Semi OT, Italy in the Med, a good book

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: RFalvo69

The real problem was the co-ordination between the Navy and the Air Force - which could be rated as "none". The commanders at sea had to request air support from Superaereo (the high command of the Air Force). Here, after deciding what to do, they had to arm and fuel the planes, and brief the pilots. The result was that the Air Force arrived when the battle was over and, in a few occasions, mistakenly attacked Italian ships. The same happened when, for example, a British convoy was sighted.

Just imagine Spruance at the Battle of Midway: instead of launching his attacks, he had to contact Pearl Harbor, detail the situation, wait for an answer, and only then launch the attack. Guess who would have won...

warspite1

Yes and in fairness the Italians were not alone here. Look at the Germans in the North Sea (February 1940 was a classic) or the Allies at Savo Island. Those in charge were getting to grips with one or more of three distinct problems - integration of new technology and how best to employ this - inter-service rivalry between 'old school' and 'new school' ways of thinking - and in extreme cases, humans being humans, you have people on the same side actively working against each other, in time of war! for prestige and political brownie points - Goering vs Raeder being an example or IJN vs IJA.

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: Buckrock

ORIGINAL: dr.hal

Folks,

I've often wondered about the portrayal of the Italian forces in the Med. Were they as poor as some authors would have us believe, or as amazing as the frogmen seemed to illustrate? I recently read an interesting book that I wanted to bring to your attention. It is short and "sweet", full of stuff I was not aware of. It also might change your view of the Regia Marina and the Regia Aeronautica during the latter stages of Italy's participation in the war as a part of the Axis powers. In short, the book illustrates the growth of both forces over the previous years and the deadly consequences of ignoring that growth and allowing preconceived negative stereotypes about the fighting abilities of these forces to persist by the British. The book is by Vincent P. O'Hara and it is titled "In Passage Perilous". Hal

............. even if it was about the boring Med and not the sexy Pacific.

warspite1

Well each to their own of course.....

The Pacific War, for those interested in naval warfare, is certainly 'sexy' in the same way that the Russian Front is the ultimate for those interested in land combat. The biggest battleships, the largest aircraft carriers with great aircraft - what is not to like, to want to study and get interested in?

But the Mediterranean, boring? The Mediterranean has all that the Pacific has - fleet actions, battleship encounters, cruiser actions, destroyer actions, port attacks, amphibious invasions, convoys, trade war, submarines, night actions, naval and land based air (only carrier vs carrier warfare is missing) - albeit on a different scale - and has an added feature that the Pacific War has only for a much shorter period. I am of course referring to close matching of forces where outcomes were far from certain. In addition the Mediterranean has more navies - American, British, French, German, Italian and Vichy.

If people are interested in naval warfare, and I guess most people interested in this game are, the Mediterranean is a very worthwhile area to study too - and to wargame. [:)]

[Dili]

ORIGINAL: warspite1

ORIGINAL: Dili

Had nothing to do with the carrier presence. The battle was just after Taranto attack and the orders from Supermarina was to be even more conservative than usual.

warspite1

So two things:

a) that supports my view that Supermarina were too cautious
b) Campioni was, as far as he was aware, facing one capital ship (the battlecruiser Renown) with his two battleships - one of which was the modern Vittorio Veneto. The Italians also had 8-inch gunned cruisers - the British had just one.

His cruisers were being attacked by Renown but he continued to run. His force was attacked by Ark Royal's aircraft to no effect, but you say that had nothing to do with his decision.

Mussolini disagreed and removed Campioni after the battle.

Renown and Ramilies.
Did i said that Supermarina was not conservative? I am not aware were i contested that even if it is necessary caveats to know what it means. Supermarina had no problems sending the fleet for combat like the numerous times it sent it to sea in the end just spending fuel, but the engagement decisions was the most conservative major navy. It was almost lock step procedure.

The Italian cruisers put 2 rounds in that only heavy cruiser Berwick damaging/disabling one turret and disabling another so in essence they were even actually "wining" against a damaged destroyer, when they retired. But Campioni was not probably even aware of that... Some say he was conferencing with Supermarina in Rome and decided based on what Rome said.

I don't see the point of reference to Mussolini.

[Dili]

ORIGINAL: RFalvo69

Two other "nuggets" about the battles for the Med.

Italian pilots, even in WWII, were very well trained. Italy had been the first nation to really show the use of air-support during the Italo-Turkish war. In the interwar period, aviation was "fashionable", with many civilians either becoming flyers, enrolling in the Air Force, or (after Italy entered the war) enrolling in the Air Force with their civilian experience. Mussolini own son, Bruno, had been an excellent war pilot, fighting (for real) in the Ethiopian War, the Spanish Civil War and in North Africa. He was also a test pilot and died in 1941 while testing a bomber prototipe.

The problem (the same which plagued the Italian Army in general) was that the technology was, mostly, obsolete. No matter how good they were, the Italian pilots flew on outdated planes; this made their experience if not futile at least not fully useful. The result is something that you can even check in WitP.

The second thing to consider is the "carrier problem" . one of the most enduring myths of WWII. Actually, Italy didn't need carriers, and Mussolini was correct in saying that Italy was "a natural aircraft carrier".

The real problem was the co-ordination between the Navy and the Air Force - which could be rated as "none". The commanders at sea had to request air support from Superaereo (the high command of the Air Force). Here, after deciding what to do, they had to arm and fuel the planes, and brief the pilots. The result was that the Air Force arrived when the battle was over and, in a few occasions, mistakenly attacked Italian ships. The same happened when, for example, a British convoy was sighted.

Just imagine Spruance at the Battle of Midway: instead of launching his attacks, he had to contact Pearl Harbor, detail the situation, wait for an answer, and only then launch the attack. Guess who would have won...

The Matapan disaster wasn't caused by the presence of a British carrier vs. none on the Italian side: it was caused by the total lack of air support for the Italian fleet during the day action (in a rare reversal of roles, the Italians had decripted the British codes and were aware of the presence of a carrier).

Of course the disaster during the night action was caused by a real technological inferiority: the lack of radar on Italian ships. They steamed into the night with no clue that the British fleet was there.

I don't agree.

The Matapan disaster for once can be pinned to the carrier, it was the only successful Swordfish/Albacore operation against naval forces at sea in whole Mediterranean war.
And shows the need of the carrier for offense and defense.
There wasn't fighter range to cover the fleet at sea, neither anyone could count of something so dependent on circumstances, weather, etc.

Of course they realized that and started the hack-job of putting Reggianne fighters in the battleships after Matapan, and building of Sparviero/Aquila.

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: Dili

ORIGINAL: warspite1

ORIGINAL: Dili

Had nothing to do with the carrier presence. The battle was just after Taranto attack and the orders from Supermarina was to be even more conservative than usual.

warspite1

So two things:

a) that supports my view that Supermarina were too cautious
b) Campioni was, as far as he was aware, facing one capital ship (the battlecruiser Renown) with his two battleships - one of which was the modern Vittorio Veneto. The Italians also had 8-inch gunned cruisers - the British had just one.

His cruisers were being attacked by Renown but he continued to run. His force was attacked by Ark Royal's aircraft to no effect, but you say that had nothing to do with his decision.

Mussolini disagreed and removed Campioni after the battle.

Renown and Ramilies.
Did i said that Supermarina was not conservative? I am not aware were i contested that even if it is necessary caveats to know what it means. Supermarina had no problems sending the fleet for combat like the numerous times it sent it to sea in the end just spending fuel, but the engagement decisions was the most conservative major navy. It was almost lock step procedure.

The Italian cruisers put 2 rounds in that only heavy cruiser Berwick damaging/disabling one turret and disabling another so in essence they were even actually "wining" against a damaged destroyer, when they retired. But Campioni was not probably even aware of that... Some say he was conferencing with Supermarina in Rome and decided based on what Rome said.

I don't see the point of reference to Mussolini.

warspite1

1. I did not say what you thought about Supermarina. The case has been made by the OP to discuss whether the RM performance has been accurately assessed and whether the 'upturn' in fortunes in 1942 was because the British were complacent. I have made my case and I simply pointed out that Spartivento supports one element of that. That is all. I have no idea what the next part means. But yes, the third part of your paragraph confirms we are on the same page with regard to Supermarina.

2. I know Ramillies was there - the important point is what Campioni knew or thought he knew.

3. I don't understand the point you are making re Berwick. If Campioni knew he was 'winning' then turning away was inexplicable. If Campioni didn't know - but based on what he thought he was facing - then turning away was inexplicable.

4. Not understanding the relevance of Mussolini is equally puzzling. Why do you think Campioni was replaced?

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: Dili

ORIGINAL: RFalvo69

Two other "nuggets" about the battles for the Med.

Italian pilots, even in WWII, were very well trained. Italy had been the first nation to really show the use of air-support during the Italo-Turkish war. In the interwar period, aviation was "fashionable", with many civilians either becoming flyers, enrolling in the Air Force, or (after Italy entered the war) enrolling in the Air Force with their civilian experience. Mussolini own son, Bruno, had been an excellent war pilot, fighting (for real) in the Ethiopian War, the Spanish Civil War and in North Africa. He was also a test pilot and died in 1941 while testing a bomber prototipe.

The problem (the same which plagued the Italian Army in general) was that the technology was, mostly, obsolete. No matter how good they were, the Italian pilots flew on outdated planes; this made their experience if not futile at least not fully useful. The result is something that you can even check in WitP.

The second thing to consider is the "carrier problem" . one of the most enduring myths of WWII. Actually, Italy didn't need carriers, and Mussolini was correct in saying that Italy was "a natural aircraft carrier".

The real problem was the co-ordination between the Navy and the Air Force - which could be rated as "none". The commanders at sea had to request air support from Superaereo (the high command of the Air Force). Here, after deciding what to do, they had to arm and fuel the planes, and brief the pilots. The result was that the Air Force arrived when the battle was over and, in a few occasions, mistakenly attacked Italian ships. The same happened when, for example, a British convoy was sighted.

Just imagine Spruance at the Battle of Midway: instead of launching his attacks, he had to contact Pearl Harbor, detail the situation, wait for an answer, and only then launch the attack. Guess who would have won...

The Matapan disaster wasn't caused by the presence of a British carrier vs. none on the Italian side: it was caused by the total lack of air support for the Italian fleet during the day action (in a rare reversal of roles, the Italians had decripted the British codes and were aware of the presence of a carrier).

Of course the disaster during the night action was caused by a real technological inferiority: the lack of radar on Italian ships. They steamed into the night with no clue that the British fleet was there.

I don't agree.

The Matapan disaster for once can be pinned to the carrier, it was the only successful Swordfish/Albacore operation against naval forces at sea in whole Mediterranean war.
And shows the need of the carrier for offense and defense.
There wasn't fighter range to cover the fleet at sea, neither anyone could count of something so dependent on circumstances, weather, etc.

Of course they realized that and started the hack-job of putting Reggianne fighters in the battleships after Matapan, and building of Sparviero/Aquila.

warspite1

You don't agree that the sending of the 1st Division, at night, on a salvage mission, when you don't know the whereabouts of the enemy, was wrong? This despite Iachino's cruiser squadron commander knowing it made no sense - and he was right as it cost him his entire division and his own life in the process.

[dr.hal]

Rusty,

E.H. Carr wrote a book many years ago called "What is History?" (his most famous work is "The Twenty Years Crisis, 1919-1939" first published in Sept 1939 which is a timely date for this amazing book). The basic thesis of his "What is History?" is KNOW THY HISTORIAN! In a word: historiography. It is a small book based upon lectures he gave. But it is clear, that you need to know WHO is writing as much as what is being written about. Of course this is not an academic forum, but it doesn't hurt to understand the academic arguments that go into writing history. Churchill was prolific, no question about that. I too have read (most) of his World War 2 series (I've got a first edition set) and it is resplendent with information, some of it not as accurate as one would like given other sources, as you point out! Hal

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: dr.hal

Rusty,

E.H. Carr wrote a book many years ago called "What is History?" (his most famous work is "The Twenty Years Crisis, 1919-1939" first published in Sept 1939 which is a timely date for this amazing book). The basic thesis of his "What is History?" is KNOW THY HISTORIAN! In a word: historiography. It is a small book based upon lectures he gave. But it is clear, that you need to know WHO is writing as much as what is being written about. Of course this is not an academic forum, but it doesn't hurt to understand the academic arguments that go into writing history. Churchill was prolific, no question about that. I too have read (most) of his World War 2 series (I've got a first edition set) and it is resplendent with information, some of it not as accurate as one would like given other sources, as you point out! Hal

warspite1

I'm sure that is true - as Napoleon said, history is written by the winners. I wonder how many autobiographies, memoirs and books written about one's own actions are completely true and without lies, stretching of the truth or ahem embellishments? Call me a cynic but I'll wager none.

[RFalvo69]

Regarding the lack of air cover, Supermarina had made clear that the whole operation had to be covered by the air forces based in Italy, Sicily and Rodi. Between the three the whole operational area could have been covered. Both the Italian and German airforces promised such cover, but, as usual... (only two stray Savoia Marchetti out of Rodi attacked the Formidable, without managing to hit her). This allowed both for the British fleet to act mostly unmolested and for the Swordfish to attack the Italian squadron.

Regarding the night action, maybe Iachino thought that the still present possibility of air attack during the following day had made the British forces to retreat. If he could have sent only the destroyers back to the Pola, I don't know. It is possible that Iachino thought that the destroyers alone could not tow the cruiser at an acceptable speed.

However, had the Italian ships being equipped with radar, they would have seen that the whole British fleet was still out there - and possibly cut the corner. Instead, in the dark, they arrived at less than 3km from the British ships, with the HMS Valiant tracking them but without the same possibility for the Italians - and the Matapan disaster ensued.

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: RFalvo69

Regarding the lack of air cover, Supermarina had made clear that the whole operation had to be covered by the air forces based in Italy, Sicily and Rodi. Between the three the whole operational area could have been covered. Both the Italian and German airforces promised such cover, but, as usual... (only two stray Savoia Marchetti out of Rodi attacked the Formidable, without managing to hit her). This allowed both for the British fleet to act mostly unmolested and for the Swordfish to attack the Italian squadron.

Regarding the night action, maybe Iachino thought that the still present possibility of air attack during the following day had made the British forces to retreat. If he could have sent only the destroyers back to the Pola, I don't know. It is possible that Iachino thought that the destroyers alone could not tow the cruiser at an acceptable speed.

However, had the Italian ships being equipped with radar, they would have seen that the whole British fleet was still out there - and possibly cut the corner. Instead, in the dark, they arrived at less than 3km from the British ships, with the HMS Valiant tracking them but without the same possibility for the Italians - and the Matapan disaster ensued.

warspite1

Yes, as said radar was a factor but we are talking objectively about performance in World War II. When the Royal Navy's performance was less than brilliant, there is no convenient get out such as being attempted here. "Yes, the Bismarck was only just caught and there was a lot of luck along the way - BUT had the British developed better carrier borne aircraft then all would have been okay as Victorious would have stopped her long before Ark Royal was even needed". Well that's alright then.

Well no actually it isn't - the British didn't and so in an objective look at what happened and their performance, it's totally irrelevant what they could've/would've/should've done.

Iachino and poor Cattaneo KNEW they didn't have radar. They KNEW some British did. It does not take six ships to tow a cruiser - there were four destroyers on hand. It was night. The whereabouts of the British ships - no. and composition - were unknown to Iachino. The decision was taken based on the facts and given the facts to hand, Iachino made a grave mistake.

But if we are going to adopt this route then simply no one on any side was ever guilty of anything and an objective look at performance is impossible.

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: RFalvo69

Regarding the lack of air cover, Supermarina had made clear that the whole operation had to be covered by the air forces based in Italy, Sicily and Rodi.

warspite1

Well that is fine in theory but not an excuse for what happened. All admirals would ask for the same thing in every situation obviously. But usually - even with the best will in the world - these things are not possible and you a) go with what you've got or b) decide to back out.

Can you imagine Norway, France (twice), Greece, Crete and Singapore?

"Sorry but we need to send the fleet in to rescue the army".
"Well sure, so long as I have air cover to cover my ships for the entire length of their journey".

Well that's 400-500,000 troops in the German bag then.

In reality what was Cunningham's response off Crete? (I paraphrase)

"We go back - the navy must not let the army down. It takes 3-years to build a ship, 300 to build a tradition".

Yeah, I'm sure Cunningham would have liked even one aircraft in support....

[Dili]

ORIGINAL: warspite1

ORIGINAL: Dili

ORIGINAL: RFalvo69

Two other "nuggets" about the battles for the Med.

Italian pilots, even in WWII, were very well trained. Italy had been the first nation to really show the use of air-support during the Italo-Turkish war. In the interwar period, aviation was "fashionable", with many civilians either becoming flyers, enrolling in the Air Force, or (after Italy entered the war) enrolling in the Air Force with their civilian experience. Mussolini own son, Bruno, had been an excellent war pilot, fighting (for real) in the Ethiopian War, the Spanish Civil War and in North Africa. He was also a test pilot and died in 1941 while testing a bomber prototipe.

The problem (the same which plagued the Italian Army in general) was that the technology was, mostly, obsolete. No matter how good they were, the Italian pilots flew on outdated planes; this made their experience if not futile at least not fully useful. The result is something that you can even check in WitP.

The second thing to consider is the "carrier problem" . one of the most enduring myths of WWII. Actually, Italy didn't need carriers, and Mussolini was correct in saying that Italy was "a natural aircraft carrier".

The real problem was the co-ordination between the Navy and the Air Force - which could be rated as "none". The commanders at sea had to request air support from Superaereo (the high command of the Air Force). Here, after deciding what to do, they had to arm and fuel the planes, and brief the pilots. The result was that the Air Force arrived when the battle was over and, in a few occasions, mistakenly attacked Italian ships. The same happened when, for example, a British convoy was sighted.

Just imagine Spruance at the Battle of Midway: instead of launching his attacks, he had to contact Pearl Harbor, detail the situation, wait for an answer, and only then launch the attack. Guess who would have won...

The Matapan disaster wasn't caused by the presence of a British carrier vs. none on the Italian side: it was caused by the total lack of air support for the Italian fleet during the day action (in a rare reversal of roles, the Italians had decripted the British codes and were aware of the presence of a carrier).

Of course the disaster during the night action was caused by a real technological inferiority: the lack of radar on Italian ships. They steamed into the night with no clue that the British fleet was there.

I don't agree.

The Matapan disaster for once can be pinned to the carrier, it was the only successful Swordfish/Albacore operation against naval forces at sea in whole Mediterranean war.
And shows the need of the carrier for offense and defense.
There wasn't fighter range to cover the fleet at sea, neither anyone could count of something so dependent on circumstances, weather, etc.

Of course they realized that and started the hack-job of putting Reggianne fighters in the battleships after Matapan, and building of Sparviero/Aquila.

warspite1

You don't agree that the sending of the 1st Division, at night, on a salvage mission, when you don't know the whereabouts of the enemy, was wrong? This despite Iachino's cruiser squadron commander knowing it made no sense - and he was right as it cost him his entire division and his own life in the process.

What is the matter with you? I said nothing on first cruiser division behavior, i was just contesting the OP defending the old Mussolini/Supermarina canard that Italy was like an aircraft carrier.
If you want my opinion Cattaneo was completely unprofessional in not having is forces prepared for an engagement and not sending the destroyers in front.

About Mussolini i don't see the point of course he was p****d.

[Dili]

ORIGINAL: RFalvo69

Regarding the lack of air cover, Supermarina had made clear that the whole operation had to be covered by the air forces based in Italy, Sicily and Rodi. Between the three the whole operational area could have been covered. Both the Italian and German airforces promised such cover, but, as usual... (only two stray Savoia Marchetti out of Rodi attacked the Formidable, without managing to hit her). This allowed both for the British fleet to act mostly unmolested and for the Swordfish to attack the Italian squadron.

Regarding the night action, maybe Iachino thought that the still present possibility of air attack during the following day had made the British forces to retreat. If he could have sent only the destroyers back to the Pola, I don't know. It is possible that Iachino thought that the destroyers alone could not tow the cruiser at an acceptable speed.

However, had the Italian ships being equipped with radar, they would have seen that the whole British fleet was still out there - and possibly cut the corner. Instead, in the dark, they arrived at less than 3km from the British ships, with the HMS Valiant tracking them but without the same possibility for the Italians - and the Matapan disaster ensued.

Fighters from Rodi don't have range and time on station from Rodi to the Western/South of Crete. The mission was to be in North of Crete, but then was changed to be South of Crete.

See the map where the hits were made.
https://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/UN/UK/ ... d-II-6.JPG

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: Dili

ORIGINAL: warspite1

ORIGINAL: Dili





I don't agree.

The Matapan disaster for once can be pinned to the carrier, it was the only successful Swordfish/Albacore operation against naval forces at sea in whole Mediterranean war.
And shows the need of the carrier for offense and defense.
There wasn't fighter range to cover the fleet at sea, neither anyone could count of something so dependent on circumstances, weather, etc.

Of course they realized that and started the hack-job of putting Reggianne fighters in the battleships after Matapan, and building of Sparviero/Aquila.

warspite1

You don't agree that the sending of the 1st Division, at night, on a salvage mission, when you don't know the whereabouts of the enemy, was wrong? This despite Iachino's cruiser squadron commander knowing it made no sense - and he was right as it cost him his entire division and his own life in the process.

What is the matter with you? I said nothing on first cruiser division behavior, i was just contesting the OP defending the old Mussolini/Supermarina canard that Italy was like an aircraft carrier.
If you want my opinion Cattaneo was completely unprofessional in not having is forces prepared for an engagement and not sending the destroyers in front.

About Mussolini i don't see the point of course he was p****d.

warspite1

What's the matter with me? Sorry I thought we were having a grown up debate..... Anyway, for some reason my name has appeared in a chain that should only contain you and RFalvo so I assumed you were answering my point. The same happened with a few comments that appeared when I clicked 'quote' but weren't there otherwise... weird.

Anyway....

You said you had nothing to say on the actions of the 1st Division, but I see you now blame Cattaneo. So you agree that there was operational deficiency - whether by Iachino or Cattaneo (or both) that caused the loss of four warships + the stricken Pola?

And why was Mussolini upset? Mussolini was upset because once again the RM had blown an excellent opportunity to hurt the British. He had had enough after this with the result that key changes were made - including the removal of Campioni.

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: Dili

If you want my opinion Cattaneo was completely unprofessional in not having is forces prepared for an engagement and not sending the destroyers in front.

warspite1

That is interesting. I did not mention this because I have only one source, but you seem to be confirming what I have read once before. There are reports that the Italian ships were not 'combat ready' when sailing to Pola. What is your understanding?

[rustysi]

The second thing to consider is the "carrier problem" . one of the most enduring myths of WWII. Actually, Italy didn't need carriers, and Mussolini was correct in saying that Italy was "a natural aircraft carrier".

I think not. This philosophy got more than one nation in trouble. Land/sea air coordination proved to be problematical at best during WWII. The navies of those nations suffered accordingly.

[BBfanboy]

ORIGINAL: warspite1

ORIGINAL: Dili

If you want my opinion Cattaneo was completely unprofessional in not having is forces prepared for an engagement and not sending the destroyers in front.

warspite1

That is interesting. I did not mention this because I have only one source, but you seem to be confirming what I have read once before. There are reports that the Italian ships were not 'combat ready' when sailing to Pola. What is your understanding?

I read that the Italian cruisers had sighted the dead-in-the-water Pola to starboard and their bridge crews were looking that direction while their deck crews were preparing the tow cables. Not good battle readiness with British BBs preparing their broadsides on the Italian port side!

[warspite1]

The book arrived today - hurrah! First impressions, not good value for money, just over 200 pages only - Horroo!

Oh well, time to get stuck in

[Dili]

ORIGINAL: warspite1

ORIGINAL: Dili

If you want my opinion Cattaneo was completely unprofessional in not having is forces prepared for an engagement and not sending the destroyers in front.

warspite1

That is interesting. I did not mention this because I have only one source, but you seem to be confirming what I have read once before. There are reports that the Italian ships were not 'combat ready' when sailing to Pola. What is your understanding?

After the large time he spent before going after Pola(+1 hour) he was in one line -not very fast at cruise speed- with cruisers in front and destroyers at back - i have read somewhere this could have been some bizarre Regiamarina procedure which makes no sense, main destroyer weapon is the torpedo, destroyers at back mean that when combat happen they will be afraid to hit their own cruisers- i also read that the main cruiser guns were not prepared to fire.

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: Dili

ORIGINAL: warspite1

ORIGINAL: Dili

If you want my opinion Cattaneo was completely unprofessional in not having is forces prepared for an engagement and not sending the destroyers in front.

warspite1

That is interesting. I did not mention this because I have only one source, but you seem to be confirming what I have read once before. There are reports that the Italian ships were not 'combat ready' when sailing to Pola. What is your understanding?

After the large time he spent before going after Pola(+1 hour) he was in one line -not very fast at cruise speed- with cruisers in front and destroyers at back - i have read somewhere this could have been some bizarre Regiamarina procedure which makes no sense, main destroyer weapon is the torpedo, destroyers at back mean that when combat happen they will be afraid to hit their own cruisers- i also read that the main cruiser guns were not prepared to fire.

warspite1

Okay thanks Dili and BBfanboy. I did not want to include that without being reasonably sure that this is likely to be true.