that I'm arguing against. IMO, if you weigh up the results of the carrier exchanges (sunk/damaged) in the three South Pacific CV battles, the IJN would be seen as at least the equal if not the superior of the USN. Notice I'm still avoiding mention of Midway (oops). As I indicated before, the result was heavily influenced by factors outside the immeadiate battlefield (and it was not in the UV Theatre and I want to go to sleep).

Coral Sea is one of those Great What If battles from the Allied POV not only because Lex might have been saved, but because Sho an Zui benefitted greatly from a front that developed over their position. Sans that front, I think they'd have lost both flattops and probably saved their CVL for another day. If the front had been over the US TF, and not ovr the IJN one, I think Lex and York would have escaped without damage, and the IJN would have lost Sho, Zui, the CVL, and several escorts.

I agree. Almost any battle can have a different outcome. But it cuts both ways (rain clouds were pretty friendly to USN CV's as well in other battles). I assume one of the main reasons we play these stupid games for a ridiculous number of hours (that could be spent doing better things - like reading Lundstrom :p ) is to achieve those different results. But those results would only be a possibility, not fact.

This post has used up the most of my remaining braincells. I'm going to bed before I get caught by the rising sun ('scuse pun).
I'll check in tommorrow to see how humiliated I've been.
BTW mdhiel, I really am interested in your facts on USN recon.

[mdiehl]

Sounds like we're not too far apart. I'll stand by my point that the USN and IJN were equals at carrier combat and that Grigsby has bought into a kind of pervasive myth about IJN/Kido Butai superiority. There are *three,* count em, CV meeting engagements. Based on these you see models that routinely give the IJN "the edge" even though the USN actually sank more carriers, (I'm counting Midway), *hit* as many, and that the IJN got some damned lucky breaks at Coral Sea. That latter point is important. The lucky breaks had nothing to do with IJN training or ability. They were dumb luck, hence the IJN should not be given any particular "edge" in carrier combat.

Scouting:
1. Wake Island. The loss of one DD was to a bomb dropped by an F4F, and a DD was lost and substantial damage to a transport from heavy shore batteries. Japanese intel said there were no heavy shore batteries. No one scouted Wake prior to the 1st invasion, hence were completely surprised by the presence of aircraft there.

2. Midway, which was an abject failure. Was the IJN primary reliance on CA scout planes a systemic error, any more than their routinely abysmal radio maintenance? (Sakai had his thrown out because they were unreliable, although that has nothing to do with scouting it tells you alot about the effort invested in radio maintenance and its importance for command and control of a/c). Was the US SBD scouting doctrine superior? Hard to say. Seems to me like most of the US contacts happened as a result of land based recon.

3. 2nd Guadalacanal. Two USN BBs mistaken for CAs then revised to BBs. Kondo (IIRC) deemed Japanese LBA scouting to be so unreliable that he disregarded the sighting report (and a submarine report) as erroneous.

4. Santa Cruz, the aforementioned IJN Strike that Found Nothing.

5. Coral Sea. The USN found the Japanese first, IIRC. Aforementioned rain squalls averted an IJN disaster IMO.

Also, IIRC, the USN CVs prior to the war had hangar deck catapults from which they could launch amphibious scouts. USN naval exercises apparently proved that a small number of short range scouts were inadequate for the job, hence the removal of catapults and the designation of "scout" units among the CV based SBD squadrons. This (along with dive bombing, which was invented by the USN and in which USN bomber pilots were extensively trained) is an area in which the USN clearly invested more tactical training, and naval exercise type R & D.

Certainly carrier based scouting averted problems with submarines. True, Wasp was torpedoed. But several IJN subs were sunk by CV based scouts. In contrast teh IJN lost *how many* CVs to US subs? 4? And no US subs sunk by CV based a/c IIRC.

[Drongo]

Mdiehl,

Yup, we're not too far apart (just in opposite directions). Coming into UV, I always thought the big question was how quickly the Japanese lost their first team "quality" edge. Didn't expect that we'd be discussing whether it existed. You live 'n' learn.

Thanks for listing the recon instances. I agree that IJN scout planes did a poor job of ship recognition (but it still meant they did their job of getting there in the first place). The USN CV scouts could be just as bad. At Coral Sea, 7 May. IJN CV's strike the AO Neosho + DD because they were reported as CV + CA. At the same time, 2 USN CV scouts (one from each CV) searched the area containing the IJN Support Group (CL/AV/DD) and Covering Group (CVL). The Covering force was missed entirely while Support force was reported as 2 CV/4CA. This triggered Fletcher's launch of the full strike (part of which found the Shoho while enroute, the rest being redirected onto her). I will check accounts of other battles for my own interest to compare how many times the USN got it wrong (in case Coral Sea was just inexperience etc).

Re : your point 5 (IJN were saved from disaster at Coral Sea from rain squalls). On my understanding, the IJN CV's were in bad weather but the first USN strike found them where they were supposed to be without too much difficulty. The USN dive bombers circled around waiting for the TBD's to catch up so as to make the strike coordinated. This allowed Zuikaku to seek cover into a squall, leaving Shokaku to bear the brunt (which resulted in 2 damaging bomb hits and one ineffective). Vitually all of Yorktown's strike found its target and attacked. Lexington's strike, which arrived later, was heavily reduced in SBD no's (from 24 to 4) due to wasting fuel trying to find the targets. Was this directly attributable to the bad weather or was it the standard combination of inexperience, confusion, poor communication, etc. that often dogged both sides strikes? I'm not sure on that one (been a while since I read a detailed account). Given the way the day went, IMO, an extra 20 SBD's attacking a mutually supporting CV force (they wouldn't have seperated if the weather was clear and both CV's fighters could have fully taken part) wouldn't guarrantee a disaster for the IJN. Maybe a hit or two on Zuikaku? Unless one of them sank, the historical impact would have been only slightly worse than the reality (neither took part in Midway anyway). As a side point, it would have been interesting to see the effect of an obvious heavy defeat on the IJN. Maybe they would have been more cautious at Midway due to having more respect for USN CV's.

Re : your comment in point 2 on radio. Completely agree on fighter pilots throwing them out. The Zeros cockpit was too cramped (I can vouch for that personally) to fit in anything but the simplest model. Because of poor shielding, they were near useless due to static etc. Zeros operating from the carriers kept them for homing needs (also CV's had well trained tech's who did better with shielding). As you pointed out, cruiser scout seaplanes were a different matter. They had larger, more powerful sets and, due to cockpit layout, suffered only the standard atmospheric interference. Using morse key transmissions, they had a good range. Couldn't say how the USN compared but I'd assume out of ignorance that they may have had better, more reliable sets. How much of an advantage that would give, I wouldn't know.

Thanks again for the info.

P.S. Can anyone tell me what IIRC is short for? I've worked out what all the others are.

[denisonh]

If I Recall Correctly

[Drongo]

Thanks mate.

[wpurdom]

You can't judge the quality of the IJN "first team" from Coral Sea or the Guadalcanal battles. The first team was Akagi, Kaga, Hiryu and Soryu. The Japanese regarded Hara's division of the Shokaku and Zuikaku as not up to speed, distinctly inferior, and more of the quality of the balance of their carriers. The only anti-CV strike we ever saw by the first team were the two small strikes by Hiryu (conducted with whatever was on hand when the other CV's sunk) against Yorktown which had an impressive number of hits for the small number of planes who had the opportunity. You have to judge their quality from other operations they conducted.
There is no sign that in 1942 the US was capable of the sort of large coordinated multi-carrier attacks that the Japanese did at Pearl, Darwin, or even the attack on the Midway Island.
The Japanese admirals, with the exception of Yamaguchi and Tanaka (who wasn't a CV admiral, of course), were abysmal.

[mdiehl]

"There is no sign that in 1942 the US was capable of the sort of large coordinated multi-carrier attacks that the Japanese did at Pearl, Darwin, or even the attack on the Midway Island."

Well, of *course* there isn't. At that point in time there was no strategic target worthy of such an effort except, perhaps, Truk, which in 1942 was rightly assumed to be too well-defended to risk a CV attack. It was a far bigger and better-defended complex than Midway and Darwin combined and hundreds of miles within air-space that was easily covered by land based recon. And, of course, that leaves PH. Not hard to coordinate a carrier strike when you're not at war and, more importantly, not in imminent danger of attack (which also describes the situation at Darwin, and the situtation taht the Japanese *assumed* they were facing at Midway).

It's why I refer to PH, Darwin and the Midway Isl strike as "set-piece attacks." I think the USN and RN could have done the same had the shoe been on the other foot. I also think the Italians, the Soviets, and the Kriegsmarine could have done the same given the same ships and the same circumstances.

Drongo -- "As a side point, it would have been interesting to see the effect of an obvious heavy defeat on the IJN. Maybe they would have been more cautious at Midway due to having more respect for USN CV's."

Maybe, but there's no reason to believe that anyone in the chain of command of the army or navy recognized a tactical defeat for what it was. There's this consistent thread of "S**t we just lost a battle. Must have been a bad die roll. Given that we are superior just imagine the horrendous pounding our foes are taking. Sure they've siezed Tarawa, Guam, Saipan, Davao, Luzon, New Guinea and Okinawa, but they *must* be on the ropes and ready to throw in the towel. All we have to do is continue to do what we've been doing all along."

[wpurdom]

"It's why I refer to PH, Darwin and the Midway Isl strike as "set-piece attacks." I think the USN and RN could have done the same had the shoe been on the other foot. I also think the Italians, the Soviets, and the Kriegsmarine could have done the same given the same ships and the same circumstances."
At Midway, the US knew from code-breaking the forces they would face at Midway, the exact vector of the invasion fleet and the approximate vector and morning the Striking Force would approach Midway from the NW. The U.S. had two weeks to prepare for the early morning ambush theyy were preparing. As was pointed out they did a very good job laying out the abundant searching assets they had to catch the Japanese right where they expected them as well as taking precautions against inccorect information. But how did their attack go? Each element attacked separately and without coordination. First the Midway TBD's and B-26's made a torpedo attack without fighter cover. 5 of 6 TBD's and 2 of 4 B-26's were shot down and they didn't come close to endangering a Jap CV. Then 16 SBD's attacked, all missed, 8 were shot down and 6 of the surviving planes never flew again. Then 15 B-17's attacked from 20,000 feet, all missed. Then 11 Vindicators attacked, all missed but 9 returned safely.
Was the CV strike any better coordinated? No. The Hornet SBD's and fighters got lost and eventually most of them made it to Midway. The Hornet TBD's attacked by themselves and all 15 were shot down with no hits. Enterprise's fighters got separated from her planes and though they followed the Hornet TBD's for a while did not participate in the battle. the 14 TBD's from Enterprise attacked by themselves, scored no hits and 10 were shot down. Yorktown's fighters went in with the torpedo bombers, all but two were shot down, no hits. So of the 41 TBD, they all attacked at separate times, got no hits and all but 6 were shot down. These various attacks lasted from 710 to 1015.
Of course what happened then was that the Enterprise SBD's and the Yorktown SBD's (launched one hour and 40 minutes later)miraculously arrived at the same time and although they had no fighter cover got an unimpeded attack on the Jap force, "encountering no interference from fighter planes and very
little from anti-aircraft fire." Under these ideal conditions, the 37 planes from the Enterprise scored 7 hits. The 17 SBD's from Yorktown scored 3 hits. Due to the incredible fortune of timing, these hits were enough to make each carrier into a raging inferno.
In response, Yamaguchi, freed up to do want he wanted to do earlier, got off 18 Vals and 6 fighters in a first wave from the surviving carrier Hiryu. He also sent 2 recon planes in advance to lead the strike in. In a second wave, he scrounged up 10 Kates and 6 fighters. Of the first wave, 6 planes were able to penetrate into diving position and 3 got hits on the Yorktown. The 10 Kates in the second wave did a coordinated anvil attack, 4 were able to to get into launching position and 2 hit the Yorktown.