ORIGINAL: aspqrz
ORIGINAL: battlevonwar
From documentaries I watched as a boy until very recently I remember the ole drills of watching German Paratroopers loaded unto massive super gliders. The Germans were very innovative at getting things done. They even had light tanks in the nose. I'm sure anything is possible..(in small #s)
Pretty sure that what you saw has been misremembered. AFAIR the Germans didn't have light tanks designed to be used in Gliders. The Brits did, but they were basically useless ... and not available in 1940.
The Germans *did* have a big glider, the Me-321, from which the 6-engined Me-323 "Gigant" was developed. But, as far as I can tell, though it was the result of a 1940 design competition for a large Glider for Sealion, it didn't actually enter service until 1941, and not in large numbers at that time.
Both models had a maximum payload of 20 tons, give or take, and that precludes carrying anything larger than a Panzer I/II or, perhaps, a Panzer 38(t) [both weighing in at around 10 tons, whereas the Panzer III was c. 23-24 tons, and obviously too heavy) ... *if* the Me-321 had been available, which it wasn't.
All the Germans had for Sealion were a number of DFS-230's, with a payload of 1200 kg or 9 soldiers. And I don't think they had very many of those, as, for example, they were only able to muster *80* for the entire Marita-Merkur operation (the invasion of Crete).
Also, the reality was that the number of Ju-52's available for Sealion operations was much more limited than for Crete, for the simple, obvious, and rarely understood fact that the losses (damaged and destroyed) to the Ju-52 force in the operations against Holland, Belgium and etc. had savaged them ... and, indeed, of the (IIRC) 3 parachute Divisions (really Brigades, strength wise) available at the beginning of the operation, only one was still operationally viable at the end ... and there evidently weren't enough Ju-52s and Gliders to carry all of what was available, even these reduced numbers, all in one wave.
(Oh, and production of Ju-52s had, IIRC, ceased even before Fall Gelb, so operational losses couldn't even be replaced by new productiuon)
Of course, as the Battle of Britain progressed, the reorganisation of the Parachute Divisions and Ju-52 units rectified the situation somewhat, but never to the point where the Germans could manage an entire divisional (and these were small even by US/UK Airborne Divisional Standards, around 6-7k IIRC) drop with the resources available.
So, they *might* get a half division drop, or less, over the UK. Once. After that, well, what do you call Gliders and Glider Tugs and Ju-52s in general in disputed airspace?
Targets.
Dead targets.
Don't like the chances of the second and succeeding waves, no siree!
So, no tanks on Gliders.
ORIGINAL: battlevonwar
Although I hear that the RAF would have been moved North in the event of a real invasion, reserved for the inevitable. I heard that if the BEF was destroyed at Dunkirk there would be nothing left to fight the Germans at all. It would be just a cakewalk period...
Most people don't know that the RAF only committed three of five Groups against the Germans directly, and those three Groups only had 55% of the fighter strength.
So, even if the Germans *had* savaged the 3 Groups committed to the BoB, they'd only have been up against 55% of the RAF fighters.
The RAF plan was that, if the fighter strength of the three Groups committed was reduced to less than 50%, they'd withdraw north of the Luftwaffe Fighter range ... which would leave the RAF with 45% (uncommitted) plus 27.5% (half of the 55% committed) = 72.5% of their entire fighter strength and, therefore, actually *more* than they had committed originally, left to sortie south in the event of an invasion.
Now, the Germans, as is shown historically, couldn't even handle the 55%! With an additional 20%, and with the Luftwaffe now committed to Air Superiority PLUS Ground Support PLUS Anti-Surface Warfare *simultaneously*, 24/7 ... well, lets just say that it doesn't look good ... for the Luftwaffe [;)]
As for the BEF. Most people, back in 1940 as well as now, assume that 100% of the BEF was pocketed in the Dunkirk pocket and could, therefore, have been lost "if only" Hitler hadn't told the Panzers to halt.
Sadly, none of the above is true.
Around 45% (yes, again) of the BEF was *not* at Dunkirk and was never encircled. It was able to withdraw (mostly, not all, and not with a lot of their equipment) through the Breton ports about a month or six weeks later. So, no, the whole of the BEF wasn;t ever going to be lost.
As for whether all of what was in the Dunkirk pocket was losable, the assumption here is based on Hitler's (in)famous "Stop" order to the Panzers. Allegedly (postwar, mainly) the argument is that Hitler did this because he didn't want to destroy the BEF, somehow seeing this as a political ploy that would make Churchill more likely to negotiate.
"Rubbish" wouldn't be too strong a word for this theory. Mostly it's postwar justifications by German Generals blaming Hitler for every alleged mistake made during the entire war.
The reality is that the Panzer divisions had just about shot their bolt. Divisional records show that they had largely outrun their supply network, and were short on fuel, ammo and other supplies, and their ability to initiate another offensive was much reduced, if possible at all. The other thing that the German divisional records show is that the rate of traffic accidents amongst Tank and Truck (and other) drivers was skyrocketing ... because the units had been in virtually nonstop action since the beginning of the campaign and drivers were, quite literally, falling asleep at the wheel! So whether the soldiers would have been able to continue with another assault, given the poor supply situation, is also questionable.
Then there's the fact that the Panzer divisions had outrun the infantry. There's two issues here, the Panzers were more exploitation than breakthrough units ... the Infantry's heavy artillery was to provide the rupture through which the Panzers would then rumble. So they'd have been being asked to do something for which they were not really equipped, while short on supply and with exhausted soldiers.
Then there's the other problem ... their flanks were, quite literally, in the air ... nothing was securing them. Now, with the advantage of 20:20 hindsight we know now that the French, even their armoured formations, had well and truly shot their bolt and were, at best, able to offer limited resistance to attacks and had no hope at all of mounting another offensive such as the one led by De Gaulle at Arras (which has been much overblown in significance, but worried the Germans regardless), but neither the French nor the British nor the Germans knew that at the time. In fact, based on what the Germans *did* know, they were very worried about moving further ahead until the Infantry caught up.
So, in reality, the German generals in charge actually had stopped the advance, for good and sufficient reasons, and Hitler more or less formalised it when they explained their reasoning.
Even if they *had* resumed (or attempted to) their advance/attack, the likelihood is that it merely reduces the number of British and French (mainly French, indeed, as few people realise as well) soldiers that are evacuated rather than preventing it completely.
But say they did get most of the forces in the Dunkirk pocket ... that still leaves almost half still intact. A disaster, sure, but not an overwhelming one.
Then there's the issue of how many soldiers were in the UK at the time.
Lots.
And Lots.
And Lots and Lots and Lots.
More than were in France.
Much More.
Much Much More.
There was a whole, fully equipped, Canadian Division in the SE. A whole UK Armoured Division (not with the best tanks, but since the Germans weren't likely to have *any* at the beginning of the Sealion window, and the Brits were replacing their losses every week of delay ... IIRC even the final Sealion plan only planned on a dozen or so tanks being committed to the first wave ... and the second wave was to be *three weeks later* ... seriously! [8|]) was also in the area. There were several more fully equipped Brigades in the SE, and there were the equivalent of a dozen more divisions spread around the country, in various stages of training and equipment, but the UK would *always* have been able to outnumber any planned German invasion force from very early on ... even the final plan involved elements of 12 divisions in the first wave (and German divisions were anywhere between half and 2/3rds the manpower of British Divisions, and all British units were motorised ... the Germans were planning on bringing their horses with them, and one of the problems their planners faced was brining fodder enough for said horses over) ... or about 3 divisions in absolute strength, spread across the SE coast from Dover to Southhampton ... and the second wave would be *three weeks later*.
*THREE WEEKS LATER*
That was their *best* plan. And even that was, obviously, a fantasy.
ORIGINAL: battlevonwar
We must assume the threat was very real though. Look at the way the English built up for it. Look at the Speeches, the Dogfights! 109s with 30 minutes to Rock N Roll over English territory until suitable landing strips were created!
Nope. Not a real threat at all. Not even close.
Of course, all this is with the benefit of 20:20 hindsight. No-one at the time *knew* this for sure.
I suspect the British had a fair idea of the problems the Germans were likely to face ... they mainly feared a coup de main, and even that wasn't (as we now know) very likely at all.
The Kriegsmarine seem to have had a pretty fair idea that it was impossible.
The Wehrmacht? Not so obviously sure as the Kriegsmarine, and perhaps thinking it might work.
The Luftwaffe? Well, Goering professed to think it possible ... but he was a blowhard. I suspect the rest of the Luftwaffe may have been somewhat more sanguine at their chances.
ORIGINAL: battlevonwar
This was a logistical nightmare for either side given different circumstances. So it's not impossible, just EXTREMELY expensive for either side. So much the Germans decided against it and the British were willing to pay their entire Fighter Defense for it.
"Londoners fighting? There are some pretty vicious and nationalistic men there. As bad as Americans or Russians? The Russians knew what was coming I don't think they were as naive as we think. I think they knew the Germans were bad by December '41. London could have been street fighting, that could have had tens of thousands of poorly equipped strong willed 14-65 year old men!"
Nope. 27.5% of their fighter strength
I seriously doubt any significant number of Germans would have gotten anywhere near the streets of London except, perhaps, passing through them on the way to POW camps [:)][:D]
Phil
