Where are the long lances?

[CapAndGown]

Ok, i've just got the game, so don't have lots of experience, but in playing out Guadacanal several times against the AI (historical difficulty) in every "Battle of Savo Island", the Japanese get the stuffing beat out of them. Most often, there loses are somewhat higher than the U.S. Now granted, Savo may have been somewhat lucky for the Japs, but there was also a lot of poor training on the part of the Americans that led to the disaster. And of course the Japs showed on many other occasions that they could kick the stuffing out of the U.S. (Battle of Tassaforonga)

But what I find most bizarre is all the gunnery action on the part of the Japs. Where are all the torpedos? Jap doctrine was to open up with a salvo of torpedos. Often they would just fire off the torpedos and run if there were just DDs present. Hell, in one action that Morrison described off of Villa, the US thought they had been hit by a submarine because they had no clue as to the capabilities of the long lance.

So am I just seeing some odd results that are not typical, or will the U.S. continue to be able to engage in gun duels which is where there advantage lies?

[Long Lance]

Good Post!

I never observed a devastating night-torpedo-attack by the Japanese.
I'm playing a short scenario pbem against afenelon, Guadalcanal, and because in short scenarios you can play like there is no tomorrow - that's why I prefer long campaigns - I charged a 'Kamikaze'-TF of 1 CA, 1 CL and 8 DDs against his BB-TF (2 BB, 4 CAs 8 DDs?) by night just to score some deadly torpedo hits and soften up the BB-TF this way. My plan was 'succesful' in losing all my ships, but not a single torpedo- or shell hit on the US-Ships was reported. That's the worst performance ever I observed with Japanese night torpedo attacks, but on other occasions, I usualy only see torpedo-hits on APs that are heavily damaged by artillery. In Version 1.11, the Long Lance seemed to be better, too good, I remeber DDs and SCs being torpedoed at 7000 yrds and beyond. I don't know if they changed anything about the accuracy of the ll, but that's what I have observed.

[patrickl]

I absolutely dread those long lance torpedoes. They are worse than 18.1 inch gun hits! 2 of these into 1 ship and you can kiss goodbye to her! As US, there is just no way of evading Long Lance except avoid confronting Japanese Bombardment Task Forces. That means leaving your Lunga land forces to have hellish miserable life for quite a while!:mad:

[Drongo]

cap_and_gown,

You've hit on a subject that's been discussed in a few threads. The general feeling was that LL torpedo's are modelled in the game quite well (nasty) but the early doctrinal difference between the two sides aren't really there.

Several players suggested ideas as to how the IJN approach to night battle's could be introduced (effectively an initial 'salvo fire' of torps depending on experience, tactical situation, etc. In the end, it's up to Matrix.

When I watched my first night naval battle in UV, I wondered the same thing as you. I thought it was a bit rough that the IJN are taking same (or worse) damage in early encounters with USN. The lack of any chance of an initial salvo of LL's hurts but I also think that any advantage the IJN gets through its experience at the start of a battle is also lost very quickly once the firing begins (it turns into a lengthy, all in brawl).

My preference would be for more (not always) shorter, sharper battles where someone gaining a major advantage at the start (ie superior position allows chance of devastating "line ahead" firing or opening torp salvo) gets a clearer benefits in terms of holding that advantage longer (as enemy ships sunk/knocked out at start).

It may be worth putting it to Matrix (at the moment, you'd think Savo was a million to one chance to repeat in UV - the USN could be hurt as badly but the IJN would also always suffer in the attempt).

Note : These advantages would have to apply to both sides - as the USN DD's get better, they would increase their chance of getting a mass salvo of torps off.

I also think its a bit strange the way DD's can be ignored as threats in this game (except for the odd torp hit). You don't seem to feel obliged to attach DD's to surface combat TF's as you did historically (especially at night). If one side had DD's at night and the other side had all capital ships, you'd think it would be destroyer heaven!

patrickl, I agree the LL's are deadly but I don't regularly lose many ships to them in battle (they certainly make you wince when they do hit.

[Yamamoto]

I would like to see the long lance salvo work something like this:
(For night time battles only)

Japanese task force leader makes a leadership check.
If he succeeds, then each captain ( or crew ) makes a check.
Foe each ship that passes that ship gets a free "before-the-battle" torpedo salvo off.

The same system could be applied to Americans starting in 43.

Yamamoto

[Long Lance]

Originally posted by Yamamoto
I would like to see the long lance salvo work something like this:
(For night time battles only)

Japanese task force leader makes a leadership check.
If he succeeds, then each captain ( or crew ) makes a check.
Foe each ship that passes that ship gets a free "before-the-battle" torpedo salvo off.

The same system could be applied to Americans starting in 43.

Yamamoto

Sounds very good to me, great idea!

[ReDDoN45]

even without surprise where should be a difference. Japs often fired gigantic patterns. In game each ship makes its single torpedo run.... quite effective against target slower than abotu 24 kns, but not effective against faster. With the gians patterns the japs often shot, a US TF which didn´t make a radical course change, was caught in this pattern. Then several torps strucked... regardless how fast the Ships where, as they were moving in a TF wiht similar speed, to maintain formation. With a broad spread of about 60 torps coming at a US TF.... it will either have catastrophic results, especially when TF is in line astern formation and shows broadside to pattern, or none, when they made an unpredicted course change. At least that would count for these big spreads the japs sometimes fired (Tassafaronga or the BB action... in which the whole pattern missed the US BBs).

Despite all, the LL is quite good modeled. I achieve nasty results sometimes! NASTY!!!! Poor US guys with their swimming targets!

[ReDDoN45]

BTW US ships wouldn´t be very effective for the "before the battle torpedo salvoe", as US Mk.15 only had a range of 6000 yds with maximum speed... merely enough!
LL had 22000 yards with 45kns!!!!!!!!!!

This wonderful 24" present! It is truly superior in all regards!

[mdiehl]

1) Okay. Correcting some errors posted by others about US torps:

see www.warships1.com weapons US torpedoes
Ranges in Yards. Speeds in knots. Notes as indicated.

21" Mark 14 (subs) 4500@46, 9000@31

21" Mark 15 (post 1930 DDs, CLs) 6000@45, 10,000@33.5, 15,000@26.5

21" Mark 16 (subs) 13,700@46 (peroxide driven, designed for WW2 use but not used during WW2)

21" Mark 18 (subs), 4000@29, wakeless (US variant of German G7e-battery electric torpedo)

and, my personal favorite

19" Mark 24 "Fido" (aircraft), 98 pound warhead, 4000@12. Homing acoustic torpedo deployed principally as ASW torp. Sank 68 subs and damaged 33 others.

2) The Type 93 long lance was not routinely effective at ranges in excess of 7000-8000 yards unless the target was unaware of the presence of the launching ship. As with all unguided, essentially ballistic missiles, the propensity to hit anything was primarily dependent on time-to-target and target awareness (and lack of evasive maneuvers).

3)

Japanese task force leader makes a leadership check.

That's a silly idea. Not only did Japanese task forces *not* regularly get the torpedo doctrine drop on their opponents, they also suffered some minor defeats in 1942 at the hands of torpedo-doctrine savvy USN skippers. At most you'd expect a higher chance of Japanese success at a torpedo-doctrine attack if:

(1) The IJN TF was not detected by radar or spotted prior to or at any time during the torpedo run.
(2) The target TF was a USN TF that contained at least one CA or heavier ship.

Meaning that a USN DD-CL squadron would have as high a probability as any Japanese squadron of launching a torp-doctrine attack. Any RN squadron would have as high a probability, since many RN ships of larger displacement carried torpedoes and were as extensively trained in night-torp doctrine as anyone. *Some* USN squadrons with CAs as the flag would be less likely to launch a torp doctrine attack if the flag lacked radar, or if the R.Adm in charge of the TF had little post-1930 DD experience in his career.

Note. This does not mean that a detected IJN TF launching a night torp shot should always miss if detected prior to or during the torpedo run. Their hit rate (% of shots fired) in night shots at close range at alerted targets was about 6%. Tassafaronga was the exceptionally good IJN case, not the anecdote on which the model should be based. It is noteworthy primarily because the USN DDs clamored for permission to launch a torp-doctrine solution at optimal range but were denied permission by the TF commander (a CA admiral). As Arleigh Burke pointed out, the problem in 1942 was that USN DD commodores were not always given room to do what they already knew how to do when hampered by a gun-doctrine admiral operating from a CA.

[ReDDoN45]

A good fleet commander launches an effective torpedo attack, not only shoots torps on the projected intercept point (of torps and TF), he also shoots a good salvoe on a point where the enemy TF might evade to. Only fools shoot ALL their torps on the projected intercept point as it´s unlikely that a TF will continue moving there.

Moreover the usual line astern formation makes short range torpedo attacks very futile. Since ships stay in formation, you aim for the first one to get the torps on one of the following. This sometimes works rather good - i.e. Jap TF spots US TF on 6000 yards. Shoots some of its torps on projected intercept course and the rest on the current posit of the leading US ship and perhaps some on the current posit on one of the following ships. IF US TF detects them the make course change, it might well be caught insde some of those torp spreads. If it stays on course (didn´t detect IJN TF), they are still in danger.


BTW, there was also a Mk-18 mod. with much improved speed.
and Mk-15´s even, when hitting had a too high dud rate.... though this was improved throughout the war.

And of course - sometimes even US torpedo attacks were successful - as sometimes even Japanese Radar made the first contact

[ReDDoN45]

and I think this leadership check idea isn´t that bad. There is still a difference between single ships fireing their torpedoes when they want and a well coordinated 30-45 torpedo spread fired by all ships of the TF. Regardless of the TF has been already detected, is the latter better.... like with gunfire - well coordinated fire by all turrets by fire control is better than each turret firing on it´s own. The same for single ship/all ship torpedo attacks.

[mdiehl]

Standard USN doctrine was to fire half-torpedo salvoes at the initial solution and have the other half available for exigencies or to kill cripples. Not sure what the IJN doctrine was. I know they had a rapid and reasonably effective reload capability (something like 20-40 minutes reload time), so if they were using full salvoes they may have counted on the reload to do for them what the USN did by reserving a half salvo.

USN ships did not salvo by single ship. The USN DD skippers had basically the same torpedo doctrine as the Japanese, *when* they were allowed to employ it. So, you would not expect a CL-DD only USN TF to be hampered by the same kind of constraints as a DD commodore subordinate to a CA admiral. Thing is, I'm not certain to what exten one should generalize about USN CA admirals on the basis of two battles around the 'canal. (one Tassafaronga, a CO's personal Fubar, and the other, Savo Island, a general lack of readiness among the Allies).

I'm proposing that it's either moot (i.e. no situational negative mods for the USN) or that some research needs to be done to figure out which USN admirals were likely to let their DDs strike when the solution is good.

[ReDDoN45]

So- I meant some ships fire on intercept course - some on evasion possibilites - there are generally only 2 to fire at. Since this TF-"snake" needs some time to come around or maneuver.

The smaller the TF the harder to hit - of course - not only because of the number of ships, aslo because it can maneuver faster and more unpredicatble.

[mdiehl]

Ah. That was pretty much the idea in USN doctrine. Shots at predicted course and probable alternative courses as well. I think that was pretty much the doctrine of all the navies DD/CL group commodores. Certainly it was UK and Italian doctrine. I wonder about Germany though, largely out of ignorance about the German navy.

[ReDDoN45]

LOL with our bull.... torps we decided to throw them over board to make more room for Swastika flags and Führer-pictures.... and perhaps a ship launched mini V-2

[ReDDoN45]

the problem with the current torpedo attack´s are that each ships fires them alone, rather than making a coordinated attack. So there should really be a check for ALL sides (USN, RN, IJN), whether they make a coordianted run. Of course the doctrine should aslo taken into account. US CA TFs don´t make that. A TF which got crossed by another i.e. the vertical part of the T also has almost no chance to make a coordinated torpedo attack - for obvious reasons.

[mdiehl]

I'd give a US CA TF a somewhat lower probability of making that check. I'd still let the DDs (or in the IJN or UK case, any torp armed ship) fire en masse according to doctrine, but they'd (if the check failed) not necessarily benefit from any kind of surprise modifier. The way I figured it from the Warships1 study of Long Lance Doctrine and the USN 1942-1943 engagements, you get a daylight hit rate mean of 1 percent. No kiddin. At night a mean hit rate of about 6% if fired at a decent range. Double the hit rate to 12% if the target TF is unaware that the enemy is nearby ("surprised"), has a lousy tactical deployment (Allies at Savo, IJN at Empress Augusta Bay), or is led by a CA skipper whose disrespect for the idea of torpedo water gets him pickled despite all warnings to the contrary (USN at Tassafaronga).

LOL about the German Navy thing. I still can't figure out what a "Schnellboot" was supposed to be. Since I don't speak German, despite my surname, I'm sort of left in the Hollywood mode of interpretation. To me it means something like "Hurry up and put your shoes on!" Odd that the WW2 nation with the lead in sub doctrine would be "out in left field" with respect to surface ships. Maybe they were weighed down too heavily by the idea of surface ships as "convoy raiders."

[ReDDoN45]

Schnellboote were essentially PT-boats - nothing else! - We divided our resources in ship builing - ensuring that we have too less of both (warships or subs) when we really need them (U-Boats at the beginning of the war and warships all the time). Was never a good idea to build big ships anyhow (for Germany) since our lag behind the other nations war too gigantic. Though some 300 subs at the outset of the war......... would have made a difference. A Bismarck more or less didn´t !

subs would have made, if available in decent numbers and properly refined throuout the war, and of course, equipped with usable torpedoes - not these wooden swords, running circles, running deep, exploding too early, exploding never or exploding only on Hitler´s direct order... or whatever.
Further developement was also too slow and too late.... well, I think we all know the story.
Would prefer 10 XXI subs to EVERY other warship (Essex, Iowa....)!

[Nikademus]

My guess at the reletive infrequency of IJN advantage in early night battles despite having up to a 20+ exp point advantage for key ships are two fold.

The first has been well discussed already, the game does not seem to allow Torp salvoes to be the initial throw by either side giving gun-heavy US CA/L - DD forces a chance to get their licks in before the campaign's deadliest weapon has a chance to influence the battle.

The 2nd factor, not discussed as far as i've seen may stem from the presence of radar on many of the US ships. While the presence of these sets is not ahistorical, their effectiveness in the game may very well be.

Doctornal issues are probably not as relevent here as i dont believe the game truely factors them in other than to "roll" for suprise and certain positional advantages at the onset of the combat round.

With that all said, it should be acknowledged that even with their advantages in this area, its true that the IJN will not always come out on top, given the very chaotic nature of night engagements in general, and later in the conflict the US DD men proved that they were capable of fighting well at night when not saddled to the cruiser line. However given the exp and early doctornal advantages that the Japanese initially had they should have a better than even chance of acomplishing it, assuming the force ratio balances are not too skewed (and even there it could still go their way, such as the time when a IJN DD force badly handled a US CA TF at Tassafaronga

[mdiehl]

However given the exp and early doctornal advantages that the Japanese initially had they should have a better than even chance of acomplishing it,

This is just wrong history. The Japanese had no particular doctrinal advantage over USN torp-armed ships. What they had in a doctrinal sense was the addition of torps to their CAs. The result was that engagements between USN DD-CL commodores tended to work out favorably for the USN (*despite* the superiority of the Type 93 *because* of radar) in 1943. That USN DD and CL skippers were trained in this doctrine is apparent in any close inspection of any USN naval engagement at any time in 1942.

When USN CAs had the flag, however, there is one major engagement in which bad doctrine at the higher-up stopped the implementation of the right doctrine by his subordinates (who knew darned well what to do and how to do it). What the Japanese had at Tassafaronga is a USN CA admiral who obligingly dropped trou and said "bring it on" despite the rather pointed, leading suggestion from the DD commodore at the time that he ought to be allowed to shoot. Based on Tassafaronga, one *might* make a rule giving an IJN TF a slight doctrinal advantage over a USN combined CA-DD TF. I say *might* because there is no substantive evidence to suggest that another USN CA admiral would necessarily have made the same mistake.

What the Japanese have had since WW2, at least with respect to wargame design, is a bunch of folks who think Savo Island and Tassafaronga are the only battles that occurred in 1942 that mean anything for discussions of intrinsic capability.