The benefits of active defense

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: ny59giants

I am probably starting my 5th or 6th game as the Allies. I have only gotten to early '43 once. But, I have enough experience in learning to deal with the Allied shortcomings in the early war.

The biggest one, IMO, is the lack of Aviation Support except for the few large BF in Malaya, Java, and Luzon. Many of them have disabled squads so they don't have their full potential until some time has past. The difficulty is getting them out of their exposed positions to a place of your choice and then be able to conduct your "bunker" defense. Having just one large base with adequate BF and aviation support usually results in a few massed attacks escorted by Zeros.  [:(]

The second is the hindsight of knowing the Japanese BB/CA can only be hurt by very few TB that are available in the SRA area. Unless Force Z gets lucky, they can run around without fear of being sunk in the early months. Thus, a methodical Japanese player will just have them assigned to protect his transports and you have to try the "hit and run" tactics to have a chance without lossing the small surface fleet you have.

Third, is many Allied players (probably including myself) have developed too healthy a respect for massed attacks of Nell/Betty on naval/shipping assets. With many of the more experienced Japanese players knowing which bases have an AF at 4 or at least level 3, these are taken quickly and anything that floats is in danger if it comes anywhere closer than 12 hexes of their base.  

My newest game is RHS (for the second time) and I like the fact that I get my beloved Beauforts in 5/42 with torpedo range of 8. [:D]  They should help stiffen whatever defensive perimeter I have at that time. Having the Japanese player fearing his BB/CA can be sunk (along with his CVs) will help the Allied cause and halt any type of "Sir Robin" approach.

The problem with a general evacuation is that Japan then does NOT need to cover his invasion groups - and can go for many points at the same time - instead of a very few. That has compound benefits for Japan - not for the Allies.

It is quite true the Allies need to be careful - to concentrate - and to attack where the enemy is weak.

Note that in RHS you do get many base forces - not all large - but you can MOVE them together - achieving a very large amount. You have much more support capacity than aircraft to use it.

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: John 3rd

This is a great discussion.  I really concur with jwilkerson about people who have played the Japanese know their weaknesses and then use that knowledge to exploit the Japanese by fighting for every inch of ground wherever possible.  I played against Moses as well and he is a fantastic player who really knows the art of amubush using massed air.  Wouldn't mind playing him again...

I have only played the Allies twice and just for the first few months of the campaigns but I raised Hell with hit-and-run and projected defense.  Managed to throw off the Japanese timetable and cause total and complete chaos.  In short--it was a lot of fun--then I got my taste of Allied power, I shifted back to the more humble, challenging Japanese side...

I completely agree - it is knowing Japan well that makes understanding why Sir Robin is a huge mistake. Sir Robin is the way to insure maximum Japanese power longer in time. Attrition forces Japan to do less - because he is repairing what is damaged and cannot use what is lost. And more so because he is afraid of more attrition - so he tries to do less - with better and bigger packages of forces. Sir Robin means anything can be sent anywhere - safely - and you still win.

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: Historiker

There are several reasons for Sir Robin:

1. There's no surprise.
Even today wouldn't be as much information to an enemy, as the Japanese player has. He only has to start the game as allied player to know exactly to the last man, how many and good the units are. He can run test against himself or the computer to know almoust exactly (there's of course always a dice role) how much own units he needs.
So why should I leave the units there?


REPLY: This is a two edged sword: The Japanese capability and location is far better known by a gamer than it was IRL - and to such an extent this is much more of an advantage to the Allies than to the Japanese. The Allies were ignorant and arrogant. The Japanese were just arrogant - they had good initial intel. Allied players doing a Sir Robin "because they cannot win" are - in fact - doing somthing they would NOT to IRL because they did NOT know they were going to lose (at first).

2. The ground combat model
It still is a book with seven seals for me. Every time a units is forced to retreat, it looses a significant part of their strength so I try to avoid every forced retreat. I try to fight only where I can hold position.


REPLY: Terrible strategy. It means modders need to make more units static - to insure realistic play. I trust players more than Matrix does - but maybe Matrix has it right? There are LOTS of places that MUST be defended for strategic and/or local reasons - and then too there are units that are inherently static (fixed guns for example). And the reasons to defend places are often operational military ones - it means the enemy must concentrate - must supply his concentrated force - and both are OPPORTUNTIES for you to hit him - or his LOC. But even if you do not - that he MUST concentrate means he cannot attack as many points - and every point he does not attack is a victory for you. It helps if you are an AAA guy - this is SOP in anti-air warfare: you seek to minimize the number of points of engagement by increasing the cost of engagement at a point.

3. The units aren't lost
The units you leave in the PI, in DEI and on Manila are finally lost. One will really miss them when India or Australia are invaded. Moreover, the more you save, the earlier you can start a comeback, the earlier your offensive can begin.


I don't care about morality here, if I would see a significant benefit in sacrifying my units I would - it's just a game - but I don't see that.
As I don't know anything about the witp-ground combat, I must know where my limits are. I know what I can and what not.

For me, it's defenitly better to save more units for a later counter-offensive than to let them beaten without any benefit. Benefit is here - of course - what I consider to be one. For many, delaying the enemy is enough benefit to finally loose the troops, but I'm defentily ineffective in that, so I have to react the way my experience and my competence allows me.

REPLY: This is based on a misunderstanding of game mechanics: except for Dutch or Philippine units, all units will regenerate. You can lose them - and get them back anyway. Further - there are great - not merely significant - benefits in fighting:

1) Delay - delay means that Japan gets less far by the time technical things change to the Allied advantage

2) Total resources to fight with - the less Japan takes - the fewer resources, oil, supply points and fuel points he gets

3) Attrition - the one kind of war Japan can win is one of battles with almost no losses - but a war of attrition from the start is one Japan is doomed to lose - faster than any other.

4) Psychology - your opponent is the MIND of the enemy leader - and imposing fear of a fight is better than even a defeat - he will attack fewer points and take more with him - so every point not attacked that would have been attacked on the same day is - well - a victory for you.
Your strategy makes your opponent willing to attack sooner at more points - and so you lose even faster.

[anarchyintheuk]

This seems more an argument about semantics than anything else. Is there truly an allied player that participates fully in the ideal of the Sir Robin and just buggers off? By that I mean evacuates all the frontline lcus, ships and squadrons that he can. Let's face it, most frontline lcus are toast. It suicidal to either reinforce or evacuate Malaya or the Phillipines and there are only a few lcus in the DEI worth saving (DAF, etc.). The state of rear area and initial reinforcement allied lcus only gets better by the day in filling out to&e, recovering damaged squads and eq, experience increases, etc. There's no point in committing them until ready.

Sir Robin really just concerns naval and air assets. From reading the aars, it appears most allied players leave a significant portion of their starting oob (Force Z aside) in the IO, DEI and SoPac. They also leave air assets until it's obvious that they're getting pimp slapped. Given the IJN/IJA's ability to concentrate and overwhelm an area, their initial advantage in experience and zero bonus and, depending on the mod, the allied player's limited fighter production ability, it doesn't take to long for obvious to happen.

Including what was said by others above, imho Sir Robin appears to be more a myth or a goad to allied players than anything.


Scattershooting:

As far as the "backfill" scenario, that sounds like Hirohito's ideas from a couple of years ago. I forget if he attacked PH or not.

I haven't found a single IJN submarine commander that was executed among the 'usual suspects' of the Class B and C defendants. Nakagawa Hajime and Kusaka Tashio were imprisoned for under 5 years, Tatsunake Ariizumi killed himself, Fukumura Toshiaki and Kudo Kaneo presumably were KIA/MIA. I can't find any record of what happened to Kazuro Ebate and Shimizu Tsuruzo. Any sources Cid?

[Big B]

I have to agree with anarchyintheuk.

ORIGINAL: anarchyintheuk
Sir Robin really just concerns naval and air assets. From reading the aars, it appears most allied players leave a significant portion of their starting oob (Force Z aside) in the IO, DEI and SoPac. They also leave air assets until it's obvious that they're getting pimp slapped. Given the IJN/IJA's ability to concentrate and overwhelm an area, their initial advantage in experience and zero bonus and, depending on the mod, the allied player's limited fighter production ability, it doesn't take to long for obvious to happen.

Including what was said by others above, imho Sir Robin appears to be more a myth or a goad to allied players than anything.

I also agree with this summation:

ORIGINAL: okami
As for the "Sir Robin" strategy, if used with the build up of rear area bases(USA, India, Australia)can not be overcome by an auto victory. Simple put by denying the Japanese player the points gained by destroying vast ground units and air losses, coupled with the increase of Base Value when you increase Ports and Airfields, will eliminate the chance of a four to one victory at the end of 42. Is the "Sir Robin" strategy historical? No. But it is effective if done correctly. Does in make for a boring early game? Maybe, depends on how the Japanese player adjusts to the situation. That is my two cents.

The bottom line to me seems to be that the debate about playing the 'Sir Robin' defense is more about a good game for the Japanese player, than whether it works well for the Allied player.

[Historiker]

The Japanese can use the situation as welll which is one reason I don't really understand all that moaning.
Is there any way more easy to destry enemy ground forces than sinking the ships they are loaded on?
Every base the Allied player abandons is free to be conquered by Japan - without loss of men and time.
Every undefended Ressource or Oil center has a way lower chance of getting damaged.
The Jap is much faster in gaining ground.

So there are some really good things for the Jap if the Allied does Sir Robin...

[el cid again]

THAT is the problem: I cannot test a Japanese strategy alleged to tax limited resources if there is no test at all. ANY force is big enough vs nothing - even a submarine landing party. There is grave risk that Japan might take things like Sydney - Seattle - Bombay. The game is designed to be played in the MIDDLE of the map - and loses validity near the edges.

Anyway - in RHS you are not permitted to do this: it is a violation of the primary house rule: real commanders would never abandon ALL of Malaya, Burma, Philippines - so you cannot either. It is not effective - so I am mystified why you want to do it?

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: Big B

I have to agree with anarchyintheuk.

ORIGINAL: anarchyintheuk
Sir Robin really just concerns naval and air assets. From reading the aars, it appears most allied players leave a significant portion of their starting oob (Force Z aside) in the IO, DEI and SoPac. They also leave air assets until it's obvious that they're getting pimp slapped. Given the IJN/IJA's ability to concentrate and overwhelm an area, their initial advantage in experience and zero bonus and, depending on the mod, the allied player's limited fighter production ability, it doesn't take to long for obvious to happen.

Including what was said by others above, imho Sir Robin appears to be more a myth or a goad to allied players than anything.

I also agree with this summation:

ORIGINAL: okami
As for the "Sir Robin" strategy, if used with the build up of rear area bases(USA, India, Australia)can not be overcome by an auto victory. Simple put by denying the Japanese player the points gained by destroying vast ground units and air losses, coupled with the increase of Base Value when you increase Ports and Airfields, will eliminate the chance of a four to one victory at the end of 42. Is the "Sir Robin" strategy historical? No. But it is effective if done correctly. Does in make for a boring early game? Maybe, depends on how the Japanese player adjusts to the situation. That is my two cents.

The bottom line to me seems to be that the debate about playing the 'Sir Robin' defense is more about a good game for the Japanese player, than whether it works well for the Allied player.

The thread title indicates the rational of the proposition: active defense is ALWAYS more effective for the Allies. It takes a person unfamiliar with Japan in either military or economic senses to believe they don't have severe limits on what they can attempt - IF they are opposed, forced to expend supplies and fuel, and forced to deal with damage and losses. Sir Robin is not an effective strategy compared to an active defense - in any case. Active defense does NOT mean everybody sit there and be overwhelmed - it means - use an intelligent defense of every point of value possible. Force em to concentrate and attrit - and damage the resources and industry taking them. Failure to TRY is the ONLY way to miss this - IF you try - it will work.

[el cid again]

[quote]ORIGINAL: anarchyintheuk

This seems more an argument about semantics than anything else. Is there truly an allied player that participates fully in the ideal of the Sir Robin and just buggers off? By that I mean evacuates all the frontline lcus, ships and squadrons that he can. Let's face it, most frontline lcus are toast. It suicidal to either reinforce or evacuate Malaya or the Phillipines and there are only a few lcus in the DEI worth saving (DAF, etc.). The state of rear area and initial reinforcement allied lcus only gets better by the day in filling out to&e, recovering damaged squads and eq, experience increases, etc. There's no point in committing them until ready.


REPLY: Yes. There is - there are. This thread is a result of witnessing such play - and it is preventing testing of RHS scenaios altogether. That is - I can use AI (in seconds) to order every unit in Malaya to retreat to Singapore - and trust it never to send any units TO Malaya to defend it (never mind supplies). This means we cannot find out if RHS has moved in the direction of my design intent: does Malaya fall in closer to the historical 100 days than in stock or CHS? It means we cannot test if the forces available in the EOS family are adequate either (they are reduced in favor of many being sent to the Central Pacific). The same thing is happeing in Burma - not a single defended town is in sight. There are no fighters at Singapore, Manila (both bastions) or Rangoon (which appears abandoned except for static units). It is time consuming to conduct human testing - and we won't be able to do it to complete the WITP series (before it is overtaken by AE) if we don't do it well soon - so I find it very frustrating that I might as well be playing AI (and not even have to wait for a reply). I suffered under the illusion that a primary principle would be understood: you may do ANYTHING - but you must not do something which is totally ahistorical. This is so unclear I fear that the ONLY way to get it right is to FORCE it on everyone: if we cannot get a consensus here - every unit that would never leave a territory must be made static. [We DID get a consensus about limited commands - and lots of other things - but here we seem to have only support from very experienced players - not a consensus- not a general understanding Sir Robin is very wrong - and not good for the Allies - never mind not historical or even possible in a political sense.)

Sir Robin really just concerns naval and air assets. From reading the aars, it appears most allied players leave a significant portion of their starting oob (Force Z aside) in the IO, DEI and SoPac. They also leave air assets until it's obvious that they're getting pimp slapped. Given the IJN/IJA's ability to concentrate and overwhelm an area, their initial advantage in experience and zero bonus and, depending on the mod, the allied player's limited fighter production ability, it doesn't take to long for obvious to happen.

REPLY: Let me be clear about this: Sir Robin is mainly about LAND units. And it is NOT being done AFTER initial battles show there is a problem - it is being done in the first days of the campaign - at a time virtually no Allied commander would know about any sort of major problem. They don't yet understand the range of enemy aircraft, the effectiveness of his torpedoes, or that the IJA is likely to win a battle when outgunnened and outnumbered 2:1. They abandon positions BEFORE they are attacked - and those undefended positions fall undamaged into enemy hands. This is even worse than the horrible defenses of Malaya and Philippines - NEI and Burma were not much less of a defensive disaster IRL - yet Sir Robin is doing far worse than any and all of these. Measured in terms of

1) Time to take a territory

2) Victory points for Japan (compared to the same offensive vs an actual defense)

3) Loss ratios of planes, ships, land units (compared to the same offensive vs an actual defense)

4) The total amount of resource/oil/supply/fuel/industrial production available to Japan on any given date (compared to the same offensive vs an actual defense)

[quote]

Sir Robin results in worse ALLIED scores by all measures. I wish this to be understood - so it won't be considered as an option.
If we cannot get this as a consensus understanding I either must modify RHS so it is impossible to move the LAND units that are wrongly being moved out of country - OR I must simply stipulate that any human player needs to agree not to do it (which in my view he has if he claims to want to honor the primary RHS house rule). It is not possible to get the design intent loss ratios if the forces do not engage. And they are NOT engaging.

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: Big B

I have to agree with anarchyintheuk.

ORIGINAL: anarchyintheuk
Sir Robin really just concerns naval and air assets. From reading the aars, it appears most allied players leave a significant portion of their starting oob (Force Z aside) in the IO, DEI and SoPac. They also leave air assets until it's obvious that they're getting pimp slapped. Given the IJN/IJA's ability to concentrate and overwhelm an area, their initial advantage in experience and zero bonus and, depending on the mod, the allied player's limited fighter production ability, it doesn't take to long for obvious to happen.

Including what was said by others above, imho Sir Robin appears to be more a myth or a goad to allied players than anything.

I also agree with this summation:

ORIGINAL: okami
As for the "Sir Robin" strategy, if used with the build up of rear area bases(USA, India, Australia)can not be overcome by an auto victory. Simple put by denying the Japanese player the points gained by destroying vast ground units and air losses, coupled with the increase of Base Value when you increase Ports and Airfields, will eliminate the chance of a four to one victory at the end of 42. Is the "Sir Robin" strategy historical? No. But it is effective if done correctly. Does in make for a boring early game? Maybe, depends on how the Japanese player adjusts to the situation. That is my two cents.

The bottom line to me seems to be that the debate about playing the 'Sir Robin' defense is more about a good game for the Japanese player, than whether it works well for the Allied player.

I started this thread because there is a problem. Denying the problem is not going to solve it. While having a good game is probably of value for most members of the Forum - it is completely to misunderstand the motives of the simulators (like me): we are professionals, and we don't give a whit if the contest is fair or fun or even. This thread was not begun by me because I want a "good game" in the sense of fun - but because there is no value to the game as a simulation if it is not played with some consideration to the historical and military realities which should be involved.

My thesis has two threads:

1) Sir Robin is not an option for political reasons (and for that reason also not an option for any person who plays RHS and claims to honor the primary house rule - which restricts one from ever doing what is either physicially or politically impossible - and further is supposed to have each player ask "would these commanders do that in these conditions?". This latter is not something that requires universal agreement - but it DOES mean the choices are going to be conservative. No case should ever occur where it clearly would not have been a possibility. You can push the edge of the envelope - but never - say - abandon Malaya (except for Singapore) - abandon Luzon (except for Manila) - abandon Java (except for Soerabaja) - etc.

2) Sir Robin is not effective. By every possible mechanism it could be gaged it is going to result in less favorable scores for the Allies at key dates (e.g. 1 July 1942, 1 January 1943, etc). There is no reason to hand Japan - gratus - a vast area bigger than the SRA almost wholly undamaged - sooner than history - with vastly less attrition to Japanese forces which has any relationship to a rational Allied strategy.

The latter point should be understood in this additonal context:

Active opposition to Japanese advances is likely (probably = greater than 50 per cent) going to cause Japan losses of a critical sort from which it can not recover. This happened IRL at Midway. After half a century of gaming this theater I can say it almost always happens in 1942. If it does not happen on the first opportunity (the first major confrontation where it is a possibility) it happens on the second or third - but it almost always happens - and only rarely is in 1943. If it is clear that autarky was possibe (theoretically) - if you agree with Parillo in terms of there being "more than enough oil" for example - it is NOT clear Japan can both manage the economy AND the war on several fronts so that NO WHERE can the Allied bombers (never mind other things) cut up that economy? About the only way to almost guarantee this is possible is a Sir Robin strategy - give Japan the maximum area and undamaged resources AS WELL as the least damaged military force to defend it. EVERY OTHER option must be worse for Japan.

In other words the real bottom line is Sir Robin optimizes the best case for Japan and the worst for the Allies. I think this is so clear it should lead to a consensus on the board. If it does not - I am considering just making it clear that I will have nothing to do with anyone for whom it is not clear. It is not useful to a simulator - in any case.

[anarchyintheuk]

ORIGINAL: el cid again

ORIGINAL: anarchyintheuk

This seems more an argument about semantics than anything else. Is there truly an allied player that participates fully in the ideal of the Sir Robin and just buggers off? By that I mean evacuates all the frontline lcus, ships and squadrons that he can. Let's face it, most frontline lcus are toast. It suicidal to either reinforce or evacuate Malaya or the Phillipines and there are only a few lcus in the DEI worth saving (DAF, etc.). The state of rear area and initial reinforcement allied lcus only gets better by the day in filling out to&e, recovering damaged squads and eq, experience increases, etc. There's no point in committing them until ready.

REPLY: Yes. There is - there are. This thread is a result of witnessing such play - and it is preventing testing of RHS scenaios altogether. That is - I can use AI (in seconds) to order every unit in Malaya to retreat to Singapore - and trust it never to send any units TO Malaya to defend it (never mind supplies). This means we cannot find out if RHS has moved in the direction of my design intent: does Malaya fall in closer to the historical 100 days than in stock or CHS? It means we cannot test if the forces available in the EOS family are adequate either (they are reduced in favor of many being sent to the Central Pacific). The same thing is happeing in Burma - not a single defended town is in sight. There are no fighters at Singapore, Manila (both bastions) or Rangoon (which appears abandoned except for static units). It is time consuming to conduct human testing - and we won't be able to do it to complete the WITP series (before it is overtaken by AE) if we don't do it well soon - so I find it very frustrating that I might as well be playing AI (and not even have to wait for a reply). I suffered under the illusion that a primary principle would be understood: you may do ANYTHING - but you must not do something which is totally ahistorical. This is so unclear I fear that the ONLY way to get it right is to FORCE it on everyone: if we cannot get a consensus here - every unit that would never leave a territory must be made static. [We DID get a consensus about limited commands - and lots of other things - but here we seem to have only support from very experienced players - not a consensus- not a general understanding Sir Robin is very wrong - and not good for the Allies - never mind not historical or even possible in a political sense.)

ORIGINAL: el cid again

ORIGINAL: anarchyintheuk

Sir Robin really just concerns naval and air assets. From reading the aars, it appears most allied players leave a significant portion of their starting oob (Force Z aside) in the IO, DEI and SoPac. They also leave air assets until it's obvious that they're getting pimp slapped. Given the IJN/IJA's ability to concentrate and overwhelm an area, their initial advantage in experience and zero bonus and, depending on the mod, the allied player's limited fighter production ability, it doesn't take to long for obvious to happen.

REPLY: Let me be clear about this: Sir Robin is mainly about LAND units. And it is NOT being done AFTER initial battles show there is a problem - it is being done in the first days of the campaign - at a time virtually no Allied commander would know about any sort of major problem. They don't yet understand the range of enemy aircraft, the effectiveness of his torpedoes, or that the IJA is likely to win a battle when outgunnened and outnumbered 2:1. They abandon positions BEFORE they are attacked - and those undefended positions fall undamaged into enemy hands. This is even worse than the horrible defenses of Malaya and Philippines - NEI and Burma were not much less of a defensive disaster IRL - yet Sir Robin is doing far worse than any and all of these. Measured in terms of

1) Time to take a territory

2) Victory points for Japan (compared to the same offensive vs an actual defense)

3) Loss ratios of planes, ships, land units (compared to the same offensive vs an actual defense)

4) The total amount of resource/oil/supply/fuel/industrial production available to Japan on any given date (compared to the same offensive vs an actual defense)


Sir Robin results in worse ALLIED scores by all measures. I wish this to be understood - so it won't be considered as an option.
If we cannot get this as a consensus understanding I either must modify RHS so it is impossible to move the LAND units that are wrongly being moved out of country - OR I must simply stipulate that any human player needs to agree not to do it (which in my view he has if he claims to want to honor the primary RHS house rule). It is not possible to get the design intent loss ratios if the forces do not engage. And they are NOT engaging.

My statements were formed from a general observation of aars. Your database/experience is obviously different from mine.

In the context of RHS I agree w/ what you say. However, the ability to retreat at will from forward defenses in Burma and Malaya should be allowable as long as the IJN/IJA can deviate from the historical opening.

Just my $.02.

Edited for visual clarity and the fact that it just looks cooler.

[bradfordkay]

Cid wrote:
"In RHS - defend Baguio City/Balinta Pass (which - as the word pass implies - is mountains). It is malaria free - it has lots of resources and supplies - and a rear area if you keep it also resource rich - an airfield - and it cannot be bombarded by battleships."

Is your map any different from the one used in CHS?

If not, there is a real weakness with defending Baguio: it can easily be outflanked by troops moving from San Fernando through Lingayen and into Clark Field, none of which offer any defensive advantages. It was different at the end of the war when the Japanese holed up in that area in that they were not trying to defend Clark/Manila.

[1275psi]

Im playing my first game as Allies CHS - and Im fighting every step of the way
I tried to reinforce wake -lost CVs
I tried to reinforce the phillipines - got some troops in

Mini bunkered Ambionia, menando -and held him up

Have stuffed PM -and it holds

And turned Kupang into the Mother of all bunkers

And I have been smashed, and beaten, and bruised.[8|]
But so is he (quite a few CVs with holes in em now)[:D]

And had SO MUCH FUN -every turn has been nail biting.[:)][:)]

And the second result - 8/42 -Timor Holds. Allies fighting UP the solomons.
On the offensive PNG, and even though Pearl Hbr fell -there has been NO invasion of India or Australia -and the attrition has been very nice.

Sir Robin I think is a bust - its less fun, less of a mental challenge, and can lead to Auto victory for Japan.
I will always fight for every inch -I can replace my stuff -he can't.

[bbbf]

Bah, what CV has any holes in it!
 
Well, maybe some - but at least I don't need to put my pilots in scuba gear to get em on the flight deck...
 
Herbie's been a bit unlucky - I have been able to ambush him at times, but he has also repaid me with some ambushes as well - I have been lucky that my losses have been generally smaller ships.
 
Koepang is a pain - but it will fall by Christmas.
 
You can have the rest anyway - Hawaii is lovely.

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: anarchyintheuk

.
My statements were formed from a general observation of aars. Your database/experience is obviously different from mine.

In the context of RHS I agree w/ what you say. However, the ability to retreat at will from forward defenses in Burma and Malaya should be allowable as long as the IJN/IJA can deviate from the historical opening.

Just my $.02.

Edited for visual clarity and the fact that it just looks cooler.

You lost me here: how could Japan NOT diviate from the historical opening? And why in the world would we play a game in which they had to do that? The complaint that the Japanese know too much about Allied positions should apply here: if they come in exactly as programmed the Allies - knowing exactly what that means - surely can frustrate many of the moves. Further - all scenarios I have seen have vast amounts of the Japanese units not tasked at all: they are just to sit around?

Another aspect of my confusion with your comments is that I do NOT object to retreating from forward bases - I object to retreating from ALL bases, forward, middle and rear - without fighting for ANY of them. The Allies should indeed be free to move - and many players are amazed I don't say "sit in port waiting for air strikes" - although going to sea at PH may be worse than riding out the storm in port - you decide - not me.
But moving should not equate to "everybody run - and no base is ever damaged when attacked." I don't think the Allies are not free to move or even retreat - but I think they are obligated - to the extent a commander who didn't would be imprisoned - to fight. And I also think they should not send LOCAL units to DISTANT lands where that is unlawful, ineffective and impolitic.

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: bradfordkay

Cid wrote:
"In RHS - defend Baguio City/Balinta Pass (which - as the word pass implies - is mountains). It is malaria free - it has lots of resources and supplies - and a rear area if you keep it also resource rich - an airfield - and it cannot be bombarded by battleships."

Is your map any different from the one used in CHS?

If not, there is a real weakness with defending Baguio: it can easily be outflanked by troops moving from San Fernando through Lingayen and into Clark Field, none of which offer any defensive advantages. It was different at the end of the war when the Japanese holed up in that area in that they were not trying to defend Clark/Manila.

Since there is NO Baguio City on the CHS Map - I guess the answer is "absolutely yes." I had to add it. [Maybe Andrew added it later. If so - maybe he didn't rate it as mountains - or resource/supply rich - or an airfield - but I did all three. There is no way anyone who has been there would not rate it as mountains, it is temperate - no mosquitos of either type - a rice rich area, and a mining area. The only road in those days was The Naguilion Road (named for a town 15 km from the coast along it) - and the final couple of miles are on the inside curve of a cliff - which is entirely exposed to fire from anywhere along the arc. Before you get there you must cross many swift rivers at the bottom of ever higher ridge lines. It was a nightmare when we went down it in 1944. But in 1941- a Japanese regiment was unopposed on the same route.]
The route from San Fernando to Linguyan to Clark is a RR route - but the Naguilion Road and the Balinta Pass Road are not RR - nor is the road to the Cayagan Valley NE of Baguio. So the enemy will take longer to get into Baguio - and if you defend the North - it will be fed by Cayagan as well. Yes - it can be outflanked - but it can be DEFENDED - and it does NOT dibilitate the troops with diseases.

[bradfordkay]

Actually, Baguio is on the CHS map, and is in the mountains. I don't recall if it has much of an airstrip in CHS (I'm at work right now and so don't have the game to check), and it has no resources (there are resources in three of the surrounding hexes - San Fernando, Taguigian (sp?) and Clark).
 
From your description, it will work as a final defensive bastion but you will not be able to either reinforce or withdraw troops that are holed up there. They'll just be tough to root out...

[Elladan]

So it basically works the same purpose as Manila, except it's mountain not urban so you have worse defense modifier, has less port/airfield levels, is not a port, so no way to supply it at all and is much less important hex for Japanese, so they can easily just ignore Allies there and leave only a guarding force. Looks like a poor bargain for me.

[herwin]

ORIGINAL: Elladan

So it basically works the same purpose as Manila, except it's mountain not urban so you have worse defense modifier, has less port/airfield levels, is not a port, so no way to supply it at all and is much less important hex for Japanese, so they can easily just ignore Allies there and leave only a guarding force. Looks like a poor bargain for me.

I'm attracted to it because once I take it I'm in a strong central position. But it is a bugger to take. I nearly had it when that **bzfk** shock attack was imposed by the game engine.

[Elladan]

ORIGINAL: herwin
I'm attracted to it because once I take it I'm in a strong central position. But it is a bugger to take. I nearly had it when that **bzfk** shock attack was imposed by the game engine.

Could you explain what you mean? Can't say I understood much.