Semi OT, Italy in the Med, a good book

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: Dili

All that German conquering Poland etc.. was done before 10 June, so Mussolini could not have seen it in war.

(where the Greeks had not only kicked the Italians out of Greece, but had occupied a third of Albania iirc! before being saved by German intervention)

By that time Italians didn't need any saving, the Greeks were already on defensive.

warspite1

Sorry I still don’t understand what you mean – there is no confusion with timescales.. I wrote:

Yes, my understanding is that in March 1940 the latest iteration of the plan was for Italy to remain on the defensive on all fronts inc the Yugoslav Alpine regions and Albania. Only the army in East Africa and the navy in the Med and elsewhere were to act offensively. There was no plan either to co-ordinate Italian actions with Germany.

But then the above included France and Egypt too and we know what happened to that plan come June 10th...

Essentially, once at war Mussolini got even more over excited, saw what Hitler was achieving in Poland, Norway, Belgium and Holland and decided that knocking over Greece, in winter, in the mountains, while also involved against the British in Egypt would make good sense....

Yes the German successes were pre-June 1940 and those successes made Mussolini think he needed to get in on the action.

Getting in on the action i.e. declaring war on a (for all intents and purposes) already beaten France and a Britain that had just been kicked off the continent was one thing, and despite the revised pre-war plan, that is what he did - and we know why and what the specific goal was. But given the pre-war plan, there was no reason to go any further pending Britain's expected surrender.

In his sane moments he knew full well what he was being told about Italy’s ability to wage war – and so going further and then demanding an attack on Britain in Egypt and Greece was total madness. But one can only assume he had seen what the Germans had done previously and lost any remaining ability to think rationally. No doubt as with the invasion of France (he thought they were beaten anyway) so similarly the British in Egypt must be weak as most forces are guarding against invasion of the UK. As discussed previously, the way Mussolini felt Hitler treated him simply added to his muddled thinking and he was determined to surprise Hitler by invading Greece.

By that time Italians didn't need any saving, the Greeks were already on defensive.

Really? I think this is looking at things through somewhat rose-tinted spectacles. To re-cap, the Italians invade Greece from Albania. They get a few miles inside Greece before disaster strikes and the Italian forces are sent into retreat. Not only do they retreat from Greece, but actually lose about a third of Albania. They then launched a spring offensive that totally failed. By the time of German intervention a stalemate was reached with the Greeks still well inside Albanian territory. Even come Spring, they appeared to have no ability to evict the Greeks from Albania.

Now consider what had recently happened at Beda Fomm. Yes, by any measure, in Spring of 1941 the Italians - on both the Greek and Libyan fronts - needed saving.

[Dili]

Well i just read what you wrote, it seemed to me literal.

---
By that time Greeks had no depth and lacked everything, the inevitable would happen end of spring, summer.
It was just a matter time for Italian units finally being rearranged, being whole, the Albanian harbors were working and finally the supply chain was starting to work . Before Divisions were split by regiments and even divided by battalions to stop holes, arriving without support. At time one general even said he didn't wanted more guns and soldiers he wanted "salmerie" = supplies/support.

[RFalvo69]

ORIGINAL: Dili

Attack on Greece was because Hitler didn't warned Mussolini of German troops being "invited" in Romania - the only place the Italy could get oil by that time- but the main reason was emotional out of spite.

Actually Italy planned to attack Greece since the Declaration of War in Jun, 1940 - out of the following profound reason: "Now that we are at war we must do something." Hitler, quite correctly, pointed out how that "something" should have been the invasion of Egypt - but Graziani, who knew very well how dire the situation in North Africa was, postponed the offensive over and over.

From Jun, 1940 onward the Italian High Command and Mussolini danced around the "Emergency G" (the codename for the invasion of Greece) always swinging from launching it within a week to postpone it indefinitely. Only the propaganda machine worked overtime to explain why Italy should attack a fellow fascist country. The excellent result of all of this was that Greece quietly started to mobilise while Italy was demobilising (the only country in WWII which started to demobilise after declaring war, I guess).

It is true that, at the end, Mussolini ordered the "immediate" invasion of Greece out of spite after Germany occupied Romania without warning him first. "This time it will be Hitler who will learn from the newspapers that I invaded Greece!"

That plan required 20 Divisions, they attacked with less then 10 because suddenly they had a vision and all saw the Greeks surrendering at first shot.

True. Actually, Italy attacked with 9 Divisions because (and this was only one an example of how surreal the whole situation was) that was the maximum number of Division that Visconti Prasca could command given his rank. With even one division more the overall operational command would have required a higher-ranked general - "robbing" Visconti Prasca of his moment of glory.

If you are interested in the Italo-Greek War, there is an excellent, very in-depth book written by an Italian journalist who fought in Greece (but he never mentions this in the book). I see that it is still available on Amazon. It would be the story of a farce if it weren't the story of a tragedy.

https://www.amazon.com/hollow-legions-M ... rvi+greece

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: RFalvo69

The excellent result of all of this was that Greece quietly started to mobilise while Italy was demobilising (the only country in WWII which started to demobilise after declaring war, I guess).

warspite1

No, Hitler did that too to after the fall of France iirc

[Skyros]

Hollow Legions is a good book so are any of the books by MacGregor Knox on Italy during this time period. In particualr Mussolini Unleashed and Hitler's Italian Allies.

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: Dili

By that time Greeks had no depth and lacked everything, the inevitable would happen end of spring, summer.
It was just a matter time for Italian units finally being rearranged, being whole, the Albanian harbors were working and finally the supply chain was starting to work . Before Divisions were split by regiments and even divided by battalions to stop holes, arriving without support. At time one general even said he didn't wanted more guns and soldiers he wanted "salmerie" = supplies/support.

warspite1

Well you might be right, but equally, had the Germans stepped in in the early spring you may have said the same thing with confidence that the Spring offensive would have been successful - and we know what happened there.

Fact is we don't know for certain either way. But remember Greece had no designs on Albania (look at their actions while occupying the place) and they could withdraw into the mountains as circumstances required. Even if you are right and the next spring, summer or whatever offensive was successful, in removing the Greeks from Albanian soil the Italians will lose more men, more equipment, more aircraft and more naval assets. The ability to reinforce the mess that is Libya is compromised too, although the ANZAC corps would be in Greece by then and further bolstering the line.

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: Skyros

Hollow Legions is a good book so are any of the books by MacGregor Knox on Italy during this time period. In particualr Mussolini Unleashed and Hitler's Italian Allies.

warspite1

Thanks - Hollow Legions on order [:)]

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: RFalvo69

ORIGINAL: Dili

Attack on Greece was because Hitler didn't warned Mussolini of German troops being "invited" in Romania - the only place the Italy could get oil by that time- but the main reason was emotional out of spite.

Actually Italy planned to attack Greece since the Declaration of War in Jun, 1940 - out of the following profound reason: "Now that we are at war we must do something." Hitler, quite correctly, pointed out how that "something" should have been the invasion of Egypt - but Graziani, who knew very well how dire the situation in North Africa was, postponed the offensive over and over.

From Jun, 1940 onward the Italian High Command and Mussolini danced around the "Emergency G" (the codename for the invasion of Greece) always swinging from launching it within a week to postpone it indefinitely. Only the propaganda machine worked overtime to explain why Italy should attack a fellow fascist country. The excellent result of all of this was that Greece quietly started to mobilise while Italy was demobilising (the only country in WWII which started to demobilise after declaring war, I guess).

It is true that, at the end, Mussolini ordered the "immediate" invasion of Greece out of spite after Germany occupied Romania without warning him first. "This time it will be Hitler who will learn from the newspapers that I invaded Greece!"

warspite1

In Mussolini (Hibbert) General Armellini stated "after the Duce had changed his mind about the timing every hour and once five times in a quarter of an hour".....

[warspite1]

.

[warspite1]

And so to the final parts of O’Hara’s conclusion chapter. This looks at the 1942 convoys themselves. I want to start with the section headed ‘Intangibles’. The reason being that the author’s view here was specifically picked up and commented upon by the OP and so is worthy of further examination. The OP said:

In short, the book illustrates…… allowing preconceived negative stereotypes about the fighting abilities of these forces to persist by the British.

Firstly, to talk about a preconceived view – and I am not sure that O’Hara actually used this term but may be wrong – is strange in this regard. Preconceived of course implies a view is taken about something before having any evidence is available to validate the view, but that is not the case here - Adowa, WWI, The Spanish Civil War - these are events that would have shaped a degree of expectation. Those views are then moulded and refined by actual events and experiences.

By the time of Harpoon/Vigorous the British had been at war with Italy for two years and had first-hand experience of Italian strengths and weaknesses. So the view built up by the British during those 2-years is no longer preconceived - to the extent it ever truly was.

Why does it matter? Well it matters because losing a battle or campaign (or struggling to win one) because of bad luck, small errors in the plan or because the enemy was just plain better, is one thing. Losing or struggling to win because the plan is guided by a bunch of rosy-faced, overweight Colonel Blimp types who despise the enemy for no reason other than racial stereotyping, is something else. Clearly the latter is more damning and so is a useful tool when trying to amplify one’s point in favour of a certain cause and downplay another.

But regardless of the word O’Hara uses, he does state: “The British fought the battle as victims of their own propaganda regarding the fighting qualities of the Italian armed forces”. The use of the word propaganda here is rather disappointing. Propaganda sounds as though there is some Machiavellian denial of the truth going on, whereas, as said, in reality the thought process was based on actual experience and what has gone before during two years of warfare. While Italian capability was held in high regard in certain areas e.g. Cunningham’s view of the air force, in the main it is hardly surprising if the overriding view of performance was guided by what happened in East Africa, Libya, Greece, Battle of Britain, failure to subdue Malta, failure to stop the reinforcement and re-supply of Malta. All of this points to a reasoned view of Italian capability without the need for ‘propaganda’.

But if we forget the inflammatory language like propaganda, there is another glaring problem with O’Hara’s conclusion, and one that means his view does not stand up to scrutiny imho. Notice the wording of this sentence: “The British fought the battle as victims of their own propaganda regarding the fighting qualities of the Italian armed forces”. BUT, that makes no sense, as clearly the British knew they were facing the Italians and the Germans. Not just the Italians. Whatever one wants to believe about the British view of the Italian armed forces, the simple fact – known all too well by the British – was that they would be facing German submarines and aircraft too. As has been detailed in previous posts on this thread, whilst the Italian forces had caused the British losses, the real threat to the RN, RAF and the supply of Malta time and again, proved to be the Germans. Any convoy operation in 1942 would mean the British facing the Italians and the Germans. Not just the Italians.

So in the final analysis what the author is arguing is that the British were going into battle against both the Germans and Italians, but because of mis-placed ‘British propaganda’ as to the ability of the Italians, the British would ignore the threat from the Germans and launch a plan as though they were only facing only the Italians…… like you do. Once again, and as has been mentioned before, O’Hara seems to airbrush the Germans out of the story when it suits…...

[Buckrock]

ORIGINAL: warspite1
But if we forget the inflammatory language like propaganda, there is another glaring problem with O’Hara’s conclusion, and one that means his view does not stand up to scrutiny imho. Notice the wording of this sentence: “The British fought the battle as victims of their own propaganda regarding the fighting qualities of the Italian armed forces”. BUT, that makes no sense, as clearly the British knew they were facing the Italians and the Germans. Not just the Italians. Whatever one wants to believe about the British view of the Italian armed forces, the simple fact – known all too well by the British – was that they would be facing German submarines and aircraft too. As has been detailed in previous posts on this thread, whilst the Italian forces had caused the British losses, the real threat to the RN, RAF and the supply of Malta time and again, proved to be the Germans. Any convoy operation in 1942 would mean the British facing the Italians and the Germans. Not just the Italians.

So in the final analysis what the author is arguing is that the British were going into battle against both the Germans and Italians, but because of mis-placed ‘British propaganda’ as to the ability of the Italians, the British would ignore the threat from the Germans and launch a plan as though they were only facing only the Italians…… like you do. Once again, and as has been mentioned before, O’Hara seems to airbrush the Germans out of the story when it suits…...

Just maybe O'Hara is suggesting the British ran their convoys the same as before, the German threat was as dangerous as before but this time, the
Italians lifted their game beyond what the British had expected from them through previous encounters.

If O'Hara believes it was the improved performance of the Italian armed forces, particularly their navy, in planning, co-ordination, speed of response
and determination in their mission that was the key spanner thrown into the British June convoy plans, then he's probably justified in focusing on that
in his conclusion.

He certainly didn't shy away during the action narrative from giving credit to any German aircraft, S-Boat and U-boat for inflicting damage, as they had
done on previous occasions against British convoys that had still succeeded in getting through.

This time though, something was different and O'Hara is attempting to identify what it was.

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: Buckrock

ORIGINAL: warspite1
But if we forget the inflammatory language like propaganda, there is another glaring problem with O’Hara’s conclusion, and one that means his view does not stand up to scrutiny imho. Notice the wording of this sentence: “The British fought the battle as victims of their own propaganda regarding the fighting qualities of the Italian armed forces”. BUT, that makes no sense, as clearly the British knew they were facing the Italians and the Germans. Not just the Italians. Whatever one wants to believe about the British view of the Italian armed forces, the simple fact – known all too well by the British – was that they would be facing German submarines and aircraft too. As has been detailed in previous posts on this thread, whilst the Italian forces had caused the British losses, the real threat to the RN, RAF and the supply of Malta time and again, proved to be the Germans. Any convoy operation in 1942 would mean the British facing the Italians and the Germans. Not just the Italians.

So in the final analysis what the author is arguing is that the British were going into battle against both the Germans and Italians, but because of mis-placed ‘British propaganda’ as to the ability of the Italians, the British would ignore the threat from the Germans and launch a plan as though they were only facing only the Italians…… like you do. Once again, and as has been mentioned before, O’Hara seems to airbrush the Germans out of the story when it suits…...

Just maybe O'Hara is suggesting the British ran their convoys the same as before, the German threat was as dangerous as before but this time, the
Italians lifted their game beyond what the British had expected from them through previous encounters.

If O'Hara believes it was the improved performance of the Italian armed forces, particularly their navy, in planning, co-ordination, speed of response
and determination in their mission that was the key spanner thrown into the British June convoy plans, then he's probably justified in focusing on that
in his conclusion.

He certainly didn't shy away during the action narrative from giving credit to any German aircraft, S-Boat and U-boat for inflicting damage, as they had
done on previous occasions against British convoys that had still succeeded in getting through.

This time though, something was different and O'Hara is attempting to identify what it was.

warspite1

I will look at the other points he makes in the conclusion later, but just two points to make here:

1. You say that something was different and O’Hara is attempting to justify what it was. Well justification can come from a number of angles; e.g. improved Italian performance, mistakes by the British in planning, operational mistakes by the British, the Germans and the Italians, weather (and O'Hara makes these points as he sees them) but also a desperate shortage of the ships, aircraft and air bases that would give the operation a better chance. It was war, things go wrong. In other words, a sensible appraisal. What O’Hara doesn’t have to do is bring in silly words like propaganda. The British didn’t launch Vigorous without a battleship or an aircraft carrier because they thought the Italians (remember for this theory to work they ignore the Luftwaffe and the U-boats) were useless (although human nature being what it is, they could be forgiven for drawing on past experience). They didn’t have any spares kicking around doing nothing. It is June 1942, Malta desperately needs re-supply. Midway had not happened during the planning stage (and had only just happened when the convoys operations were launched) and the British had concerns over the security of the Indian Ocean (the Kido Butai had already attacked the previous Easter) and the fear was that they would adopt raiding tactics similar to the Germans from their newly won bases in Singapore and the NEI. For that reason an Eastern Fleet has been assembled. Could the British have diverted some of these forces? Well yes, but they simply cannot cover everything with the resources available….

2. You say he doesn’t shy away from giving credit to the Germans during the action narrative, and yes, he does mention which air force or which submarine sunk which ship. But when summarising performance, when attempting to prove his view of the Italian Navy, the German contribution goes strangely AWOL. It has to – otherwise the point he is trying to make starts to unravel.

[Buckrock]

All I was really addressing was your stated confusion over a line O'Hara used in his concluding chapter.....

ORIGINAL: warspite1
Notice the wording of this sentence: “The British fought the battle as victims of their own propaganda regarding the fighting qualities of the Italian armed forces”. BUT, that makes no sense, as clearly the British knew they were facing the Italians and the Germans. Not just the Italians.

It made sense to me when I read it under the heading of "Intangible" factors as O'Hara had already identified in his chapters on the June convoys that
the primary reason for the British defeat was their assumption during planning that the Italian operational use of its own naval surface forces would
prove to be no more of a threat than it had been to prior convoys.

You can disagree with his supporting analysis all you wish but simply picking out a line in his conclusion and saying that makes no sense on its own,
well that seems to make no sense either. Perhaps it would have been better to have first addressed the underlying reasons he had already laid out in
his book.

[Dili]

The Italian submarines were also more effective in battle by 1942 and that was not because they were better boats.

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: Buckrock

All I was really addressing was your stated confusion over a line O'Hara used in his concluding chapter.....

ORIGINAL: warspite1
Notice the wording of this sentence: “The British fought the battle as victims of their own propaganda regarding the fighting qualities of the Italian armed forces”. BUT, that makes no sense, as clearly the British knew they were facing the Italians and the Germans. Not just the Italians.

It made sense to me when I read it under the heading of "Intangible" factors as O'Hara had already identified in his chapters on the June convoys that
the primary reason for the British defeat was their assumption during planning that the Italian operational use of its own naval surface forces would
prove to be no more of a threat than it had been to prior convoys.

You can disagree with his supporting analysis all you wish but simply picking out a line in his conclusion and saying that makes no sense on its own,
well that seems to make no sense either. Perhaps it would have been better to have first addressed the underlying reasons he had already laid out in
his book.

warspite1

Well I thought I would look at this broken down into sections to avoid the possibility of running down your battery [;)]

But on a more serious note, I guess this is a case of agreeing to disagree. It is impossible to view the June convoys - or the August convoy, or just about anything else in the Med post January 1941 without looking at the whole pie. Regardless of assumptions on naval performance of the Italians, the performance of the German U-boats and aircraft and indeed Italian aircraft needed to be taken into account. The convoys would come under attack along almost the entire length of the journey, starting with the aircraft (and possibly submarines). What those units achieve could be anything ranging from nothing to annihilation of the convoy. To suggest that British planning was only - or even primarily - focused on the Italian Navy (and further that that planning was compromised because of 'propaganda') doesn't - to my mind - ring true.

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: Dili

The Italian submarines were also more effective in battle by 1942 and that was not because they were better boats.

warspite1

And this is to be expected (with caveats). All things being equal one would expect all services to improve effectiveness over time during war as false, pre-war assumptions are proven to be wrong, as crews gain experience, and as lessons are learned etc.

The two things that can most affect that (in the absence of new and better equipment) are a) have sufficient cadre of crews survived to learn from the experience (which if not can amend the expectation downwards) and b) what is the experience level/strength of the enemy (which can amend up or down)?

[Orm]

Very interesting discussion. [&o] Thank you. Much for me to ponder on. [:)]

xxxxx

However. One minor detail distracted me somewhat in some of the posts. I think referencing to a Minor Non-commissioned Officer instead of using his name is confusing and distracting. Especially since I suspect the it was used as a derogatory term and therefore, in my humble opinion, lessens the argument made.

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: Orm

Very interesting discussion. [&o] Thank you. Much for me to ponder on. [:)]

xxxxx

However. One minor detail distracted me somewhat in some of the posts. I think referencing to a Minor Non-commissioned Officer instead of using his name is confusing and distracting. Especially since I suspect the it was used as a derogatory term and therefore, in my humble opinion, lessens the argument made.

warspite1

Not meant in a derogatory way. Both Napoleon and Hitler are known as 'Little Corporals'. In the case of Napoleon this is most certainly not a derogatory term - but one to celebrate his achievements at such a lowly rank. In the case of Hitler, this was his highest rank in the army - and he was referred to as such in the film Battle of Britain (about 2:25) when referring to his (and Napoleon's) attempts to invade the UK. I believe he was referred to as such in mocking terms by members of the German Army.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ymFSzyTqfe0

[BBfanboy]

ORIGINAL: warspite1

ORIGINAL: Orm

Very interesting discussion. [&o] Thank you. Much for me to ponder on. [:)]

xxxxx

However. One minor detail distracted me somewhat in some of the posts. I think referencing to a Minor Non-commissioned Officer instead of using his name is confusing and distracting. Especially since I suspect the it was used as a derogatory term and therefore, in my humble opinion, lessens the argument made.

warspite1

Not meant in a derogatory way. Both Napoleon and Hitler are known as 'Little Corporals'. In the case of Napoleon this is most certainly not a derogatory term - but one to celebrate his achievements at such a lowly rank. In the case of Hitler, this was his highest rank in the army - and he was referred to as such in the film Battle of Britain (about 2:25) when referring to his (and Napoleon's) attempts to invade the UK. I believe he was referred to as such in mocking terms by members of the German Army.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ymFSzyTqfe0

I sometimes wonder if the English language confused the junior NCO "corporal" with the Italian (and maybe Spanish?) Caporal - or "Capo" in mafia parlance. The latter clearly means the top boss.

[Buckrock]

ORIGINAL: warspite1
Well I thought I would look at this broken down into sections to avoid the possibility of running down your battery [;)]

Touche,

But...

But on a more serious note, I guess this is a case of agreeing to disagree. It is impossible to view the June convoys - or the August convoy, or just about anything else in the Med post January 1941 without looking at the whole pie. Regardless of assumptions on naval performance of the Italians, the performance of the German U-boats and aircraft and indeed Italian aircraft needed to be taken into account. The convoys would come under attack along almost the entire length of the journey, starting with the aircraft (and possibly submarines). What those units achieve could be anything ranging from nothing to annihilation of the convoy. To suggest that British planning was only - or even primarily - focused on the Italian Navy (and further that that planning was compromised because of 'propaganda') doesn't - to my mind - ring true.

What exactly are you suggesting we are disagreeing about? I only pointed out O'Hara's concluding statement on the June convoys makes sense when taken
with his supporting arguements elsewhere in the book, as would be expected with an author's concluding statements. Saying an author's statment makes
sense is not the same as saying the author's case is persuasive.

And I'm perplexed about your following comments concerning British Jume convoy planning being primarily focused on the Italian Navy. O'Hara didn't say
that and neither did I.

I have to ask at this point, did you read O'Hara's book in its entirety or just his opening and closing chapters for the background and skim through the
rest?