Where are the long lances?

[ReDDoN45]

every nation had quite similar doctrine for torpedo attacks - in this point there wasn´t much advantege/disavantege.

The Japs, just had the weapon best suited for this doctrine - and especially designed and build for it. That´s all about their "superior doctrine".

[mdiehl]

Agreed. In 1942 it gave them a tactical edge in the Solomons, where ranges were typically rather short and USN radar often hazed out by islands. When you look at 1942 you have one classic USN torp doctrine success (Balikpapan, in January), two classic IJn successes (Savo Isl and Tassafaronga), and a whole bunch of confused engagements in which (miraculously, I guess, to some souls) USN gunfire seemed to come out on par with IJN torps. 1st Gcanal saw the USN trading 4 DDs and 2 CLs for a BB and 2 DDs. In displacement, that's a USN victory. 2d Gcanal another USN win and a particularly rotten night for the IJN trying to hit USN BBs at point n' shoot range (0 for 48 IIRC). At Badung Strait the IJN did nail Perth and Houston (footnote: both previously damaged and low on ammo), but only while sinking more of their own ships (measured in displacement, long tons, and raw numbers) and drowning several thousand of their own soldiers. Cape Esperence was inconclusive with respect to torp doctrine except that the USN guns hit their targets and the Japanese torps did not.

1943 is much clearer with respect to doctrine and night fighting abaility. The USN wins most of the fights by gunfire despite superior IJN torpedoes. There are three clear cut instances of torp doctrine victories -- all USN victories -- at Cape St. George, Vella Gulf, and Blackett Strait.

Which is *not* to say the IJN did not hit anything in 1943. Only that the balance generally favored the USN and the only obvious torp doctrine victories in 1943 were USN victories. Kolombongara, Kula Gulf, and Empress Augusta Bay saw lots of torps fired but not many torpedo hits.

Interested parties should visit the Orde of Battle pages at Warships1.com.

[Nikademus]

Originally posted by mdiehl


This is just wrong history. The Japanese had no particular doctrinal advantage over USN torp-armed ships. What they had in a doctrinal sense was the addition of torps to their CAs. The result was that engagements between USN DD-CL commodores tended to work out favorably for the USN (*despite* the superiority of the Type 93 *because* of radar) in 1943. That USN DD and CL skippers were trained in this doctrine is apparent in any close inspection of any USN naval engagement at any time in 1942.

When USN CAs had the flag, however, there is one major engagement in which bad doctrine at the higher-up stopped the implementation of the right doctrine by his subordinates (who knew darned well what to do and how to do it). What the Japanese had at Tassafaronga is a USN CA admiral who obligingly dropped trou and said "bring it on" despite the rather pointed, leading suggestion from the DD commodore at the time that he ought to be allowed to shoot. Based on Tassafaronga, one *might* make a rule giving an IJN TF a slight doctrinal advantage over a USN combined CA-DD TF. I say *might* because there is no substantive evidence to suggest that another USN CA admiral would necessarily have made the same mistake.

What the Japanese have had since WW2, at least with respect to wargame design, is a bunch of folks who think Savo Island and Tassafaronga are the only battles that occurred in 1942 that mean anything for discussions of intrinsic capability.

I'm not interested in your disparagements of other people who have some knowledge of this area of the war. I'm well aware that Savo and Tassafaronga are only two of multiple battles conducted in the Solomons. I'm also aware that before improvements in overall US "doctorine", training, radar and the implementation of radar, coupled with a general degradation in IJN efficiency due to lack of rotational opportunities the Japanese won more night engagements then they lost. The fact that they lost a few only proves what most everybody knows....that the Japanese wern't invincible and that night battles throw in variables that can skew the "odds" and give victory to the other side. No-one ever said the USN couldn't fight at night, but the Japanese embraced night tactics more firmly then the US did initially for the simple reason that they knew they would need to better the odds between themselves and the numerically superior US battlefleet before the "Jutland-ish" engagement most felt would happen prewar (ala "Orange")

Hence the emphasis on developing better torpedoes and the tactics and *training* to utilize said tactics

When i refered to "Doctorine" i was not discussing what tactics USN destroyermen might have theorized or even practiced before the war.....but the actual battle plan and tactics that were implemented during the fighting, which is all that really matters. I agree once the errors were pinpointed and the destroyermen "unleashed", they did correspondingly better and actually started hitting things rather than presenting themselves as targets.

[Drongo]

Posted by mdiehl

What the Japanese have had since WW2, at least with respect to wargame design, is a bunch of folks who think Savo Island and Tassafaronga are the only battles that occurred in 1942 that mean anything for discussions of intrinsic capability.

Mate,

You have pointed out in several threads that you believe that games covering the WWII Pacific tend to incorrectly model the real US capabilities while overstating the Japanese. If that really was the case, I can't see how UV can be included in that group when discussing the capabilities of the 2 navies for night naval combat.

This thread centered around the question of why the IJN in UV seem incapable of repeating their outstanding night success at Savo and Tassafaronga. No one has suggested that the IJN should achieve this regularly, simply that they should have a chance of such a result early in the game (ie till late '42) when the night capabilities of the two sides were at their most diverse (experience, radar quality/use and command/control).

The discussion also centered on the use of multi ship torpedo salvos being launched by the IJN early (or initially) in a surface combat (if conditions were favourable) as being a way of giving the IJN the chance for a major victory. IMO, there is an entirely realistic possibility that this could happen. Early, multi ship launches did happen in 3 of the 5 naval actions in the '42 period covered by UV.

In case you're wondering, I'm including 2nd Guadalcanal in the 3 (you know the other 2) because the IJN light forces successfully coordinated the tracking and ambush of the USN force despite having 3 distinctly seperate groups. They delivered a combined gun/torp attack which put paid to the USN DD's for little loss and then were able to get a 38 strong torpedo slavo at the South Dakota (without her knowing it). The salvo missed (as it could in UV) but this first phase of the battle is indicative of the potential of the IJN to deliver multi ship torpedo salvos when the opportunity arose.

By introducing the chance of an initial or early multi ship torpedo launch, UV would better model the "doctrine" (intent) of the IJN as well as giving the IJN a chance of achieving a Savo or Tassafaronga. By tieing it to an experience check, you also give the USN the ability to have the same opportunity later as they gain experience.

I see no real reason to give it to them earlier as, except for pickets, the USN kept their destroyers close to the gunline during the combat in the first 4 battles (all different leaders). In the fifth and final Solomon's surface battle (Tassafaronga) for '42, the only attempt to learn from the hard lessons of the earlier battles was carried out half heartedly (some DD's were released to launch a torpedo attack but the USN CA/CL's gunnery began before the torpedoes were half way to their target).

By late '42, the importance of giving experienced, radar equiped USN destroyer squadrons free reign to attempt to close with an enemy at night and launch torpedoes prior to engaging the enemy with guns, had been accepted. It did, however, take the experience of 5 battles to drive that home to the USN.

[John Carney]

I agree with Drongo, the chance for IJN to have his torp attack prior to the gun battle would be historical. Not always. (The VG Pac War does this by surprise, which is effected by the initiative of the game and the USN radar. Early in the war 42, I have gotten 2-6 of these attacks in 1942, which have resulted in sinking many destroyers 2 CA and severely damaging a BB in an attack to only getting 17% damage (one critical hit) on a BB prior to getting hit by the USN guns.) The hit level should be 2-10 % for surprise using the Long Lance Torpedoes. Giving a chance to repeat one of those devastating night fights. But as the war went on and the USN improved radar and fire control, the intiative and surprise shifts to USN, so that late war the USN will often hold the intiative (getting their hits in first) while IJN almost never got the advantage in a late war battle. (0.5% after USN improved radar and US intiative + in VG Pac War). Sorry for the constant reference to VG Pac War, but it is the only grand strategy game I play that uses this detail.

[Ron Saueracker]

Good thread guys.

[Ron Saueracker]

Originally posted by mdiehl
So, you would not expect a CL-DD only USN TF to be hampered by the same kind of constraints as a DD commodore subordinate to a CA admiral. Thing is, I'm not certain to what exten one should generalize about USN CA admirals on the basis of two battles around the 'canal. (one Tassafaronga, a CO's personal Fubar, and the other, Savo Island, a general lack of readiness among the Allies).

US CLs were used like CAs, as part of the gunline. They were never used as leaders during the war as most were simply 6" gunned versions of CAs of the same relative displacement.

USN DDs were pretty much "tied" to a cruiser force, being split fore and aft of the "heavies". As such, their ability to perform torpedo attacks were hindered.

[Drongo]

Posted by Ronnie boy

US CLs were used like CAs, as part of the gunline. They were never used as leaders during the war as most were simply 6" gunned versions of CAs of the same relative displacement.

That was my understanding too. I don't think you'd want to risk 10,000 ton ships just to help your DD's defeat their DD's (certainly not at night). The Japanese CL's were far better suited for the role due to their speed, manueverability and size. I think the only USN ships designed to be destroyer leaders were the Porter/Somers class.

[mdiehl]

the Japanese won more night engagements then they lost

Nikademus: Prove it. Please specify standards by which one evaluates who "won." Typically I count tonnage in the quick and dirty, but a multiple-variable approach would also count total number of warships, damage (I think one could use casualties as a proxy for this, one could also use "days in the yard" or possibly even "reams of bureaucratic paperwork") and whether or not the deployed forces achieved their tactical objectives. (We can leave out the "strategic victory" conditions for puroposes of simplification).

You also overlooked or missed my point. The guys who knew torpedo doctrine tended to be the guys whose ships had torpedoes. One would expect a DD commodore operating alone to do better than a DD commodore subordinate to a CA Admiral in the USN in 1942. (This is basically the same point made by Sauercracker in his last post, and Drongo also, about what happened to USN DDs in 1942 when they're subordinate to some CA admirals).

Here's the Real Issue (IMO):

Since UV is a wargame with ahistorical flexibility (which is *fine*) one can easily imagine that the USN player might send a CL+DD TF for some of the various skirmishes in 1942 rather than a CA+CL+DD TF. (Just as the IJN player can choose which ships to send where and so forth). *In that event*, one would not as a feature of game design presume that the USN Desron or DD+CL TF would necessarily be any less likely to launch a torp doctrine attack than the IJN. That the DD desrons were trained in this is beyond dispute -- it was used in January 1942 at Balikpapan and USN DD skippers looked for oppotunities to fight in this manner from the start. The problem seems, to me anyhow, to have occurred when DD commodores were attached to CA admirals who would not let them do what they'd been trained to do.

So, if the Allied player decides, in his capacity as ubermind, to send a USN desron sans heavies up the slot, he risks running into much heavier opposition (IJN CAs) but he might accept that risk in return for a greater probability of launching a doctrinaire torpedo attack that *might* work out swimmingly for the USN. He'd ahve to do what real people do: evaluate the objective, commit forces accordingly.

Drongo:

If that really was the case, I can't see how UV can be included in that group when discussing the capabilities of the 2 navies for night naval combat.

I'm not wacking UV on that one. I'm wacking the proposed solution. A systemic advantage to the IJN seems to me to gloss over the real causes of the IJN victories and their defeats as well in 1942. It may be that UV needs a "Tassafaronga" engine. I'm not sure what the solution would be. In 1942 you could, with decent anecdotal supporting evidence, argue for a greater likelihood of surprise when the two navies clash in and around uplift island chains -- the early radar was certainly hinky enough in the slot. I think the long term solution for games like WitP (which will allegedly use major parts of the UV combat code) is to get really complicated with the "radar exp" "night exp" "asw exp" "smoke exp," "starshell exp," "rotary bugsmasher observation floatplane exp," etc, or else to assume that at the ship level it all "comes out in the wash," and instead model it at the admiral level.

John Carney. I agree that the VG product is a great game. IIRC the initiative DRM is an optional rule. I prefer not to use it in large part because I don't know what the game design means by "initiative," and because what I usually think of as "initiative" should be determined by the players, not by a rule.

By the way. As the resident curmudgeon I'm sure I'll shock everyone when I say that the LL (or any other torpedo) ought to have a hit rate much closer to 12% in night combat when the target is surprised, rather than the 2-12% range seen in VG PacWar.

[TIMJOT]

Mdeihl,

First US CLs didnt carry torps. and did not operate or train with Desrons as a formal entity. Any groupings as such were simply adhoc taskgroups thrown together for specific operations. IJN DesFlots on the other hand with CLs (carrying torps) acting as Flottilla leaders were formal entities that trained and fought together as independent combat forces.

This is a reflection on the two differing doctorines. The IJN saw the torp as a primary weapon. A weapon on equal standing with gunnery. Hence reason behind equiping all CAs, CLs and DDs with large numbers of torps. In the IJN the DD was first and foremost as an *offensive* weapon. Its priimary mission was to deliver torp attacks *Period*. A mission that dictated every aspect of their training and design.

The USN however saw the surface launched torp as a secondary weapon. Subordinate to gunnery. Torps were taken off USN CAs and CLs because they were deemed to be ineffective at ranges where the USN envisioned cruisers would be exchanging gunfire in daylight surface actions. Destroyers were seen first and foremost as a *defensive* weapon. In this vain the USN saw in the destroyer a multi-purpose work horse. Designed equally for scouting, screening, escorting, and ASW. The deveopement of torpedo doctorine being just one of many aspects of their mission, suffered accordingly.

The fact is USN torp doctorine was flawed becuase USN DD doctorine tied DDs to the Battleline. You have to go all the way to July 15 1943 at the Battle a Vella Gulf to find an instance were US DDs took independent action against a Japanese surface force.

Balikapan can be discounted, becuase it was a Destroyer force only, by default. The two CLs that made up part of the TF were incapacitated on the way. Secondly the DDs attacked defenceless stationary targets.

P.S.

By the way, The Battle of Kolombagara was a USN defeat in every respect.

[Drongo]

Posted by Mdiehl

I'm not wacking UV on that one. I'm wacking the proposed solution. A systemic advantage to the IJN seems to me to gloss over the real causes of the IJN victories and their defeats as well in 1942. It may be that UV needs a "Tassafaronga" engine. I'm not sure what the solution would be. In 1942 you could, with decent anecdotal supporting evidence, argue for a greater likelihood of surprise when the two navies clash in and around uplift island chains -- the early radar was certainly hinky enough in the slot. I think the long term solution for games like WitP (which will allegedly use major parts of the UV combat code) is to get really complicated with the "radar exp" "night exp" "asw exp" "smoke exp," "starshell exp," "rotary bugsmasher observation floatplane exp," etc, or else to assume that at the ship level it all "comes out in the wash," and instead model it at the admiral level.

Mate,

I'll be the stubborn bugger this time.

The "systemic advantage" solution for the IJN (as well as the USN DD's later) does not gloss over anything. The reality was that, regardless of the circumstances which brought it about, if a naval force like the IJN found itself in a position to deliver an early concerted, multi ship torpedo launch, it would. We were suggesting the "systemic advantage" solution for UV as it works with factors already present in the game's surface combat model (experience and tactical advantage), and therefore give players a slight hope of having the designers consider it.

How TF leadership is used, tactical advantage is gained, etc. are really totally different aspects to surface combat and would require seperate analysis (as you said). They are not being glossed over. UV already models (rightly or wrongly) these aspects. What it doesn't model is how the IJN would always try to fight when given the chance.

You can drop your defenses on this one, mate. From looking at the posts on this thread, no one had actually suggested the Japanese should consistently emerge victorious at night. I think the posters were all aware of the various factors influencing the results of surface combat in the theatre and time period covered by UV. I'm sure, too, that they were aware that the USN DD's were leashed in most battles in '42 and that USN DD commanders would have preferred to close with the enemy. The point of cap_and_gowns original post was to ask the valid question as to where is the chance for the IJN to deliver an initial (starting) torpedo salvo. No one suggested it should always happen or that the USN DD's couldn't (as opposed to weren't allowed) or that it should guarantee a devastating victory. Talking about who won what battle is fine but it doesn't change the fact that the IJN would try it at any possible opportunity.

Since UV is a wargame with ahistorical flexibility (which is *fine*) one can easily imagine that the USN player might send a CL+DD TF for some of the various skirmishes in 1942 rather than a CA+CL+DD TF. (Just as the IJN player can choose which ships to send where and so forth). *In that event*, one would not as a feature of game design presume that the USN Desron or DD+CL TF would necessarily be any less likely to launch a torp doctrine attack than the IJN.

I agree that the USN player in UV is free to mix his ships in whatever combination he wants. I dont believe, though, that using CL's rather than CA's should make any difference. The USN CL was designed and used as a "gun line" ship. If this was the only cruiser type in a TF, the USN commander should still be expected to fight his battle in the same way as if he had CA's. I think there was a very good reason, beyond that of the TF commander's bias, why USN DD's were kept leashed in most battles in '42. The USN knew all about torpedo use but, as TIMJOT mentioned, they chose to emphasise gun over torpedo in their engagement doctrine. Given the quality of the US guns, gunnery/fire control, radar and communications, it is quite reasonable that they would also apply this concept at night. Unfortunately for the USN, they were limited in applying this to '42 battles by a lack of night experience, poor radio discipline during combat (TBS), commanders who mostly did not know how best to use radar and who had to coordinate TF's made up of warships that had a mix of SC, SG or no radar and had rarely worked together before. It becomes understandable why USN TF commanders would normally not want to then complicate the whole battle further by releasing their DD's into the fray (to become potential targets for both the enemy's ships and his own cruisers).

Even if a TF was made up of only DD's, I wouldn't think that it would guarantee the same chance as the IJN in '42. They would certainly attempt torpedo attacks as their main effort but their ability to deliver a well timed, coordinated strike would still be dependant on their night experience, spotting capability (radar) and night formation training. How well they could do it, as opposed to whether they did it, was only demonstrated in '43 when the three factors I mentioned were definitely there to the level of equaling (or even bettering) the IJN.

By the way. As the resident curmudgeon I'm sure I'll shock everyone when I say that the LL (or any other torpedo) ought to have a hit rate much closer to 12% in night combat when the target is surprised, rather than the 2-12% range seen in VG PacWar.

[Ron Saueracker]

It is my understanding that US TFs involved in the 5 major night surface actions off Guadalcanal were predominantly ad hoc and did not really train as a unit prior to the engagement in question. The exception is Scott's TF at Cape Esperance. They conducted limited night combat practice. Two heavy cruisers and two 6" gunned light cruisers and the five DDs of Desron 12. Despite this, Desron 12 was tied to the cruisers, 3 in the van and two bringing up the rear. The main reason for this was that cruiser admirals feared that the overall lack of night combat training/experience would lead to freindly fire incidents, as actually happened during the first three battles. At Cape Esperance, despite the precautions taken by Scott, a wheel maneuver caused the van destroyers to swerve out of line and caused both Duncan and Farenholt to suffer freindly fire casualties.

[Drongo]

Posted by Ron Sourcracker

It is my understanding that US TFs involved in the 5 major night surface actions off Guadalcanal were predominantly ad hoc and did not really train as a unit prior to the engagement in question. The exception is Scott's TF at Cape Esperance. They conducted limited night combat practice. Two heavy cruisers and two 6" gunned light cruisers and the five DDs of Desron 12. Despite this, Desron 12 was tied to the cruisers, 3 in the van and two bringing up the rear. The main reason for this was that cruiser admirals feared that the overall lack of night combat training/experience would lead to freindly fire incidents, as actually happened during the first three battles. At Cape Esperance, despite the precautions taken by Scott, a wheel maneuver caused the van destroyers to swerve out of line and caused both Duncan and Farenholt to suffer freindly fire casualties.

Ron,

Do you think that the strengths and weaknesses of "gun line" TF's should be modeled better in the game as well? It seems to be handled very rudimentarily in UV at present.

[Possum]

Hmm....
Seem's what is missing is a Task Force Experience rating.
I have read many accounts that say it's through concerted teamwork training that many battles were won, not on the individual expertese of the ships/planes involved.
What we really need is some way to form ships up into semi-permenant divisions, and give those divisions their own experience rating to reflect how well the components of that division performed.
For Example, the British Escort Team B2, North Atlantic 1941, Rapidly became the Champion U-boat killers. Even though this Team consisted of 1 ww1 V class DD, 1 Black Swan class FF, and 5 Flower Class corvettes. Why, Because they were trained to work as a team by their commander. They had mastered the art of pack attacking U-boats, and of doing feints, to force U-boats away from the convoy.
To further highlight the effectivness of teamwork, the Team actually performed worse on the several occasions they had to use a substitute escort for one of the original ships.
I also read about how the effectivness of all of the North atlantic escort groups in 1942, was increased dramatically, by having them spend 2 weeks in practicing teamwork before they actually went out to escort each convoy.

[Ron Saueracker]

Originally posted by Drongo
Posted by Ron Sourcracker


Ron,

Do you think that the strengths and weaknesses of "gun line" TF's should be modeled better in the game as well? It seems to be handled very rudimentarily in UV at present.

I don't know how this could be accomplished as the battle routines are very abstract. First off, what are the strengths and weaknesses? Depends on the period in question.

During 1942, with the DDs tied to the cruisers and radar in its infancy, the line ahead formation was as much a target as a gunnery platform. By mid 1943, with DD divisions untethered and allowed to operate independently of the rapid firing 6" gunned cruisers, the Allies evened (exceeded sometimes) the initial advantages of training and torpedoes the IJN had enjoyed. Radar controlled smothering 6" gunfire, with flashless powder, reduced the vulnerability of the cruisers, now able to remain at a comfortable distance from the enemy. PPI scopes and radar training made US DDs operating away from the cruisers less vulnerable to friendly fire and free to attck with torpedoes.

I don't think UV models radar controlled gunnery, high rates of fire etc. We know that varying ranges are not modelled, as ranges are set per round. Destroyers therefore cannot "close" the range so to speak. As UV is now, basically everything is one big line ahead slugfest, with the odd not engaged ship thrown in to represent the vagaries of night combat.

I have to remind myself of one thing, though. I have hounded Joel and the boys for a more detailed model, but this is an "operational" level game, with the outcomes more important than the abstraction utilized to achieve the end result. They have tweaked a major bee in my bonnet already (DDs now are more involved than earlier versions). The one major thing I'd like to see now is perhaps a "superstructure" hit location to ships, as the present format limits hits to critical spaces protected by armor only, greatly reducing the robustness of ships to multiple hits. DDs through CAs basically crumble under BB gunfire, while historically, these same ships survived a large number of hits because many hits were not damaging vital areas, just rearranging steel above the waterline, causing fires, and maiming bluejackets (all unpleasant, but not critical to a ships survival).

Oh! One other thing. Ships in UV fight like the Black Knight in Monty Python...you know, "just a flesh wound". If ships could be put out of action somehow due to grievous damage, perhaps this might allow for a Savo or Tassaforonga result, in conjuction with an attack bonus to an unsurprised force vs a surprised force.

[Drongo]

Matrix must be jumping for joy over all the helpful player suggestions coming out of this thread. Maybe they should start paying us (or lock the thread).

Posted by Possum

Seem's what is missing is a Task Force Experience rating. I have read many accounts that say it's through concerted teamwork training that many battles were won, not on the individual expertese of the ships/planes involved.
What we really need is some way to form ships up into semi-permenant divisions, and give those divisions their own experience rating to reflect how well the components of that division performed.

Spot on, Poss

TF ratings that reflect the time that ships have been operating together would be valid for UV. If you replaced ships, the rating should drop. The same with a commander.

It should also incorporate the ratings of the various permanent squadrons/divisions that have worked/trained together over long periods as the operational life of a TF would be short compared to them. Wouldn't like the chances of Matrix going with that one though (prob a bit much for UV).

[panda124c]

Spotting is the key to the torpedo launches, the Japanese were able to spot US ships before they were spotted (this is pre radar) thus alowing them to launch torpedo's then withdraw to reload. After US radar became more effiecent US TF commanders would order radical course changes once a Japanese TF was spotted because the assumption was that the torpedo's were on their way.
So if the rules get changed to allow the Japanese to launch topedo's when they have spotted the US TF and after a certain date allow the US TF's to manuver to decrease the effectiness of the Japanese torpedo attack, you should get the historical results.

[mdiehl]

TF Experience rating sounds like a good idea to me too. You'd actually get experienced old desrons like the flushdecks at Bkppn delivering torp doctrine attacks.

I think there's something to CAC issues, and the TF experience rating is interesting. Of course, it begs a whole new level of code (and actualy a feature I've been *pushing* on boardgame designers for a while). Although the shots should be resolved by ships, the "unit" of action was usually ship teams Desrons, DD divisions, CA divisions etc. *But* this may be way too much for Matrix to code.

Drongo. We'll just both be stubborn I guess. I do not see any evidence in gunnery hit rates or spotting success that all the night training gave IJN an edge. IMO that has long been a simple and convenient explanation *because* clearly the IJN spent more time training at night and had the best torp. Looking at the engagements, however, in detail, the critical element seems always to have been something *else*.. both for IJN victories and defeats in 1942. And IJN torp and gunfire accuracy varied so greatly that it is not apparent that all that night training made them necessarily more accurate at night. Same applies to observation. IJN night optical spotting binocs were the best, but that seems not to have regularly given them an advantage.

[HMSWarspite]

Originally posted by mdiehl

LOL about the German Navy thing. I still can't figure out what a "Schnellboot" was supposed to be. Since I don't speak German, despite my surname, I'm sort of left in the Hollywood mode of interpretation. To me it means something like "Hurry up and put your shoes on!" Odd that the WW2 nation with the lead in sub doctrine would be "out in left field" with respect to surface ships. Maybe they were weighed down too heavily by the idea of surface ships as "convoy raiders."

Schnellboot is the German name for what were called E boats by the Allies. This stood for Enemy War Motor Boat (UK name, that stuck). As someone said =PT, or MTB

[HannoMeier]

"Schnellboot" is made up of two words: "Schnell" means fast and "Boot" means boat (of course). Regards, Hanno