Got to agree with Mogami, woth with regard to PM - a japanese player who ignores it will loose PNG eventually. However a japanese player who takes it can turn PNG into a bunch of fortresses that advancing allied troops have to bleed to take, especially since there are half a dozen good airbases to stage planes to harass enemy invasion fleets from within good range (the allies can't knock them all out at once) and fly cap over your own resupply.
Kavieng or the Admiralty Islands are the only place for a long term naval base because port attack is one of the deadliest tools in the game. 12 b17s at night can land a 500 lbs bomb on your cv if they're parked at Rabaul and Shortlands.
Hell, some jap opponents have me stationing two fighter squadrons at every base I use at a port (including Noumea) - one for day cap and one for night cap (no pun intended).
Japanese Strategy guide
Got to agree with Mogami
With dancing Bananas and Storm Troopers who needs BBs?
I'm lovin this
Wow! Some extremely interesting discussions and disagreements going on here - please keep it up! Although I'm starting to become very familiar with this game's basic 'mechanics', I'm still quite new to all of the strategic possibilities for both sides. Since both my opponent and myself are just getting into the 1st week of Sep '42 (playing the Aug 1 scenario) we both admit that we have no clue about how to really proceed long term.
As the ANZAC I tried to mimic history and went after Lunga (successfully) as soon as I could get marines loaded on APs. But I left Tulagi alone and now I'm trying to take it as well. Unfortunately, naval searches show my IJN opponent (who admitted to too much timidity early on in not fighting over Lunga) coming after me with seemingly every ship that can float and every plane that can fly. We've just had the first of what will be quite a melee I imagine. I say the above as background because both of us newbies do not really have a good feel for when either side should decide to put up an earnest fight, for what geography, and for what timeframes. We intend to follow this thread in the hopes of learning a great deal strategic insights.
As the ANZAC I tried to mimic history and went after Lunga (successfully) as soon as I could get marines loaded on APs. But I left Tulagi alone and now I'm trying to take it as well. Unfortunately, naval searches show my IJN opponent (who admitted to too much timidity early on in not fighting over Lunga) coming after me with seemingly every ship that can float and every plane that can fly. We've just had the first of what will be quite a melee I imagine. I say the above as background because both of us newbies do not really have a good feel for when either side should decide to put up an earnest fight, for what geography, and for what timeframes. We intend to follow this thread in the hopes of learning a great deal strategic insights.
self diagnosis not working
Well, Having read mogami's classification system I don't think I fit into any. I play very different games for each side. As the allies I avoid direct naval confrontation as much as possible - my lba is my biggest strength and my ability to use my superior assets to outflank a jap opponent who concentrates on a few strongholds (or on all of them - just none of them is strong enough to beat me off).
As the japs, well, so far it has been two victories to nil by fighting the coral sea (won one, lost one), leaving PM long enough (late july) that the allied player doesn't think I'm going for it, then I take it in one foul, and usually bloody costly swoop. Sure, both times it cost me 10 or 15 Aps, probably a dozen DDs, damage to Cas, BBs, Cvs, the whole lot (haven't lost a capital ship that way though) and my big japanese regiments are usually mutilated beyond repair . . . but both times I've closed the airfield, and then taken it within a week (keeping it closed) and both times I've destroyed all of the allied airpower (got 253 allied planes destroyed on the ground last game). Of course, then I won the next big cv battle and that was the end of those games. Have never actually had to defend PNG as the japanese (next time, I'm the ijn in scn 15.).
As the japs, well, so far it has been two victories to nil by fighting the coral sea (won one, lost one), leaving PM long enough (late july) that the allied player doesn't think I'm going for it, then I take it in one foul, and usually bloody costly swoop. Sure, both times it cost me 10 or 15 Aps, probably a dozen DDs, damage to Cas, BBs, Cvs, the whole lot (haven't lost a capital ship that way though) and my big japanese regiments are usually mutilated beyond repair . . . but both times I've closed the airfield, and then taken it within a week (keeping it closed) and both times I've destroyed all of the allied airpower (got 253 allied planes destroyed on the ground last game). Of course, then I won the next big cv battle and that was the end of those games. Have never actually had to defend PNG as the japanese (next time, I'm the ijn in scn 15.).
With dancing Bananas and Storm Troopers who needs BBs?
Re: self diagnosis not working
Originally posted by Luskan
Have never actually had to defend PNG as the japanese (next time, I'm the ijn in scn 15.).
If ya want....but it is gona hurt you.
Never argue with an idiot, he will only drag you down to his level and beat you with experience.
Good info all around. Thanks for the interesting discussion guys! I'm playing my first couple PBEM games and need all the help I can get. Either strategy-PM or Lunga first-sounds workable, just depends on the execution to me. That's what I love about this game, there is no one idiot-proof way to win. I can't wait to hear more about everybody's strategy.
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CapAndGown
- Posts: 3078
- Joined: Tue Mar 06, 2001 10:00 am
- Location: Virginia, USA
I will have to agree with Mogami versus Oleg: PM is vital. I do not believe, however, that Lunge should be left alone until PM is taken.
Mogami say that the more people that the USN sticks in Lunga, the better. Crap! His whole point in taking PM is because it is a huge air base. Well Lunga can be made into a huge airbase as well. Ergo, Lunga is critical. Mogami also states there is not much time in which to take PM. Well time is working against the japs as far as Lunga is concerned as well. Time and assets.
Mogami is working on the assumption that the US player will throw everything into defending PM, thus wasting his assets once it falls. But in this concentration on PM, the Jap player is forced into the same overstretch that he claims the US player would be in should he go for Lunga. Here is the basic problem: neither side can be overwhelmingly strong everywhere. Mogami wants to be overwhelmingly strong at PM. How nice. But what has he then left that I should fear at Lunga?
Mogami believes that Lunga is a distraction from PM. How can securing your eastern flank be considered a distraction? Flank protection should be considered as part of the overall operation to secure PM.
Any assets the US player sends to secure Lunga early will be diverted from defending PM. This will make PM easier to take. I had one player (must have thought he could win the entire war in 42) throw 3 divisions onto Gaudacanal. This left only one regiment to defend PM. Well I was able to hang onto Gaudacanal and grab PM.
But this is no reason to just conced Lunga. If you allow the US player to hold Lunga early with minimal strength, then he can build up that airbase and defend PM.
No, I say make the US player work for Lunga. Make him go there in enough strength that he has to weaken the defenses of PM (i.e. in assets not sent there). Don't let him just waltz in with a couple of regiments, a base force, and some engineers and start building up. Instead, send at least one regiment and two battalions of engineers to Lunga right away to build up the airbase there. Once one of your base forces arrive as a reenforcement, send the 4th Base Force down to Lunga. Keep your fleet at Shortlands. This can now react very quickly to any situation where the allied player threatens Lunga (your carriers can be all the way down the slot in one day) while still being as close to PM as Rabual (and without the added danger of an unneccessary trek through the Solomons Sea).
Mogami also claims that the US player can easily harrass Lunga. No doubt. But you cannot allow yourself to become diverted by mere distractions. So he bombards it once and a while? So what? Let him. The wear and tear on his ships for no other purpose than harrassing you will not be worth the price. You only need to react to a major movement against the base. And as I said, a major movement will mean that he has diverted forces away from PM, making it easier to take.
So, no, I do not believe going for Lunga is dividing your effort. Rather, I view it as an intergral part of the operation to take PM.
Mogami say that the more people that the USN sticks in Lunga, the better. Crap! His whole point in taking PM is because it is a huge air base. Well Lunga can be made into a huge airbase as well. Ergo, Lunga is critical. Mogami also states there is not much time in which to take PM. Well time is working against the japs as far as Lunga is concerned as well. Time and assets.
Mogami is working on the assumption that the US player will throw everything into defending PM, thus wasting his assets once it falls. But in this concentration on PM, the Jap player is forced into the same overstretch that he claims the US player would be in should he go for Lunga. Here is the basic problem: neither side can be overwhelmingly strong everywhere. Mogami wants to be overwhelmingly strong at PM. How nice. But what has he then left that I should fear at Lunga?
Mogami believes that Lunga is a distraction from PM. How can securing your eastern flank be considered a distraction? Flank protection should be considered as part of the overall operation to secure PM.
Any assets the US player sends to secure Lunga early will be diverted from defending PM. This will make PM easier to take. I had one player (must have thought he could win the entire war in 42) throw 3 divisions onto Gaudacanal. This left only one regiment to defend PM. Well I was able to hang onto Gaudacanal and grab PM.
But this is no reason to just conced Lunga. If you allow the US player to hold Lunga early with minimal strength, then he can build up that airbase and defend PM.
No, I say make the US player work for Lunga. Make him go there in enough strength that he has to weaken the defenses of PM (i.e. in assets not sent there). Don't let him just waltz in with a couple of regiments, a base force, and some engineers and start building up. Instead, send at least one regiment and two battalions of engineers to Lunga right away to build up the airbase there. Once one of your base forces arrive as a reenforcement, send the 4th Base Force down to Lunga. Keep your fleet at Shortlands. This can now react very quickly to any situation where the allied player threatens Lunga (your carriers can be all the way down the slot in one day) while still being as close to PM as Rabual (and without the added danger of an unneccessary trek through the Solomons Sea).
Mogami also claims that the US player can easily harrass Lunga. No doubt. But you cannot allow yourself to become diverted by mere distractions. So he bombards it once and a while? So what? Let him. The wear and tear on his ships for no other purpose than harrassing you will not be worth the price. You only need to react to a major movement against the base. And as I said, a major movement will mean that he has diverted forces away from PM, making it easier to take.
So, no, I do not believe going for Lunga is dividing your effort. Rather, I view it as an intergral part of the operation to take PM.
my opinion
Greetings, Of course everyone is free to make their own decisions. My view of the campaign is...it is a long campaign. Making your long term plans known so early and so easy for the enemy allows them to adopt a slow meticulous approach. There are not enough Land combat formations in scenario 17 for the Japanese to pile them onto one base (Lunga) early and have any type of flexibility towards meeting the allied counter response. No matter how many troops you dump onto Lunga the allies will, when the time comes bring more and FRESHER, units. If you take PM early (and I believe it to be the only logical first move.) then your options in the Solomon's are expanded (versus not securing PM early where you enter a race to move material to Lunga and build the airfield "Fortress complex")
The main point for the Japanese is to maintain the initiative by retaining viable threats to other bases (San Crsitabol/Santa Cruz/Espirtu Santo) If you use all your combat formations in garrisoning PM and Lunga the allies can deduce what is needed to protect their bases. The remaining Allied units are free for offensive operations directed at points you do not guard. Ground and air units are worst units for actually holding a base. It is the fleet that must defend bases. (air units may not fly because of weather, ground units have little impact on enemy fleet/air units and are subject to attrition from just being at a location over time.
The allies only have 4 divisions prior to late 42. Two in SWPAC and two in SOPAC. They have two choices prior to then.
Choice one SWPAC move as much as possible to defend PM. If PM is held the allies hold the upper hand for rest of campaign no matter what occurs in first 6 months. Around Aug/Sept 42 their air power will begin exerting it's potential.
If the Japanese capture PM and eliminate these ground units SWPAC is put on the defensive for another 6 months.
Choice Two. Refrain from risking anything to defend PM outside of air transport of supply and submarines to attrit Japanese invasion. This concedes PM's capture but does not lose anything outside the temporary concession of victory points for the base. The allies retain their threat of action against PM or Gili whenever they feel the Japanese have not properly defended them or if the Japanese become committed against SOPAC.
Therefore the Japanese after the capture of Port Moresby must subtract from their available forces for use against Solomon's SOPAC area enough strength to contain SWPAC while they fight SOPAC. There must at all times exist a Japanese reserve to meet future needs.
If the Japanese make Lunga their ultimate goal and commit their entire resources to maintaining it. The Allies will counter in NG.
The Japanese must "freeze" allied units by maintaining viable future threats.
SOPAC's two options early
Option one: During Japanese operations against PM move into Lunga-Tulagi area and build to maximum size while the Japanese are otherwise occupied. The problem is in the first several months the US has only 1 division to watch Noumea/Espirtu Santo with. There are no spare baseforces unless he strips the bases he has yet to build in Noumea with. There are no airgroups and few ships. The energy spent moving and building Lunga will leave him unprepared when in July/Aug the Japanese turn their attention towards Lunga. I say (as Japan) let the allied player move everything he wants to Lunga. It is much easier now for me to kill then it was at L'ville or Noumea. The Japanese can put Lunga's airfield out of action in 2 days. After resting and refitting the troops that capture Port Moresby they can eliminate whatever the Allies have put there. There is no need for the Japanese to worry about building Lunga early. It is more important for them to build the chain of bases leading to Lunga early. After Sept 42 the Japanese forward bases need to be within the fast transport/barge network. The AP's must not be required to enter Allied air space.
If the Allies commit to Lunga prior to defeating the IJN CV force they are sacrificing anything they leave beyond their range of resupply. Lunga will have an IJN surface/bombardment TF vist every night intill it falls. Aircraft consume supply. The repair of the airfield and port will halt when the supply gets low.
To attack an enemy base, the first goal should be to build 2 friendly bases within supporting range.
The second goal is to close enemy supply reinforcement routes.
Third close all enemy airfields in range
fourth move transports with assault troops in enough strength for at least a 3-1 ratio.
After you kill enemy ground formations they are gone for longer then it takes to send yours back to Truk and rest refit them. Never be in more hurry then is necessary.
Option Two for SOPAC, build Noumea and sundry bases, build L'ville, send engineers and baseforce as they become available to Santa Cruz (Neva) and San Cristabol (Irau) Use subs to lay mines and pick off Japanese Transports. Insure safety of (in this order)
1. Noumea (always have LBA ASW and Surface protection)
2. L'ville.
3. Santa Cruz or San Cristabol (whichever you decide to build)
Wait till you have at least 4 CV. Send bombardment TF's to Lunga if Japanese have moved there. Try to intercept light;y defended enemy transports with surface ships to gain experience in night fighting. Cultivate your heavy bomber formations (B-17/24)
build airbases large enough to house 10 groups (120 AC size 4 airbase hold 200 ac)
Stockpile supply at these bases. Wait for the Japanese to run out of steam.
Everything I mention is in regards to a scenario 17 against a human. Please no example of how you whooped the AI.
The main point for the Japanese is to maintain the initiative by retaining viable threats to other bases (San Crsitabol/Santa Cruz/Espirtu Santo) If you use all your combat formations in garrisoning PM and Lunga the allies can deduce what is needed to protect their bases. The remaining Allied units are free for offensive operations directed at points you do not guard. Ground and air units are worst units for actually holding a base. It is the fleet that must defend bases. (air units may not fly because of weather, ground units have little impact on enemy fleet/air units and are subject to attrition from just being at a location over time.
The allies only have 4 divisions prior to late 42. Two in SWPAC and two in SOPAC. They have two choices prior to then.
Choice one SWPAC move as much as possible to defend PM. If PM is held the allies hold the upper hand for rest of campaign no matter what occurs in first 6 months. Around Aug/Sept 42 their air power will begin exerting it's potential.
If the Japanese capture PM and eliminate these ground units SWPAC is put on the defensive for another 6 months.
Choice Two. Refrain from risking anything to defend PM outside of air transport of supply and submarines to attrit Japanese invasion. This concedes PM's capture but does not lose anything outside the temporary concession of victory points for the base. The allies retain their threat of action against PM or Gili whenever they feel the Japanese have not properly defended them or if the Japanese become committed against SOPAC.
Therefore the Japanese after the capture of Port Moresby must subtract from their available forces for use against Solomon's SOPAC area enough strength to contain SWPAC while they fight SOPAC. There must at all times exist a Japanese reserve to meet future needs.
If the Japanese make Lunga their ultimate goal and commit their entire resources to maintaining it. The Allies will counter in NG.
The Japanese must "freeze" allied units by maintaining viable future threats.
SOPAC's two options early
Option one: During Japanese operations against PM move into Lunga-Tulagi area and build to maximum size while the Japanese are otherwise occupied. The problem is in the first several months the US has only 1 division to watch Noumea/Espirtu Santo with. There are no spare baseforces unless he strips the bases he has yet to build in Noumea with. There are no airgroups and few ships. The energy spent moving and building Lunga will leave him unprepared when in July/Aug the Japanese turn their attention towards Lunga. I say (as Japan) let the allied player move everything he wants to Lunga. It is much easier now for me to kill then it was at L'ville or Noumea. The Japanese can put Lunga's airfield out of action in 2 days. After resting and refitting the troops that capture Port Moresby they can eliminate whatever the Allies have put there. There is no need for the Japanese to worry about building Lunga early. It is more important for them to build the chain of bases leading to Lunga early. After Sept 42 the Japanese forward bases need to be within the fast transport/barge network. The AP's must not be required to enter Allied air space.
If the Allies commit to Lunga prior to defeating the IJN CV force they are sacrificing anything they leave beyond their range of resupply. Lunga will have an IJN surface/bombardment TF vist every night intill it falls. Aircraft consume supply. The repair of the airfield and port will halt when the supply gets low.
To attack an enemy base, the first goal should be to build 2 friendly bases within supporting range.
The second goal is to close enemy supply reinforcement routes.
Third close all enemy airfields in range
fourth move transports with assault troops in enough strength for at least a 3-1 ratio.
After you kill enemy ground formations they are gone for longer then it takes to send yours back to Truk and rest refit them. Never be in more hurry then is necessary.
Option Two for SOPAC, build Noumea and sundry bases, build L'ville, send engineers and baseforce as they become available to Santa Cruz (Neva) and San Cristabol (Irau) Use subs to lay mines and pick off Japanese Transports. Insure safety of (in this order)
1. Noumea (always have LBA ASW and Surface protection)
2. L'ville.
3. Santa Cruz or San Cristabol (whichever you decide to build)
Wait till you have at least 4 CV. Send bombardment TF's to Lunga if Japanese have moved there. Try to intercept light;y defended enemy transports with surface ships to gain experience in night fighting. Cultivate your heavy bomber formations (B-17/24)
build airbases large enough to house 10 groups (120 AC size 4 airbase hold 200 ac)
Stockpile supply at these bases. Wait for the Japanese to run out of steam.
Everything I mention is in regards to a scenario 17 against a human. Please no example of how you whooped the AI.
I'm not retreating, I'm attacking in a different direction!
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Oleg Mastruko
- Posts: 4534
- Joined: Sat Oct 21, 2000 8:00 am
Even if I'd agree that PM is "vital" (and I don't) - how do you take it if Allies managed to reinforce it with say additional 2-4 brigades in the first week of the campaign?Originally posted by cap_and_gown
I will have to agree with Mogami versus Oleg: PM is vital.
Are you guys really ready to risk two dozens of APs, two divisions of infantry and whatnot to wrestle it from the allied hands? If so, I'd love to play as Allies against you
Resulting carnage is sure going to be fun to watch (even if I lose PM eventually), all the while my Marines go up the Hebrides/Santa Cruz/San Cristobal/Guadalcanal "ladder", bringing shipload after shipload of Seabees and supplies after them.I'd say - if you see up to 2-3 brigades of infantry in PM - go after it. If there are more infantry units there, blockade the PM with Bettys and subs and pick off Allied transports (and there's gonna be lots of transports in that case, as 5-6 brigades need lots of food).
In my game against Rowlf (sadly missing from these boards for a month or so) as Jap I have almost perfect situation as to the outline I mentioned above:
- Lunga is 6 air base with 150+ Bettys/Nells and 200+ air support and very strong infantry garriosn
- Tulaghi is 5 naval base with 2 surface groups, CVs ready to intervene etc.
- Maybe I'll go further to the south in Solomons/Santa Cruz, I'll see
- No major ship losses on any side so far (US lost 4 CAs though)
- In the NG theatre I decided not to go after PM after he reinforced it with mucho infantry
BUT
- Wau is taken, and secured with Jap Brigade
- Lae is getting build up and used as airbase to harras Allied shipping in waters north of Aus with Nells and Bettys
- Gili is fortified and equipped with strong garriosn (I won't go into too much details)
- Buna is garrisoned, Dubadura is getting built up as "backup" airbase
- I sent a regiment of infantry down the Kokoda trail to the outskirts of PM, just to make Allied life there miserable
Frankly I don't plan on taking PM in this situation (Rowlf if you're reading this, I lie, this is not Oleg, it's my evil twin brother
. It's 1st of July 42. I am awaiting for Allied offensive in NG theatre, and sure hope I'll make his life miserable. I have mucho infantry as reserves in Rabaul and Truk, ready to commit them when the need arises.I eagerly wait for Rowlf to get back to the game so as to test some of my hypotheses as to the relative unimportance of PM. Maybe I'm wrong? We'll see I hope.
BTW, this is scen #19 I am talking about, but I guess most points are valid for #17 as well. I didn't use additional Jap forces to capture PM anyway
O.
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CapAndGown
- Posts: 3078
- Joined: Tue Mar 06, 2001 10:00 am
- Location: Virginia, USA
It occurs to me that Mogami is advocating the same strategy that the Japs actually used: Go for PM, Lunga is a side show. Of course by the time the Japs actually decided they wanted to have Lunga, that it was too valuable for the allies to have, it was too late.
Mogami claims that the US doesn't have a lot to defend everything with. Yes, exactly. And this is why a commitment to Lunga is feasible at the same time your main effort is directed towards PM. Mogami is talking as if one need commit several divisions to defending Lunga early on when this is simply not the case. Two regiments should be sufficient. The US basically has the Americal, 3rd and 7th Australian divisions to work with until August. If the 7th goes to PM, the Americal defends Luganville/Noumea, this leave only the 3rd division to assault Lunga. This will not be enough to take it away from a garrison equivalent to two regiments. Intead of regiments, one can use a bunch of those garrison units that show up rather early. One can even strip Buin and Buka and move those units down an build up those bases later.
It would seem that Mogami is basically advocating a porcupine strategy. Therefore, one need only counter with the very methods he has laid out.
Mogami claims that the US doesn't have a lot to defend everything with. Yes, exactly. And this is why a commitment to Lunga is feasible at the same time your main effort is directed towards PM. Mogami is talking as if one need commit several divisions to defending Lunga early on when this is simply not the case. Two regiments should be sufficient. The US basically has the Americal, 3rd and 7th Australian divisions to work with until August. If the 7th goes to PM, the Americal defends Luganville/Noumea, this leave only the 3rd division to assault Lunga. This will not be enough to take it away from a garrison equivalent to two regiments. Intead of regiments, one can use a bunch of those garrison units that show up rather early. One can even strip Buin and Buka and move those units down an build up those bases later.
It would seem that Mogami is basically advocating a porcupine strategy. Therefore, one need only counter with the very methods he has laid out.
Scenario 17 versus 19
Greetings, The Japanese in Scen 19 have a lot more to work with then in 17. This makes the allies much more likely to sit on their starting bases and wait to build up. In scenario 17 I am interested in just how the allies can develop Lunga (or any other base) since they do not generally have any units in SOPAC beyond what can protect Noumea/L'ville. There are no Seabees and the Mar Div is still some time in the future.
The whole reason Japan can afford to concentrate on PM/NG is the lack of a viable threat from SOPAC.
This is why there is no need for the Japanese to bother with Lunga. I don't care what they garrison it with. (2 Regt's seems rather excessive) I am refering to the FLEET!!!!! units that will now need to be diverted from PM to Lunga. If you send a TF to Lunga it will need a covering force. The allies have enough CA/CL/DD to intercept it and gain early easy night experiance at the same time.
Every supply/fuel point that is used outside of the PM operation delays/puts at risk that operation. Every ship damaged or busy else where does the same. I would like the allies to reinforce PM
(at cost) The more they send there, the better. (the Japanese player if he only goes for PM can carry around 70k combat troops to PM. After it falls he needs 45-60 days to recarry it back to Truk where it rest and rebuilds. If Japan captures PM in first week of July 42 by Sept 1st he has the whole 70k (minus the new PM garrison which I recommend be made up of one Bde and several Nav Gar and Base force) to use beyond Lunga....(note not at Lunga) If the Japanese stop their offensive threats the Allies simply go into build up mode.
Of course everything is dependant on the CV versus CV situation.
Japan must force and win a carrier battle at the earlist date. They can only be sure of doing this by making a threat the allies can not allow to succeed.
"It would seem that Mogami is basically advocating a porcupine strategy. Therefore, one need only counter with the very methods he has laid out."
What post made by me ever advocated digging in? I think I have been pretty adament in opposing any digging in at any base at any time. My plan calls for building supply lines and going as far as fast as possible without ever leaving any weak target for the enemy to strike. Early adventures in the Solomon's present the allies with early opportunity for a small victory (sinking un escorted transports) It is not the Japanese ground units that matter here it is stretching the fleet. The fleet the fleet the fleet.
That is all that matters. Japan can capture no base nor defend a base without the fleet. Every single ship commited must have a purpose and none can be lost without reason. The allies will in the end (after all else fails) come to realize the IJN is their primary target. The Japanese player must take steps early to place his fleet in a position of advantage. Port Moresby is captured because it is the number one threat to the fleet. Lunga can not be held if the Japanese player is allowed to deposit every ground unit and airgroup he has unless the fleet is there to protect it. Lunga before the fall of Port Moresby assigns the fleet 2 missions. It is for this reason alone I ignore Lunga (I do one thing at a time)
Greetings, I never intended for this thread to be "the Gospel according to Mogami" merely a starting point for person unacquainted with both Uncommon Valor and the WW2 history of this theater of operations. Experianced players can adopt what ever plan they desire thats suits their style. Rabaul is the safer choice for traffic between Truk and points south. The future status of Port Moresby is the first question the Japanes player must ask (and answer)
Other items of interest include assigning TF commanders. I recommend changing from the default Adm to the leader at the top of the list (senior CO of ships in TF) this prevents the Japanese from losing R Tanaka to sub while he commands a TF of several AP (Tanaka is the default leader of all non air combat IJN TF) Only assign Admirals to TF's that you expect engage in surface combat. Do not assign your best commanders (Tanaka or Lee depending on what side your on) without good reason. (There are lots of competent officers to use. Do not use officers to chase enemy subs (I've killed Lee and Tanaka many times when my sub torpedoed a subchaser or Patrol boat.)
The whole reason Japan can afford to concentrate on PM/NG is the lack of a viable threat from SOPAC.
This is why there is no need for the Japanese to bother with Lunga. I don't care what they garrison it with. (2 Regt's seems rather excessive) I am refering to the FLEET!!!!! units that will now need to be diverted from PM to Lunga. If you send a TF to Lunga it will need a covering force. The allies have enough CA/CL/DD to intercept it and gain early easy night experiance at the same time.
Every supply/fuel point that is used outside of the PM operation delays/puts at risk that operation. Every ship damaged or busy else where does the same. I would like the allies to reinforce PM
(at cost) The more they send there, the better. (the Japanese player if he only goes for PM can carry around 70k combat troops to PM. After it falls he needs 45-60 days to recarry it back to Truk where it rest and rebuilds. If Japan captures PM in first week of July 42 by Sept 1st he has the whole 70k (minus the new PM garrison which I recommend be made up of one Bde and several Nav Gar and Base force) to use beyond Lunga....(note not at Lunga) If the Japanese stop their offensive threats the Allies simply go into build up mode.
Of course everything is dependant on the CV versus CV situation.
Japan must force and win a carrier battle at the earlist date. They can only be sure of doing this by making a threat the allies can not allow to succeed.
"It would seem that Mogami is basically advocating a porcupine strategy. Therefore, one need only counter with the very methods he has laid out."
What post made by me ever advocated digging in? I think I have been pretty adament in opposing any digging in at any base at any time. My plan calls for building supply lines and going as far as fast as possible without ever leaving any weak target for the enemy to strike. Early adventures in the Solomon's present the allies with early opportunity for a small victory (sinking un escorted transports) It is not the Japanese ground units that matter here it is stretching the fleet. The fleet the fleet the fleet.
That is all that matters. Japan can capture no base nor defend a base without the fleet. Every single ship commited must have a purpose and none can be lost without reason. The allies will in the end (after all else fails) come to realize the IJN is their primary target. The Japanese player must take steps early to place his fleet in a position of advantage. Port Moresby is captured because it is the number one threat to the fleet. Lunga can not be held if the Japanese player is allowed to deposit every ground unit and airgroup he has unless the fleet is there to protect it. Lunga before the fall of Port Moresby assigns the fleet 2 missions. It is for this reason alone I ignore Lunga (I do one thing at a time)
Greetings, I never intended for this thread to be "the Gospel according to Mogami" merely a starting point for person unacquainted with both Uncommon Valor and the WW2 history of this theater of operations. Experianced players can adopt what ever plan they desire thats suits their style. Rabaul is the safer choice for traffic between Truk and points south. The future status of Port Moresby is the first question the Japanes player must ask (and answer)
Other items of interest include assigning TF commanders. I recommend changing from the default Adm to the leader at the top of the list (senior CO of ships in TF) this prevents the Japanese from losing R Tanaka to sub while he commands a TF of several AP (Tanaka is the default leader of all non air combat IJN TF) Only assign Admirals to TF's that you expect engage in surface combat. Do not assign your best commanders (Tanaka or Lee depending on what side your on) without good reason. (There are lots of competent officers to use. Do not use officers to chase enemy subs (I've killed Lee and Tanaka many times when my sub torpedoed a subchaser or Patrol boat.)
I'm not retreating, I'm attacking in a different direction!
Rehearsal
Ive found this to be one of the more interesting threads.Whatever your tactical views, the line that sticks in my head is Mogamis oneon "the complete war picture"
Im currently mucking about with the scenerio where the japs start with the monster task force and have PM, and Lunga, and Im playing as the japs.
Now we know this is easy to win, (max the 4 US Cvs and go and sink everything- at cost)
But what of the wider war picture?
Obviously Im talking WIP!
So Im using this scenerio as practice for later on, Ive had a major battle, sunk 4 CVs, crippled a few BBs, and boy, am I dug in. What next?. Im sending 6CVs, 5 BBs and all but 20 APs and escorts back to japan, as Im sure I will have to do in WIP
Tactics?
What do you think, oppose any landings with everything Ive got left?, or use the landing as a gigantic trap? cutting of the enemy division with my superior sea power
Anyway, playing this scenerio with a complete war picture in mind is very interesting, any cooments?
ps Beer is good
pps This game is bloody good
Im currently mucking about with the scenerio where the japs start with the monster task force and have PM, and Lunga, and Im playing as the japs.
Now we know this is easy to win, (max the 4 US Cvs and go and sink everything- at cost)
But what of the wider war picture?
Obviously Im talking WIP!
So Im using this scenerio as practice for later on, Ive had a major battle, sunk 4 CVs, crippled a few BBs, and boy, am I dug in. What next?. Im sending 6CVs, 5 BBs and all but 20 APs and escorts back to japan, as Im sure I will have to do in WIP
Tactics?
What do you think, oppose any landings with everything Ive got left?, or use the landing as a gigantic trap? cutting of the enemy division with my superior sea power
Anyway, playing this scenerio with a complete war picture in mind is very interesting, any cooments?
ps Beer is good
pps This game is bloody good
Big seas, Fast ships, life tastes better with salt
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dpstafford
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- Joined: Sun May 26, 2002 5:50 am
- Location: Colbert Nation
Re: Rehearsal
Sounds like you have tried to turn UV into a role playing game. What you need to do is pick a real scenario and a real opponent and prepare for the "boat" kicking of a life time.........Originally posted by herbieh
But what of the wider war picture?
Obviously Im talking WIP!
So Im using this scenerio as practice for later on, Ive had a major battle, sunk 4 CVs, crippled a few BBs, and boy, am I dug in. What next?. Im sending 6CVs, 5 BBs and all but 20 APs and escorts back to japan, as Im sure I will have to do in WIP
USN at holidays meanwhile???
Hi! I'm playing as Allied my third game vs AI. Are you thinking about USN forces and Australian Inf Divisions are at Holidays near Great Barrier???Originally posted by Oleg Mastruko
What do you (you as in all of you, not only Mogami) think of this semi-strategic outline:
- Capture and buildup of Lungga/Tulaghi ASAP, and making it into huge Zero/Betty base with the aim of terrorising the allied player up to (or down to) his doorstep at Noumea
- Capture of Buna, Wau and Gili with at least Regiment + support each (Wau is essential, I hope not to have to explain why)
- Fortify Wau, Buna and Gili, capture outlying islands (perhaps putting a garrison on more important ones)
- Maybe send a regiment to scout down the Kokoda trail to the outskirts of PM
- Keep division or two of infantry in Rabaul as a reserve. When you see where the allied player is going to attack (most probably Gili or Buna) - commit them
- Wait and fortify
O.
The first thing I did was secure PM, Buna and Lunga with Inf forces and Engineers, later BaseForces and Air Units. Meanwhile I have been transporting there supplies and fuel with low Jap opposing forces.
The only bad experience was when I was triying to keep GiliGili, but unfortunely my transports were sunk but 3 or 4, with one regiment and engineers to the sea.
I don't know the initial japanese forces, but I didn't have too problems to mantain these bases.
Greetings.
Churruca.
"Recuerdo cuando el Sol no se ponía en nuestro imperio!"
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Oleg Mastruko
- Posts: 4534
- Joined: Sat Oct 21, 2000 8:00 am
Re: USN at holidays meanwhile???
Churruca, "AI-girlies" (I borrowed this term from one of the Ozzies) are banned from this threadOriginally posted by churruca
Hi! I'm playing as Allied my third game vs AI.
O.
Re: Re: USN at holidays meanwhile???
Oleg, I have no problem to play against any of you!Originally posted by Oleg Mastruko
Churruca, "AI-girlies" (I borrowed this term from one of the Ozzies) are banned from this thread
O.
Churruca.
"Recuerdo cuando el Sol no se ponía en nuestro imperio!"
This is a great thread. One question for Mogami. He's always emphasizing the importance of rotating troops back to Truk or Rabaul to rest and refit. Is this practical? I mean, if Japan takes PM, do you really want to risk losing troops on transports making the long trek around Gili Gili, always in range of LBA from Australia? I suppose your answer is that you're diligent about using LRCAP to cover your troop transports, but of course that means less fighter support for other things. Do other folks rotate troops? Just how bad is the malaria-induced attrition, anyway?
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Oleg Mastruko
- Posts: 4534
- Joined: Sat Oct 21, 2000 8:00 am
Re: Re: Re: USN at holidays meanwhile???
You're on! As soon as the v2.0 is out.Originally posted by churruca
Oleg, I have no problem to play against any of you!
Churruca.
It's gonna hurt...
O.
troop rotation
Originally posted by Grotius
This is a great thread. One question for Mogami. He's always emphasizing the importance of rotating troops back to Truk or Rabaul to rest and refit. Is this practical? I mean, if Japan takes PM, do you really want to risk losing troops on transports making the long trek around Gili Gili, always in range of LBA from Australia? I suppose your answer is that you're diligent about using LRCAP to cover your troop transports, but of course that means less fighter support for other things. Do other folks rotate troops? Just how bad is the malaria-induced attrition, anyway?
Greetings, I guess I can reveal this now since the situation has changed. In game against U2 I sent every ground unit that was south of Truk home after I captured Port Moresby. Many of them were nearing 50 percent damaged. As they returned to full strength and rested and regained their morale I starting sending garrisons back to guard the empty bases. To cover their absence I kept the fleet active. Bombarding the Aussie coastal cites, Patroling between L'ville and Lunga. The engineers and Port Moresby assault troops were the ones that needed the break the most. The first units sent back south were the base forces that are going to maintain the bases. Then fighter groups moved south to provide CAP over the transports. I have pretty much regarrisoned all the forward bases. And many of the small way stations. My reserve at present contains a full strength rested division and several independent Bde's. It did require some weeks to accomplish but I think the time was worth it.
I'm not retreating, I'm attacking in a different direction!
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dpstafford
- Posts: 1329
- Joined: Sun May 26, 2002 5:50 am
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Re: troop rotation
By "damaged", I take you to mean 50% disrupted?Originally posted by Mogami
Greetings, I guess I can reveal this now since the situation has changed. In game against U2 I sent every ground unit that was south of Truk home after I captured Port Moresby. Many of them were nearing 50 percent damaged.
What is the difference in disruption and/or fatigue recovery for a stationary unit at a malaria vs. non-malaria base? Anybody know?
Re: Re: troop rotation
no I mean squads and weapons were "broke"Originally posted by dpstafford
By "damaged", I take you to mean 50% disrupted?
What is the difference in disruption and/or fatigue recovery for a stationary unit at a malaria vs. non-malaria base? Anybody know?
in a units listing it has
Inf Sqd X150
motar X 15
when something is not working you get something like
Inf Sqd (35) X115 The 35 Sqds are broke and do not add to the unit in combat.
At a non malaria base with the units HQ present units recover almost to 0 disruption/fatigue
At malaria bases getting them below 30 takes a lot of doing.
I'm not retreating, I'm attacking in a different direction!