Japanese defensive strategy...

[sven6345789]

at least those transports were flying, not like many US aces who got their ace status for strafing runs on german airfields[;)]
point is, one ace doesn't win a war. a 1000 average pilots just might (if they have good planes, the Hellcat or Mustang are perfect examples for this effect).
[:'(]

[Ol_Dog]

ORIGINAL: mdiehl

You might be a Japanese fanboy if, for example, if you think that as a viable 'alternative history' (a) it is reasonable to assume that the USN CVs might have been in Pearl Harbor at 7:30 AM on 7 December 1941 and (b) it is unreasonable to assume that USN CVs might have been together in a TF 125 miles away from Kido Butai launching a surprise airstrike at 7:30 AM on 7 December 1941.

(a) Since it was only weather that kept 1 carrier force at sea the night of 6 Dec 1941, that is not entirely out of the question.

(b) Maybe at 8:30 AM the carriers are alerted, but they were specificly ordered out of the area of the launch the week before.
An attack by 2 CVs may have been possible by noon, but that was after both waves of the attack. It would be a factor only if the Japanese fleet stayed for a 3rd wave to destroy the oil tanks and carrier dry docks.

[brisd]

I don't consider Midway a case of luck. The USN set a trap and the IJN paid dearly. Do I think that the Japanese commanders could have planned and handled their forces better? Certainly! The plan was needlessly complex and their superiority was spread across the Pacific instead of focused on the objective. The historical results are more a factor of tactics than luck, so I guess I am not a fanboy in this instance. Do I think the Zero superior to F4F? Yes in some ways, especially in hands of good pilot that could exploit those advantages. But also the F4F, as most allied planes, was far more rugged and the loss ratios in any PacWar game should reflect that (more damaged F4F's, less kills). I give the designers their chance to make the game before I can comment on it at length but I'm very impressed with scope and challenge of recreating this conflict accuracy and yet make it PLAYABLE.

[mdiehl]

Uh, Ol_Dog, the USN CVs were already at alert status. I offer you, verbatim, USN Battle Order No 1:

U.S.S. ENTERPRISE
At SeaNovember 28, 1941
BATTLE ORDER NUMBER ONE
1. The ENTERPRISE is now operating under war conditions.
2. At any time, day or night, we must be ready for instantaction.
3. Hostile submarines may be encountered.
4. The importance of every officer and man being speciallyalert and vigilant while on watch at his battle stationmust be fully realized by all hands.
5. The failure of one man to carry out his assigned taskpromptly, particularly the lookouts, those manning thebatteries, and all those on watch on the deck, mightresult in great loss of life and even loss of the ship.
6. The Captain is confident all hands will prove equal toany emergency that may develop.
7. It is part of the tradition of our Navy that, when putto the test, all hands keep cool, keep their heads, andFIGHT.
8. Steady nerves and stout hearts are needed now.
G. D. MURRAY,Captain, U.S. NavyCommanding
Approved: November 28, 1941.W. F. HALSEY,Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy,Commander Aircraft, Battle Force

Battle Order No. 2 (emphasis mine):

U.S.S. ENTERPRISE (CV6)
CV6/A16-3(11-Kz) At Sea,
November 28, 1941.

BATTLE ORDER NUMBER TWO - 41

Subject: Supervisor - Instructions for.

The Supervisor of the Watch will see that the following provisions for action against hostile craft are carried out whenever conditions warrant: Current developments have changed the "challenging" situation to some extent, in that we are now on a war basis and must be ready to open fire without hesitation should suspicious contacts be made.

Carrier doctrine - for exercise or for war - still requires use of evasive tactics in all cases of possible hostile contact. ENTERPRISE must not disclose its presence by challenging or opening fire unless we are obviously being sighted or will soon be sighted. Fire emergency identification signal if ENTERPRISE comes under fire or appears in danger of being fired upon and immediately thereafter open fire if the correct answer to challenge is not properly made.

If a submarine is encountered at close range immediately turn toward or away, depending on whether she is forward or aft of the beam. Open fire, and if turning toward, attempt to ram the submarine, unless she makes the proper recognition signal. In that case give submarine as wide a berth as possible and have plane guard check on identity.
At night, if the plane guard fails to challenge when a contact with any unknown vessel, other than a submarine, is made, ENTERPRISE shall challenge immediately and open fire without delay, unless proper identification is made by the stranger.

Until the return of ENTERPRISE to port, the Supervisor, as direct representative of the Captain, will consider all submarine contacts to be hostile vessels and will take immediate necessary action to avoid attack and will order fire to be opened when deemed necessary, without waiting for the Captain's arrival on the bridge.

Fire against aircraft, or vessels other than submarines, will not be opened without reference to the Captain, except when it is evident that an actual attack on ENTERPRISE is being made.
(Signed) G. D. MURRAY
Captain, U.S. Navy,
Commanding.
APPROVED, November 28, 1941.
(Signed) W. F. Halsey
Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy,
Commander Aircraft, Battle Force.

Memorandum of the state of the ship:

MEMORANDUM FOR: SUPERVISORS and DECK WATCH OFFICERS.

Subject: Current information.

AIRCRAFT:
Readiness:

Normal Condition of Readiness of the Air Department is Flight Quarters or Condition III.
4 VF planes in Condition II daylight to sunset.
1 VB plane in Condition II with 2 depth charges loaded.
All VF, VB, VS, and VT planes on board are loaded to capacity with free and fixed gun ammunition.
Bombs are in ready condition in the magazines.
Torpedoes with war heads in ready condition in torpedo storage.
Every plane leaving the ship will carry 3 message droppers.

Plane sighting submarine will:
Zoom it.
Drop float light
Open fire with machine guns
Report position by radio ONLY in case it is evident no surface vessel's attention has been attracted.

BATTERY:
Readiness: - Fire Control is in Condition of Readiness III, with ready ammunition at the guns as follows:

50 rounds per 5" gun
20 clips - 160 rounds per barrel - 1.1" guns.
1000 rounds per barrel .50 caliber machine guns.

RADIO:
Ship and aircraft will observe strict radio silence except for contacts. Merchantmen will be reported by aircraft message drops.

A watch-in-3, Officer Watch, is being maintained in Radar Plot and the Radar instrument being continuously manned and operated, at prescribed intervals, day and night.

SHIP CONTROL
Condition of Readiness III.
At least once each watch all lookouts will be inspected to ascertain that men are familiar with sectors to be covered and clearly understand that they will not abandon search of their own sector when contacts have been reported in another sector.

Control Officers will have their attention brought to the necessity of ascertaining that all battery officers understand their assigned sectors and are familiar with the location of own ships within those sectors.

The Officer of the Deck will maintain current familiarity with challenge and recognition signals and require necessary changes to be made at times specified.

The Supervisor, Officer of the Deck and Junior Officer of the Deck will keep themselves currently informed of the disposition and the location of ships therein.

FLOATING OBJECTS
All floating objects whose character is in anyway uncertain should be avoided. Mines may be secured to dummy periscopes, water-logged boats, or to wreckage or to other objects or they may be tethered in pairs to floating objects.
(Signed) T. P. JETER
Commander, U.S. Navy,
Executive Officer.
CC: OOD Order Book
All Officers

Excerpt from a conversation after the issuance of Battle Order No. 1.

The consternation of the men and officers was considerable. Commander William Buckner, Halsey's Operations Officer, confronted Halsey immediately after the briefing: "Goddammit, Admiral, you can't start a private war of your own!" "I'll take [responsibility]. If anything gets in the way, we'll shoot first and argue afterwards," replied Halsey.

[Mr.Frag]

I'll take [responsibility]. If anything gets in the way, we'll shoot first and argue afterwards," replied Halsey.

I love the way the history boys adjust the wording to not offend anyone [:D]

[Ol_Dog]

I did not say the carriers could not fight.

It was after 8:00 when Air Raid Pearl Harbor was broadcast. No one knew where the IJN carriers were at that time. If two CVs were 100 miles West of Pearl (300 miles from IJN), they could not find the JAPANESE in less than 1 hour and it would be another hour before they could attack.

[Mr.Frag]

Not really sure it would have made a major difference overall. Had the CV's been there, they would have been the targets instead of a bunch of obsolete rust buckets that we call BB's.

The USA would have gotten off a couple of strikes against KB (for sure) and probably lost a CV or two for a CV or two in exchange. Basically, Coral Sea would have not happened because it had already happened at PH in all likelihood.

If the USA had been really lucky with their strikes, perhaps Midway would have been averted because Japan would have still been licking up their wounds.

It's almost a good thing when you think it through. Had PH gone differently, a lot of Japan's mistakes may not have been made with the resultant position of Japan actually being better 7 months later.

[Sabre21]

Hi Midiehl

I would have to say that moving 50 or even 100+ pilots to a new operating area would not cause those crews to be down for a week. If the receiving base did not have adequate ground crers already..they would also be flown in by transport as would the initial deployment package of parts and immediate supplies.

To fly from PI to say the Mariannas shouldn't take more than 3-5 hours in the aircraft of that time. The distance is but around 500 miles from the northern PI area. That amount of time is really not much at all. I have flown missions up to 14 hours and those were tactical in nature..not ferry..and was up the next day flying again.

Considering the Japanese had the islands in their possesion for quite some time would give them the chance to stockpile provisions and many of the veteran pilots would have been assigned there at one time or another. So even if the majority of the pilots that flew in were new to the area..many of the old hands would help them get acquainted rather quickly.

Considering it was war time...contingency plans would be in place to move squadrons as needed to threatened areas quickly. Once the alert came down..if it was early enough in the day..the first squadrons would be off the ground in a matter of hours and be on station and available the very next day. Fighter squadrons leaving the following day could in fact refuel/rearm and be up ready to defend the place in a short time. Bombing and torpedo squadrons may need a bit more time to react..but at the very worse would be available the next day. Even in peacetime..we could deploy several thousand miles in a day and begin operations the very next day. Deploying 500 miles is a piece of cake:)

Sabre21

[Ol_Dog]

I am not much for alternate history, although I did like Kirk Douglas, Martin Sheen and the Nimitz at Pearl Harbor.

However, if the CVs had been ANCHORED at Pearl Harbor 7 Dec 1941, then there would have been no strike back at the Japanese carriers. They could not lauch planes from the carriers, and the ones flown to Ford Island would have been destroyed like all the other Army and Navy planes on the ground. We would have lost any carriers there since they were a prime target, and maybe saved a few old BBs.

[Mr.Frag]

Ah, anchored ... yup, agreed.

I was thinking of in the area and close enough to respond to the strike.

[jnier]

ORIGINAL: mdiehl

The Japanese aces did score that many kills.

Nope. The problem is that the number is based on "claims" then subsequently revised downward by Japanese review as "confirmed kills." When you look at the unit records for the units against which Japanese "confirmed kills" occurred, you still find Japanese kills overestimated by anything from a factor of two to an order of magnitude.

Interesting...do you have a source that actually lays out the evidence that kills are overestimated by 2X to 10X?

[Sabre21]

More to add on the alternate history. Had the US carriers been in Pearl at the time of the attack..they no doubt would have been sunk and at the very best been out of action for 6 months or more.

It was very fortunate that the 2 carriers were at sea at that time. But even had a 3rd strike against pearl been launched..and if the one US carrier enroute to Midway been successful in finding the Japanese, it is highly unlikely that a single carrier could have caused much concern to a 6 carrier task force and would have most likely itself been sunk. it is highly unlikly that both the Lexington and Enterprise could have linked up to form a task force in time. Halsey was just to rash to wait on Fletcher and the latter was just to conservative. My opinion on Fletcher is that he should have been relieved after the battle of the Coral Sea...but that's a different issue.

If I was in Nagumo's place (hindsight of course), I would have launched a 3rd strike. I would have readied the 2nd strike in an anti-shipping role upon it's return and would have had all my escort seaplanes out on search patterns once I received word that the carriers were not at pearl. Once the 3rd strike returned I would have equipped them too in an anti-shipping role and begin my egress back west.

Sabre21

[jnier]

ORIGINAL: mdiehl

Does it make me an Japanese fanboy to think that they could have done even better than historically?

You might be a Japanese fanboy if, for example, you think that "Midway was a result of luck."

All military operations (and just about everything in life, for that matter) involves an element of luck. There are always unforseeable events that can effect an outcome. When those unforseeable events are in your favor - then we call it "good luck," when those events are not in your favor we call it "bad luck." Sometimes luck has little or no impact, sometimes it has a great impact. Weather (at least before accurate forecasting) is probably the best example of how "luck" has profoundly influenced military outcomes.

Midway is perhaps not the best example - but it is obvious that, at the very least, the USN was not "unlucky" on that day - things went largely according to plan and often times they do not, often times because of bad "luck." (Again - luck being the effect of influences that cannot be realistically forseen in advance).

Imagine if both sides lined up and fought Midway 100 times? Would it turn out the same way every time? Of course not - because of luck. And that's one of the great things that even the simplest wargames model - that's why we have dice. [:)]

[Sabre21]

There was plenty of luck on the US part at Midway. Yes..we laid a trap for the Japanese..but we still had to destroy their carriers and stop the invasion of Midway.

It was bad luck on the Japanese part that the one seaplane that had spotted the US had radio problems...it was good luck on the overall US part that the Devestator torpedo squadrons arrived first on the scene with little to no fighter escort..although bad luck on their part. It was bad luck for the Japanese that most of the fighter cap got involved in chasing down the torpedo planes. It was good luck on the US part that at the moment of the devestators demise..two dive bomber squadrons from two seperate task forces arrived nearly at the same time over the top of the Japanese. It was bad luck on the Japanese that they had just begun launching their own strike and had left munitions lying all over the place at the when the Dauntless's arrived overhead. It was bad luck..although not critical at the time, that the Hornet dive bomber squadron couldn't find the Japanese and were forced to divert to Midway.

So there was plenty of luck to go around that day.

Sabre21

[mdiehl]

Interesting...do you have a source that actually lays out the evidence that kills are overestimated by 2X to 10X?

I have yet to find any source that actually looks at unit loss records that DOES NOT lay out that evidence. Indeed, all "confirmed" kill estimates by all powers written at the time of combats or within a few years of the war tended (IMO, judgmentive estimate based on numerous sources) to overestimate enemy a/c casualties by 3:1. As an example, in late 1942 Jimmy Thach was able to assert that the USN could essentially "do much better" than the 3:1 kill ratio (3 IJN fighters shot down per USN fighter) assessed by the USN at the time (in reality, the ratio was about 1.5:1 favoring the USN).

Over a campaign, the best sources for the interval in 1942 are Lundstrom's "The First Team" duo, since it is the one that lays out in most meticulous detail the individual combats.

It was bad luck on the Japanese part that the one seaplane that had spotted the US had radio problems...it was good luck on the overall US part that the Devestator torpedo squadrons arrived first on the scene with little to no fighter escort..although bad luck on their part. It was bad luck for the Japanese that most of the fighter cap got involved in chasing down the torpedo planes. It was good luck on the US part that at the moment of the devestators demise..two dive bomber squadrons from two seperate task forces arrived nearly at the same time over the top of the Japanese. It was bad luck on the Japanese that they had just begun launching their own strike and had left munitions lying all over the place at the when the Dauntless's arrived overhead. It was bad luck..although not critical at the time, that the Hornet dive bomber squadron couldn't find the Japanese and were forced to divert to Midway.

All incorrect. Difficulties with Japanese radios were par for the course in 1942. Not just at Midway but also at Coral Sea and during the Guadalcanal campaign. Sakai had his removed because it was not worth its weight, even as a device for communicating with his wingmates. Radio problems were a symptom of a general systemic contempt among the Japanese armed forces for 'gadgetry' that was not directly related to killing. Sakai was actually dressed down for suggesting in 1942 that they needed better radios, since radios had nothing to do with killing the enemy.

The TBD early arrival was a disaster for the USN. Had they arrived as a coordinated strike with the SBDs and F4Fs, the battle plan, most of the TBDs would have survived, and Japan would still have lost three CVs in the initial strike. To be sure, the USN F4Fs would have suffered higher attrition at the hands of the Zeroes, but there is no evidence to suggest that the US strikes would have been adversely affected by coordination.

It was not bad luck that the Japanese had just begun launching their follow up waves when the USN strikes started to arrive. That event was deliberately planned and caused by Capt Brown, adjunct to Spruance, on Enterprise (IIRC); the USN strikes were deliberately timed to catch the IJN CVs in their most vulnerable moment of launching or recovering aircraft.

If Midway were fought 1000 times, it would turn out more or less the same for the US or even better for the US 999 times. The fundamental problem was, from the outset, that Japan's CVs were mission-overtasked with simultaneous mandates to (1) suppress/eliminate Midway atoll as a operational base, (2) maintain CAP, (3) attack enemy CVs that were not supposed to be there in the first place. The fact that this problem was pointed out prior to the battle by Japanese operational planners and never resolved points out how willfully Nagumo and the operational planners simply wished to disbelieve in the known realities of carrier ops in 1942.

Sure, there was a small amount of luck. And, IMO, it could have broken out much more favorably for the US. I see no solution to the problem of mission creep/ mission incompatibility that faced the IJN strike force at Midway. "Better luck" does not factor into the equation.

It was very fortunate that the 2 carriers were at sea at that time. But even had a 3rd strike against pearl been launched..and if the one US carrier enroute to Midway been successful in finding the Japanese, it is highly unlikely that a single carrier could have caused much concern to a 6 carrier task force and would have most likely itself been sunk.

Incorrect. Consider that the IJN at Midway lost 2 CVs to Yorktown in the initial strike. Had Enterprise launched a surprise airstrike on 7 December it is completely plausible that Japan would have lost two or three CVs without ever locating Enterprise. Frankly, I'd trade Enterprise for 2 Kido Butai CVs on 7 December any day. It means that the force ratios in subsequent engagements are going to be more favorable for the USN.

[mdiehl]

As to the other point about re-imagining Pearl Harbor. The point is, if your imagination is so limited that as plausible "alt history" you find it easy to imagine 2 USN CVs at PH on 7 December, but can't fathom 2 USN CVs on Kido Butai's flank on 7 December (the Wake and Johnson relief operations are, for example, conducted 1 week earlier than historically.. or 1 week later), your imagination already starts out with a decidedly pro-Japanese slant in imagining alternative outcomes.

[Rendova]

Hartmann's records are genrally accepted as being correct, Although he had alot (all?) on the Eastern Front, which, was where the USSR was operating the a REALLY bad airforce and the Germans cut them to peices, not taking anything away from Hartmann I am sure he was a excellent pilot, but on the east front he had some a whole lot of bad planes flow by a whole lot of bad pilots. Another thing to remember is that all US pilots only served a set tour of duty, and were then rotated back to the US. Richard Bong was actually a test pilot back in the US when he was killed in an accident. Also US pilots flew less missions per pilot then did Japan or Germany (ie a P-51 Pilot would fly one escort mission for B-17's and a German Pilot would fly 2-3 missions agaisnt that same raid). Plus the US was active in the war for a much shorter period of time (if I remeber right Hartmann had most of his kills by the time the US got into the war). This is not to take away from the other countries' aces, just trying to explain why US scores are lower.

PS one more point. The US I believe had stricter standards for crediting kills which led to more "probables" and less "confirmed"

[Rendova]

Frankly, I'd trade Enterprise for 2 Kido Butai CVs on 7 December any day. It means that the force ratios in subsequent engagements are going to be more favorable for the USN.

I doubt the crew of the Enterprise would agree with you there!

[jnier]

If Midway were fought 1000 times, it would turn out more or less the same for the US or even better for the US 999 times. The fundamental problem was, from the outset, that Japan's CVs were mission-overtasked with simultaneous mandates to (1) suppress/eliminate Midway atoll as a operational base, (2) maintain CAP, (3) attack enemy CVs that were not supposed to be there in the first place. The fact that this problem was pointed out prior to the battle by Japanese operational planners and never resolved points out how willfully Nagumo and the operational planners simply wished to disbelieve in the known realities of carrier ops in 1942.

You're certainly right that the "average" outcome would be an American victory for reasons that you cite. But you're completely out to lunch if you think that you can be so sure of the oucome (or any outcome for that matter). Chance plays a large role in all outcomes in life (more than .1%) and Midway is no exception.

[Mr.Frag]

One wonders how Midway would have turned out if as little as a single key search plane had been shot down ...