The benefits of active defense

[el cid again]

There is apparently a perception among the WITP masses that it is wise NOT to stand up to the Japanese early in the war.

This is - of course - wholly to misunderstand the nature of what the Allies understood in 1941. The stuff they had - and the plans they had - were based on their actual understanding. This clearly didn't include knowledge about long range, land based bombers, oxygen torpedoes, the capture of the Imperial (British) Defense Plan (on HMS Amdromedon) by a German raider - etc. The Zero and the Oscar were almost equally technical surprises - it was believed the "good" Japanese fighters were Ki-27s and A5M4s - and the "bad" ones were biplanes. [ Indeed - Ki-10s were still in service - as were carrier bi planes - but the latter only for training purposes ] On the other hand, Mike was assigned as code name for the Me-109 because Mikes had been sighted in JAAF markings by Allied officers in Japan - so possibly some of the errors were on the side of exaggeration. But on the whole, the Japanese were believed to be less capable than they were - and no commander would act on understandings they had this wrong BEFORE it was shown by some action. You may do what you wish - but RHS is designed to be played this way. If you are truly free to do things outside the context of what commanders would do - we have a big problem with local militia forces in New Zealand, India, Philippines - name it - showing up in the wrong places (as indeed is happening to me in a game).

But there is more than good historical play at stake. Not engaging the enemy is a strategic error. I have an ongoing game in which I am wholly held up in central Malaya - both fronts are going nowhere - and I have more Japanese troops than the three divisions historically sent. In the same game, I have lost two hexes of Luzon - and am unable to take Baguio City - which is a very tough mountain hex IRL. You can tell Yamashita was a great captain because he defended it - and Mac a fool because he did not. A PLAYER need not do what Mac did - particularly if you relieve him and - say - put a Waynewright in charge. Mac was really engaged in deterrence politics - his Philippine Army earned him millions of dollars in personal pay - and it was supposed to be so big (on paper) Japan would not attack.

IF you "know" that you "must lose" something - and don't defend it strongly - you make it too cheap and easy and fast to capture. The point is not so much that you will keep it forever as you will make them pay to take it - and in the process damage the industry and resources there - and the combination of later capture and long repair times means they get less utility out of the place. Japan has a very limited period of possible offensive action - and giving them maximum position and resources to use as a basis for operations in that limited period is foolish in the extreme: it means they are able to get much farther than otherwise. Minimalism means that the enemy can devote surpluss shipping to additional missions too.

It is much better to defend defensable points hard - forcing the enemy to concentrate to engage them effectively. This means he must maximise his logistic effort - exposing his almost undefended tail to your submarines and other raiders. It means you may be presented with opportunities for battles on your terms as well. Forcing him to concentrate at predictable points means his major forces are NOT somewhere else.

It is also much better to force attrition warfare on Japan. Japan cannot sustain this very well or very long. The idea that Allied units are not expendable is backwards: they will be replaced in any case - but Japan's comparable assets are truly irreplacable. As soon as you damage a significant number of his carriers his mobile warfare capability will be gone - probably for good. IJA and IJN are very like the PLA and PLAN in our present day - overspecialized - very thin in vital categories of capability - and unfit to sustain attrition for more than a brief period. The Allies can lose it all - and still be overwhelming. Since you should not ever lose it all - being overly cautious about losing part of it is a poor strategy. This goes double for the Chinese, who regenerate lost units in 30 days. If a Chinese unit is lost- it is anything but the end of the game - or the theater.

Running guarantees Japanese victory on a larger scale than history, at least for a while. It means even Australia and India may not be safe from invasion. It may be that a skilled player will NEVER lose all of the Philippines or the NEI - and the latter is partly a function of "how long did Singapore hold out." So is the fate of Burma. There are better strategies than purely to "get out of the way." And "getting in the way whenever it will attrit him" is one of them.

[okami]

Sadly the "Sir Robin" strategy has become an institution.

[JWE]

I, too, find the lack of pants disturbing. Gosh, been playing this game for years with a group from Pendleton; even had the CO of the Infantry School come to Oceanside Yacht Club to watch one of our more important turn resolutions.

We have found that the game is quite sufficient to the player. Every player ‘knows’ what’s going to happen, if they can read, so they will do what most people will do – conserve their assets and do a Sir Robin: a cold, calculated response devised in the full knowledge of ultimate power and victory, in game terms. Very effective, in game terms.

We like the ‘calculated risk’ approach. We don’t play to ‘win the computer game’, we play to win the current campaign. We may lose, but we strike. The most exciting scenarios we have devised are in the 1942 time frame, where forces are approximately equal. We’ve done some ‘adjustment’ to the savegames, and got some real nasty 1943-44 scenarios as a result, that were a barrel of fun to play.

[Big B]

ORIGINAL: JWE
...
We have found that the game is quite sufficient to the player. Every player ‘knows’ what’s going to happen, if they can read, so they will do what most people will do – conserve their assets and do a Sir Robin: a cold, calculated response devised in the full knowledge of ultimate power and victory, in game terms. Very effective, in game terms.
....

I think you have hit the nail on the head so to say. The lamented Sir Robin is quite attractive to Allied players.

I am not sure that there is anything inherently unsound or wrong with the idea...

I think from an historical perspective, the Allied high command (whom we play as) intrinsically knew(or certainly believed) that victory would be forthcoming when the 'machine' was ramped up.

It makes very little sense to me to sacrifice lives for what must be lost - with no hope of victory...I could not do so in real life and sleep at night. It makes far more sense to me to delay with a reasonable chance of survival for the troops, and make preparations to stand where you know you can be successful, than to blindly let your men die in a fore-ordained fashion to apparently no avail? Or if they are to stand and die - that would only be conscionable to me as a means to buy time to save non-combatants (your women and children). A friend from Bulgaria told me once of an old saying -"there is no fortress too important to abandon".

Given all of the forgoing, it also seems to me - that forces spread out in indefensible positions are a waste if they could have been gathered and combined into a much more secure and defensible position. (Not only a waste, but a good reason for a court-martial if they could have been saved).

Further, it can be argued that each unit sacrificed is taking time for the enemy to conquer, and true as that is, to me it would depend on the value you place on your countryman's lives. In most European wars, a soldier was expected to fight on as long as he had the ability to resist...at which point he would be allowed to surrender with honor satisfied, and he could then expect humane treatment from his captors for the duration of hostilities or until exchanged. Those were the rules of war that were commonly accepted.

But in the war against Japan - it was quickly understood that the rules of war no longer applied to captives of the Japanese Empire. Therefore, the old rules of fighting on as long as possible and then surrendering were no longer going to be respected.

So it really comes down to not only military strategy, but it very much becomes a matter of morality.

Therefore, the Sir Robin Defense is not only militarily attractive to an Allied player, it also takes on the aspect of a moral imperative from an historical point of view.

Now balance that against a Hitlerian policy of stand and die - and there seems to be little to recommend fighting it out to the death for the Allied player at any level.

Now - all this is not to say there is anything wrong with a 'Well Calculated Risk' of throwing a heavy blow when it seems worth while.

My thoughts anyway.
B

[jwilkerson]

ORIGINAL: okami

Sadly the "Sir Robin" strategy has become an institution.

One of two anyway .. the "Bunker" being a very viable alternative.

I've lost one game (I've only be able to play Japanese in PBEM) to "the Bunker" ... and had the wits scared out of me twice by "the bunker" ... were I ever get to play the Allies in PBEM, I'm pretty sure I would try "the bunker'.

This defense involves picking a few key locations, like Soerabaja, and building them up and fortifying. Obviously, each game is different, and pre-determining all bunker locations, will not work in general. But the idea, is to build up a few spots and surprise and hence delay the Japanese. They are powerful, but they cannot be everywhere with everything. A very active Allied defense, is, IMHO much more likely to result in a early "reversal of fortunes" than a "Sir Robin" ....

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: Big B

ORIGINAL: JWE
...
We have found that the game is quite sufficient to the player. Every player ‘knows’ what’s going to happen, if they can read, so they will do what most people will do – conserve their assets and do a Sir Robin: a cold, calculated response devised in the full knowledge of ultimate power and victory, in game terms. Very effective, in game terms.
....

I think you have hit the nail on the head so to say. The lamented Sir Robin is quite attractive to Allied players.

I am not sure that there is anything inherently unsound or wrong with the idea...

I think from an historical perspective, the Allied high command (whom we play as) intrinsically knew(or certainly believed) that victory would be forthcoming when the 'machine' was ramped up.

REPLY: The nature of economic and strategic choices makes this certainly true. Allied leaders had almost complete faith in their ability to win by overwhelming by numbers. I am less than totally impressed with this - in PTO in particular you find a lot of very bloody attrition going on -
which I will return to below. They expected to win. They also expected to hold a whole lot better than they did. The forces in the area were what they were partly because they were regarded as adequate to deal with "only" Japanese - or because they were colonial occupation forces not intended even to face the Japanese.

It makes very little sense to me to sacrifice lives for what must be lost - with no hope of victory...I could not do so in real life and sleep at night. It makes far more sense to me to delay with a reasonable chance of survival for the troops, and make preparations to stand where you know you can be successful, than to blindly let your men die in a fore-ordained fashion to apparently no avail? Or if they are to stand and die - that would only be conscionable to me as a means to buy time to save non-combatants (your women and children). A friend from Bulgaria told me once of an old saying -"there is no fortress too important to abandon".

REPLY: I prefer NO losses at all. But I fear the present age in the West - with its unwillingness to consider military units expendable. PLA regards this as a strategic weakness - dooming us to defeat - and I suspect it may. This was clearly NOT the case in WWII. We WERE willing to risk losses. Nor does it follow that all missions that cannot be won make no sense - even in this age. When Argentina invaded the Falklands - HMS Endurance was near South Georgia - and she had a squad of Royal Marines embarked. Wishing to establish a legal claim to South Georgia by defending it - a tiny team was disembarked - with orders to resist: as he went down the gangway leading his men ashore the LT said "We will make their eyes water." They did. They hit a patrol craft with an anti-tank missile - and also hit a helicopter with another - forcing it to land - a total loss. They only had two missiles - and nothing else big enough to do much damage - so it was 2 for 2. In that case no one was killed or even wounded on the British side - but they did surrender and would show up as "casualties" in our system. The point is - there are POLITICAL reasons for fighting. Soldiers are political instruments and no one should ever think that is without meaning - if you are NOT serving ANY political objective - you are wasting your time (and lives). But my larger point is there are MILITARY reasons to resist: just do so intelligently. DELAY is a valid military objective. If you give ALL the bases - with minmal damge - with all their facilities and resources to the enemy - at no cost - surely this is going to be the optimum case for the Japanese to have the greatest power to take places far from Japan.
Everything less than this - every delay - every loss - every bit of damage that must be repaired before those places can be used - is better for the Allies. To this add that Japan has a very small and fragile system in many respects. Serious losses will end the offensive - either for a long period - or more likely forever. This is worth taking risks to cause to happen, and anything paid to that end is not wasted.

Given all of the forgoing, it also seems to me - that forces spread out in indefensible positions are a waste if they could have been gathered and combined into a much more secure and defensible position. (Not only a waste, but a good reason for a court-martial if they could have been saved).

REPLY: This is confused, and often the reverse of the case. It was actually unlawful to move some sorts of units from their country/territory. It was impolitic. The various regimes had a stake in being regarded as credible owners of their countries - and certainly the vast sums invested in military and para military forces to defend those territories were NOT invested to defend some OTHER place. It may sometimes make sense to help each other - but it does not always make any sense in local political terms. There is a saying "all politics is local politics" - and if things do NOT make sense in a place - the view of some grand strategic leader is not germane. [IRL there was NO grand strategic commander - in charge in Russia, China, NEI - name it - such a point of view is a player one - artificial - and not related to what could happen in the theater - unless the player makes an effort to confine his moves to what might make sense] Failing to grasp that Soviet politics matter might lead to the (historical US) plan to put bombers at Kamchatka and Vladivostok - which is useful to the USA - harmful to Japan - but not sensible for the Russians. The problems of coalition warfare are not trivial, they do impose what might be regarded as inefficiencies, but that idea only makes sense if it were possible to have a sort of grand Allied Empire to efficiently integrate everything - which of couse does not make sense. IRL coalition warfare is very efficient in the sense that cooperation is better than standing and falling alone - but it isn't anything like one unified military force covering 55 per cent of the longitude on the globe (which is on the RHS map).

Further, it can be argued that each unit sacrificed is taking time for the enemy to conquer, and true as that is, to me it would depend on the value you place on your countryman's lives. In most European wars, a soldier was expected to fight on as long as he had the ability to resist...at which point he would be allowed to surrender with honor satisfied, and he could then expect humane treatment from his captors for the duration of hostilities or until exchanged. Those were the rules of war that were commonly accepted.

REPLY: This is indeed what I am arguing. But if you get into the politics of that era, these were not always - or even usually - the lives of "your countrymen." Further - this war was a bit more savage than European standards. Prisoners were not generally taken at all in Burma- the Allies had an exception - a prisoner could be taken to torture for information. I said Allies. Aussie behaviors on New Guinea and Borneo, British and American behaviors in Burma, are as bad as anything alleged for the IJA. [One Aussie XO objected to killing everyone in a IJA unit that surrendered - but he was overruled. Some of Commander Mortons' officers refused to serve with him again - but he was given the Navy Cross for a mission in which he machine gunned men in the water from 5 sunken ships - acts for which we EXECUTED Japanese sub captains after the war - as "war criminals". And none of these sorts of things compare to the firebombing raids - 85 per cent of Japanese urban area was burned out - in clear violation of our own interpretation of the law of land warfare.] The battles on the Pacific islands were NOT efficient in Allied lives either. No part of this "War Without Mercy" was led by those really greatly concerned with limiting human losses - on either side. And as much as I am not of the same school that permitted firebombing of Tokyo or the invasion of Palau - I DO think that good leaders MUST be willing to risk lives. In my case it is usually the lives of my contrymen I risk for some political/military objective. This is not always bad. If you balance the risk and possible cost with the possible gains - well you get something like Midway when the scale is large. I say - do this in many places - and on smaller scales - to optimize the chances for victory.

But in the war against Japan - it was quickly understood that the rules of war no longer applied to captives of the Japanese Empire. Therefore, the old rules of fighting on as long as possible and then surrendering were no longer going to be respected.

REPLY: If you think this, you are either believing propaganda, or you are not fully aware. There were many cases where it was possible - and there are cases where the Japanese behaved well. Nor were the Allies always well behaved. Nor for that matter was everyone reliable - it appears that Burmese soldiers changed sides twice - and certainly Thai soldiers did. To think of every little unit as identical - which in a simplistic game they pretty much are - in motivation and value - is not really to get it right. And then there are the volunteers: the Second Independent company was more or less an elite special forces unit NOT composed of soldiers - but civilians TOUGHER than soldiers - men who VOLUNTERED to defend points like Kavieng and Tulagi (5 platoons were spread from New Guinea to Fiji) - NOT to let these detachments fight for what they agreed to defend is hardly respectful of them. Nor did they die - just because a game unit is lots does not mean it is "dead" - it is just "out of the game." Some casualties should be thought of as "prisoners"

So it really comes down to not only military strategy, but it very much becomes a matter of morality.

Therefore, the Sir Robin Defense is not only militarily attractive to an Allied player, it also takes on the aspect of a moral imperative from an historical point of view.

Now balance that against a Hitlerian policy of stand and die - and there seems to be little to recommend fighting it out to the death for the Allied player at any level.

Now - all this is not to say there is anything wrong with a 'Well Calculated Risk' of throwing a heavy blow when it seems worth while.

My thoughts anyway.
B

Wow. Morality. A detailed study of the colonial Allied regimes in PTO might make one wonder if we are speaking the same language?
I myself believe in the moral as a powerful military advantage - a moral leader wins the hearts and minds of the locals - and has good intel - and the respect of his men - and often of the enemy as well. I have some experience in these matters. But being a moral leader does not mean you don't fight hopeless battles. I once had to decide wether or not to defend a village from a battalion assault when "all assets were committed" and none could come to the aid of my squad? It was clear we could - possibly should - be wiped out if we tried. But vs the VC the fate of the village - which had broken one of their rules - was entirely to be killed - to the last baby (babies first if they surrendered). We resolved to try - and we had the active support of the locals - and pretty obviously we didn't die. But that was anything but clear at the time: squads do not usually defeat battalions. The point is - even at the cost of our lives - we felt it was MORE moral to die than to live - permitting the crime unresisted. And the larger point is - if you make the enemy fight - make him earn his victories - sometimes he will lose.

The ONE way to GUARANTEE Japan gets farther than they did faster than history is to run. Japan is fragile - it has few long range air units that cannot engage constantly on many fronts - only if they do NOT have to engage can Japan build a strong air force able to fight a big battle. Japan has a problem with supplies - it does not produce that much supplies and fuel. Giving it more does not make it weaker - but stronger. Otherwise it will have a very weak air force. Japan cannot afford to lose carriers - but you cannot get any if you are not creating the possibility.
EXPENDING their supplies in combat and delaying how long they must wait to get new sources (which is not the day they are captured, but the day they are repaired after capture) - these make Japan weaker. Force them to concentrate - and feed LOTS of supplies and fuel to the heads of the spear - and then cut up the SLOC. Strike where he is not strong - surely that is not too risky.

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: jwilkerson

ORIGINAL: okami

Sadly the "Sir Robin" strategy has become an institution.

One of two anyway .. the "Bunker" being a very viable alternative.

I've lost one game (I've only be able to play Japanese in PBEM) to "the Bunker" ... and had the wits scared out of me twice by "the bunker" ... were I ever get to play the Allies in PBEM, I'm pretty sure I would try "the bunker'.

This defense involves picking a few key locations, like Soerabaja, and building them up and fortifying. Obviously, each game is different, and pre-determining all bunker locations, will not work in general. But the idea, is to build up a few spots and surprise and hence delay the Japanese. They are powerful, but they cannot be everywhere with everything. A very active Allied defense, is, IMHO much more likely to result in a early "reversal of fortunes" than a "Sir Robin" ....

Nor is the bunker the same in all mods. In RHS - defend Baguio City/Balinta Pass (which - as the word pass implies - is mountains). It is malaria free - it has lots of resources and supplies - and a rear area if you keep it also resource rich - an airfield - and it cannot be bombarded by battleships.

I completely concur that a very active Allied defense will result in a much earlier reversal of fortune. The question is not if it will happen - but when? Keep throwing the dice - sooner or later he gets hurt - and he cannot recover from that very fast or easily - if at all. The delay is in itself a victory - he is not making progress while he is recovering.

Note that running is a self fulfilling prophesy: "Malaya never holds out" hardly has meaning if you only evacuate things from it and never send anything there to fight. I have a game going where the British (my opponents ) have a strong line at the level of Kuala Lumpur - I have failed to breach it at either end after multiple attacks - and I have no sense of when that will change? The usual force I send - about a division or two stronger than history - is not able to win fast - so I must either divert other units - or take longer. In the SAME game I have been driven out of three hexes of Luzon I previously occupied. In spite of a fine combiend arms force with bases at both ends of the island for short range air support. My opponent - who has played games with me for decades - is almost a professional - but HE says the reason for his success is "I took your advice - and just tried to fight rather than run"

[herwin]

ORIGINAL: jwilkerson

ORIGINAL: okami

Sadly the "Sir Robin" strategy has become an institution.

One of two anyway .. the "Bunker" being a very viable alternative.

I've lost one game (I've only be able to play Japanese in PBEM) to "the Bunker" ... and had the wits scared out of me twice by "the bunker" ... were I ever get to play the Allies in PBEM, I'm pretty sure I would try "the bunker'.

This defense involves picking a few key locations, like Soerabaja, and building them up and fortifying. Obviously, each game is different, and pre-determining all bunker locations, will not work in general. But the idea, is to build up a few spots and surprise and hence delay the Japanese. They are powerful, but they cannot be everywhere with everything. A very active Allied defense, is, IMHO much more likely to result in a early "reversal of fortunes" than a "Sir Robin" ....

That's what blitzk is doing against me, in part because of a house rule. The first time, he managed to hold almost everything. This time, I'm making slow progress.

[JWE]

“Sir Robin”, and “The Bunker”; we even have our own military lexicon. lol [:D]

Here’s a Japanese one. One of the guys wrote a beaut of a scenario, that we call “The Backfill”. Wild & wooly, lots of risk, calculated and otherwise. No PH, KB goes South; very early landings in DEI; take Sumatra and Batavia, land & sea conversion on Soerabaja. Then ‘backfill’to the North – squeeze to the West from the Palaus. If done right, there’s nowhere to run, nowhere to hide.

[herwin]

ORIGINAL: JWE

“Sir Robin”, and “The Bunker”; we even have our own military lexicon. lol [:D]

Here’s a Japanese one. One of the guys wrote a beaut of a scenario, that we call “The Backfill”. Wild & wooly, lots of risk, calculated and otherwise. No PH, KB goes South; very early landings in DEI; take Sumatra and Batavia, land & sea conversion on Soerabaja. Then ‘backfill’to the North – squeeze to the West from the Palaus. If done right, there’s nowhere to run, nowhere to hide.

Historically, Japan delayed its DOW on the NEI. On the other hand, this scenario would show the Japanese player why in reality they attacked America at the start of the war. It makes a lot of sense as a what-if.

[Big B]

Well, what can I say, you were right and I was wrong.

I would certainly leave you to the mercy of the Japanese on Wake Island rather than try to evacuate you and spare your life....I get it now. After all, we didn't spend all that money to defend Wake Is - only to pull the troops out when it looked bleak for their survival...bad local politics. [;)]

ORIGINAL: el cid again

ORIGINAL: Big B

ORIGINAL: JWE
...
We have found that the game is quite sufficient to the player. Every player ‘knows’ what’s going to happen, if they can read, so they will do what most people will do – conserve their assets and do a Sir Robin: a cold, calculated response devised in the full knowledge of ultimate power and victory, in game terms. Very effective, in game terms.
....

I think you have hit the nail on the head so to say. The lamented Sir Robin is quite attractive to Allied players.

I am not sure that there is anything inherently unsound or wrong with the idea...

I think from an historical perspective, the Allied high command (whom we play as) intrinsically knew(or certainly believed) that victory would be forthcoming when the 'machine' was ramped up.

REPLY: The nature of economic and strategic choices makes this certainly true. Allied leaders had almost complete faith in their ability to win by overwhelming by numbers. I am less than totally impressed with this - in PTO in particular you find a lot of very bloody attrition going on -
which I will return to below. They expected to win. They also expected to hold a whole lot better than they did. The forces in the area were what they were partly because they were regarded as adequate to deal with "only" Japanese - or because they were colonial occupation forces not intended even to face the Japanese.

It makes very little sense to me to sacrifice lives for what must be lost - with no hope of victory...I could not do so in real life and sleep at night. It makes far more sense to me to delay with a reasonable chance of survival for the troops, and make preparations to stand where you know you can be successful, than to blindly let your men die in a fore-ordained fashion to apparently no avail? Or if they are to stand and die - that would only be conscionable to me as a means to buy time to save non-combatants (your women and children). A friend from Bulgaria told me once of an old saying -"there is no fortress too important to abandon".

REPLY: I prefer NO losses at all. But I fear the present age in the West - with its unwillingness to consider military units expendable. PLA regards this as a strategic weakness - dooming us to defeat - and I suspect it may. This was clearly NOT the case in WWII. We WERE willing to risk losses. Nor does it follow that all missions that cannot be won make no sense - even in this age. When Argentina invaded the Falklands - HMS Endurance was near South Georgia - and she had a squad of Royal Marines embarked. Wishing to establish a legal claim to South Georgia by defending it - a tiny team was disembarked - with orders to resist: as he went down the gangway leading his men ashore the LT said "We will make their eyes water." They did. They hit a patrol craft with an anti-tank missile - and also hit a helicopter with another - forcing it to land - a total loss. They only had two missiles - and nothing else big enough to do much damage - so it was 2 for 2. In that case no one was killed or even wounded on the British side - but they did surrender and would show up as "casualties" in our system. The point is - there are POLITICAL reasons for fighting. Soldiers are political instruments and no one should ever think that is without meaning - if you are NOT serving ANY political objective - you are wasting your time (and lives). But my larger point is there are MILITARY reasons to resist: just do so intelligently. DELAY is a valid military objective. If you give ALL the bases - with minmal damge - with all their facilities and resources to the enemy - at no cost - surely this is going to be the optimum case for the Japanese to have the greatest power to take places far from Japan.
Everything less than this - every delay - every loss - every bit of damage that must be repaired before those places can be used - is better for the Allies. To this add that Japan has a very small and fragile system in many respects. Serious losses will end the offensive - either for a long period - or more likely forever. This is worth taking risks to cause to happen, and anything paid to that end is not wasted.

Given all of the forgoing, it also seems to me - that forces spread out in indefensible positions are a waste if they could have been gathered and combined into a much more secure and defensible position. (Not only a waste, but a good reason for a court-martial if they could have been saved).

REPLY: This is confused, and often the reverse of the case. It was actually unlawful to move some sorts of units from their country/territory. It was impolitic. The various regimes had a stake in being regarded as credible owners of their countries - and certainly the vast sums invested in military and para military forces to defend those territories were NOT invested to defend some OTHER place. It may sometimes make sense to help each other - but it does not always make any sense in local political terms. There is a saying "all politics is local politics" - and if things do NOT make sense in a place - the view of some grand strategic leader is not germane. [IRL there was NO grand strategic commander - in charge in Russia, China, NEI - name it - such a point of view is a player one - artificial - and not related to what could happen in the theater - unless the player makes an effort to confine his moves to what might make sense] Failing to grasp that Soviet politics matter might lead to the (historical US) plan to put bombers at Kamchatka and Vladivostok - which is useful to the USA - harmful to Japan - but not sensible for the Russians. The problems of coalition warfare are not trivial, they do impose what might be regarded as inefficiencies, but that idea only makes sense if it were possible to have a sort of grand Allied Empire to efficiently integrate everything - which of couse does not make sense. IRL coalition warfare is very efficient in the sense that cooperation is better than standing and falling alone - but it isn't anything like one unified military force covering 55 per cent of the longitude on the globe (which is on the RHS map).

Further, it can be argued that each unit sacrificed is taking time for the enemy to conquer, and true as that is, to me it would depend on the value you place on your countryman's lives. In most European wars, a soldier was expected to fight on as long as he had the ability to resist...at which point he would be allowed to surrender with honor satisfied, and he could then expect humane treatment from his captors for the duration of hostilities or until exchanged. Those were the rules of war that were commonly accepted.

REPLY: This is indeed what I am arguing. But if you get into the politics of that era, these were not always - or even usually - the lives of "your countrymen." Further - this war was a bit more savage than European standards. Prisoners were not generally taken at all in Burma- the Allies had an exception - a prisoner could be taken to torture for information. I said Allies. Aussie behaviors on New Guinea and Borneo, British and American behaviors in Burma, are as bad as anything alleged for the IJA. [One Aussie XO objected to killing everyone in a IJA unit that surrendered - but he was overruled. Some of Commander Mortons' officers refused to serve with him again - but he was given the Navy Cross for a mission in which he machine gunned men in the water from 5 sunken ships - acts for which we EXECUTED Japanese sub captains after the war - as "war criminals". And none of these sorts of things compare to the firebombing raids - 85 per cent of Japanese urban area was burned out - in clear violation of our own interpretation of the law of land warfare.] The battles on the Pacific islands were NOT efficient in Allied lives either. No part of this "War Without Mercy" was led by those really greatly concerned with limiting human losses - on either side. And as much as I am not of the same school that permitted firebombing of Tokyo or the invasion of Palau - I DO think that good leaders MUST be willing to risk lives. In my case it is usually the lives of my contrymen I risk for some political/military objective. This is not always bad. If you balance the risk and possible cost with the possible gains - well you get something like Midway when the scale is large. I say - do this in many places - and on smaller scales - to optimize the chances for victory.

But in the war against Japan - it was quickly understood that the rules of war no longer applied to captives of the Japanese Empire. Therefore, the old rules of fighting on as long as possible and then surrendering were no longer going to be respected.

REPLY: If you think this, you are either believing propaganda, or you are not fully aware. There were many cases where it was possible - and there are cases where the Japanese behaved well. Nor were the Allies always well behaved. Nor for that matter was everyone reliable - it appears that Burmese soldiers changed sides twice - and certainly Thai soldiers did. To think of every little unit as identical - which in a simplistic game they pretty much are - in motivation and value - is not really to get it right. And then there are the volunteers: the Second Independent company was more or less an elite special forces unit NOT composed of soldiers - but civilians TOUGHER than soldiers - men who VOLUNTERED to defend points like Kavieng and Tulagi (5 platoons were spread from New Guinea to Fiji) - NOT to let these detachments fight for what they agreed to defend is hardly respectful of them. Nor did they die - just because a game unit is lots does not mean it is "dead" - it is just "out of the game." Some casualties should be thought of as "prisoners"

So it really comes down to not only military strategy, but it very much becomes a matter of morality.

Therefore, the Sir Robin Defense is not only militarily attractive to an Allied player, it also takes on the aspect of a moral imperative from an historical point of view.

Now balance that against a Hitlerian policy of stand and die - and there seems to be little to recommend fighting it out to the death for the Allied player at any level.

Now - all this is not to say there is anything wrong with a 'Well Calculated Risk' of throwing a heavy blow when it seems worth while.

My thoughts anyway.
B

Wow. Morality. A detailed study of the colonial Allied regimes in PTO might make one wonder if we are speaking the same language?
I myself believe in the moral as a powerful military advantage - a moral leader wins the hearts and minds of the locals - and has good intel - and the respect of his men - and often of the enemy as well. I have some experience in these matters. But being a moral leader does not mean you don't fight hopeless battles. I once had to decide wether or not to defend a village from a battalion assault when "all assets were committed" and none could come to the aid of my squad? It was clear we could - possibly should - be wiped out if we tried. But vs the VC the fate of the village - which had broken one of their rules - was entirely to be killed - to the last baby (babies first if they surrendered). We resolved to try - and we had the active support of the locals - and pretty obviously we didn't die. But that was anything but clear at the time: squads do not usually defeat battalions. The point is - even at the cost of our lives - we felt it was MORE moral to die than to live - permitting the crime unresisted. And the larger point is - if you make the enemy fight - make him earn his victories - sometimes he will lose.

The ONE way to GUARANTEE Japan gets farther than they did faster than history is to run. Japan is fragile - it has few long range air units that cannot engage constantly on many fronts - only if they do NOT have to engage can Japan build a strong air force able to fight a big battle. Japan has a problem with supplies - it does not produce that much supplies and fuel. Giving it more does not make it weaker - but stronger. Otherwise it will have a very weak air force. Japan cannot afford to lose carriers - but you cannot get any if you are not creating the possibility.
EXPENDING their supplies in combat and delaying how long they must wait to get new sources (which is not the day they are captured, but the day they are repaired after capture) - these make Japan weaker. Force them to concentrate - and feed LOTS of supplies and fuel to the heads of the spear - and then cut up the SLOC. Strike where he is not strong - surely that is not too risky.

[John 3rd]

Not that I play the Allies often but I love to FIGHT from Dec 7th on!  Too many Allied players play the 'Sir Robin' defense because they become appalled at their losses.  It drives me nuts to see this.  They will get ALL of it back and more as time passes.  ANYTHING destroyed of the Japanese will not...
 
That people/players don't get this is amazing...
 

[el cid again]

[quote]ORIGINAL: Big B

Well, what can I say, you were right and I was wrong.

I would certainly leave you to the mercy of the Japanese on Wake Island rather than try to evacuate you and spare your life....I get it now. After all, we didn't spend all that money to defend Wake Is - only to pull the troops out when it looked bleak for their survival...bad local politics. [;)]

[quote]ORIGINAL: el cid again

.

Wake was clearly a case of a deliberate defense - and a successful one.

In WWI German ships put small armed parties ashore and did lots of damage. USMC Marine Defense Battalions were intended to prevent that. They were not supposed to stop proper assault units. But the first assault on Wake (admittedly be a weak second string force) failed.

Adm Kimmel wanted to form a Wake Island Militia from construction and Pan Am civilians there. In the event - it took too long- but the men fought anyway - quite illegally. [Having no uniforms and improvising no arm bands - the minimum required - they were "unlawful combattants" and properly should ALL have been executed - only some were - the worst offenders]

I realize this is not how we usually tell the tale - but this is what happened. We WANTED to defend Wake - and its defense DID hurt the enemy - and it was not related to the (non existent) local population. It was a strategic decision. But - in spite of the botched failure to provide the militia with uniforms - it was a good decision. This is so necessary that ALL mods make the defense unit static - so you cannot run away.

You might have picked a better example if you wanted to imply I had it wrong. It is hard to think of a better case for NOT running with a small unit than at Wake. But the generalization about local politics does indeed not apply there - since there was none. Yet the rationale for a defense still existed. Other places add local politics as a motive: anybody get it yet? There are sound reasons for defending - not all of them local.

[Big B]

Well if you go back and re-read my original post you will find that there is nothing in it we actually disagree on - it seems it's just nuances of what I said you differed with, like my example of standing until the end to save the women and children - and then you quoted a story of facing overwhelming odds to save civilians in a village (I honestly don't see what you are saying is different.)

By the way - at Wake Island the Navy and Marines did raise a rescue mission rather than leave them to their fate - it was just 24 hours too late. It was also a good example of why no Allied commander with a soul would willingly leave his men to Japanese mercy, isolated and hopeless.

ORIGINAL: el cid again
....
You might have picked a better example if you wanted to imply I had it wrong. It is hard to think of a better case for NOT running with a small unit than at Wake. But the generalization about local politics does indeed not apply there - since there was none. Yet the rationale for a defense still existed. Other places add local politics as a motive: anybody get it yet? There are sound reasons for defending - not all of them local.

The whole point is that the Sir Robin Defense angers many Japanese Players because they intuitively know in the grand campaign game it diminishes their longer term chances for victory. For example If the Japanese player can take out most all US Naval strength piecemeal in 1942 for little cost (a typical 8CV vs 2Cv battle), then they will be much better placed to fight an Allied comeback developing in late 43/ early 44.
If the Allied player throws every aircraft he has at the Japanese in the Zero Bonus period (in stock) all he is doing is training up the Japanese pilots to perfection while loosing at about a 10:1 rate - this is not really in the Allied Players best interest.
On the other hand the most Allied Players intuitively understand that they must save what they can to fight another day - so they may make use of what they have most effectively.

I mean, this is just common sense. This is why players build up large bases full of fighters and bombers to dominate sea space - rather than piss them away on scattered airfields outside of mutual support range.

Everyone understands the basic principal of not squandering their assets - it's just an individual interpretation of what is important enough to risk assets over and what is just foolhardy.

[JWE]

ORIGINAL: herwin
Historically, Japan delayed its DOW on the NEI. On the other hand, this scenario would show the Japanese player why in reality they attacked America at the start of the war. It makes a lot of sense as a what-if.

Quite right Henry. The 'backfill' scen is based on Tanaka Toshiro's alternate ops plan of Mar '41, with some very 'nasty' embellishments by contemporary members of 1 MEU. Oh .. the horror .. the horror! These guys are good. I'm glad I'm just the referee, if I was playing Jeremy, I'de be toast.

Ciao. John

[DuckofTindalos]

Would, as always, be really interested to see an AAR for such a scenario. Always fascinated to see contemporary military professionals tackling historical military scenarios.

[TOMLABEL]

ORIGINAL: Terminus

Would, as always, be really interested to see an AAR for such a scenario. Always fascinated to see contemporary military professionals tackling historical military scenarios.

Agreed. I would love to see/read this as well.

TOMLABEL

[bilbow]

ORIGINAL: okami

Sadly the "Sir Robin" strategy has become an institution.

In game terms the primary Jap objective is an auto-victory, and that is most easily done if the Allied player runs away. The Allied player saves units, true, but more importantly does not inflict casualies on the Jap.

As Jap, I need 4 to 1 in points for an auto. If the allied player fights and trades 2-3 planes for one of mine, he is ahead in terms of avoiding an AV.

If the allied player runs away, the Jap can advance quickly and without loss which opens up the opportunity to go for high-vp locations like Noumea before they are fortified. If I have to fight for everything, I kill units, but take losses myself, and most importantly don't get the chance for these big vp objectives.

The best allied strategy is to fight, trading initial forces for time. A good example of this is my game with Feinder (He updates his AAR occaissionally). He stood and fought, and lost a lot. But I lost enough so there was no auto victory. Now I certainly don't advocate the Allied player letting his carriers get ambushed like Feinder did his, but by then (9/42) AV was out of reach anyway. That bought me an extra year before the roof falls in on me, but hardly won the game.

Clearly the best allied strategy is to stand and fight and make he Jap pay. Anyone who sir robins me will be staring at an AV in short order.

[Big B]

Well, I suppose this all centers on what the definition of running away is (Sir Robin).

This thread is about the positives of an active defense. Any such defense that wears the Japanese player down and damages the resource centers that the Japanese player needs is beneficial to the Allied player(s). But the Allied player has no choice but to fight in most areas the Japanese player decides he wants to go (resource areas). No Allied player can evacuate the entire DEI without loss - the Japanese player will not give him the time to do so (unless he is too cautious). The same holds true for the PI, and Malaya.

So what is running away? Running away with what?

So as far as I can see - the only thing that may constitute 'running away' is to save what ground units that the Allied player can salvage from doomed areas, and especially to save naval and air units for further concerted use.

Therefore, it seems to me that 'running away' is primarily a euphemism for not throwing away valuable units.

I find it interesting that - or should I say - 'it seems to me' that damning efforts to run away has been most pronounced by Japanese players...not Allied players.

I could be wrong - but I get the impression that the biggest controversy has been that Allied players save Dutch infantry to defend other areas, Allied players save unit fragments to rebuild(they won't have many for a good year or so), Allied players don't dutifully take on the KB early and suffer the consequences.
None of the above seem detrimental to the Allied cause to me? At least I never seem to hear Allied players complaining that they have saved too much?

So what is it about 'Sir Robin' that is so good for Japanese players and so bad for Allied players - that seems to leave the Japanese players so negative about the whole thing?

As Shakespeare said - you protest too much?

ORIGINAL: bilbow

ORIGINAL: okami

Sadly the "Sir Robin" strategy has become an institution.

In game terms the primary Jap objective is an auto-victory, and that is most easily done if the Allied player runs away. The Allied player saves units, true, but more importantly does not inflict casualies on the Jap.

As Jap, I need 4 to 1 in points for an auto. If the allied player fights and trades 2-3 planes for one of mine, he is ahead in terms of avoiding an AV.

If the allied player runs away, the Jap can advance quickly and without loss which opens up the opportunity to go for high-vp locations like Noumea before they are fortified. If I have to fight for everything, I kill units, but take losses myself, and most importantly don't get the chance for these big vp objectives.

The best allied strategy is to fight, trading initial forces for time. A good example of this is my game with Feinder (He updates his AAR occaissionally). He stood and fought, and lost a lot. But I lost enough so there was no auto victory. Now I certainly don't advocate the Allied player letting his carriers get ambushed like Feinder did his, but by then (9/42) AV was out of reach anyway. That bought me an extra year before the roof falls in on me, but hardly won the game.

Clearly the best allied strategy is to stand and fight and make he Jap pay. Anyone who sir robins me will be staring at an AV in short order.

[jwilkerson]

ORIGINAL: John 3rd

Not that I play the Allies often but I love to FIGHT from Dec 7th on!  Too many Allied players play the 'Sir Robin' defense because they become appalled at their losses.  It drives me nuts to see this.  They will get ALL of it back and more as time passes.  ANYTHING destroyed of the Japanese will not...

That people/players don't get this is amazing...

I think people who have played the Japanese - understand the weaknesses of the Japanese and the total "shoe string" nature of the Japanese attack. In some of the AARs ... like GH's a couple of years ago ... I think the Japanese side looked like a "steam roller" ... but those who play the Japanese know better ... hence we might make good Allied players because we would try to exploit these weaknesses. Playing an active defense is the answer. Moses played a combination of "bunker" and "hit and run" with me ... and .. to be honest I got lucky a few times. I sent my main strength initially into Celebes and was able to defeat some "minor bunkers" he set up and Ceram and Celebes. But if his defense was repeated in 5 more games it would likely be dangerously successful. His repeated massing and unmassing of fighters at Singapore scared the heck out of me. Singapore cost me 100 pre-war zero pilots. Port Moresby cost me another 100 pre-war zero pilots. By the time I'd captured both of those - the zero force was history. It is this "invisible" attrition that makes the active defense so powerful. But only Japanese players probably understand this. With a few exceptions (Tom Hunter for one).