ORIGINAL: Buckrock
Congratulations, that's probably twice the amount of words O'Hara used in that section of his conclusion.[:)]
Nice analysis but I'll just make one point for clarity. O'Hara is critical of the expensive British decision to go on and remain on the offensive in the
Mediterranean, particularly after the original objective of quickly knocking Italy out of the war had proven far more difficult than first thought. To my
knowledge though, O'Hara does not ever suggest the British should not have fought in defense (and less expensively) of their Mediterranean position.
Maybe it was because of the sheer number of words but to me the line between not being on the offense in the Mediterranean and not being there at all
seemed to be blurred at times in your analysis.
warspite1
Re the number of words, yes I think it appropriate to give adequate explanation when one is attacking the rubbishing of an entire strategy – particularly when in doing so, the simplistic nature of the argument needs to be properly exposed. When I reviewed O’Hara’s Torch (a decent book by the way) one of my criticisms is that at the end of every chapter was a conclusion. The problem was not the appearance of a conclusion – which was welcome – but the fact they were so short, almost as if they were an afterthought…… I feel that O’Hara has taken the same approach here. But anyway I digress….
To be clear, O’Hara
is critical of the decision to go on and remain on the offensive in the Mediterranean after the original objective of quickly knocking Italy out of the war had proven far more difficult than first thought*. But he is
also critical of Britain fighting any offensive war in the Mediterranean too – which apparently was not needed and was a secondary theatre…. Funny old war that O’Hara seems to be envisaging should have taken place – Italy not fighting from Libya and Britain not fighting from Egypt or Malta. Bizarre.
*Note that even had the British taken that view, the problems detailed below still apply – as indeed does the original need to fight in the Mediterranean as the only place to take on the Euro Axis on land.
Anyway back to the real world. What O’Hara said was:
- The RN should have vacated the Eastern Mediterranean (what I asked re the message that such action would have sent out to Spain and Turkey remains).
- The loss of Suez would not have been a problem
Did he actually say that the British should not have fought in the defence of Egypt? No, not in so many words – a lot of words are not his forte - but his throwaway line that the loss of Suez would apparently not be a problem perhaps gives a clue as to how hard the British should have fought for it in his eyes.
He did say that the best divisions should have been defending the Far East. Now forgive me but if the ‘best’ divisions that remained in North Africa in real life could not achieve a decisive breakthrough earlier – and indeed in 1942 were pushed back to El-Alamein, why does he assume that they would not be needed in a defensive war centred on Egypt?
All the British are doing, if they choose to fight in Egypt as opposed to Libya, is make a German breakthrough more problematic as the Axis are starting further forward – where do the British go once Cairo falls? Giving up the Eastern Mediterranean and defending Egypt only means the Italians can brings supplies further east. Note: the fleet’s position in Alexandria would have been completely untenable if the British are defending Egyptian soil only
The situation in Egypt was not exactly stable in WWII. The British deciding to fight a defensive war on the Nile would hardly be likely to invoke confidence from the Egyptians and encourage those who would week to revolt against the British. This is especially true when the Germans revert to terror bombing the civilians of Cairo and environs.
Of course O’Hara may counter the above by saying that the Germans would not have got involved. But again that makes no sense – well it does to O’Hara because in his world I assume he thinks Mussolini won’t attack into Egypt - well he attacked into Egypt in real life so why would he not in this alternate scenario? What has changed? But again, ignoring fantasy, if the British are in Egypt, then Hitler will fear (as he did in real life) an attack on his southern flank while he is involved in the USSR when Graziani’s offensive goes horribly wrong.
So apologies if I did not make myself clear, as you can see from the amendment time, I had a few stabs at it, but I hope that this is a little clearer and my word count is acceptable? [;)]
