Invasion of the US by Japan

[mdiehl]

You're just wrong PxB. All variants of the M4 had better suspensions and more reliable engines than all variants of the PzIV. Even the earliest model shermans with 75mm guns had more than enough penetration to penetrate the armor of all variants of the PzIV. The reverse is not the case with late PzIVs and late M4s. The M4 was faster, went farther on a tank of fuel, was generally better armored, had better secondary armament, had faster turret traverse (all models). By mid 1944 most M4s had wet stowage and the standard 75 was being phased out for the 76.

If you still think the PzIV was generally superior I am hard-pressed to imagine what attributes you have in mind that convince you of your position.

As to burning, at least the M4 had to be hit by something before it would catch fire.... unlike the PzVIA which had a tendency to brew up from spontaneous engine fires.

[Becket]

ORIGINAL: Mr.Frag

Bah to all of you, give me a russian tank anyday [:D]

Heh. I say a hearty no to that unless you give me an IS-3 (In which case, yes, give me a Soviet tank). If we're talking about being out on your lonesone in a single tank, there's no widely available Allied tank I would choose (I leave the IS-3 and Pershing out because they saw so little (if any, in the case of the Stalin 3) action).

However, if I get to *command* an amount of tanks that roughly equal the same amount of production time & resources, then, hell yes, give me the T-34.

But the idea of driving one -- especially in 1943 when they were severely undergunned -- yowza.

[PzB74]

By all means, I'm no oracle and my humble opinion doesn't weigh much.
Continuing this discussion would be like taking up the Zero vs Wildcat issue.

Since you ask, I can mention what attributes I consider important in my evaluation of the M4 and PzIV;

1. The 75mm gun of the PzIV kills M4's from a much longer range than what the lower velocity gun of 42-mid 44 M4's is capable of. Taking out the opponent from longer ranges has always been considered vital in armoured warfare.
2. The extreme height of the M4 makes it a much easier target to hit. The tank with the lowest silhouette always got an advantage.
3. Before mid 44 the M4's had already lost the confidence of their crews by regularily catching fire when hit. Trust in the capability of your weapon is vital.

"As one German POW put it, Shermans were “Ronsons… . our gunners could see your tanks coming … and they say to one another, ‘Here comes another Ronson.’ Why do Americans do this for us? Bang! And it burns like twenty hay stacks… . Those funny tanks with the little guns, and so high and straight we can see them a long way in our gunsights. Those square sides, and thin, the armor. We know if we hit one, it goes up. Why does the county of Detroit send their men out to die in these things?”

They also had approximately the same speed, range and armour.
M4 top speed: 24 mph PzIV 40km/h
M4 range Roads/cross country 120/190km PzIV 130/190km.

The M4 had a better secondary armament and slightly faster turret traverse, that is true - but these are of secondary importance compared with the other vitals.

All these data comes from 1942 versions of the M4 and PzIV.
Later versions may vary slightly.

Here is the link I used to dig up some info on the M4
http://afvdb.50megs.com/usa/m4sherman.html

And to the PzIV
http://www.geocities.com/pentagon/2833/ ... vdata.html

I hereby rest my case as I don't really have that much more to add. I'm sure you've got your own reliable
data that backs up your opinions Mdiehl. I'll read what you and other posters have to add and modify my point of view if there is something I've overlooked [:)]

[stljeffbb]

Actually, I'm hoping that the lowered effectiveness due to cold will be a neutralizer. This works in a limited way in PacWar as well. Of course, if a defender is well dug in, they have the advantage more than likely.

A question for the designers.....will there be special troops who will work better in the cold, mountains, etc?


Thanks,

Jeff

[Damien Thorn]

Man, I miss a day and this entire thread deteriorates into a discussion on German tanks. Are they even in the game? If they are, I won't complain. I'll trade my Ha-Gos for some tigers any day. [:)]

[mdiehl]

Yeah. You can trade all the Ha-Gos in the IJN inventory for ONE PzVIA. Then the napalm comes.

PzB, fair enough. I do not agree with your overall assessment and I think that relying on a few anecdotes by a few Germans about Shemans brewing up (written primarily by guys manning 88mm dual purpose guns, not Pz IV crews) amounts to much, but my total disdain for "history by anecdote" is already well known around here. I believe naught of it. Neither of the marked inferiority of the Allied footsoldier in morale, courage, training, or equipment, nor of comarpable Japanese delusions about numbers of Allied planes destroyed, nor of the myth that the Axis powers were superior beings done in by superior numbers.

The M4 and PzIV were indeed well matched against each other until the decisive advantage of the 76-armed M4s (which were more than just the Easy 8). I still regard the M4 as the better tank, but even if you disagree almost anyone would agree that the PzIV was not decisively better. Yeah, the M4 was easier to hit. But at long range, it was the harder of the two to penetrate.

And yeah. The Tiger was better at taking and giving blows than the M4. It ought to have been. It weighed considerably more. Had the battle been all Tigers vs all M4s waged in Morocco, the differences might have been decisive.

[redman1]

You guys are ignoring a key point in analyzing what were the decisive advantages that decided the war. The Unites States, which had manpower second only to the USSR, and which had the biggest manufacturing base of any country in the world, had no land that came under attack in the "lower 48 states" at any time during the war. The factories and their workers could go about their jobs with impunity. Every other major country in this conflict was in a life and death struggle for its survival with its cities burning and its civilian manpower stretched to the absolute limit; the U.S. never reached that point.

As a result, the U.S. was not only able to churn out previously unimaginable quantities of good quality materiel, but also put in place deliberate training programs for its soldiers, sailors and airmen so that when they reached battle for the first time, they were of a better quality than the average Soviet peasant farmer who had - if he was lucky - been handed a rifle (with ammunition?) and was pointed westward. By 1942-43, even the Germans with their love of training and high quality armaments were forced to field inferior troops who were either too young or too old (or too injured) to fight well, or worse who were part of the "Ost" batallions consisting of Russian, Polish, etc. conscripts who weren't exactly itching to fight for Hitler.

These were HUGE advantages.

[Mike Scholl]

You're all ignoring the biggest single advantage of the "Sherman"---it was reliable and
easy to service. Shermans probably knocked out as many German tanks by forcing
them to move rapidly as they did with their guns. Detroit may not have known much
about building tanks, but after building 10 times more automobiles than the rest of the
world combined they knew about automotive engineering and reliability.

[PzB74]

Read an interesting article that called the M4 the most underrated and overrated tank
of the war.

Obviously it had both weaknesses and strengths - numbers and reliability were indeed
two of the latter Mike. Since this tank was produced in 1941-42, there was simply not enough
time to develop a new mbt in sufficient numbers by 1944. It was first when Tigers and Panthers
were encountered in 1943 that the Allies realized that they needed a better tank.

Our little discussion about M4 vs PzIV abilities is quite indifferent really. As I said, the PzIV
peaked in performance in mid 42 and could really not be upgraded anymore.

Since the US produced so many superior and excellent combat machines during WWII, the
M4 stands out as an ugly little duckling. The US state of the art tank in 1944 was an even match
for the obsolete PzIV that was being phased out.

If the Allies had fought Russian T-34's and KV's on the Steppes of Russia in 1941, I'm quite certain
that we would have seen a much more capable tank than the M4 in 1944!

The important thing was that it got the job done, even though it cost a lot of blood.
I think discussing whether the M4 was the right weapon for the time is not the same as discussing individual
performance against the PzIV.

Personally I would have traded the trusty and reliable M4A1 for a PzIVj. The first was way to tall and noisy
to make up for the fact that it was slightly more agile. Ammo quality of the 76mm gun made it no better
than the 75/48 (unless using HVAP). Both tanks would have knocked each other out at normal combat ranges,
no matter where they hit.

Should I choose a model for further upgrading in 1944, I would have gone for the M4! The fact that it could field
bigger weapons gave it more potential than the MkIV. The Pershing represented a quantum leap in US tank production
when it arrived in 1945. What you would expect after facing Panthers and Tigers in 1943?

Not very relevant for invading Japan, but nevertheless and interesting topic while we kill time and wait for the release
of WitP [8D]

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

You're all ignoring the biggest single advantage of the "Sherman"---it was reliable and
easy to service. Shermans probably knocked out as many German tanks by forcing
them to move rapidly as they did with their guns. Detroit may not have known much
about building tanks, but after building 10 times more automobiles than the rest of the
world combined they knew about automotive engineering and reliability.

[Apollo11]

Hi all,

Believe it or not (or remember it or not) this very same discussion was already done few months ago (but that darn hacker attacked and threads were gone)... [:(]

That time "Nikademus" and I discussed this very same issue with "mdiehl" (i.e. Tiger and PzIV v. Sherman).

I even remember me posting comprehensive table of armor thickness and ammo penetration statistics in that thread (and I can't find that file on my computer right now)...


Leo "Apolo11"

[jnier]

Do you really think Roosevel would have been able to declare war on Germany within 6 months of Pearl Harbour?

ORIGINAL: mdiehl
I do. The point would have been pressed simply because of US efforts to supply Britain. The US came within a deuce of declaring war on Germany in October 1941 because of the Reuben James incident.

I've heard this assertion before about the Reuben James and I'm not sure I buy this. What is the source for this? If the US had come so close to declaring war on Germany, how come there was no vote in Congress to actually declare war? FDR probably wanted to declare war, but US presidents do not have the authortity to declare war (unless Congress gives them this authority). It certainly would have taken months for the US to enter the war withouth a German declaraton, how many months is anybody's guess - it could have been 2 months, it could have been 12. Anyone who says that they know how long it would take is full of it - it is an unknowable piece of information

Frankly, I think Hitler's declaration of war was as optimally timed for Germany as it could get. The US was in a state of confusion over the effects of the initial Japanese attack, and in the process of revamping strategy and commands helter-skelter. The US coastal defenses were vulnerable, contributing in part to the incredible success of Operation Drumbeat. Had Hitler not declared war then, it is possible that by mid 1942 the Uboats would have faced a much better-prepared coastal defense and USN convoy system, greatly reducing the effects of the German submarine campaign in 1942 and in the first half of 1943.

I think the benefits of a more effective sub campaign in 1942 are far outweighed by having the US as a full fledged combatant (instead of just aiding England). The only optimal time for a German declaration of war would have been never.

[tsimmonds]

FDR probably wanted to declare war, but US presidents do not have the authortity to declare war (unless Congress gives them this authority).

It is true that presidents do not have the authority to declare war, but they are still the C in C of US forces, and as such they can certainly deploy US forces in creative ways that, while falling just short of war, are certainly war-like, and that force the undeclared enemy to deal with them in ways that are war-like as well. The escorting of Atlantic convoys by USN destroyers was one such creative deployment. No doubt further similar opportunities could have been devised. That such continued deployments would lead to further incidents like the Reuben James sinking is inevitable. Once Pearl Harbor had occurred, I don't believe that either the US Congress or the American people would have been especially ready to forgive further similar incidents....just think back to how the mood in this country changed after 9/11.

[BB57]

What was the time span for the US to declare war in 1917?

[mogami]

Hi, It was a little over 2 months from the time the President cut relations to the time congress declared war. (relations cut on 3 Feb 1917 DOW 6 Apr 1917)

[BB57]

Thank you

[Zero the Hero]

Just noted you assertation that Pz Mk IVs were inferion to Shermans. I must disagree, sure the MK IVa was inferior but that only packed a 37mm gun and was obselete by 1939. The later marks were much more formidable and mechanically reliable (hence the building of lots of variants on the MK IV chassis). MK IV was always referded to as panzers or tanks. The fact that Shermans were called Tommy Cookers and Ronsons by boththe allied and axis troops speaks voulumes. If you look at any period in WW2 and compare the contemporay standard issue Sherman vs the standard issue MKIV, the satistics speak for themselve. Except maybe for the last few months of the war when the Germans were only able to cobble together basic tanks with none of the advanced refinements that gave german armour the qualitative advantage that they enjoyed almost throughout the war.

[Mike Scholl]

ZERO must have been the thought and research you put into your post. The Panzerkamphwagon Mark IV NEVER mounted a 37mm gun. Even the originals
mounted a 75mm. The Mark III (meant to be the Main Battle Tank) started life
with a 37mm---but the Mark IV (meant for support) mounted a 75mm howitzer.
As the war went on, the Mk III proved incapable of "up-gunning" past a 50MM,
and the Mk IV became the Main Battle Tank with it's 75mm "upgunned" to an L48
model.

[HMSWarspite]

ORIGINAL: PzB

Patton and the yanks at least knew how they were supposed to handle their tanks in 1944.
The way the British tanks were used in and after Normandy left a lot to be desired, and time and again they were
outmanouvered and outfought by flexible and fast moving German units.

Reading about how British, Canadian and Polish armour was used and wasted from D-Day and up until Cobra finally broke the deadlock, is really sad. In walking pace the armour accompanied the infantry, taking tea breaks and resting at night.
The Falaise gap would have been closed earlier and trapped a lot more troops if they had used their tanks to their full potential.

German PzIV's were many times reported as Tigers, and it wasn't really the quality of German tanks
that gave the Allies the biggest headache in the war - it was the way they were used. Guderian once stated that it was the engine that was the tanks most important weapon. I'm quite certain that Germany would have been better of producing only PzIV's from 42 and throughout the war. Greater numbers would have more than made up for the lack of improved quality.

This is the sort of US centric, badly researched and understood post that really winds up some non-US readers of this board (yes, I know you are non-US, but you appear to have swallowed the myth). Please consider the following specific comments, and read/understand a little more widely before you indulge in (to me) offensive and stereotyped generalisations.

"The way the British tanks were used in and after Normandy left a lot to be desired, and time and again they were
outmanouvered and outfought by flexible and fast moving German units."
Examples please. You might want to consider the ratio of Panzer units opposing the eastern (UK) half of the bridgehead to the US half. Cobra had to fight the shattered remains of Lehr, and a couple of KG. The British had at various times fought 1SS, 2SS, 9SS, 10SS, 12SS, Lehr (guess how it was a remnant), 21 Pzr Div, etc. I have probably forgotten a few (especially the heavy tank btns). Only when the ill concieved Mortain counter attack was launched did the balance shift, and it is WAY different attacking moving Pzr units that have been softened up, to attacking them in prepared positions.

"Reading about how British, Canadian and Polish armour was used and wasted from D-Day and up until Cobra finally broke the deadlock, is really sad. In walking pace the armour accompanied the infantry, taking tea breaks and resting at night."
This appears to be a partly digested summary of criticism of the slowness to close the gap at Falaise, the 'famous' halt after forcing the bridges at Nijmegen, and a few misunderstandings. All armour stopped at night at this period, being EXTREMELY vulnerable in the dark. In fact, SOP was to withdraw from the front line at dusk, to re-arm, refuel, and rest, whilst infantry take over to prevent infiltration etc. The 'inexplicable halts' syndrome during Market Garden was actually as much by 43rd Wessex Div (infantry) as Gds Armoured tanks!. The Falaise gap issue is worth a book in its own right. A few facts: the failure to close the gap was commented upon extensively at the time, and was IMHO due to a combination of (mental) exhaustion by high command, coupled with an ambition to make an even wider noose, thus dealying closing the smaller one. However, it had negligable effect on the war. Some 20000 German troops escaped from the noose, with 24 tanks, and 60 guns ferried east of the Seine. Attempts to close the gap at Falaise earlier could have resulted in higher allied losses. Finally, and by no means least. ONE PART OF THE FAILURE WAS BRADLEY'S (i.e. US!)
The use of Armour in and around Caen was excessive and unimaginative (according to some), This was almost exclusively due to the inability of the British Army to take large losses - there were no replacements, and the army actually started to shrink after July 1944 for this reason. A tank lost could be replaced - not so an infantry section. I do not know where you get the 'walking pace with infantry' idea from. Goodwood et al failures were actually proof that racing unaccompanied tanks around prepared postions just gets them KO'd

"German PzIV's were many times reported as Tigers, and it wasn't really the quality of German tanks
that gave the Allies the biggest headache in the war - it was the way they were used. Guderian once stated that it was the engine that was the tanks most important weapon. I'm quite certain that Germany would have been better of producing only PzIV's from 42 and throughout the war. Greater numbers would have more than made up for the lack of improved quality."

It was more the way the entire army was used. It is (I think) undeniable that the Wehrmacht was (usually) tactically very good, and effective. However if you think the Germans could have done better producing just PzIV tanks, you need to do a little research! The later M4s are easily capable of taking on PzIVs in equal numbers (try playing Combat Mission). The benfit in numbers of tanks produced would not make any difference: US tank production (alone) in 1944 was more than the entire German tank production for the entire war! Whilst I do not deny the Germans were their own worst enemy as far as most production issues are concerned, producing only PzIV from 1942 on would have had them totally outclassed by early 1944. I guess this view makes a change from the usual German Ubertank seeking ones.

I do not wish to create the impression that the UK is perfect, (and there is a long discussion on how the UK learnt how not to use tanks during the early/middle war!) however, I do like to counter the more outrageous simplications that get discussed on this, and similar, boards.

[Apollo11]

Hi all,

ORIGINAL: HMSWarspite

It is (I think) undeniable that the Wehrmacht was (usually) tactically very good, and effective. However if you think the Germans could have done better producing just PzIV tanks, you need to do a little research! The later M4s are easily capable of taking on PzIVs in equal numbers (try playing Combat Mission). The benfit in numbers of tanks produced would not make any difference: US tank production (alone) in 1944 was more than the entire German tank production for the entire war! Whilst I do not deny the Germans were their own worst enemy as far as most production issues are concerned, producing only PzIV from 1942 on would have had them totally outclassed by early 1944. I guess this view makes a change from the usual German Ubertank seeking ones.

I do not wish to create the impression that the UK is perfect, (and there is a long discussion on how the UK learnt how not to use tanks during the early/middle war!) however, I do like to counter the more outrageous simplications that get discussed on this, and similar, boards.

I think that Germans always tried to put their main emphasis on quality rather than numbers in every way they could.

This can be observed in almost any field (tanks, aircraft, ships) for German army / air force / navy in WWII.

IMHO they knew that they couldn't match production capabilities of their enemies (which was becoming painfully obvious to them as war progressed) and thus tried their best to create better weapon systems than what enemy had whenever possible.

Now... there is serious downside to that because the more complex system is more expensive and harder to produce but it also might be so much better so that investment pays off...

We, of course, know that Hitler lost and that, ultimately, German weapons didn't won the war...


At the end small anecdote:

After the war some Western historians asked Germans why they didn't produce T-34 copies after stunning realization that their PzIII and PzIV tanks in 1941/1942 were no match for Russians.

The answer was that the Russian T-34 would not pass the technical quality test.

We may laugh nowadays but, believe me, when you see and touch Russian made tank like T-34 or even after WWII examples like T-55 (I had opportunity to be inside both of them) you will be aghast how poorly they were made (i.e. no finish at all and very sharp interior you can seriously hurt yourself unless you are extremely careful).


Also, it is very interesting to note that NATO (and US) in Cold War choose the _VERY_ same thing Germans did against Russians - they solely relied on quality rather than quantity (in almost every field - just remember number ratios for tanks, troops and aircraft).


Leo "Apollo11"

[PzB74]

Hope I didn't hurt your national pride too much Warspite, my post didn't contain any examples or further elaboration for several reasons.
1. I didn't find it appropriate as I was writing about the PzIV, and not the campaign in Normandy.
2. I'm 16000km away from my books back home, and fetching examples is...difficult to say the least!-)

British soldiers were brave and usually fought very well, but initiative wasn't encouraged and there was a lack of competency the
further you went up the ladder of rank. There was also a big difference in the relationship between private and officer in the British and Germany armies.
Especially in the SS, officers were usually mentors and had a much more informal relationship with their men. Today this is very much the way in which
organizations are organised, leaving the traditionally hierarchical based model of leadership.

This also brings up another of your points: that the British faced most of the German armour around Caen. This is to an extent, the majority of the
German panzers were indeed not fighting the Americans until the end of the campaign. The Allied forces around Caen still had wastly more troops, tanks, arty and
men than the Germans facing them. In several occasions there appeared cracks and openings in the German lines, but almost each and every time - the Allied forces didn't take
advantage of these possibilities. There was an astute lack of aggressiveness and elan! Again I would like to say that this was not the mens fault, and hold their leaders responsible.

You're also right when you say that it was not only the British' fault that 20k Germans escaped from Falaise. I think it was Bradley that ordered Patton to halt to prevent
him from driving head on into Montys troops.

I'm not sure I follow your reasoning when you say that it was dangerous to drive at night...!? The Germans only drove at night, and while they took casualties, they were both able to advance and retreat during night. When a great opportunity arises, you don't camp simply because its dark - you step on it!

Inability to take big losses? I think the Allied forces around Caen lost 3 times more tanks than the Germans did, despite having 3 times as many.
IMHO losses would have been much smaller if there had existed better doctrines and leadership.

When I said that the Germans may have been better of producing only PzIV's from 42 an onwards, it wasn't meant literally. I guess you're familiar with the multitude of models and designs they produced, and standardisation was something they never learned. In 1941 their panzers were able to outflank, outfight and defeat numerically and qualitative superior Russian units. This happened mainly because they had leaders like Guderian which was one of the inventers of the modern mechanized army. There was still much resistance to these methods, and it took time before these ideas were embraced by the majority of senior officers.

It's a little a-typical that the British lagged so far behind in how they handled their tanks, Liddel Hart is, together with Guderian, is considered one of the pioneers of the armoured warfare doctrine.

So I hope you understand that my criticism goes straight to the top of the hierarchy in the British Army, and is not directed towards the enlisted men. When properly led and equipped, they were a match for the best the Germans could field. If this had been the case in Normandy, I dare to say that not many Germans had escaped from the Falaise pocket, and a lot of Allied lifes could have been saved.

ORIGINAL: HMSWarspite

ORIGINAL: PzB

Patton and the yanks at least knew how they were supposed to handle their tanks in 1944.
The way the British tanks were used in and after Normandy left a lot to be desired, and time and again they were
outmanouvered and outfought by flexible and fast moving German units.

Reading about how British, Canadian and Polish armour was used and wasted from D-Day and up until Cobra finally broke the deadlock, is really sad. In walking pace the armour accompanied the infantry, taking tea breaks and resting at night.
The Falaise gap would have been closed earlier and trapped a lot more troops if they had used their tanks to their full potential.

German PzIV's were many times reported as Tigers, and it wasn't really the quality of German tanks
that gave the Allies the biggest headache in the war - it was the way they were used. Guderian once stated that it was the engine that was the tanks most important weapon. I'm quite certain that Germany would have been better of producing only PzIV's from 42 and throughout the war. Greater numbers would have more than made up for the lack of improved quality.

This is the sort of US centric, badly researched and understood post that really winds up some non-US readers of this board (yes, I know you are non-US, but you appear to have swallowed the myth). Please consider the following specific comments, and read/understand a little more widely before you indulge in (to me) offensive and stereotyped generalisations.

"The way the British tanks were used in and after Normandy left a lot to be desired, and time and again they were
outmanouvered and outfought by flexible and fast moving German units."
Examples please. You might want to consider the ratio of Panzer units opposing the eastern (UK) half of the bridgehead to the US half. Cobra had to fight the shattered remains of Lehr, and a couple of KG. The British had at various times fought 1SS, 2SS, 9SS, 10SS, 12SS, Lehr (guess how it was a remnant), 21 Pzr Div, etc. I have probably forgotten a few (especially the heavy tank btns). Only when the ill concieved Mortain counter attack was launched did the balance shift, and it is WAY different attacking moving Pzr units that have been softened up, to attacking them in prepared positions.

"Reading about how British, Canadian and Polish armour was used and wasted from D-Day and up until Cobra finally broke the deadlock, is really sad. In walking pace the armour accompanied the infantry, taking tea breaks and resting at night."
This appears to be a partly digested summary of criticism of the slowness to close the gap at Falaise, the 'famous' halt after forcing the bridges at Nijmegen, and a few misunderstandings. All armour stopped at night at this period, being EXTREMELY vulnerable in the dark. In fact, SOP was to withdraw from the front line at dusk, to re-arm, refuel, and rest, whilst infantry take over to prevent infiltration etc. The 'inexplicable halts' syndrome during Market Garden was actually as much by 43rd Wessex Div (infantry) as Gds Armoured tanks!. The Falaise gap issue is worth a book in its own right. A few facts: the failure to close the gap was commented upon extensively at the time, and was IMHO due to a combination of (mental) exhaustion by high command, coupled with an ambition to make an even wider noose, thus dealying closing the smaller one. However, it had negligable effect on the war. Some 20000 German troops escaped from the noose, with 24 tanks, and 60 guns ferried east of the Seine. Attempts to close the gap at Falaise earlier could have resulted in higher allied losses. Finally, and by no means least. ONE PART OF THE FAILURE WAS BRADLEY'S (i.e. US!)
The use of Armour in and around Caen was excessive and unimaginative (according to some), This was almost exclusively due to the inability of the British Army to take large losses - there were no replacements, and the army actually started to shrink after July 1944 for this reason. A tank lost could be replaced - not so an infantry section. I do not know where you get the 'walking pace with infantry' idea from. Goodwood et al failures were actually proof that racing unaccompanied tanks around prepared postions just gets them KO'd

"German PzIV's were many times reported as Tigers, and it wasn't really the quality of German tanks
that gave the Allies the biggest headache in the war - it was the way they were used. Guderian once stated that it was the engine that was the tanks most important weapon. I'm quite certain that Germany would have been better of producing only PzIV's from 42 and throughout the war. Greater numbers would have more than made up for the lack of improved quality."

It was more the way the entire army was used. It is (I think) undeniable that the Wehrmacht was (usually) tactically very good, and effective. However if you think the Germans could have done better producing just PzIV tanks, you need to do a little research! The later M4s are easily capable of taking on PzIVs in equal numbers (try playing Combat Mission). The benfit in numbers of tanks produced would not make any difference: US tank production (alone) in 1944 was more than the entire German tank production for the entire war! Whilst I do not deny the Germans were their own worst enemy as far as most production issues are concerned, producing only PzIV from 1942 on would have had them totally outclassed by early 1944. I guess this view makes a change from the usual German Ubertank seeking ones.

I do not wish to create the impression that the UK is perfect, (and there is a long discussion on how the UK learnt how not to use tanks during the early/middle war!) however, I do like to counter the more outrageous simplications that get discussed on this, and similar, boards.