Japanese defensive strategy...
Moderators: Joel Billings, wdolson, Don Bowen, mogami
RE: This one is great - thanks Mogami!
One important point to mention is that in the real war, the Japanese had no clue the US had broken it`s codes so well (in the game, the IJN player realizes his mail is being read). Much like Pearl Harbor being a surprise as the US high command did not believe it possible (in spite of good info Japan was about to go to war....then again the US had good info that Al Quaeda would strike in 2001 and the government did not make it a high priority it seems) it seems the IJN doubted the ability of the USN to get more than 1 or 2 CVs ready..And they were quite confident of handling a couple of carriers..Also, if one of their carriers had take the beating that the Lex took, it is doubtful they could have done a 3 day patch job....
To quote from Evans/Peattie`s {Kaigun}
"Mistakes in operations and tactics can be corrected, but
political and strategic mistakes live forever". The authors were refering to Japan but the same could be said of the US misadventure in Iraq
"Mistakes in operations and tactics can be corrected, but
political and strategic mistakes live forever". The authors were refering to Japan but the same could be said of the US misadventure in Iraq
Yorktown
Hi, Since we are being Doctor Technical throughout this thread. It was Yorktown that was repaired from Coral Sea for Midway. Lexington was lost.
I'm not retreating, I'm attacking in a different direction!
RE: Yorktown
ORIGINAL: Mogami
Hi, Since we are being Doctor Technical throughout this thread. It was Yorktown that was repaired from Coral Sea for Midway. Lexington was lost.
Well then, that would make the patch job even more doubtful.
Have no fear,
drink more beer.
drink more beer.
RE: Yorktown
Hi Byron
I haven't been on the web site for quite a long while until recent. My work had kept me very busy and was unable to help out on the game, but my current work contract ends officially today and has tapered off in the last couple weeks. I am actually back now trying to catch up with whats been going on.
This has been an entertaining thread to say the least:) You have to give Mdiehl credit for being able to spar with so many adversaries..although he is getting a bit testy...hehe.
On a side note, referencing his last comment to me. My educational degree just happens to be in the aviation field which includes aviation history and aircraft design. I am fully aware of how the aircraft production cycle was during WWII which, from an engineer's perspective, has never changed much until the early 90's when design engineers started using computers versus slide rules and calculators. As for aircraft documentation and operating manuals and the definitions of max range, combat radius, and other related aircraft characteristics that I stated earlier, these haven't changed in 60+ years. Technology has advanced quite a bit and the design process has become extremely complex and lengthy, but the basic definitions haven't changed a bit.
Also one has to be wary when reading aircraft specifications from various online sources. When you start to read specs that deal with ranges, speeds, rates of climb, weapons loads and other performance data, I would almost guarentee that they are derived from the aircraft operating manuals. There maybe articles on the web actually written by aircraft test pilots that can provide more precise data, but unless that's the case, I wouldn't trust the source myself.
One reason why online sources don't tell the whole truth is that most people that write these just don't understand all the vagries that can occur when calculating the various aircraft specifications. Let's take max speed for instance. Max speed is supposed to be the aircrafts maximum possible non-accelerating/decelerating speed in level flight. The AH-1 cobra has a listed max speed of 190 knots. What the reader doesn't know is that this is in "clean" flight, meaning no wing stores or weapons. Well..the aircraft never flies without wingstores due to weight and balance issues, and the moment you attach a rocket pod (empty), the max speed is reduced to 180 knots. Then when you attach a tow missile launcher, which is the standard configuration, the speed is further reduced to 170 knots. In all my years, even in diving flight I was never able to get the aircraft past 165 knots let alone level flight. I even flew a new aircraft right from the factory with less than 25 hours on the airframe and still was only able to get to 145 in level flight. So, technically speaking, even though the -10 states max speed is 190 knots, realistically this is an unachievable airspeed..unless of course the rotor blades come off in flight due to retreating blade stall when trying to fly that fast.
My point here is that even though an aircraft specification says max speed equals "x" amount of speed or max range equals "x" number of miles, you have to understand this is done in a clean configuration with no weapons and with no aircraft mods (basically a factory stock aircraft) and at optimum operating engine and environmental conditions. When you attach weapons, add various aircraft mods, operate with worn engines, operate when temps and pressure altitudes do not conform to a "standard day", aircraft performance is going to degrade, and it doesn't matter if that plane was made in 1934 or in 2004.
Sabre21
I haven't been on the web site for quite a long while until recent. My work had kept me very busy and was unable to help out on the game, but my current work contract ends officially today and has tapered off in the last couple weeks. I am actually back now trying to catch up with whats been going on.
This has been an entertaining thread to say the least:) You have to give Mdiehl credit for being able to spar with so many adversaries..although he is getting a bit testy...hehe.
On a side note, referencing his last comment to me. My educational degree just happens to be in the aviation field which includes aviation history and aircraft design. I am fully aware of how the aircraft production cycle was during WWII which, from an engineer's perspective, has never changed much until the early 90's when design engineers started using computers versus slide rules and calculators. As for aircraft documentation and operating manuals and the definitions of max range, combat radius, and other related aircraft characteristics that I stated earlier, these haven't changed in 60+ years. Technology has advanced quite a bit and the design process has become extremely complex and lengthy, but the basic definitions haven't changed a bit.
Also one has to be wary when reading aircraft specifications from various online sources. When you start to read specs that deal with ranges, speeds, rates of climb, weapons loads and other performance data, I would almost guarentee that they are derived from the aircraft operating manuals. There maybe articles on the web actually written by aircraft test pilots that can provide more precise data, but unless that's the case, I wouldn't trust the source myself.
One reason why online sources don't tell the whole truth is that most people that write these just don't understand all the vagries that can occur when calculating the various aircraft specifications. Let's take max speed for instance. Max speed is supposed to be the aircrafts maximum possible non-accelerating/decelerating speed in level flight. The AH-1 cobra has a listed max speed of 190 knots. What the reader doesn't know is that this is in "clean" flight, meaning no wing stores or weapons. Well..the aircraft never flies without wingstores due to weight and balance issues, and the moment you attach a rocket pod (empty), the max speed is reduced to 180 knots. Then when you attach a tow missile launcher, which is the standard configuration, the speed is further reduced to 170 knots. In all my years, even in diving flight I was never able to get the aircraft past 165 knots let alone level flight. I even flew a new aircraft right from the factory with less than 25 hours on the airframe and still was only able to get to 145 in level flight. So, technically speaking, even though the -10 states max speed is 190 knots, realistically this is an unachievable airspeed..unless of course the rotor blades come off in flight due to retreating blade stall when trying to fly that fast.
My point here is that even though an aircraft specification says max speed equals "x" amount of speed or max range equals "x" number of miles, you have to understand this is done in a clean configuration with no weapons and with no aircraft mods (basically a factory stock aircraft) and at optimum operating engine and environmental conditions. When you attach weapons, add various aircraft mods, operate with worn engines, operate when temps and pressure altitudes do not conform to a "standard day", aircraft performance is going to degrade, and it doesn't matter if that plane was made in 1934 or in 2004.
Sabre21
RE: Yorktown
There's much flying around so I'm going to direct my responses generically and if you've been looking for an answer from me to a question I hope I've not forgotten your question.
1. Sources. I typically use four printed sources for a/c range. The only web site source that I used is the USN's web site that gives the combat radius of the F4F as 324 miles. Since I do not carry my sources around with me, I sometimes use a web source (such as the NASM), but I'll revise it if I subsequently discover that the web source is way off from my printed sources.
2. Range. Maybe this belongs in the a/c range thread, but... the ranges of ALL of the a/c (Japanese and US) exceed the actual combat radii by a good margin. Some sources will have the "combat loaded range" which in essence means how far the thing can fly on one tank of gas, armed. If you halve these figures and back off 20-30% you still get ranges that greatly exceed 200 miles. By the way, this applies to Japanese a/c as well as Allied ones. That is, the "ranges" given for a/c like the Aichi D3A are typically 900 miles. That is not a "strike radius" (otherwise you'd have to argue that the strike radius of the SBD was 750 miles), it's just "how far on one tank of gas." IIRC it was Sabre21 who pointed out that these may be "optima." The sources do not cite mfrs manuals or design bureau specs, so these may be optima or they may be "most common expected range." At some point, we can be sure, the people who actuallyd eployed and used the a/c wrote down some observations as to what could really be expected.
3. Why, then, does the "range" even halved less 20-30% exceed the common practice? Answer, because carrier ops are more complex than land based runway ops. Carriers (then, anyhow) did not typically have the launch rate capability of runways, so a/c had to loiter longer to form groups. Carriers tended to move after launching planes, so navigation was unarguably trickier. Naval targets tended to move after strikes were launched at them, so navigation was trickier still. When returning to parent CVs, a/c typically had to spend more time waiting (because it was not always "a good moment" for the CV to land planes, or because there were lots of planes ahead of you in the landing cycle). Thus, while a TF commander might launch a strike at targets at extreme range (for ex in the battle of the Phillippine Sea), if he wanted potentially battle-damaged a/c to get home, he'd give a pilot a good margin for problems.
4. Common practice. It seems fairly typical of both the USN and IJN to launch CV based a/c at FIXED targets (land bases, ships anchored in a port) at ranges up to 250 miles for the IJN (Darwin Raid is the longest ranged attack a Japanese CV ever put up) and up to 200 miles (USN in 1942, increasing as the war progressed and longer-legged a/c became available). In CV vs CV combat, both the IJN and USN made regular practice of waiting to close the range to less than 180 miles. The Pearl Harbor strike is interesting in that the Japanese, despite the risk of detection, chose to close to 180 miles more or less before launching their attack. One reason for a Japanese commander to close the range is the consideration of the fragility of his a/c. Lacking self-sealing tanks, they were far more susceptible to fuel loss than USN a/c.
That, by the way, is why I responded that limiting a/c (at least CV based ones) to two hexes, while offered in jest, was not the worst idea I've heard around here. Assuming that every hex represents 80 nm, a two hex range would be appropriate for both IJN and USN CV based a/c attacking mobile enemy surface units. Axis Fanboys might protest being shortchanged maybe 20 nm, but at no point in the war was the common GAME practice of standing off out of the (hindsight informed) known range of the USN CV based a/c a tactic employed by the IJN. It'd be nice if Matrix could figure out a way to prevent that ahistorical tactic from being used.
5. Collisions. They happened alot. That's my point. And not just in the IJN. If the originally proposed massive bombardment TF comprised of Godzilla, 6 IJN BBs, Xerxes Army, a dozen CAs, and sixty plus DDs tried to get in range to pound Midway, they'd HAPPEN. It's almost a dead certainty. What're you gonna do, establish a Flying Circus of ships and have them steam in a big circle, each in turn opening fire for a few minutes as its distance from Midway approached its nadir? If two CAs (Mikuma and Mogami) can bump avoiding a submarine (not the torpedoes, muind you, just the sub), don't you think jamming 100+ (mostly radarless) ships into a gun line at night is an, err, "complex maneuver?" To believe otherwise is to have an inordinate faith in perfect planning.
6. The Japanese plan at Midway sucked. I may be opposed by 100 people here, fortunately being correct is a fundamentally NON democratic process. I'd staunchly defend the claim that the Earth is a spheroid in the face of 100 Flat-Earthers any day, and that's about how much contempt I have for the "Midway=Luck" devotees. When you consider how much BAD luck the USN had that day, and how much GOOD luck the IJN had in even finding Yorktown at all, invoking "better luck for Japan" is a crazy idea.
7. Beyond that, the Japanese plan was UTTERLY ERROR INTOLERANT. Not only in requiring perfect results from the first strike wave on Midway, but also in assuming that the CVs could simultask three jobs at once. Their recon plan had NO overlap in a/c search routes. They knew, from the get go, that if ANY ONE search plane had problems, disappeared, for example, from an engine failure or whatever, that that a/c's assigned patrol area would go un-explored. That they chose to implement such an error intolerant plan does itself strongly suggest that the only way the Japanese COULD have won at Midway would have been if EVERY element of the Japanese plan were executed without flaw, AND if major elements of the USN plan went awry.
That's why 1/1000 is, IMO, the best approximation of Japanese success at Midway that I am willing to accept. To believe that the Japanese plan was LIKELY to come out otherwise is to believe in perfection in Japanese planning and execution. I am quite sure that the famous Axis Faboys around here believe the IJN was incapable of error, and that is probably why they think Midway had much chance of turning out other than it did.
1. Sources. I typically use four printed sources for a/c range. The only web site source that I used is the USN's web site that gives the combat radius of the F4F as 324 miles. Since I do not carry my sources around with me, I sometimes use a web source (such as the NASM), but I'll revise it if I subsequently discover that the web source is way off from my printed sources.
2. Range. Maybe this belongs in the a/c range thread, but... the ranges of ALL of the a/c (Japanese and US) exceed the actual combat radii by a good margin. Some sources will have the "combat loaded range" which in essence means how far the thing can fly on one tank of gas, armed. If you halve these figures and back off 20-30% you still get ranges that greatly exceed 200 miles. By the way, this applies to Japanese a/c as well as Allied ones. That is, the "ranges" given for a/c like the Aichi D3A are typically 900 miles. That is not a "strike radius" (otherwise you'd have to argue that the strike radius of the SBD was 750 miles), it's just "how far on one tank of gas." IIRC it was Sabre21 who pointed out that these may be "optima." The sources do not cite mfrs manuals or design bureau specs, so these may be optima or they may be "most common expected range." At some point, we can be sure, the people who actuallyd eployed and used the a/c wrote down some observations as to what could really be expected.
3. Why, then, does the "range" even halved less 20-30% exceed the common practice? Answer, because carrier ops are more complex than land based runway ops. Carriers (then, anyhow) did not typically have the launch rate capability of runways, so a/c had to loiter longer to form groups. Carriers tended to move after launching planes, so navigation was unarguably trickier. Naval targets tended to move after strikes were launched at them, so navigation was trickier still. When returning to parent CVs, a/c typically had to spend more time waiting (because it was not always "a good moment" for the CV to land planes, or because there were lots of planes ahead of you in the landing cycle). Thus, while a TF commander might launch a strike at targets at extreme range (for ex in the battle of the Phillippine Sea), if he wanted potentially battle-damaged a/c to get home, he'd give a pilot a good margin for problems.
4. Common practice. It seems fairly typical of both the USN and IJN to launch CV based a/c at FIXED targets (land bases, ships anchored in a port) at ranges up to 250 miles for the IJN (Darwin Raid is the longest ranged attack a Japanese CV ever put up) and up to 200 miles (USN in 1942, increasing as the war progressed and longer-legged a/c became available). In CV vs CV combat, both the IJN and USN made regular practice of waiting to close the range to less than 180 miles. The Pearl Harbor strike is interesting in that the Japanese, despite the risk of detection, chose to close to 180 miles more or less before launching their attack. One reason for a Japanese commander to close the range is the consideration of the fragility of his a/c. Lacking self-sealing tanks, they were far more susceptible to fuel loss than USN a/c.
That, by the way, is why I responded that limiting a/c (at least CV based ones) to two hexes, while offered in jest, was not the worst idea I've heard around here. Assuming that every hex represents 80 nm, a two hex range would be appropriate for both IJN and USN CV based a/c attacking mobile enemy surface units. Axis Fanboys might protest being shortchanged maybe 20 nm, but at no point in the war was the common GAME practice of standing off out of the (hindsight informed) known range of the USN CV based a/c a tactic employed by the IJN. It'd be nice if Matrix could figure out a way to prevent that ahistorical tactic from being used.
5. Collisions. They happened alot. That's my point. And not just in the IJN. If the originally proposed massive bombardment TF comprised of Godzilla, 6 IJN BBs, Xerxes Army, a dozen CAs, and sixty plus DDs tried to get in range to pound Midway, they'd HAPPEN. It's almost a dead certainty. What're you gonna do, establish a Flying Circus of ships and have them steam in a big circle, each in turn opening fire for a few minutes as its distance from Midway approached its nadir? If two CAs (Mikuma and Mogami) can bump avoiding a submarine (not the torpedoes, muind you, just the sub), don't you think jamming 100+ (mostly radarless) ships into a gun line at night is an, err, "complex maneuver?" To believe otherwise is to have an inordinate faith in perfect planning.
6. The Japanese plan at Midway sucked. I may be opposed by 100 people here, fortunately being correct is a fundamentally NON democratic process. I'd staunchly defend the claim that the Earth is a spheroid in the face of 100 Flat-Earthers any day, and that's about how much contempt I have for the "Midway=Luck" devotees. When you consider how much BAD luck the USN had that day, and how much GOOD luck the IJN had in even finding Yorktown at all, invoking "better luck for Japan" is a crazy idea.
7. Beyond that, the Japanese plan was UTTERLY ERROR INTOLERANT. Not only in requiring perfect results from the first strike wave on Midway, but also in assuming that the CVs could simultask three jobs at once. Their recon plan had NO overlap in a/c search routes. They knew, from the get go, that if ANY ONE search plane had problems, disappeared, for example, from an engine failure or whatever, that that a/c's assigned patrol area would go un-explored. That they chose to implement such an error intolerant plan does itself strongly suggest that the only way the Japanese COULD have won at Midway would have been if EVERY element of the Japanese plan were executed without flaw, AND if major elements of the USN plan went awry.
That's why 1/1000 is, IMO, the best approximation of Japanese success at Midway that I am willing to accept. To believe that the Japanese plan was LIKELY to come out otherwise is to believe in perfection in Japanese planning and execution. I am quite sure that the famous Axis Faboys around here believe the IJN was incapable of error, and that is probably why they think Midway had much chance of turning out other than it did.
Show me a fellow who rejects statistical analysis a priori and I'll show you a fellow who has no knowledge of statistics.
Didn't we have this conversation already?
Didn't we have this conversation already?
RE: Yorktown
You are not alone. The farce is with you.
[:D]
Honestly. I sometimes think that every f*ckin grognard around here has 20+ years experience in Star Fleet or something. The deluded faith in operational and tactical perfection is astonishing.
Show me a fellow who rejects statistical analysis a priori and I'll show you a fellow who has no knowledge of statistics.
Didn't we have this conversation already?
Didn't we have this conversation already?
RE: Yorktown
ORIGINAL: mdiehl
You are not alone. The farce is with you.
[:D]
Honestly. I sometimes think that every f*ckin grognard around here has 20+ years experience in Star Fleet or something. The deluded faith in operational and tactical perfection is astonishing.
[:D]
Ain't that the truth!
Just one minor factor to add to your discussion points, the USN liked to recover pilots unlike the IJN, this may play into the actual ranges used. It is possible they used the shorter range based on the fact they would be in a better position to recover pilots shot down or ditching when out of gas. This would also have the added benefit of keeping their fighters in A2A combat longer as they knew their CV's were charging in to close the range, buying them time ... While it may not actually help in the end, it would certainly help morale.
-
Mike Scholl
- Posts: 6187
- Joined: Wed Jan 01, 2003 1:17 am
- Location: Kansas City, MO
RE: Yorktown
MEDIEL I will flat out agree with you that the Japanese Planning for Midway
"stunk up the joint". No plan based on your enemy doing exactly what you
want him to do is very realistic. I think it was the elder Von Molke who cor-
rectly observed that "There are always three courses of action available to
the enemy..., from which he inevitably selects the fourth."
The plan scattered their assets all over the Pacific in "cutsey" little deception
missions when what they really needed was a "600 lb Gorilla". From top to
bottom it was riddled with "wishful thinking".
But luck still played a part. The Americans were in a better position to capito-
lize on it when it came their way, and the Japanese planning was virtually
based on their's being all good (which it wasn't). But it wasn't a guarantee.
No plan ever survives contact with the enemy, and if luck wasn't a factor then
Napoleon would never have commented that he'd rather have a lucky General
than a good one.
"stunk up the joint". No plan based on your enemy doing exactly what you
want him to do is very realistic. I think it was the elder Von Molke who cor-
rectly observed that "There are always three courses of action available to
the enemy..., from which he inevitably selects the fourth."
The plan scattered their assets all over the Pacific in "cutsey" little deception
missions when what they really needed was a "600 lb Gorilla". From top to
bottom it was riddled with "wishful thinking".
But luck still played a part. The Americans were in a better position to capito-
lize on it when it came their way, and the Japanese planning was virtually
based on their's being all good (which it wasn't). But it wasn't a guarantee.
No plan ever survives contact with the enemy, and if luck wasn't a factor then
Napoleon would never have commented that he'd rather have a lucky General
than a good one.
RE: Yorktown
I don't (much) believe in luck. I believe in Murphy's law. Systems have weak points and when highly stressed the weak points give first. The Japanese plan had several critical weak points. The USN plan had few. One can imagine how things could have broken out differently. But one can't imagine that a complex, weak, error intolerant plan was likely to be executed without error.
I suppose my "1/1000" figure is my nod to the vagaries of "luck."
I suppose my "1/1000" figure is my nod to the vagaries of "luck."
Show me a fellow who rejects statistical analysis a priori and I'll show you a fellow who has no knowledge of statistics.
Didn't we have this conversation already?
Didn't we have this conversation already?
Midway
Hi, Well it appears to me you are confusing two distinct conversational paths in this thread. I'm not advocating the historical outcome of the battle of Midway being changed.
I'm addressing a reality. In 2 person games of WITP Midway is unlikely to repeat in the historic pattern. The Japanese player who ventures into the central pacific (or any other location) looking for a carrier battle is going to have a much improved chance. The CV airgroups will be set to naval attack. Search will be increased and most likely the CV will be divided into several TF's traveling together.
If there is a local Allied airfield inside the battle area it will likely as not be targeted by a bombardment TF. (I'd recommend the Japanese preform some kind of recon in advance to check for number of aircraft and mines)
Doing what Nimitz did (deploy 3 CV to ambush 4) is not going to be easy.
For one thing in UV and WITP strikes are not mutally exclusive. If you launch a strike at enemy CV in range they are going to launch a strike back at you. (unless the airgroups are set to other missions)
The Japanese operate inside enemy air range from day one of the war.
The Allies also remained inside range of enemy LBA for long periods.
There were disasters (POW/Repluse) but many ships traveled many miles under going many air attacks without damage. You cannot depend on LBA to protect a base. The only sure defense is a surface force that is able to outfight enemy TF's supporting a landing. Of course to complete the circle this TF is exposed to enemy CV airgroup attack.
CV aircraft are by their nature lighter then Land based aircraft of same role. Range is generally less. It is supposed the LBA can detect and attack the CV before the CV can launch. It is supposed the LBA will carry a heaver load. Early in the war it is training levels that make the difference. Allied ships in range of Japanese LBA are in much more danger then Japanese ships in range of Allied LBA. USN CV's however have well trained aircrews making them very dangerous. In the beginning it is the low number of fighters and older models of fighters that limit the USN CV.
The important thing from the IJN point of view when hunting USN CV is to insure they bring as many aircraft to the fight. (If not more) In the first exchange the IJN will lose more aircraft so they have to cripple the enemy the first try.
If the USN has a like number of CV operational after the first strikes are exchanged it is likely their 2nd strike will be larger then the Japanese 2nd strike.
Don't put all your CV into the same TF. Mutally supporting TF's are better then monster TF's.
I'm addressing a reality. In 2 person games of WITP Midway is unlikely to repeat in the historic pattern. The Japanese player who ventures into the central pacific (or any other location) looking for a carrier battle is going to have a much improved chance. The CV airgroups will be set to naval attack. Search will be increased and most likely the CV will be divided into several TF's traveling together.
If there is a local Allied airfield inside the battle area it will likely as not be targeted by a bombardment TF. (I'd recommend the Japanese preform some kind of recon in advance to check for number of aircraft and mines)
Doing what Nimitz did (deploy 3 CV to ambush 4) is not going to be easy.
For one thing in UV and WITP strikes are not mutally exclusive. If you launch a strike at enemy CV in range they are going to launch a strike back at you. (unless the airgroups are set to other missions)
The Japanese operate inside enemy air range from day one of the war.
The Allies also remained inside range of enemy LBA for long periods.
There were disasters (POW/Repluse) but many ships traveled many miles under going many air attacks without damage. You cannot depend on LBA to protect a base. The only sure defense is a surface force that is able to outfight enemy TF's supporting a landing. Of course to complete the circle this TF is exposed to enemy CV airgroup attack.
CV aircraft are by their nature lighter then Land based aircraft of same role. Range is generally less. It is supposed the LBA can detect and attack the CV before the CV can launch. It is supposed the LBA will carry a heaver load. Early in the war it is training levels that make the difference. Allied ships in range of Japanese LBA are in much more danger then Japanese ships in range of Allied LBA. USN CV's however have well trained aircrews making them very dangerous. In the beginning it is the low number of fighters and older models of fighters that limit the USN CV.
The important thing from the IJN point of view when hunting USN CV is to insure they bring as many aircraft to the fight. (If not more) In the first exchange the IJN will lose more aircraft so they have to cripple the enemy the first try.
If the USN has a like number of CV operational after the first strikes are exchanged it is likely their 2nd strike will be larger then the Japanese 2nd strike.
Don't put all your CV into the same TF. Mutally supporting TF's are better then monster TF's.
I'm not retreating, I'm attacking in a different direction!
RE: Midway
I'm not confusing anything, Mo. With respect, I suggest that if you plan on suppressing Midway solely using naval bomabrdment you will lose most of your naval bombardment TF to Midway-based strikes unless you task your CVs to cover the bombardment TF.
If you do that, since the operating CAP radius of a Japanese CV was about 14 statute miles, your CV will (a) be found, because it's within 14 miles of a TF that has to get within 20 miles or Midway, and (b) you WILL be mission overtasked, because you have to cover (i) your CVs, (ii) the bombardment group (iii) looking for USN CVs and (iv) attacking them if you find them. In these circumstances, I believe Midway gets a couple free shots at the bombardment TF, and the USN CVs still hit you with a big airstrike that sinks 1-3 CVs and damages 2-4.
Were I the Allied player I would not waste time basing B17s at Midway as strike a/c. I'd have two PBY VP groups patrolling and a couple squadrons each of F4Fs and SBS, and 1 squadron of torpedo bombers set to night attack. This assumes that the battle occurs after, say, February 1942. Before that it might be a challenge to get the assets in place.
It may be that the computer code allows bombardment TFs to routinely attempt run-ins on shore installations. I think the frequency with which this occurs in UV is optimistic and overvalues the potential of such tactics. I do hope that the most likely result in the event that people routinely try such gamey devices is that the airbase kicks the snot out of the bombardment group. At the time it was well understood that the airbase had the upper hand.
I also hope that the LR CAP mission will be eliminated from the options for CV based a/c. It has no historical precedent.
If you do that, since the operating CAP radius of a Japanese CV was about 14 statute miles, your CV will (a) be found, because it's within 14 miles of a TF that has to get within 20 miles or Midway, and (b) you WILL be mission overtasked, because you have to cover (i) your CVs, (ii) the bombardment group (iii) looking for USN CVs and (iv) attacking them if you find them. In these circumstances, I believe Midway gets a couple free shots at the bombardment TF, and the USN CVs still hit you with a big airstrike that sinks 1-3 CVs and damages 2-4.
Were I the Allied player I would not waste time basing B17s at Midway as strike a/c. I'd have two PBY VP groups patrolling and a couple squadrons each of F4Fs and SBS, and 1 squadron of torpedo bombers set to night attack. This assumes that the battle occurs after, say, February 1942. Before that it might be a challenge to get the assets in place.
It may be that the computer code allows bombardment TFs to routinely attempt run-ins on shore installations. I think the frequency with which this occurs in UV is optimistic and overvalues the potential of such tactics. I do hope that the most likely result in the event that people routinely try such gamey devices is that the airbase kicks the snot out of the bombardment group. At the time it was well understood that the airbase had the upper hand.
I also hope that the LR CAP mission will be eliminated from the options for CV based a/c. It has no historical precedent.
Show me a fellow who rejects statistical analysis a priori and I'll show you a fellow who has no knowledge of statistics.
Didn't we have this conversation already?
Didn't we have this conversation already?
RE: Midway
Allied ships in range of Japanese LBA are in much more danger then Japanese ships in range of Allied LBA.
And that's nuts. If it is the case that such is how the game works, it needs repair.
Show me a fellow who rejects statistical analysis a priori and I'll show you a fellow who has no knowledge of statistics.
Didn't we have this conversation already?
Didn't we have this conversation already?
RE: Midway
Hi, There are 3k Japanese aircraft and 3k Allied (approx) However over half the allied aircraft are not in the battle area. This leaves a decided Japanese advantage in numbers where it matters. The largest allied airfield is attacked on day one and should never regain full effectivness.
Attrition rapidly decreases Allied strength.
This simple fact should have been beyond dispute and almost no need to mention. I was trolling.
It is much more dangerous to be an Allied ship in the SRA then it is to be a Japanese ship in the SRA.
Attrition rapidly decreases Allied strength.
This simple fact should have been beyond dispute and almost no need to mention. I was trolling.
It is much more dangerous to be an Allied ship in the SRA then it is to be a Japanese ship in the SRA.
I'm not retreating, I'm attacking in a different direction!
RE: Midway
I guess I missed your point. Of course if there are no Allied strike a/c within range of Japanese TFs then the Japanese TFs should have little to fear from air strikes. If, however, six operational Hudsons with bombs are sitting on an Indonesian airbase and are flown by EXP 30 pilots, an unescorted Japanese AP TF (no CAP) should have a very good chance of being badly hurt.
Cause that's the reality of the relationship of a/c to ships. At least until the magnetron is introduced. [:D]
Cause that's the reality of the relationship of a/c to ships. At least until the magnetron is introduced. [:D]
Show me a fellow who rejects statistical analysis a priori and I'll show you a fellow who has no knowledge of statistics.
Didn't we have this conversation already?
Didn't we have this conversation already?
RE: Midway
Cause that's the reality of the relationship of a/c to ships. At least until the magnetron is introduced.
[:D]
Back to my early Midway grab plan ... to do so requires stealing the very aircraft that close Clark Field for good so one really has to think carefully about the pros and cons of such an action.
RE: Midway
Hi There are 2 Daitai of Betty in the Home Island belonging to Southern Area Army. And then there are the Nells on Kwajalean. So there is no need to steal the Clark Field bomber groups from Formosa.
I should point out that the allies can base B-17 on Johnson Island that can hit Midway so you really need to capture there as well.
Johnson might even be a better base as it is closer to Kwajalean (a major support base) then Midway is to any comparable base.
I should point out that the allies can base B-17 on Johnson Island that can hit Midway so you really need to capture there as well.
Johnson might even be a better base as it is closer to Kwajalean (a major support base) then Midway is to any comparable base.
I'm not retreating, I'm attacking in a different direction!
RE: Midway
ORIGINAL: Mogami
Hi There are 2 Daitai of Betty in the Home Island belonging to Southern Area Army. And then there are the Nells on Kwajalean. So there is no need to steal the Clark Field bomber groups from Formosa.
I should point out that the allies can base B-17 on Johnson Island that can hit Midway so you really need to capture there as well.
Johnson might even be a better base as it is closer to Kwajalean (a major support base) then Midway is to any comparable base.
I thought about that, but you will notice that I can't get there fast enough and there is still the little matter of a couple of USA CV's wandering around ...
As far as the Betty/Nell groups in the Home Islands, I am using them, I am also swiping the Kwajalean ones ... due to the extreme range of the attack, those 5 groups are just not enough for what I want. (99 planes)
Tainan yields another 36, Takao another 54. I could also swipe them from Saigon which has 99. Really depends on how well Clark and Singapore go on turn one ...
I also have to swipe the Base unit in Tokyo and the Aviation unit in Ominato to support these aircraft.
The idea here to be be operational and hitting PH within the opening days of the game. Time is very critical. While Johnson is probably a better longer term target, you just can't pull it off in the timelines I am thinking of although it would be an interesting next step because the troops used to take Midway could head there next...
btw: as a side note, Johnson doesn't have the supplies available to fly B-17's against me and it is also only a size 4 airfield as built, and getting supplies there is a little bit troublesome seeing as KB is still hanging around Midway waiting for the Yanks to come out and play.
RE: Midway
ORIGINAL: mdiehl
. If, however, six operational Hudsons with bombs are sitting on an Indonesian airbase and are flown by EXP 30 pilots, an unescorted Japanese AP TF (no CAP) should have a very good chance of being badly hurt.
Cause that's the reality of the relationship of a/c to ships.
Actually, there were several cases of when 6 Hudsons, or 6 Bleinhiems or 6 B-17s attacked no CAP AP TFs with little or no effect at all. I would expect the same from a small bomb carrying Nell or Betty formation as well. Because that was the reality of small formations level bombing shipps under steam in 41- 42. Cant think of any instances of "badly" hurting a TF by level bombing.
Game Fixes
Mogami mentioned two game issues that are troubling.
First, he mentions that if you launch a CV v. CV strike the other side will launch at you (unless you are tasked for something else). If this means that an enemy set for anti-shipping will automatically launch a full-strength counterstrike at you - even when he has not otherwise spotted you - that is something that should change. Is that truly how the system works? No chance for a free first strike if the opponent is set for anti-shipping?
Second, and probably the flip-side of the same coin, if you are not tasked anti-shipping and you are surprised by the opponent's carrier force, you cannot react. How many strikes does the opponent get at you before you can change your priority to anti-shipping? If the enemy gets more than one strike, that is wrong. What happens if you have a secondary priority of anti-shipping?
First, he mentions that if you launch a CV v. CV strike the other side will launch at you (unless you are tasked for something else). If this means that an enemy set for anti-shipping will automatically launch a full-strength counterstrike at you - even when he has not otherwise spotted you - that is something that should change. Is that truly how the system works? No chance for a free first strike if the opponent is set for anti-shipping?
Second, and probably the flip-side of the same coin, if you are not tasked anti-shipping and you are surprised by the opponent's carrier force, you cannot react. How many strikes does the opponent get at you before you can change your priority to anti-shipping? If the enemy gets more than one strike, that is wrong. What happens if you have a secondary priority of anti-shipping?
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Damien Thorn
- Posts: 1107
- Joined: Thu Jul 24, 2003 3:20 am
RE: Midway
ORIGINAL: mdiehl
Allied ships in range of Japanese LBA are in much more danger then Japanese ships in range of Allied LBA.
And that's nuts. If it is the case that such is how the game works, it needs repair.
Of course that's how the game works (just like in UV) because that is how reality worked. Japanese land-based planes carried torpedoes, which are much deadlier to ships than HE bombs. Also, the allied tactic at this time was high-altitude bombing...not accurate at all.
If, however, six operational Hudsons with bombs are sitting on an Indonesian airbase and are flown by EXP 30 pilots, an unescorted Japanese AP TF (no CAP) should have a very good chance of being badly hurt.
How can you delude yourself so? Have you even played UV at all? Exp 30 pilots are lucky to even find their way home. If your 6 exp 30 pilots attacked a task force the EXPECTED results 999 times out of 1000 should be no hits at all and at least one plane lost.