Japanese defensive strategy...

[Apollo11]

Hi all,

We all know how WWII went in history (i.e. we have hindsight) and how US defeated Japan.


Now... I wonder what are the most important strategic decision Japanese player in WitP should make to be better than what historically Japanese were...


Here are three (3) I find most important (feel free to update):


#1 Convoy System (and escorts) + ASW

One of the most neglected aspect of Japanese navy was convoy system (and escorts) together with ASW.

The US submarines took heavy heavy tool...


#2 Avoid Midway-like disaster

IMHO, the Japan should try to take what can be taken (and defended) while still strong and then immediately go defensive.


#3 Maximally secure all possible 4-engine bases in vicinity of Japan

The B-29 attacks were, at the end, so strong and so powerful that Japanese economy had no chance.

Since the fighter/AAA defense is dubious the only possible "cure" is not to allow US to get the bases where big 4-engine bombers can strike from.

IMHO, the whole strategy of Japanese WitP defense should be based on demand that such bases (and we exactly know which ones they are) should be defended at all cost and maximally defensively prepared (troops/fortifications) right from the start of campaign.


Opinions gentleman?


Leo "Apollo11"

[madflava13]

I agree with all 3 points. I would add:

4. Secure "outpost" bases (Tarawa, Lunga, etc.) and back them up with powerful surface, sub and CV forces. Establish a defense in depth so the US has to invade those outposts. Batter the invasions, bleed the Allies, repeat. You will give up ground, but each time you'll take a chunk out of Allied striking power. This is the strategy Mogami and others have discussed at length in the UV forum, and I've found it to be the best hope for the IJN player.

5. Preserve your aircrews. Don't throw away 90+ EXP pilots bombing an airfield like PM. Save them for strikes on invasion convoys, CV task forces, etc.

[mogami]

Hi, Thats pretty much the way I see things as well. I don't pretend to believe there exists any "Super" strategy for knocking the USA out. All that Japan can do is try to avoid surrender. The B-29 in range is the key to this. The longer Japan prevents this the longer she lasts.
The Allies on the other hand don't really have to rush about either.
Their war plan has to have these bases secured and built in time for B-29 arrival and deployment.

The B-29 begins production and arrival on map in May 1944. The Allied player should therefor endeavor to capture Saipan/Tinian and Guam before May 1944. The real success or failure of the period Dec 1941 to May 1944 will be measured by this.

[Apollo11]

Hi all,

ORIGINAL: Mogami

Hi, Thats pretty much the way I see things as well. I don't pretend to believe there exists any "Super" strategy for knocking the USA out. All that Japan can do is try to avoid surrender.

For those of us who will immensely enjoy playing Japanese side because it's fight against the odds this will be real fun.

Please note that I would, same as in UV, love to play both sides (Allies and Japanese) but real challenge lies in trying to beat the stronger opponent (aren't we strange - the underdog lovers)... [;)]

I also agree that Japanese victory in WitP is _APSOLUTELY_ out of question - what would matter to me is how longer and better I was able to stand before the inevitable outcome.

The B-29 in range is the key to this. The longer Japan prevents this the longer she lasts.
The Allies on the other hand don't really have to rush about either.
Their war plan has to have these bases secured and built in time for B-29 arrival and deployment.

The B-29 begins production and arrival on map in May 1944. The Allied player should therefor endeavor to capture Saipan/Tinian and Guam before May 1944. The real success or failure of the period Dec 1941 to May 1944 will be measured by this.

It would be interesting to calculate the following:

#1
How much ground forces Japan can put into crucial defense of bases that are in B-29 range?

I hope 1-2 divisions (+ support units) for each of the bases would be possible...


#2
How long it would take to maximally train the units (divisions + support) you put aside for defense of those areas?


#3
How long would it take to maximally fortify those bases?



Leo "Apollo11"

[Apollo11]

Hi all,

ORIGINAL: madflava13

Preserve your aircrews. Don't throw away 90+ EXP pilots bombing an airfield like PM. Save them for strikes on invasion convoys, CV task forces, etc.

Sadly, we don't have any influence on aircrew training but with careful management the quality should be possible to retain (especialy since UV excess pilot bugs are fixed in WitP)...


Leo "Apollo11"

[mogami]

Hi, The Players do have a lot of influence on air crew training.
The Japanese player can train airgroups of untrained pilots up to trained status. It only requires around a year. If you can do without an airgroup and have a secure base with supply then training can occur. (Many SRA bases are ideal because they produce their own supply)

Currently my practice in scenario 15 (the complete war 1941-1946) is to on turn 1 set all Japanese on map airgroups to "do not recieve replacements"
Then I go through the units and disband undersize groups to fill out other groups so the finished airgroup has all trained pilots.
Disbanded airgroups will return in around 365 days. (Dec 42)
These groups will have at least one year to train.

As groups enter battle the process will repeat. (combining existing airgroups to keep trained pilots and then rebuilding a new group)

The trained pilot pool is reserved for the CV airgroups. The Army is allowed to draw replacments for certain groups as required (giving them a little staying power)

[madflava13]

Interesting points Mogami...

Another strategy that I would employ as the IJN player would be the formation of hunter-killer ASW groups. I see TFs based on Chitose/Nisshin CSs and 3 or 4 good ASW DDs/PCs based around Takao as ideal. Coupled with heavy land-based ASW efforts, I think the Japanese player could do quite a bit better than historical. Although just about anybody could probably do better than history...

[LargeSlowTarget]

I've read claims that B-29 raids wasted bombs on factories/refineries that already had to shut down production for want of raw materials - due to the US submarines. If this was indeed the case, then #1 is even more important than #3.

[mogami]

Hi, As Japan I want to repluse the first Allied attempt to capture the Sapain/Tinian/Guam complex (Known in my war plan as the "Main Defensive Complex because it is the main point to the war effort)

Prior to 1 Jan 1944 I will improve the bases building the ports and airfields as large as possible. Japanese CD units and aviation support will be moved there. A Japanese major HQ will deploy on Tinian with a subordinate Area Army HQ on each island.

My projections are the USN will arrive with approx 1000 aircraft. (another 600 or so will be used to protect their transports and condust ASW) Japan must have ready between 3,200 and 4,800 aircraft with trained pilots. (roughly 76-114 airgroups)(Japan has roughly 90 non CV combat airgroups on Dec 7 1941)

The mission of the fighters is to absorb the enemy fighters and allow bombers to penetrate to attack. Each enemy CV damaged above 50 points reduces the total by 90.
The main target for the bombers during the opening phase is enemy CV.
As air protection is reduced the enemy transports will become the piority target.
The IJN cannot intervene in the battle before the enemy air power is exhausted or reduced to the point the Japanese can provide air support.
The IJN CV will wait to approach and attack the enemy landings.
The combination of mines, CD, massive air attack and finally IJN surface and carrier forces is hoped to isolate the Allied troops on the beach where they can then be destroyed. The effect of this reverse will hopefully be to delay the allied war effort to the point where their victory is impossible (Japan avoids surrender long enough that the allies cannot meet their victory conditions)

[Ron Saueracker]

ORIGINAL: madflava13

Interesting points Mogami...

Another strategy that I would employ as the IJN player would be the formation of hunter-killer ASW groups. I see TFs based on Chitose/Nisshin CSs and 3 or 4 good ASW DDs/PCs based around Takao as ideal. Coupled with heavy land-based ASW efforts, I think the Japanese player could do quite a bit better than historical. Although just about anybody could probably do better than history...

With the current sighting/air attack abilities of aircraft vs subs, doing better than historically should be a walk in the park. For some reason, subs seem to only be submerged in this game when attacking in daylight. Most subs STAYED submerged in daylight while patrolling enemy waters and only came to periscope depth for sonar contacts and scheduled looksees. Running on the surface was reserved for transit to the patrol area,recharging batteries at night, and for making end-arounds to position themselves ahead of a target. As the war progressed, this changed somewhat with new technology (radar) and more aggressive skippers, but the simple fact of having radar should negate the majority of air attacks.

[Ron Saueracker]

ORIGINAL: Mogami

Hi, As Japan I want to repluse the first Allied attempt to capture the Sapain/Tinian/Guam complex (Known in my war plan as the "Main Defensive Complex because it is the main point to the war effort)

Prior to 1 Jan 1944 I will improve the bases building the ports and airfields as large as possible. Japanese CD units and aviation support will be moved there. A Japanese major HQ will deploy on Tinian with a subordinate Area Army HQ on each island.

My projections are the USN will arrive with approx 1000 aircraft. (another 600 or so will be used to protect their transports and condust ASW) Japan must have ready between 3,200 and 4,800 aircraft with trained pilots. (roughly 76-114 airgroups)(Japan has roughly 90 non CV combat airgroups on Dec 7 1941)

The mission of the fighters is to absorb the enemy fighters and allow bombers to penetrate to attack. Each enemy CV damaged above 50 points reduces the total by 90.
The main target for the bombers during the opening phase is enemy CV.
As air protection is reduced the enemy transports will become the piority target.
The IJN cannot intervene in the battle before the enemy air power is exhausted or reduced to the point the Japanese can provide air support.
The IJN CV will wait to approach and attack the enemy landings.
The combination of mines, CD, massive air attack and finally IJN surface and carrier forces is hoped to isolate the Allied troops on the beach where they can then be destroyed. The effect of this reverse will hopefully be to delay the allied war effort to the point where their victory is impossible (Japan avoids surrender long enough that the allies cannot meet their victory conditions)

I'm beginning to wonder about you...[;)]

[mdiehl]

I'd use traffic analysis and codebreaking to determine the strength and disposition of air, naval and land forces in Tinian/Guam/Saipan. If the strength there was inordinate, I'd fake towards the center while attacking up the New-Guinea, Palaus, Davao, PI route, cutting off Japan from the SRA by mid 1944. From there, Formosa and Okinawa, and start carpet bombing Japanese cities from there.

If Japan has more than 500 trained pilots by 1944, he probably has not offered any significant resistence in the SOPAC, SWPAC, or SRA areas. Otherwise the production and training models are flawed.

[Mr.Frag]

Although just about anybody could probably do better than history

Is that not always the classic statement of all wars? Hindsight always seems to render all actions taken during war to be silly and questionable, but then again, we have far too much information available to us to render our judgements.

I'm sure Japan felt at the time that they really had no choice but to go to war based on the political realities of the day and fully expected to be able to come out ahead on the land grab aspect, settling afterwards and giving back everything they had taken except for the oil fields to the Dutch who really were not in a position to debate it.

Curious who would have jumped to the aid of the Dutch if that had been the ONLY target? Do people think that the USA & Britain would have jumped to their aid considering the other priorities in Europe? Based on the delayed entry of the USA into the war in Europe, I think they just might have gotten away with it. No one wanted the war, but if forced into it, they were certainly going to win in.

[mogami]

If Japan has more than 500 trained pilots by 1944, he probably has not offered any significant resistence in the SOPAC, SWPAC, or SRA areas. Otherwise the production and training models are flawed.

Hi, I'm willing to bet that more then 500 pilots who flew more then 20 combat missions survived the entire war.
(I mean trained pilots who survive from 1941 to 1945.)

We constantly seem to under rate the number of pilots Japan had at start and how many they trained per year.
Japan built 67,000 aircraft during the war (The USA built over 300,000)
Assuming half these aircraft never flew or were replaced before being lost it would mean Japan had approx 33,000 pilots. If only 1/2 of these are untrained it is still a disaster.

When the Allies destroy 50+ aircraft on the ground they put 50+ pilots out of work until (and unless) a replacement aircraft arrives. I seem to recall stories that when submarines arrived with the limited supplies to isolated bases they removed trained pilots and ground crews and other hard to replace and now nonessentional to the base defense personal.

Of the 350 pilots or so that attacked Pearl Harbor at least 50 survived into the 1980's

The effect of just 1 untrained man in a flight of 3 aircraft cannot be lightly dismissed. In a Daitai of 9 such flights 9 untrained men would greatly reduce the groups abilty. This only assumes a 33% untrained ratio.
I think it is the untrained men who make up a large portion of those lost. (Applies to flyers or ground pounders) Untrained pilots have to be constantly replaced.

I'd rather fight the great battle in the PI. More bases and I can place 500,000 troops in the PI. If you've followed my Late War AAR you'll notice the airgroups used in battle for Main Defense Complex route through PI (many of them begin in PI and surronding bases.)
I don't think the Allies can achive the tactical surprise at PI they can in CenPac. (The Japanese will know it is going to come but still the day the USN CV appear will be a surprise.)

[mdiehl]

Of course you'd rather fight the main battle in the PI if you can. But you will not be able to do so (if the game is accurately modeled) if you have the aforementioned disposition in the Marianas. It'd be a poor Allied player who does not use intel to its fullest (again, assuming the game models the advantage properly) to attack where you ain't. I expect the intel feature to give the US the identities of most GCU and ACUs at a given base, the superior HQs, ship concentrations, orders of battle, operation plans, and so forth. Aerial recon and USN scout-sub and seal functions to provide accurate supplemental counts of aircraft, their readiness and dispersal, coastal defenses and so forth.

[mogami]

Hi, Once again. I intend on having 3200 to 4800 aircraft ready for the great battle. They will not be sitting on Saipan/Tinian/Guam exposed to bombardment/surprise carrier attack. They will be deployed in the PI.

[mdiehl]

Great. If they're not in the Marianas then they should be unavailable when the US invades those islands. Again, this is the sort of information that the Allied player should have by virtue of a properly modeled intel function.

You can't just up and reassign 1000 aircraft to a new base in one or two days an expect them to operate. Even assuming that all the "aviation support" and facilities were en location to maintain, supply, arm, house, feed, launder, crap, and otherwise service the pilots and their a/c, the "down time" would be on the order of a month. Getting pilots to billets. Familiarization with new operating environment. Familiarization with local chain of command. Familiarization with new service personnel. etc. Ad nauseam.

Heck, it'd probably take at least a week just to issue the orders to MOVE that many a/c, another week to fly them to their new destination.. otherwise you'd have traffic control problems that make Chicago O'Hare traffic control look like Tarreytown Airport.

If WitP is allowing the rapid movement and operational preparation of large numbers of a/c in very brief intervals, that is a major flaw.

[mogami]

Hi, How long do you think it takes to move aircraft from the rear to forward bases?
(USN transports should be spotted 2-3 days before they can land. Fast TF's might not be spotted before they are 1 day from contact.

RO class submarines will be on picket duty 600 miles out from Japanese bases.

[sven6345789]

Looking at these numbers (see Mogami further up the Thread), I wonder if the allies are capable of taking Saipan, Tinian and Guam at all. If the japanese throw everything they have at the islands, bypassing them in turn might not be such a bad idea. You could bypass it on a southern route, using the Celebes as a staging area for an invasion of the Phillipines. These areas should be quite empty.
If you do attack Saipan, I wonder how much the superior allied aircraft (Hellcat, for example) come into play. the japanese player probably has the strength to defend the area of the marianas once. Maybe a good Idea would be to do a few raids with your carriers first (like between January and May 1944) to weaken this fortress. Seems to be the only chance you have . But taking a look at these numbers, I doubt you can take it at all.

What has to be archieved to bring japan to surrender anyhow?

Another initial defense tactic. The idea of an attack on Midway during 1942 is not as bad as it turned out to be historically. You have to concentrate your forces though. This way you might take out a few carriers, taking some offensive punch out of the allies. Might end up with you loosing a few too though which you cannot replace. But after 1943, I really don't know what to do with my Carriers as the japanese player. Fighting the allied CV's ends up in suicide in my opinion. Mogami does have an interesting point there though, similar to the actual plan the japanese had in Saipan, only on a larger scale.
Mogami, do you see a chance for the allies to win that "big battle"?

[mdiehl]

RO class submarines will be on picket duty 600 miles out from Japanese bases.

I'd have pretty routine surface search radar equipped PBYs with acoustic torpedoes clearing potential invasion routes rather routinely. I think even without such clearance, the likelihood of a picket sub getting near enough to an Allied TF in 1944 to count ships or ascertain destination is low, even assuming you can put enough subs in the defensive zone to mount an effective scouting operation.