Yamamoto's Plan in action

[Mike Scholl]

ORIGINAL: el cid again

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl
Seems that all the "what iffing" ever done on these forums is a shade of "what if the JAPANESE had this, or had done that, or hadn't done whatever?". But the Japanese players are hardly ever faced with a "what if the Allies aren't where they are supposed to be?"; or doing "what they're supposed to do?". When you look at the planning and discussion on the Japanese side before the war, there is a tremendous amount of doubt and worry over how the opening campaigns will unfold..., but players have almost no doubts that "exactly this will be exactly there and in exactly what condition".

In any case - in RHS - I FORCE your plan into action - by the use of supply sinks. It puts immobile units on the major sites, units with engineers who will demolish automatically - not to mention general damage done because a battle must be fought even if NO military units are present. In a sense RHS pre adopted your idea - for different reasons. I don't say the Allies had such a plan - I say the locals can and did try to damage things - and the Japanese get nothing - ever - for free - undamaged - unlike forms of WITP without supply sinks. My sinks exist not only to eat supplies - but to be your demolition teams - and IF Matrix fixes the excess supply problem - the demolition function will probably be grounds to keep them. [The Allies need not defend a location: if it has a supply sink it must be fought over - and it will demolish before it dies - and many think it will defend too strongly (we had to work long to make them not be too strong)]

Well, you missed the point again. The "example" was tongue-in-cheek just to show that there were Allied "what-if's" as well. A game decided in such a manner wouldn't be much fun for either side.

The real point is that all these wonderous "what if's" folks keep coming up with for the Japanese depend far to much on the certainty of information. The Japanese themselves had a ton of fears and worries about how the War would unfold..., only the certainty of "losing to economics" drove them to "tossing the military dice" at all. What I'm saying is if you are going to get very far into the "what if" world, then for the sake of fairness and realism you really need to restore the fear and uncertanty to the Japanese side. Add in a number of possibilities that could be different, or go differently. Something to put back the worries and problems the real Japanese had...., and give the players some of the same qualms and trebidations and ulcer-inducing stress.

[witpqs]

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl
The real point is that all these wonderous "what if's" folks keep coming up with for the Japanese depend far to much on the certainty of information. The Japanese themselves had a ton of fears and worries about how the War would unfold..., only the certainty of "losing to economics" drove them to "tossing the military dice" at all. What I'm saying is if you are going to get very far into the "what if" world, then for the sake of fairness and realism you really need to restore the fear and uncertanty to the Japanese side. Add in a number of possibilities that could be different, or go differently. Something to put back the worries and problems the real Japanese had...., and give the players some of the same qualms and trebidations and ulcer-inducing stress.

Excellent point.

[herwin]

ORIGINAL: JWE

ORIGINAL: herwin

Why not game it out using Command at Sea? Sofian's "No Sailor But A Fool" is supposed to allow the modelling of amphibious operations. Game out the campaign, and see if the Japanese can sustain a high enough tempo to prevent the Americans from reinforcing in time. You cannot assume surprise.

The Seelowe scenario in Sofian is a landing by two German infantry divisions against a beach defended by a heavily entrenched infantry brigade. It's believed to be balanced. The American divisions on Oahu were the best available in the Army at the time, so the force needed for a successful landing on Oahu was probably well in excess of three divisions.

What a fun idea. Might actually try it. The Marines in the group might get a kick out of it. Our group uses WitP as the strategic portion of a campaign, and TacOps as the tactical element. I think we can come up with suitable topos for the Islands. Our map guru can usually translate in a couple hours or so.

2 Big Questions … 1) where do they land? and 2) composition of the landing force?

Hydrography says they come in from the North/Northwest. Winter in the Islands … hmm … can’t be the Big Island, realistically, gotta go to the SW shore, and run the entire gauntlet of Island defenses; hydrography says it’s not likely to be Maui or Molokai, although a strike at Kaunakakai or Maalaea is not out of the question; Oahu sucks as a landing objective, Waialua??, Waianae??, or maybe into the teeth of Ewa?; no, my money’s on Kauai.

South shore (NorthWest shore runs right into the Waimea badlands) maybe at Kekaha or Eleele; could go as far east as Lihue, but hydrography again – not likely; probably couldn’t realistically get past Poipu Point.

Other perspectives are certainly welcome.

And how big is the landing force? Let’s assume they take Lihue and have access to Nawiliwili Bay. How big could it reasonably be?

Thoughts are certainly welcome here, as well.

Kauai, with secondary landings at Midway and Johnston. For Midway, they need a reinforced regiment, and for Johnston, they need a SNLF. Kauai didn't have much in the way of port assets--a wharf at Ahukini Pier. If the Japanese come ashore on the south shore, they have to capture the Lihue area fairly quickly.

Kimmel had two USMC defense battalions on Oahu that he could redeploy in the HI if he had warning, plus one that could reinforce in two weeks and a second in four weeks, so the Japanese had to maintain the tempo of their landing operations to prevent the defence from congealing. The Japanese had to build a large enough airfield complex wherever they landed to dominate Oahu.

The two military airfields on the south coast of Kauai were large enough for a fighter squadron, while the airfield at Lihue looks like it could have handled a group on its own.

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

ORIGINAL: el cid again

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl
Seems that all the "what iffing" ever done on these forums is a shade of "what if the JAPANESE had this, or had done that, or hadn't done whatever?". But the Japanese players are hardly ever faced with a "what if the Allies aren't where they are supposed to be?"; or doing "what they're supposed to do?". When you look at the planning and discussion on the Japanese side before the war, there is a tremendous amount of doubt and worry over how the opening campaigns will unfold..., but players have almost no doubts that "exactly this will be exactly there and in exactly what condition".

In any case - in RHS - I FORCE your plan into action - by the use of supply sinks. It puts immobile units on the major sites, units with engineers who will demolish automatically - not to mention general damage done because a battle must be fought even if NO military units are present. In a sense RHS pre adopted your idea - for different reasons. I don't say the Allies had such a plan - I say the locals can and did try to damage things - and the Japanese get nothing - ever - for free - undamaged - unlike forms of WITP without supply sinks. My sinks exist not only to eat supplies - but to be your demolition teams - and IF Matrix fixes the excess supply problem - the demolition function will probably be grounds to keep them. [The Allies need not defend a location: if it has a supply sink it must be fought over - and it will demolish before it dies - and many think it will defend too strongly (we had to work long to make them not be too strong)]

Well, you missed the point again. The "example" was tongue-in-cheek just to show that there were Allied "what-if's" as well. A game decided in such a manner wouldn't be much fun for either side.


REPLY: WARNING: I take things literally - if you say it I probably assume you mean what you said. Anyway, YOU missed my point: the invasion of Hawaii is not fantasy - it was really planned - and ultimately really attempted. I don't think that it is wrong to think up a totally hypothetical plan like you proposed: it might be useful in training people to consider all the possibilities. But somehow we need to get on the same page about what is history and what is fantasy: when it is found in official documents, and really was worked up - particularly all the way to implementation - regardless of how well or badly it worked out - it is not fantasy. When there is no trace of the idea in any period document or memory - that is fantasy. Even if it is a legitimate one for some purpose (analysis, fun, name it).

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

ORIGINAL: el cid again

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl
The real point is that all these wonderous "what if's" folks keep coming up with for the Japanese depend far to much on the certainty of information. The Japanese themselves had a ton of fears and worries about how the War would unfold..., only the certainty of "losing to economics" drove them to "tossing the military dice" at all. What I'm saying is if you are going to get very far into the "what if" world, then for the sake of fairness and realism you really need to restore the fear and uncertanty to the Japanese side. Add in a number of possibilities that could be different, or go differently. Something to put back the worries and problems the real Japanese had...., and give the players some of the same qualms and trebidations and ulcer-inducing stress.

Oddly enough - here I don't think we disagree a whit - although somehow you think we do. I believe that uncertainty is a factor too largely absent from war games - even genuine historical simulations - perhaps especially strictly historical simulations. You can look up just what is going to enter play, when, where, with what ratings (unless, like me, you don't want to know because you want to make decisions without knowing what could not be known).

It is to increase uncertainty for the other side - and to increase flexability for own side - that we introduced the political point scenarios (PPO, EOS and now AIO). Note this is equal for both sides in PPO and EOS - but only the Allies get them in AIO (although that for technical reasons - AI won't use vast numbers of pp). I don't see how a game campaign years long can be expected to need to put this air unit or that land unit in exactly the same operational area? Why not let the players be in control? And to the degree we give it to them, the other side must worry "where is he sending that?"


It was to increase uncertainty I introduced the deception ship Centurion (which masquarades as a KGV class battleship). Most like it - but I think you objected to it - and to the US gunnery training battleships - which at one point were proposed for gunfire support platforms (and show up that way in BBO family scenarios). I think that doing things that make it hard for players to know what is going on - to get bad reports which simulate the many more bad reports that generate IRL - is good.

It was to increase flexability for the ALLIES - and uncertainty for the JAPANESE - that I introduced map edge shipping tracks. Now you cannot know where a ship - or anything that can embark on a ship - will enter the map - or when? Nor can you know if/when something left the map - or where it will return - or when? Because recon does not generate at the map edges, this is a gigantic blind movement grid. I believe you find future versions of WITP do this even better than we can do it on the map - because it was a good idea to increase the "gut wrenching uncertainties" the Japanese strategists faced.

I am entirely and eternally open to ideas how to cross this bridge better than we have done already in hundreds of large and small ways? I love making things uncertain.

A completely unrelated point is this: WITP is inherantly unbalanced in favor of the Allies; Japan is outweighed by about 10:1 according to calculus done at the time on both sides - and crudely confirmed by economic data; any attempt to "give Japan a chance" or "balance the game" must inherantly focus on "what could have Japan done differently?" That does not lead to anything approaching certainty. ALL it does is lead to a campaign that probably takes Japan longer to lose - and only quite rarely not lose. There is no way - short of real fantasy - to make it certain Japan will win. Whatever hope the Japanese have is psychological: if they make it seem too hard to win, the Allied player may give up before he wins. The Allies cannot see the problems the Japanese have - and if they seem to be strong - it may not be apparent how they are hanging on by a thread. But by the end of 1943, that is probably the case - no matter the scenario or mod - no matter what we try to do to "balance" it. The Japanese will never be anything but worried if they have any sense of what is happening and what is likely to happen.

[Mike Scholl]

ORIGINAL: el cid again
A completely unrelated point is this: WITP is inherantly unbalanced in favor of the Allies; Japan is outweighed by about 10:1 according to calculus done at the time on both sides - and crudely confirmed by economic data; any attempt to "give Japan a chance" or "balance the game" must inherantly focus on "what could have Japan done differently?" That does not lead to anything approaching certainty. ALL it does is lead to a campaign that probably takes Japan longer to lose - and only quite rarely not lose. There is no way - short of real fantasy - to make it certain Japan will win. Whatever hope the Japanese have is psychological: if they make it seem too hard to win, the Allied player may give up before he wins. The Allies cannot see the problems the Japanese have - and if they seem to be strong - it may not be apparent how they are hanging on by a thread. But by the end of 1943, that is probably the case - no matter the scenario or mod - no matter what we try to do to "balance" it. The Japanese will never be anything but worried if they have any sense of what is happening and what is likely to happen.

Yes and no. The "unbalance" in the early game is in favor of the Japanese. The Allies will enjoy overwhelming superiority by 1944-45, but that means nothing if players are paying attention to "Victory Points" (a terrible idea in my point of view..., Victory is about winning the war, not accumulating artificially constructed "points"). And there is plenty in the game already to "give Japan a chance"---someone pointed out earlier in this thread that removing "suprise" hardly effects the outcome of the opening air raids at all. The Allied "Code-Breaking" edge (a very real factor in history) is virtually unrepresented in the game. The inability of the IJA and the IJN to cooperate (a major factor in Japan's performance in the War) doesn't exist at all in the game.

Of the dozens of things the Japanese knew COULD go wrong in their opening moves, only two actually did. Wake proved that their "amphibious landing techniques" weren't really all that good, and that not all their "shoestring" operations would go off without a hitch. And the US CV's not being at Pearl to be destroyed was a let-down to the Naval Staff. So when you propose making the invasion of the Hawaiian Islands a "start of the game" possibility, using troops the IJA wasn't going to make available for such a venture, then I say that some of their other "worries" ought to be present in the game as well for "balance". And I mean "balance" in the psychological sense for the players---balance of worries and risks.

[JWE]

ORIGINAL: el cid again

I like to put a small force onto Lanai - airborne from carriers (Japan had the world's only COD aircraft in this era) -

It was not a COD. Little known fact that I accidently discovered in secret documents when I was helping MacArthur unmask the Navy Cabal; the COD was actually a HADDOCK.

[JWE]

ORIGINAL: herwin

Kauai, with secondary landings at Midway and Johnston. For Midway, they need a reinforced regiment, and for Johnston, they need a SNLF. Kauai didn't have much in the way of port assets--a wharf at Ahukini Pier. If the Japanese come ashore on the south shore, they have to capture the Lihue area fairly quickly.

Kimmel had two USMC defense battalions on Oahu that he could redeploy in the HI if he had warning, plus one that could reinforce in two weeks and a second in four weeks, so the Japanese had to maintain the tempo of their landing operations to prevent the defence from congealing. The Japanese had to build a large enough airfield complex wherever they landed to dominate Oahu.

The two military airfields on the south coast of Kauai were large enough for a fighter squadron, while the airfield at Lihue looks like it could have handled a group on its own.

Exactamundo. My thoughts as well. We're looking at the main landings just west of Poipu, with the first objective Lihue. As you say, there were a couple strips in the area, as well as several hard surfaced roads. Terrain pretty flat and uncrumpled for a suficient distance inland on the south coast.

We're thinking a regimental sized landing force, two advance axes, Lihue/Nawiliwili and Eleele/Hanapepe, with the remainder of a division and supporting troops as follow up.

[bradfordkay]

"WARNING: I take things literally - if you say it I probably assume you mean what you said. Anyway, YOU missed my point: the invasion of Hawaii is not fantasy - it was really planned - and ultimately really attempted."

Please, Sid, give the rest of us the same leeway in reading our posts that you expect from us in reading yours. You say that if we say it, you assume that we mean what we say. Then you go on to say that the Japanese "ultimately really attempted an invasion of Hawaii" when all of us know that the troops were never loaded aboard ship to even begin the invasion. "Really attempting" an invasion means (to the general reading public) that troops were loaded aboard ship or aircraft and at least sent on the way towards their objective.

Are you really saying that we have to be extra careful in how we word our posts, but you are allowed to make the wildest comments and we are expected to understand the nuances of your reasoning? All I ask is that you afford the rest of us the same courtesy that you expect to receive from us.

[DuckofTindalos]

No,no... Remember he has "command presence" and "people instinctively trust him"...

The rules of discourse don't apply to Sid.

[DuckofTindalos]

ORIGINAL: JWE

ORIGINAL: el cid again

I like to put a small force onto Lanai - airborne from carriers (Japan had the world's only COD aircraft in this era) -

It was not a COD. Little known fact that I accidently discovered in secret documents when I was helping MacArthur unmask the Navy Cabal; the COD was actually a HADDOCK.

Really? I thought it was a PLAICE?

[aztez]

ORIGINAL: el cid again

ORIGINAL: aztez

This thread is quite an spectacle or turning into one.

Japanese did not have the transport shipping available to conduct such an massive operation at CenPac nor did they have adequate means and strenght to provide aircover for it. That pretty much sums up any Pearl Harbour invasion fantasy in WW2.

Assertions are not facts. This is a statement of faith, and note it is devoid of actual numbers. Work em out. Japan had two or three close orders of magnitude more logistical power than required for the plans put forward - at least - possibly an order of magnitude more (meaning sheer quantity of shipping under control compared to the quantity that would need to be allocated). Its naval superiority was not as great - it only had about 50 to 100% more naval vessels than would be required. This was ample. No one ever contemplated not implementing the invasion of the SRA in spite of working up plans for this invasion in various forms. One cannot understand Japanese naval thought in the early 20th century outside the context of this planning.

Well to be honest I haven't noticed a single fact that would backup your illusions. And by fact I mean a fact that can be proven! Not just some wild imaginary comments that these assumptions are based.

I have read quite a few books regarding War in the Pacific and NOT A single of them have indicated that Japanese had the resources to pull an invasion of this magnitude off. Not a SINGLE one.

Also Japanese could not provide such a CAP over its forces either. Just read "Shattered Sword" and you get an indication of what IJN was actually capable off. There are several other books as well.

As said these assumptions were just way out off the ball park! [;)]

..oh and we are all entitled to your views but we should not mix up fantasy with reality!

[m10bob]

ORIGINAL: witpqs

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl
The real point is that all these wonderous "what if's" folks keep coming up with for the Japanese depend far to much on the certainty of information. The Japanese themselves had a ton of fears and worries about how the War would unfold..., only the certainty of "losing to economics" drove them to "tossing the military dice" at all. What I'm saying is if you are going to get very far into the "what if" world, then for the sake of fairness and realism you really need to restore the fear and uncertanty to the Japanese side. Add in a number of possibilities that could be different, or go differently. Something to put back the worries and problems the real Japanese had...., and give the players some of the same qualms and trebidations and ulcer-inducing stress.

Excellent point.

Beat me to it![:D]

[spence]

Japan had two or three close orders of magnitude more logistical power than required for the plans put forward - at least - possibly an order of magnitude more (meaning sheer quantity of shipping under control compared to the quantity that would need to be allocated).

Absolutely....and from Tokyo to Hawaii was only 150 miles or so more than Tokyo to Guadalacanal...and we all know how well the Japanese kept their troopies supplied there. Perhaps Cid can tell us how to say "Canape anyone?" in Japanese.