More accurate/historical Map

[aspqrz02]

ORIGINAL: Meteor2
Experience is hardly a good equivalent, but there is nothing else.
So giving the french army its correct TOE but very low effectivness or experience will solve this
dilemma?

I don't think there is a need to change effectiveness, given what it seems to represent. The major powers had no problems with peacetime logistics, the allied powers less so than the Germans, in fact (as noted in previous post) ... the EXPERIENCE differential is what counts.

Interestingly, German experience at the start of the 1939 campaign is 75% and doesn't change at all by the start of the 1940 campaign ... no representation of the gain from the Polish campaign which 'blooded' those units involved to a greater or lesser degree ...

Making the French Mountain Corps less mobile (-2 Operational Points) to represent the fact they were garrison units in Maginot or Maginot-like fortresses is one factor that can change things.

I have previously said that reducing all other French units' OPs by -1 should represent their doctrinal and command difficulties by itself ... but I am thinking of replacing some of the Corps of the expanded OOB with their parent *Armies* to represent the reduced flexibility as well as the OP reduction. Some ICs will remain, as well as the Mech, Armour and Cavalry units, which will allow *some* flexibility (some French units performed far better than others).

We will see.

Phil McGregor

[Rasputitsa]

ORIGINAL: aspqrz02

ORIGINAL: Rasputitsa
The Battle of Britain has already been mentioned, but it is a specific feature, as within the range of the only radar air defence system in the world, at that time, the RAF was probably unbeatable. However, Britain would not have that air advantage anywhere else, as the catastrophic losses in the earlier French campaign highlight and how can that limited extra capability be indicated in the game.

Since he UK won the BoB irregardless of the losses of the units committed to France I don't see what point you are trying to make.

Radar, while it gave the UK some advantages, wasn't, at that stage, an overwhelming advantage ... it was the co-ordination of all the tech available ... Sound Ranging/Direction finding, Spotters, ESM etc. ... along with Radar in the Regional and central plotting rooms which made the difference.

[/quote]

[8|]

The point I am making is that the performance of RAF fighters varies markedly, whether it is operating with the benefit of the British air defence system (i.e. over Britain), or whether is it operating without the benefit of this system, as in France 1940 (i.e. anywhere else on the map), and whether this specific advantage should carry some bonus over the British homeland, important when considering 'Seelowe' options.

I purposely used the term air defence SYSTEM, as I am fully aware of the importance of Dowding's system, rather than the affect of Radar alone, as demonstrated at Pearl Harbor where radar 'saw' the incoming threat, but there was no system to do anything about it.

[Rasputitsa]

ORIGINAL: aspqrz02

ORIGINAL: Rasputitsa
Another example of where OOBs don't tell the full story is Soviet Mechanised units on the Eastern Front in 1941. Many Mechanised units had not received their allocation of trucks and were marching, carrying their equipment, whilst the infantry units were better off, as at least they had their horse drawn transport to carry their heavy equipment.

Soviet Mech and Armour units in 1941 were in the midst of a massive and complete (almost root and branch) reorganisation coupled with a massive rearmament program that was churning out equipment faster than anyone could be trained to use it and, to boot, more equipment than they had the technicians to maintain. Not a good example.

Why is it not a good example, when you describe the chaotic conditions which added to the situation where some Soviet Mechanised units did not receive there allocation of trucks, having less mobility than infantry units, and what effect should that have on movement points.

'The Bloody Triangle' - Victor J. Kamenir graphically describes the conditions under which Soviets units were operating in 1941 and helps explain how the Soviets, with an enormous OOB, were unable to fully utilise that power.

[Rasputitsa]

quote:

ORIGINAL: Rasputitsa
Gulags. Which is why the Germans were able to drive into undefended Soviet cities with the trams still running in the streets. The defence


Not at all. That was because the Germans moved so quickly that the Red Army, poorly equipped with Radios, found they had no idea exactly where the Germans were and how fast they were moving.

It had nothing whatsover to do with their lack of defensive doctrine, or not, more to do with the Germans getting way inside their decision and reaction cycle.

German capabilities were obviously important, but so were the effects of Soviet doctrine which contributed to their failures in 1941.

Quote - General Morgunov 5th Aug. 1941 - extract

10. Large population centres were not utilized to destroy the enemy and inability to operate in them was discovered.


Other officers noted the lack of Soviet defensive doctrine and training, which led to the above situation.


So there is more to this than the usual 'history as you know it' and yes, the Germans moved quickly, but the Soviets had made no previous preparations and were unable, initially, to respond and make use of the blocking power that a large city could provide, as General Morgunov thought they should and as happened later at Leningrad, Voronezh and Stalingrad. In game terms, it is the ability to deny supply sources, by defending all the cities, which any player will obviously do, but historically the Soviets initially did not.


Attached is a larger extract of the above report.

[Rasputitsa]

ORIGINAL: aspqrz02

ORIGINAL: Rasputitsa
Agree on Mountain Troops, as presently reading about the Alpini Corps in Russia, these are good quality mountain troops, expecting to fight in the Caucasus, but were diverted into the line on the open steppe North of Stalingrad in 1942/43. They were using mule transport, totally unsuitable for the conditions, no trucks (although occasionally these were provided), so mostly marching sometimes 100s of kms, boots and uniforms wore out, etc..

You realise, of course, that the German Infantry Divisions were what is often called 'leg' Infantry ... they might be transported by train (or ship, or barge) to a jump off point, but then they walked ... and they were supplied by a hippotrain (i.e. by horse drawn transport). And they weren't over-supplied with Horses, either.

I forget where I read it, but the CO of a German Infantry Battalion had *a* riding horse ... in Russia, these mostly died *very* quickly and, therefore, the CO had to *walk* along with his troops. There was, IIRC, *one* light truck assigned to the Battalion but it, and the horse drawn waggons of the supply platoon/company were, well, being used for rather more important things than just being a ride for the CO.

At the beginning of Barbarossa they had between 600,000 and 750,000 horses which supplied all the leg infantry units (85% of the Wehrmacht, Infantry, Light Infantry, Mountain and Security Divisions) ... the approximately 600,000 motor vehicles were committed to supplying the Panzer Armies (~15% of the Wehrmacht ... the Panzer, Panzergrendier, Motorised divisions) and weren't enough for that (made worse by the fact that there were *scores* of different makes and models scavenged from all over Europe, from the armies and states the Germans had conquered, which made keeping them operational a nightmare).

German Allied units were, if Leg Infantry, Mountain, Security etc. equipped with hippotrains as well ... no real difference except, depending on the nationality, their divisions had even less in the way of motor transport than a German ID (a German Infantry Rgt had 45 motor vehicles and 20 motorcycles, for example ... a US ID had ~1500 vehicles, a Regiment ~220, and there were whole Corps and Army level truck units that could turn that division fully motorised)

Yes I do realise, Mules it seems die quicker than horses in cold weather and the British would have been relieved to know in 1940, that one of the Germans bigger problems was how to get 500,000 horses across the Channel.

[aspqrz02]

ORIGINAL: Rasputitsa
The point I am making is that the performance of RAF fighters varies markedly, whether it is operating with the benefit of the British air defence system (i.e. over Britain), or whether is it operating without the benefit of this system, as in France 1940 (i.e. anywhere else on the map), and whether this specific advantage should carry some bonus over the British homeland, important when considering 'Seelowe' options.

Well, again, I think you're over-egging things ... the RAF units in France were facing a chaotic situation where the target areas they were defending/attacking were part of a chaotic battle of movement at high speed *and* where German short range fighters and other aircraft had an advantage they didn't have in the Battle of Britain.

IIRC the German single engined fighters had 15-20 minutes worth of fuel for dogfighting over the UK because of their extremely short legs.

And, of course, the RAF had the advantage of defending fixed targets that could only be approached by a limited number of routes.

Radar had no impact on those factors, which had at least as big an impact *as* Radar, if not more.

Phil McGregor

[aspqrz02]

ORIGINAL: Rasputitsa
Yes I do realise, Mules it seems die quicker than horses in cold weather and the British would have been relieved to know in 1940, that one of the Germans bigger problems was how to get 500,000 horses across the Channel.

You *do* know that Horses are more constitutionally fragile than mules and die/get sick faster than mules under high work demand situations?

Horses are dumb enough to let themselves be worked to death.

Mules, on the other hand ... well, they are 'Stubborn as a Mule' and will simply *stop* and refuse to work when they are overworked.

AFAIUI most of the hippotrain were horses, not mules.

Phil McGregor

[Rasputitsa]

ORIGINAL: aspqrz02

ORIGINAL: Rasputitsa
Yes I do realise, Mules it seems die quicker than horses in cold weather and the British would have been relieved to know in 1940, that one of the Germans bigger problems was how to get 500,000 horses across the Channel.

You *do* know that Horses are more constitutionally fragile than mules and die/get sick faster than mules under high work demand situations?

Horses are dumb enough to let themselves be worked to death.

Mules, on the other hand ... well, they are 'Stubborn as a Mule' and will simply *stop* and refuse to work when they are overworked.

AFAIUI most of the hippotrain were horses, not mules.

Phil McGregor

Yes, I was surprised, as mules were to be used by the Alpini in mountains, but it seemed that they were vulnerable to prolonged freezing conditions and arrangements were made to keep them under cover were possible, but that restricted the numbers that could be maintained in such protection. I suppose the comparison was with hardy local Russian horses, most of the original horseflesh dead by then.

[Rasputitsa]

ORIGINAL: aspqrz02

ORIGINAL: Rasputitsa
The point I am making is that the performance of RAF fighters varies markedly, whether it is operating with the benefit of the British air defence system (i.e. over Britain), or whether is it operating without the benefit of this system, as in France 1940 (i.e. anywhere else on the map), and whether this specific advantage should carry some bonus over the British homeland, important when considering 'Seelowe' options.

Well, again, I think you're over-egging things ... the RAF units in France were facing a chaotic situation where the target areas they were defending/attacking were part of a chaotic battle of movement at high speed *and* where German short range fighters and other aircraft had an advantage they didn't have in the Battle of Britain.

IIRC the German single engined fighters had 15-20 minutes worth of fuel for dogfighting over the UK because of their extremely short legs.

And, of course, the RAF had the advantage of defending fixed targets that could only be approached by a limited number of routes.

Radar had no impact on those factors, which had at least as big an impact *as* Radar, if not more.

Phil McGregor

German fighters had 15/20 minutes endurance over *London*, which should never have been the main target, if the objective was to win air superiority over the Channel and potential invasion areas.

There can be no doubt that the British air defence system (you keep fixating on radar) was force multiplier and that could be reflected in the British fighter capability operating in that area, but not elsewhere in 1940. The lack of capability is seen at Pearl Harbor where radar alone provided no combat enhancement, without a system. This is a very specific issue, applying in one area at one time, only important because of the implications for 'Seelowe' options.

We have no data to see what would have happened during the BoB without Dowding's system, as Britain did not just have radar, but an air defence system, which would have continued to have some effectiveness without radar. The Observer Corps, listening posts and standing patrols would have helped, but the positioning of defending aircraft, avoiding being caught on the ground in all weathers, was secured by radar. A force multiplier not available anywhere else on the map at that time, as demonstrated by the fate of every other airforce attacked in Europe during this period.

The Luftwaffe quickly won air superiority over every battlefront during this period, I don't know about you, but seems to me that something was some different about the BoB, however it was achieved.

[aspqrz02]

Well, let's look at it this way ... the Luftwaffe managed to achieve air superiority in situations where the Wehrmacht was able to run wild and cause a chaotic situation on the ground which affected the enemy forces as a whole and their air forces as part of that ...

As soon as things had stabilised, the RAF, for example, in a non-chaotic situation, handily handled the Luftwaffe in the BoB.

The Luftwaffe also never achieved Air Superiority in the Western Desert (yes, they did in the Greek campaign as no/virtually no air assets were committed).

In Russia, it took the Red Air Force some time to bounce back, but they gradually did so and certainly by 1943 there was no longer certain Axis air superiority except on a local basis for a short time.

The Luftwaffe wasn't some super-air force, it was merely in a situation where specific short term conditions hobbled their opponents.

Phil McGregor

[AlbertN]

Battle of Britain had multiple phases.

Brits were actually on the brink to lose it, twice. The critical factor many miss are pilots. The Luftwaffe had plenty of trained pilots in reserve. The RAF was living and fighting on pilots of all nations and countries including USA volounteers.

The first time when the Luftwaffe was hammering the airfields and air productions. These missions killed also an amount of pilots on the ground, squandered their command centers and the like.
RAF got saved as the Germans redirected their efforts on London instead.

The second time the RAF was running short of pilots - but the bad weather came.

-- About the radars.
They were relevant, the Germans raided them early on even. But Germans overstimated the damage done, whilst the Brits repaired them rapidly.
Later on they turned relatively relevant as the Germans changed tactic, travelling as a single pack up to the radar line and scattering afterwards, instead of having planes taking off from France and heading directly to their targets. (Think of five fingers departing from France, early on. Then it's a fist that goes beyond the radars, and spring the fingers open once beyond the radar belt).

-- Bf109 were superior to Hurricans and equivalent to Spitfires.
BUT as pointed out the Bf109s had only 15-20 minutes of dogfight time over the target (intended as London), so bit more if the target was at shorter distance.
British planes could simply intercept packetA, rebase, refuel, fly again. (Also why the Brits needed operational bases).
(Note - that is what exactly gave Axis air superiority in France. The Germans used very forward bases whilst the Allies were operating from quite remote, and safe from Germans panzers, bases. Role reversed)
Also, despite common 'knowledge' of the ignorant masses, the Hurricane was the most diffused RAF fighter. But as soon as the Luftwaffe focused on London, the Brits had massed the Spitfires there and henceforth it seemed the Spitfire was the most diffused airplane.
Alas, that component cannot truly be mimiced in most of the games, the 15-20 minutes fuel limit. Ultimately the RAF should be tuned to be inferior to the Luftwaffe for Battle for France, and get on par for Battle for Britain timeline.

Other BoB factors:

The RAF was operating from established and known airfields.
The Luftwaffe had to operate from captured airfields that they had to adapt to their needs and specifics.

The Germans had better sea recovery teams for pilots in the Channel.

The ratio of fighters lost was 3:2 favoring Germans, but the total of planes lost was 3:2 favoring Brits (as per the German bombers!)

The main conclusion of the Battle for Britain was that the Luftwaffe lost an amount of excellent crews and planes, and that by '42 their training hours per pilot started to shrink, whereas the Allied ones increased.
How to mirror that in a grand strategy game is quite hard, and in most cases the BoB is something entirely skipped as it is never cost rewarding to do so for Germany.

[aspqrz02]

ORIGINAL: Cohen_slith
Battle of Britain had multiple phases.

Brits were actually on the brink to lose it, twice. The critical factor many miss are pilots. The Luftwaffe had plenty of trained pilots in reserve. The RAF was living and fighting on pilots of all nations and countries including USA volounteers.

With the greatest of respect. Absolute tosh.

The RAF had no shortage of pilots at any time for two reason. 1) The EATS was coming on line and 2) They hadn't committed the entirety of Fighter Command.

Pilot availability remained stable or on an upward trend for the Commonwealth for the entire period, and accellerated thereafter.

ORIGINAL: Cohen_slith
The first time when the Luftwaffe was hammering the airfields and air productions. These missions killed also an amount of pilots on the ground, squandered their command centers and the like.
RAF got saved as the Germans redirected their efforts on London instead.

Again, tosh.

Pilot numbers were always stable or an an upward trend. ALWAYS. Ground losses were, in any case, infinitesimal compared to operational losses.

ORIGINAL: Cohen_slith
The second time the RAF was running short of pilots - but the bad weather came.

I don't think that 'bad weather' has any real impact since the RAF had those two sources noted.

ORIGINAL: Cohen_slith
-- Bf109 were superior to Hurricans and equivalent to Spitfires.
BUT as pointed out the Bf109s had only 15-20 minutes of dogfight time over the target (intended as London), so bit more if the target was at shorter distance.

The Hurricane was 20 mph slower than the 109 but had superior manoeuverability, better all round visibility from the cockpit and was designed to be easier for inexperienced pilots to handle.

The Bf-109's flight controls were too much to handle for all but the most experienced pilots (its much vaunted fuel injection system which gave it an advantage in negative G manoeuvres depending on the leading edge slats which, when deployed to allow such, caused so much vibration that few but the most experienced pilots would risk their use ... so the supposed advantage was really mostly irrelevant) and its ridiculously close together landing gear made for high operational losses.

The Hurricane also had a 600 mile range while the 109 could only manage 410 ... and the Hurricane was operating close to its bases while the 109s were operating far from theirs ... AND they had to increasingly waste time (and flight time) as their formation tactics formed up.

There wasn't all that much operational difference between the early model Spits and the Hurricanes.

ORIGINAL: Cohen_slith
Also, despite common 'knowledge' of the ignorant masses, the Hurricane was the most diffused RAF fighter. But as soon as the Luftwaffe focused on London, the Brits had massed the Spitfires there and henceforth it seemed the Spitfire was the most diffused airplane.

I presume you mean 'numerous' or 'in most widespread deployment' rather than 'diffused' ... which doesn't really mean what you seem to be using it for.

There were more Hurricanes used operationally ... and they were more robust, meaning they could be repaired and made operational again not only more quickly than the more temperamental early model Spits, but they could survive damage that would render a Spit useless.

They also shot down ~60% of all the planes shot down in the BoB.

The rest I mostly agree with.

Phil McGregor

[TrogusP96]

What an awesome discussion from mules versus horses to Pearl Harbor radar.

Mr. Cohen says

"How to mirror that in a grand strategy game is quite hard, and in most cases the BoB is something entirely skipped as it is never cost rewarding to do so for Germany.?

I've wondered if the airfield construction could not function as a proxy for some of these advantages and if there could not be radar installations as there are with sea mines, coastal defense and AA. Some one above or some of you kept using the word "system." I just rewatched Patton and in his opening speech he says that "an army eats, sleeps and fights as a team. The son of bitch who wrote about all this individuality crap for the Saturday Evening Post doesn't know anything more about real battle than he does about fornicating." I will not claim expertise in either.

The BoB, like the Battle of the Atlantic and the bombing campaign - are they more system's battles than land campaigns or less interesting or harder to model. The single biggest individual differences I can think of are Dick Best leading three Enterprise SBDs at the last minute to attack Akagi, maybe individual admirals and captains in various naval encounters which are very short relative to the time and capital investment for ship construction even compared to say the Germans decimating 11th Armoured in a few minutes in Goodwood.

Back to Alvaro's airfields - a recurring issue for the Allies was space for units - Alvaro does this well but also space for airfields so even moving squadrons from UK to France seems to have been important even before we get to doctrinal changes new systems instituted by Doolittle and Quesada. Are these part of the Advancements values as well as the actual planes?

[TrogusP96]

Finally and most importantly what an awesome discussion. Thanks. Alvaro has sparked some great discussion. I'm learning.

[Rasputitsa]

ORIGINAL: aspqrz02

Well, let's look at it this way ... the Luftwaffe managed to achieve air superiority in situations where the Wehrmacht was able to run wild and cause a chaotic situation on the ground which affected the enemy forces as a whole and their air forces

That is the force multiplier effect of an effective air defence system, in that the Luftwaffe was not able to 'run wild' over the SE England, as RAF Fighter Command could quickly match their moves with the minimum number of aircraft for each situation. Deciding where and when to commit and, just as important, when not to commit forces.

The Luftwaffe was never able to provide a meaningful response in North Africa, as you will recall that they were heavily committed to the Eastern Front by that time.

Performance in Russia 1943 has little relevance to a discussion on the BoB in 1940.

It is a simple proposition, that British fighter units had an additional combat bonus over British territory in 1940 and can, or should, that be reflected in the game.

Either way, I believe that being able to edit national characteristics within the game, to reflect differing command and control capabilities, including how these changed over time, will go a long way towards rationalising historic OOBs with overall national performance. I am not necessarily asking for the basic game to be changed, but would be grateful to have as much flexibility as possible in setting scenarios to adjust these features.

[Rasputitsa]

ORIGINAL: TrogusP96

Some one above or some of you kept using the word "system."

Radar doesn't shoot down aircraft, it is Dowding's air defence system which helped RAF pilots do this.

The British radar stations only had coverage over the sea, whilst most of the 'Battle' took place over land in SE England. The Observer Corps, 1000s of mostly trained civilians, operated hundreds of observation posts throughout the country and provided information on the position of formations of both friendly and enemy aircraft, giving numbers and types of aircraft and estimates of height. This information was continually fed into the communications network, along with reports from friendly aircraft. This information was then filtered to provide coherent plots that appeared on Sector control room maps, for controllers to tactically manoeuvre fighter units to the best advantage. This is, briefly, the System.

There is much more in the way it was configured, as a network, with information passing both up and down the hierarchy and also sideways, so that if there was a break in the communications network, Sectors could still continue to operate and information would still pass around the breaks.

This is all very primitive by modern standards, but was state-of-the-art in 1940 and Dowding had the foresight to get this in place before the war.

Radar gave early warning, so that controllers could to bring squadrons to various stages of readiness, but radar could only give range, direction and an estimate of formation size, whilst it was the rest of the system which provided the situational awareness that allowed commanders and controllers to quickly react to events.

Without such a system, the alternative is to send aircraft up throughout the long summer daylight hours, on constant standing patrols, to look out for the approach of enemy aircraft, which was wasteful in resources and wore down aircraft and pilots. Standing patrols would also have given the Luftwaffe an opportunity to attack small unsupported flights of RAF fighters and if bigger patrols are put up, then it is even more wasteful. Pilots often reported that during dogfights there would be hundreds of aircraft whirling around in an air battle, then suddenly the pilot would find himself alone, as it is very difficult to see other aircraft unless they are close, or you have some guidance in where to look.

The complete system was major force multiplier for a smaller force to match a larger force.