Salutations and solicitations.... 1EyedJacks (J) vs Nemo (A)

[Canoerebel]

...either the power just went out or Nemo's wife entered the room and in a sultry voice coquettishly whispered, "Come here, you winsome strategic psychologist, and analyize this!"

[modrow]

Nemo,

ORIGINAL: Nemo121

Leave them out of the unit for a month or two and see how long they take to come back. My record is something like 14 days for a pilot.

7 days is a reasonable assumption to swap in an entire daitai of 27 pilots. Sure some will come back on the 1st day BUT what use is it sailing after 3 days with 9 top-notch pilots and 27 planes?

I am basing my experience on what is happening with the RAF and USAAF in the DEI and Marshalls. There it is taking my pilots an average of a week to arrive from the general reserve.

I think, perhaps, your results are due to it being a small scenario and the length of time between transfers being so small. I'm not sure though but I am certain, absolutely certain, that swapping elite pilots in and replacing an entire sentai or daitai of pilots will not be done in 1 or 2 days if those pilots have been transferred out some months previously.

I think the key is that you talk about swapping the entire daitai, whereas I was more thinking along bringing the Daitai from 27 to 36 pilots and use mostly the noobs, leaving the rest deactivated and reactivating them when needed.

You were looking at "merely" 40ish Kates and 30ish Vals. Not sure how many carriers you were facing, but if it is a significant amount of KB's carriers, that strike package can be put together as described above. Admittedly, though, that may be detectable during the combat replay.

In any case, I think the detailed pilot management functions should allow for adding some interesting observations for one's opponent worth considering.

Hartwig

[Nemo121]

The idea of willingly running my primary strategic formation of decision ( KB ) at less than 1/3rd of its true combat potential ( 27 trainees are nowhere near as effective as 9 elite pilots ) and ONLY being able to increase that potential to about half a day AFTER any ambush ( by activating the 9 elite pilots you were holding de-activated in the squadron itself ) and NOT being able to reach full potential until one reached port and waited several additional days for pilots to transfer in from the general reserve is simply anathema to me.

You lose KB's immediate striking power, you lose its resilience to ambush and you lose its ability to rapidly respond to an Allied invasion... why? Well instead of simply topping off the fuel tanks and racing for wherever the Allies are invading on the day after you spot them you will instead have to swap in and out all those pilots and then wait 7 days or so and only THEN go to where the Allies are invading, by which time the invasion will have succeeded or failed based on its own merit.


I think that to willfully do this to one's primary formation of strategic decision - which makes it the most important formation on the entire map - is simply running too massive of a risk.

I think it is possible to over-complicate things and run too large a risk looking for that final "edge". Sometimes one needs to be satisfied with less than the theoretical maximum because that maximum carries with it unacceptable risks.



wpurdom,
Sorry I missed your question till now.

As to my air force.... I think that if he attacks I'll commit the air force to a do or die defence of Sumatra and, now that I've put in sufficient garrisons ( 400 to 500 AV each in Kendari, Ambon and Makassar with Balikpapan due for building up to 500 AV next ) to the southern DEI also.

If he doesn't attack then I'll simply use the air force as little as possible to inflict as favourable losses as possible on his IJNAF groups, which I've been preferentially targetting all game. If I do go on the offensive one can expect that any base I take will have an inordinate amount of AAA committed to its defence as that's the cheapest way for me to dissuade his aerial attacks and I don't mind him making an attack on a base if he loses 1/3rd to 1/2 of all bombers committed - which is what was happening when he hit Palembang last month.

[Alfred]

These discussions are fast becoming pointless.

It has now been some weeks since Nemo structually implemented his force structure and there has been precious little evidence presented that his opponent has adopted any offensive plan based on the new situation. Too much time has been wasted, time which is needed for the preliminary actions before the main operation is launched. Without these preliminaries what is likely to occur is a frontal assault, and that is a course of action with very little chance of success.

I am starting to fear that my comment regarding being rattled (made in post #468) might be too accurate.

Alfred

[Nemo121]

Well, he continues to try to retake Onnekotan Jima in the Kuriles and is mopping up the Phillipines. He has made a few forays to southern Borneo also but appears to pull back once spotted by recon.

With that said I think he may very well be so rattled that he may not seek to advance at all anymore but, instead, focusses on what he can do to prevent further attacks from my forces - that's what I was trying to achieve but I didn't think it'd be this successful.


Right now I think we'll see one of two things:
a) an IJN lunge into Java from Singapore/Singkawang - it'll be a frontal assault with no subtlety and it should be relatively easily contained.

b) no co-ordinated Japanese offensive at all.


Right now I'm turning more and more toward the second option and am beginning to plan for the major Allied counter-offensives to come by marshalling the necessary APs and AKs and have been putting into place another IJN-culling operation for the past few days. If the situation is favourable in about 3 days time we might see the USN smash into a major IJN base with 4 BBs and assorted DDs.

My goal is attrit the IJN as per the overall strategic plan but, more specifically to attrit them in a given region as preparation for offensive action in that region in about 4 weeks time. In addition I will also seek to monitor his response... Does he react to the attrition by replacing the SC TF guarding the base or does he withdraw the IJN? Either is acceptable as I can take advantage of either.


I think there's a very real possibility that Mike may never move on Sumatra. If he doesn't then the Allies are going to begin a general counter-offensive on 2 additional axes in 1 month's time. If those offensives succeed then this one won't be competitive at all by the end of 1942 in spite of the fact that the IJNAAF, IJAAF and KB will still be superior to anything the Allies can muster. Fortunately naval and aerial superiority isn't necessary for offensive action - even though this is a Pacific War game.

[Capt. Harlock]

I think there's a very real possibility that Mike may never move on Sumatra. If he doesn't then the Allies are going to begin a general counter-offensive on 2 additional axes in 1 month's time. If those offensives succeed then this one won't be competitive at all by the end of 1942 in spite of the fact that the IJNAAF, IJAAF and KB will still be superior to anything the Allies can muster. Fortunately naval and aerial superiority isn't necessary for offensive action

As Nathan Bedford Forrest explained in different words, it's all about having superiority at the point of contact. A counter-offensive rather soon seems like a good idea because I don't see this game lasting until the end of 1942. Especially, invading Java when there is significant LBA on Sumatra seems like a way to take serious losses.

[erstad]

hartwig.modrow is correct about the game mechanics related to pilots, in my experience. In addition, the pilot manual documents this behavior, emphasis added:

If the pilot is ‘grayed’ and delay is one, then left-click will allow pilot to be
transferred to the General Reserve (with a random 15 day delay). Right-click will
allow pilot to be activated for immediate use.

The key is that you folks keep talking to orthogonal points. hartwig.modrow is talking about putting pilots into the group's reserve, and activating them again. Nemo121 is talking about getting pilots out of the general reserve.

I'm not arguing for or against the suggested strategy, just affirming the mechanics. You definitely can put pilots into the group reserve, and have them available to restore with no delay.

Oh, and no port required or involved.

[Nemo121]

erstad,

"with no delay" is the key... If you're ambushed you only get access to them the day AFTER the first day of combat... TO me that's far too high a price to pay.

You're right I had the detail of the ports wrong with respect to those pilots in group reserve though. Thanks for the clarification.

[Andy Mac]

Surely he has only one choice now take whatever lumps he has to pay the butchers bill in men and machines but get ashore with everything he can muster and fight the fight he needs to fight.
 
It will cost him but if he does it right he can surely still  take Sumatra eventually - if he doesnt its game over.

[Andy Mac]

i.e. night bomb with sallies for 5 days to damage your air bases
follow it up with massed zero sweeps for three days to from D+2
Clean out your air power whatever it takes

Then hit the AF's in turn with massed air power from malaya he still has superiority if he is willing to take his lumps.

The send in wave after wave of subs mini subs and Netties from Singapore to force back your heavy naval power

The send in massed CL led DD flotillas to exhaust allied ship ammo not talking 2 or 3 talking 10 or 12 LL armed sqns of DD's and CL's in one night the first 3 or 4 will get creamed but allied ammo will get depleted eventually

Only then land an almighty armada under cover of every bomber he can muster 10 - 12 Divs

No messing pay the butchers bill and do what needs to be done

What am I missing ?

[Capt. Harlock]

The send in massed CL led DD flotillas to exhaust allied ship ammo not talking 2 or 3 talking 10 or 12 LL armed sqns of DD's and CL's in one night the first 3 or 4 will get creamed but allied ammo will get depleted eventually

Only then land an almighty armada under cover of every bomber he can muster 10 - 12 Divs

No messing pay the butchers bill and do what needs to be done

What am I missing ?

I don't think he can put together that many surface combat squadrons without exposing himself in other areas. And will he have enough fuel for all those ships?

[traskott]

If he doesn't have that fuel now, never will have...


Nemo, can u send me the file. My email is traskott[dot]gmail.com. Thank you in advance.

[Galahad78]

I would like also to have a look to this game, please. zelgadiss78[at]hotmail.com

Thanks in advance [:)]

[Nemo121]

Harlock,
This is Scenario 2. He'll have the fuel. He has enough fuel for about 18 months without any imports in this scenario.


Really this game is a situation where my forces are NOT strong enough, at all, for the strategic impact they are having but the effect is being achieved through inculcating caution, second-guessing and probably a bit of fear that I'm going to race through his lines into his rear elsewhere.

Logically I don't have the strength to dictate the strategic situation at this point in time BUT people aren't about logic. Most people are about feelings. Control what they feel - which can be done by metering the inputs - and you can significantly impact their mental state. With that you can significantly impact their decisions whilst still allowing them the initiative to make those decisions. IOW they do what you want but do it of their own volition without realising it is what you wish.

I hadn't expected it to occur this early though. I think the Marshalls must have dislocated Mike more than I initially had thought. A miscalculation on my part.

[Lomri]

You are missing the fact that Nemo's opponent doesn't appear to realize that there is a giant airbase packed with aircraft in the jungle, no longer just a dot base. Gaining air superiority over Palembang isn't the full answer.

[traskott]

I agree with you about "feelings". I have review your turn (thank you!! [&o]), and, altough I'm not sure how much more troops has the jap at Scen2, he should be able to put pressure on you.

Some hints: Oh, my!! 3 CVs in just 1 TF, and a couple of DDs ? a CV with 1 DD... xDD Scen2 doesn't allow japanese SS ?

Hummmm Java is a bit...well, you know what I mean, and all the whole air force you have reunited (altough impressive ), won't survive a decisive japanese attack. He can win the battle and make the war longer, but he doesn't know. You are right about feelings.

In fact, if he strikes, and is boldy enough, he can push it's limits very far at DEI and OZ. His MAIN trouble is he NEEDs to put all its strategic assest in play to win at every theater you have forced to fight.... Interesting. BUT, if he can do it, your lack of reserves and deep defenses should be a trouble...

BTW: Oh, man!!! Port dock limits doesn't mean nothing to you ? [;)]. You have tons of xAKs trying to unload but in fact been a sit duck. It is better disband them (even loaded) and unload just with the docked ships, the undocked can take weeks (more than 1 week, yes), to unload.

xDDD BTW: Impresive performance, although, honestly, I would like to see u facing a more agresive japanese player. [;)]

[Nemo121]

traskott,

I don't play to win, I play for the challenge. TO be challenged one must try to achieve much with little. So, yes, where I don't need DDs I don't have them. After all, when deceptive manoeuvring minimises the need for ASW escorts why waste 8 more DDs on escort duties? It isn't, at all, the sort of deployment which most people would make but it does put pressure on the enemy's weakness and forces a situation where the weaknesses which are created won't be exploited. IIRC his subs haven't seen a CV all game. I might be wrong but, generally, I've just avoided them through pathing instead of going with lots of escorts. If you look carefully you'll see an utterly unescorted CV on-map also . I'll bring the defibrillator for when you find it

Of course if Mike were a different style of player then my assessment of his likely actions would change and the plan and weighting of forces would change.


Java is a bit ???? Undefended is the word you are looking for. I don't think I have a single unit which isn't permanently restricted there. Ideally I wouldn't have a single soldier on all of Java... but don't forget that I never wanted to defend Java. Why waste men defending something I don't think is essential? THat would be truly wasteful. If it isn't essential then abandon it, that's my motto.


Air force: Survival prospects... Oh I NEVER said the air force would survive. If he hits Sumatra with an invasion TF the air force will die in place. It'll take 4 or 5 days and it'll gut the IJN surface fleet but that air force will die en masse and the IJNAF and IJAAF will still survive. On the other hand the survival of the air force is not a strategic imperative. Gutting the IJN ability to launch invasions BEYOND the DEI IS. In dying the air force will gut the IJN so much that it won't be able to invade beyond Java. That's my calculation at least.

he doesn't know Precisely. Most of the time when I've played the ALlies my opponents were, rationally, quite able to crush my forces when you look at things in terms of numbers and quality of troops, planes and ships. Yet my Allied forces usually not only managed to halt the Japanese but push them back. Why? I simply chose not to fight the physical battle but the psychological battle to crush their belief that they'd win out. If you look at the AARs of past opponents they usually clearly reach a point where their AAR communicates their belief that I'll push more in than they can kill and will wni through in the end. Because of that they end up falling back when, in reality, not only could they hold but they could counter-attack and destroy my forces.... but they no longer think that way and their psychological dislocation dooms them.


I disagree with you a bit about his ability to push beyond Sumatra.... If he hits it the IJN will die en masse in the waters around Sumatra when I commit 10 BBs, 2 CAs, about 12 CLs and 50 to 60 DDs plus over 1,000 planes in massed waves with escorting fighters/CAP. I think the losses he will take will preclude him from expanding Japan at all beyond Sumatra. There's just too much loss potential there for him to move on. Also, don't forget that his ground forces will be utterly destroyed even if they do win in Sumatra and EVEN if they did win and capture it ( which I doubt ) the southern DEI would have been fully built up by then and he'll be forced to attack that in order to secure his OIL supply. The Southern DEI is my insurance if he does somehow manage to take Sumatra, it forces his next action after Sumatra and means that temporally, even if the IJN survives Sumatra, he will run out of time for forcing major invasions of Oz or India.


I think you're right that the situation I've created is that he needs to commit all of his force in order to achieve success in any theatre. By doing that, indirectly, I safeguard other theatres and make it even more imperative that he commit his entire force to succeed in them. As these OODA cycles continue his situation continually worsens purely due to temporal factors.


xAKs etc... I think you must mean Cocos and Roi-Namur as well as Oosthaven.
Cocos and Roi-Namur aren't vulnerable... not because of objective reality but because Mike simply won't strike that deep at this point in time. He can't hit Cocos at all and Roi-Namur is simply something he won't risk his carriers to hit at this stage.

Oosthaven is vulnerable but, again, every time he tried to venture south before with the IJN he found torpedo bombers flying vs his BBs. He tried a few times but got scared off. When he tried to hit it with Netties - which he did a few times - he usually lost the entire raid. Currently he is only trying to hit them with subs... And subs don't take a sufficient toll on a strategic level for me to care too much about rhem.

Ah, you must be talking about the 100,000 tons of xAKs at Oosthaven... They are only there to boost southern Sumatra's supplies for future offensive action. They were due to bring the 100,000+ tons of supplies to Burma but as I began to think nMike mightn't attack at all I decided the supplies would be better used to boost an offensive from Sumatra in a month's time. They're a once off deal. Normally you can subtract 100,000+ tons of shipping from what you see at Oosthaven. Normally you only find TKs there.
Without the 100,000+ extra tons of shipping Oosthaven looks a lot less crazy . And those ships only arrived over the last two days so they haven't gotten properly organised yet.


What did you think about the southern DEI? The USN CV-based air is being committed to defend the southern DEI ( as well as some Oz fighters etc ). You have to factor those 100 additional planes into the defensive plan. Bear in mind that another 200 aviation support is in Darwin about to be ferried forward to Kendari and Makassar to fix the aviation support mismatch there.

[traskott]

Yeah, the Hermes... I said it first time, but I remember your typpo: "c'est la vie" [;)]. She doesn't matter, in fact.

About the 10 BBs and so... hummmm... a lot of firepower, yes. BUT, altough you have a great number of fighters at Sumatra, my (personal) feeling is that they are not enough to stop a well coordinated attack, or an aggresive bombing campaign. If ( IF ) he has developed correctly its factories, he should have enough medium bombers to disrupt your bases...and, with Java empty, if it falls, it should be a fantastic base to pummel Sumatra.

BUT:

Java is the bait. And with Southern DEI more and more reinforced, any advance to Java is add more troops to the bag. If I would want to take Java first clean ASAP Southern DEI. It's a key part of your defensive scheme, as it avoids the "ortodox" japanese plan of takin Flores, Kendari, Amboina and such, to isolate DEI. Now it is not posible.... And with all that troops you are carring there, soon a DEI advance almost impossible.

Now the best allied of the japanese is his recon planes. If he gets enough intel he can identify your LCUs and where they not are...Why? To launch a two pronged offensives til Southern DEI ( the more strong), and Java ( some weak units plus BF). : Java cut of OZ. DEI cut... and a path to the KB to sail to the Indic. End of more Sumatra reinforcements...Then, with the additional troops scen2 give the japanese player, he should be able to chop your defenses (although it will be costly). BTW: If I were him, no more troops to PHI except very small LCUs and Bettys and Nells with HQ to make an effective blockade.

Hummm...lot of ideas, but a bit disorganized...

[Nemo121]

Well, the first thing you need to remember is that I'm very firmly in the Tukhachevsky branch of things and ascribe to the ruthless Soviet ordering of the levels of conflict:
National Policy objectives drive the strategic planning which drive the operational planning which drives the tactical positioning and posture.

If at any point there is a mismatch between an operational and tactical imperative then the operational imperative should be the driver of operational and tactical planning. Same goes for strategic vs operational and national policy vs strategic.

So, all planning must be driven by the national policy objectives. Since you don't have an political leadership modelled in-game ( not to a realistic extent anyway, there are attempts to extrapolate it but they are crude ) you get to decide the national policy objectives. In my case I decided that my national policy objective would be to attack the enemy's critical weaknesses.

Political - Enemy morale. I planned to attack this by conducting a defence which would be actively frustrating to my opponent's hopes and morale. Certainly part of the aim was to frustrate his plans but another, significant part, was to frustrate HIM by causing him more problems etc than he had initially expected.

Military - I sought to identify the areas of his military in which I could cause significant attritional damage which he'd find it difficult to make good. These areas were combat vessels for the navy and, to a lesser extent, IJNAF strike groups. I [/quote]Well, the first thing you need to remember is that I'm very firmly in the Tukhachevsky branch of things and ascribe to the ruthless Soviet ordering of the levels of conflict:
National Policy objectives drive the strategic planning which drive the operational planning which drives the tactical positioning and posture.

If at any point there is a mismatch between an operational and tactical imperative then the operational imperative should be the driver of operational and tactical planning. Same goes for strategic vs operational and national policy vs strategic.

So, all planning must be driven by the national policy objectives. Since you don't have a political leadership modelled in-game ( not to a realistic extent anyway, there are attempts to extrapolate it but they are crude ) you get to decide the national policy objectives. In my case I decided that my national policy objective would be to attack the enemy's critical weaknesses.

Political - Enemy morale. I planned to attack this by conducting a defence which would be actively frustrating to my opponent's hopes and morale. Certainly part of the aim was to frustrate his plans but another, significant part, was to frustrate HIM by causing him more problems etc than he had initially expected.

Military - I sought to identify the areas of his military in which I could cause significant attritional damage which he'd find it difficult to make good. These areas were combat vessels for the navy and, to a lesser extent, IJNAF strike groups. I have ruthlessly sought to attack IJNAF strike groups in preference to IJAAF groups and I've achieved results which, I think, are currently bearing fruit in terms of poorer IJNAF fighter and strike pilots. Ref to Aside 1: Pilot Experience, a 3 month advantage.

Economic- Palembang is the jewel in the economic crown. Even without Palembang the Japanese economy can run at well over 95% efficiency but Palembang allows it to expand and afford an attritional fight.


So, taking those 3 aspects into account my plan was to:
1. Attack the enemy's economic weakness by holding Palembang sufficiently strongly to ensure it would be destroyed in being captured ( this has transitioned to an effort to actually hold Southern Sumatra and significant parts of the DEI as Mike hasn't progressed as I had expected ).

2. Take advantage of the insight into military critical weaknesses to leverage my denial of Palembang - and thus the denial of the ability of the Japanese economy to expand ) - into a situation where I force Mike to devote ever greater Japanese industrial capacity to replacing losses into areas of critical weakness ( aside 2: Critical weaknesses, not critically weak ).

3. Break his will ( threatening and taking the initiative was my means to that end ). By that I mean creating a situation in which he began expecting the worst. Instead of embarking on an attack with expectations of great victory I wanted to create a situation in which he'd embark on the attack with a feeling of, "I wonder what Fionn will do now to scupper this. I don't know what he'll do but I'm sure something will happen." That sort of second-guessing and mental defeatism would enable me to make a small show of strength or manoeuvre and achieve outsized results. That is important since looked at logically I simply don't have the force available to go toe to toe with him and survive for more than a few days.


So, Phase 1 was basically assessing the military, economic and political strengths and weaknesses of Japan. Phase 2 was then deciding how to create an internally consistent, mutually supporting plan which would, at each step, help me to achieve the 3 primary goals I'd set myself. If you look at the objectives I set myself above it is clear that the economic objective ( holding Palembang ) serves the military objective ( creating a focus for destruction of IJNAF land-based airgroups and preventing the expansion of Japanese industry to sustain a war of attrition and the replacement of the IJN and IJNAF assets I was preferentially targetting throughout 1942 ) which, together. served to break Mike's will.

However it is also clear that holding Palembang was not, on its own, sufficient to break the back of KB's airgroups ( the IJNAF CV-based component ) or really threaten the initiative. That's why I needed to add in the counter-attack on the Marshalls. Mike helped me tremendously by gutting his own KB airgroups over the Phillipines and Sumatra and so the Marshalls operation didn't result in the clash of 500+ planes as I had initially imagined but it has still served a useful purpose in attriting the IJNAF and IJN significantly and tethering KB to a relatively insignificant spot of ocean... and tethering it in such a way that it isn't achieving much. It requires the occasional sacrifice to keep it there but that's the price of doing business and will only need to last another month. I can continue losing a couple of DDs and the odd CL or CA for the next month in order to keep KB away from the DEI.

Phase 3 was researching my opponent. In order to do this I read EVERY post he'd ever made to the forums. It took me an entire evening ( about 6 hours ) but making a plan without including a psychological profile of one's opponent is, to me, highly suspect and suboptimal. My assessment was that he was going to be thorough but conventional, would want to clear his lines and wasn't going to be dashing madly through my lines seeking deep, strategic dislocations of my front. When we started playing I gave the first week or so of play to testing his actions and reactions - in order to confirm some of my hypothesis - and confirmed some and threw away some others when they were wrong.

After the 1st week of combat was finished I finalised the details of the plan. To the best of my recollection I hadn't picked the Marshalls as the target for the spoiling attack until about mid-December. Prior to that I'd had a vague plan to launch a spoiling attack to mess with the initiative but hadn't finalised things as I hadn't known what the front line trace would be in February. By mid-December I was confident I knew enough about how he was playing this campaign that I could plan the operation with certainty as to which bases I'd be holding by February and could thus use to organise my forces and combat-load them.


In the OODA cycle Phases 1, 2 and 3 were analogous to the OO portion of the loop. Phases 1 and 3 were Observation ( to the campaign situation and the opponent) while Phases 2 and 3 were Orientation ( begin making tentative decisions as to what the data means and how this understanding should shape future priorities and plans ). .. Of note: Phase 3 was a mixed phase since, obviously, once you assess someone's personality/style you are also beginning to orient as to how they will react to various stimuli etc.


With the data gathered and interpreted and vague plans as to how to achieve the end-points I'd set myself it was then time to DECIDE ( the D in OODA ). I picked the most strategically vital task on the map ( destroying/holding Palembang ) and ruthlessly subordinated EVERY OTHER ACTION on the map to that objective. The emphasis is important as that truly is what happened and was crucial to the success of the plan.

In order to hold Palembang I decided I needed to get as many troops there as quickly as possible. IN order to do this I did the following:
1. I skimped on recon by PBYs etc and flew them all to the DEI to fly troops from Malaysia and the DEI into Sumatra.
2. I sacrificed shipping en masse in order to evacuate British troops from Malaysia. To my recollection I rescued some 80,000+ troops and lost less than 2,000 to attack during the evacuation.
3. I began prepping a naval base to support the naval defence of Sumatra ( Cocos Islands ), began building forts and airfields ( Lahat etc ) and began flying every plane possible into Southern Sumatra. I sacrificed air cover over my troops and even my shipping in order to preserve the air force for the battle for Sumatra. I accepted losses at the tactical level in order to maintain my strength for the strategically decisive action.

I also decided I needed to tie down IJA troops elsewhere for as long as possible. To this end:
1. I decided China could tie down a lot of troops but required secure supply lines. To this end I decided I needed to hold Burma. If I didn't need China to hold down IJA troops I would have abandoned Burma in a heartbeat but without Burma he can move troops out of China and then he can use those troops against Sumatra. So, I have to hold Burma to hold Sumatra.

2. I launched a fairly active defence of the Phillipines with tank raids pushing Japanese forces back on a few occasions but some weird supply bug which used 1,000 tons of supplies per day in Manilla meant Manilla didn't hold nearly as long as it could have. C'est la vie.

3. I launched pinprick raids elsewhere to invite Japanese counter-invasions. These counter-invasions would draw more troops away from Sumatra and thus aid its defence.


The same rationale lay behind the sacrificial Oz and US cruiser raids on Truk... Draw down the IJN and weaken it before it could be committed to forcing the invasion of Sumatra.


In the end the timing of the Marshalls invasion and its phasing was also designed to draw in the IJN and allow me to destroy portions of it so that it wouldn't be available for Sumatra. I had hoped to kill more of the IJNAF also but sometimes one's opponent doesn't co-operate.

Even the build-up of the Southern DEI is dual-purpose. It acts as a fallback from Sumatra for fragments etc but also acts to guard the southern route to Java, threatening endless attacks into the flank of any invasion and, hopefully, making the northern route into Java more attractive for Japan. B y making the northern route more attractive I'm hoping to draw the Japanese into Sumatra first - as that will aid my defence of Sumatra... If they invade Java first and set up bases there my airforce and navy will have a tougher time in the defence of Sumatra. Again though that whole investment ( about 2,000 AV so far ) is ALL being done to support Southern Sumatra.

The Chinese counter-offensives are also being designed to roll out slowly enough to draw IJA reinforcements from the Southern Region Army or from Mike's reserve. In both cases the Chinese counter-offensive will stall BUT in being stalled it will have drawn several hundred AV from the SRA or reserves and prevent those troops from being used against Sumatra.

So, from my point of view the attacks in the Kuriles, Marcus, Wake, the Marshalls, China and Burma are ALL supporting the defence of Palembang. Palembang is the fulcrum around which everything else turns for the Allies.

So, once I recognised the fulcrum it was relatively easy to figure out how to support that fulcrum in each of the other theatres and that was my D ( Decision ) done for me.


All that remained then was to put it into action and phase things properly so that my weaker forces managed to seem a much more potent threat than they really were. In order to achieve that I used phasing both within and across different theatres and operational tempo to create a situation in which Mike was always reacting ( as much as possible in any case ) and, even when he wasn't reacting, was doing something I'd already prepared for and wanted him to do.

It wasn't perfect and I've made a few mistakes along the way of course but for a first game in a new system it hasn't gone too badly.


So, Galahad, that's how I went from the initial assessment to the plan I enacted. It has elements of the Boyd cycle as I hope I have pointed out and once it was put into action it definitely utilised the Boyd cycle in order to get him reacting inappropriately and manouvred into positions where even his own actions ( as opposed to reactions ) served my purposes and simply led him deeper into the trap of my plan.

Since he hasn't attacked Sumatra yet I'm changing the plan ( it is important never to get too wedded to a plan. It is merely an instrument to achieve an objective. It isn't important in and of itself. ) and looking to transition to a general offensive which would support China and the forces still in the Phillipines in order to cut his SLOCs to the oil in northern Borneo - I've prevented expansion, now it is time to cut into the raw materials necessary to run what he currently has.




Aside 1: Pilot Experience, a 3 month advantage.
KB begins the game with elite pilots. If we assume that they are all wiped out on 31st December 1941 ( imagine a particularly horrid fire in the geisha area of Tokyo while all the carriers are based there [8D] ). On the 1st January 1942 these groups will be filled with pilots drawn from the trained reserve ( 35 Exp pilots ). Now, let us assume that it takes 3 months to bring pilots from 35 Exp in their primary sub-skills ( A2A, torpedo bombing, naval strike etc ) to 70 Exp in that sub-skill. By 1st April 1942 KB will, again, be filled with 70+ Exp pilots.

Unfortunately the Allies will also be training and by 1st April 1942 they can also field 70 Exp pilots ( in their primary sub-skills ) with the end result that total annihilation of KB's pilots on 31st December 1941 would yield an equal playing field in terms of experience by April 1st 1942. The conclusion is that once the IJNAF wipes out its initial core of pilots it will never be able to regain an experience advantage - assuming competent Allied play. There are some combinations of Allied play and Japanese planning which could yield the advantage back to Japan but if a player is going to play so poorly the least of his problems is this issue.

Caveat: In order to fully capitalise on this situation the ALlied player should seek to achieve the destruction of the initial cadre of KB pilots with as few active squadrons as possible - and ideally no USN or USMC squadrons - so as to maximise his experience advantage in CV-capable airgroups and also hasten the date of onset of experience-equality from 1st April to 1st March or even 1st February.

Caveat 2: The IJN player can stave off this situation by careful utilisation of his land-based IJNAF groups as pure training groups and a drawing down of land-based IJNAF pilots into KB airgroups in order to replace losses there and maintain quality while waiting the 3 months for newly trained pilots to be available from his extempore training groups. For this reason it is important to lure IJNAF land-based airgroups into combat as frequently as possible ( see Balikpapan and the creation of a need to engage in unfavourable sweeping and escort missions over Sumatra and Ponape ) whilst ensuring that the loss ratio isn't too unfavourable to the USAAF units so tasked. You've got to be holistic with this and not only attack the spearpoint of the elite IJNAF pilots. You've also got to lure your opponent into misusing his land-based IJNAF groups for fighting instead of training. By doing that you can ensure that that new bunch of IJNAF 70 Exp pilots doesn't graduate in April 1942.


How this played out in this game: I consciously attempted to implement this strategy during this game but subordinated this strategic goal to the desire to bag a couple of CVLs and cover the Marshalls invasion. Since the Marshalls invasion has altered the entire strategic situation in the Pacific and appears to have put Japan on the defensive in March 1942 I think it was worth it but it did gut my naval airgroups with overall losses in CV-airgroups being of the order of 70% in 2 days of combat. In terms of the game I expect the IJNAF to be a capable force in April 1942 as it still has experienced pilots available transferred in from IJNAF land units ( even though it can't have many of them given the huge losses to IJNAF land-based strike groups )but once the front line is wiped out ( which I expected to happen over Sumatra ) I expect the IJNAF to collapse for 3 months. That's the time window I need to transition from my current defensive posture to an overtly offensive posture... and I'm already making the preparations for some ( positioning APs and AKs for invasions in the DEI etc ).



Aside 2: Critical weaknesses, not critically weak.
Critical weakness is defined as an area or aspect of the enemy ( whether that be economic, political, military or socially ( the latter is often forgotten but hugely powerful ) ) whose attack and/or destruction will significantly impact many/all other aspects of resistance. So, destroying all power plants in a country ( or taking down the power lines as NATO tried to do in Serbia a few years ago ) will pretty much cripple any modern country and force army units to rely on integral generators etc, all of which use fuel and hasten the onset of immobility in a modern, mechanised army.
Nothing in the definition of critical weakness speaks to that thing actually being "weak". That's a common misunderstanding wherein people think that critical weakness is the same as being weak. It isn't. One of Japan's critical weaknesses is KB, its most powerful and strategically decisive asset. No-one would argue KB is weak in March 1942 BUT if you CAN render it imporent ( sink the CVs or kill the pilots ) then the loss of KB as a weapon will hugely limit Japan's future strategic options. As such KB is a critical weakness one can attack which will have far-reaching strategic consequences. Recognising that critical weakness in no way implies anything regarding the strength of the formation or aspect identified is pretty important so I thought I'd just make sure we're all on the same page.


Ok, that's it. Took a bit longer than I expected but I hope it is useful.


In terms of the game the Chinese offensive goes well. I'll post a picture the next day and Singkawang is due to be visited by 4 BBs in 2 days time - assuming they aren't all sunk tomorrow when the stop in mid-sea some 200 miles from Singkawang. I've tasked 250 fighters for LRCAP but if they don't fly I'll lose 4 BBs.

The IJN is beginning to land on Mindanao with a very large force. I've transferred in 80 A-24s and some SB-2U3s ( sic ) and 25 fighters so I'm hopeful of bagging a half-dozen APs at little cost tomorrow.

[traskott]

Good luck at Mindanao. And thanks for the turn and combat report. It's very instructive.