Brave Sir Robin

[Mike Scholl]

ORIGINAL: treespider
Still trying to sell us on RHS...

It has a lot of good ideas...

[bradfordkay]

I'm going to say that I think we are lumping two different types of defense under the "Sir Robin" moniker in this thread.

A true Sir Robin defense would be pulling all units out of the PI, DEI and Malaya as fast as you possibly can (realizing that PP limits will prevent most of this).

I cannot call a defense where an allied player decides to concentrate his forces within those regions a Sir Robin. The idea that the dutch troops would refuse to leave Benkolen to, say, bolster the defenses at Batavia is ridiculous, IMO. In wartime soldiers will go where they are ordered to go.

I would not play in any game where the house rules prevent any relocation of SRA defenses. The allies certainly cannot defend everywhere, so a smart defender will try to at least make certain locations more difficult to capture.

These are the house rules on this subject that Chez and I worked out:
4. Allied player may not evacuate USAFFE/ABDA forces units until either Clark or Manila have fallen for USAFFE forces, or an invasion south of Luzon/northeast coast of Borneo/Celebes Sea and until either Soerabaja or Batavia have fallen for ABDA forces. This does not prevent redeployment of Dutch forces within the NEI.

[ChezDaJez]

IMO I think it is more a state of mind...an unwillingness (so to speak) of the Allies to try and engage the Japanese during 1942.

And I think that is a large part of it.

When I think of the "Sir Robin" defense, I think of the wholesale evacuation of land forces from areas that I have yet to attack. I sometimes see this happen with Dutch forces from Java before I even set foot there. That simply would not have been politically possible.

As a Japanese player exclusively, I don't mind the Sir Robin tactic because it does make my job easier. But I also dislike it because it forces me to make a choice... that is to either let it happen or attempt to interdict the sea-borne retreat of troops from the DEI and Philippines. If I choose to interdict, then I must play ahistorically and race to capture airfields such as Kendari before the allied player can withdraw large numbers of troops from Java or the PI.

Now as far as allied air and naval forces go, these are mobile units and the allies IRL did their best to save as many as possible. Withdrawing them to safer locations that still allowed them to strike is not a Sir Robin. To me, that is a fighting retreat and very prudent. To withdraw large numbers of troops, on the other hand, simply wasn't possible due to both military and political reasons.

Now I don't call it Sir Robin if the allies attempt to remove troops from areas that are under attack and the area is about to fall. For example, if I hold most of Java with the exception of a couple of bases, I don't expect my opponent to make a last stand unless trapped. However, if he begins withdrawing Dutch troops the moment my APs showed up off of Batavia, then I would find that to be a classic "Sir Robin" and very unrealistic.

Now, having said all that, I don't care if an allied player conducts a Sir Robin or conducts a fighting retreat. He has to decide his strategy and mine will be based, in part, upon what his defensive posture is.

Chez

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: rtrapasso

I think it is wrong to evacuate Malaya - when IRL troops and supplies and air units went TO Malaya. You cannot expect to hold it 100 days if you make it weaker. Nor should you want to lose it fast.

i see - just because Percival and some others were fools, i should be one as well?

There were many reasons Malaya fell - many of them had to do with idiocy on the part of the high command. The Royal Navy realized that the only real reason to defend Singapore was to support the Naval Base there, and the reason the Naval Base was there was to support the Royal Navy.

Once it was plain that the RN couldn't operate from Singapore, the plan to keep putting troops into the area was more than foolish - it seriously jeopardized the defense of the rest of the region - and was shown when Burma collapsed, barely allowing some more crucial troops to escape. Had those troops been lost, the fight might have allowed the Japanese to push into India and caused a revolt (i am only now just learning the British did face some revolts of troops as it was - one helping to cause the fall of Christmas Island.)

i don't seriously think Japan could have conquered India, but a revolt would have seriously damaged the Allied cause.

I do agree with you that Percival was a fool - and I hardly count any of us in his league.

But you have missed a big point here: Percival did NOT decide to defend Malaya - he was ORDERED to do so - and failing to try would have been a court martial offense. It was a strategic military and political decision made in London to defend the place. And the REASONS for that remain valid - even if one does not defend it the same way. I think it IS foolish to evacuate Malaya without a fight - and while none of us is likely to send as much as was sent - particularly as late as some of it was send - that doesn't change that it is foolish to send nothing at all.

You are correct about India. It was a big deal, surpressed in histories not written in India - and involved 160 battalions in occupation as it was. But you oversimplify about Malaya. It is a barrier to passage of convoys to Burma, India, the Andaman Islands, Ceylon and Sumatra. It is a useful place to cause attrition even if you are going to lose it. Wether a unit is sent there, withdrawn from there, or moved around there should be determined by operational considerations - not a hard and fast strategic principle "defending Malaya is wrong". I contend that it is necessary for a significant delay of the Japanese. I don't consider myself BETTER than Percival UNTIL AFTER I hold Malaya LONGER than the 100 days he did. I also gage my success based on how much is lost on both sides - I try to get more out - and I try to hurt them more - than he did. But I don't start with the assumption the command does not need assets to play with. I DO start with the assumption it needs a commander with better ratings.

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: rtrapasso

ORIGINAL: el cid again

ORIGINAL: rtrapasso


Well, a few hundred thousand tons is not going to make up for 4 million tons... and the Japanese were no longer getting many of the crucial materials (so they tried submarine freighters to France and Germany for some really critical stuff).

What they seemed to have done was run stuff non-stop, wearing out ships... of course, a lot of them ended up getting sunk anyways...

No - running 5 per cent of the route makes up for a LOT MORE than four million tons.

The Japanese were not short of resources. The exceptions are trivial: there is no helium outside the USA. The biggest resource problem for Japan in a strategic sense was a paucity of known sources of urnanium in Asia (which made them consider going to Shinkolobwe to get it - the US did actually do that in 1942). They were able to get vital atomic materials like Beryllium from German - also Zircon (an alloy used in fuel element cladding used to this day - invented in Germany - but no one admits Germany had such things in WWII - you must read MAGIC intercepts to find out). Japan WAS short of machine tools - and that was never solved. It DID import technical plans and weapons prototypes. It EXPORTED resources (tin, quinine, raw rubber and gold ) to Germany.

First of all, the run from Japan to the DEI is a lot longer than 5% of the distance to the US (Japan's major source of import before the war).

REPLY: What about the run from Korea or Port Arthur? What about runs to Europe or South America or Africa? The longer the run the less productive a ship is in terms of tons delivered per day. I used 5 per cent as an average figure - and I did NOT mean to imply a run to NEI vs a run to USA at all. A run from Luzon to Formosa is technically a run from SRA to Japan too - and that is shorter than from the big ports of North Korea to Japan. There are lots of ways to run ships - and only the average statistic matters for this discussion. Japan withdrew ALL its ships - worldwide - and tried to put NONE on runs even as long at the USA one - which is shorter than almost all the others. NEI is just about the longest run needed - comparing the longest run with the shortest is not really fair. Even so - if that were the typical example - it would save mroe than 4 million tons.

From what i've read of the Japanese economy, they were short of more than a few strategic minerals including aluminum, forcing them eventually to try using steel, wood, etc. for airplane manufacturing.

REPLY: In a fundamental sense, all wartime powers were short of Aluminum. But where could Japan get Aluminum (bauxite) to import? [Answer: the only significant point not in hand would be New Caledonia] FYI the most critical strategic material for Japan and the USA after petroleum was steel: steel is not limited by shipping but by plant capacity. Steel has many uses - but one bit can only be used for one thing. So you get a battleship or 150 DEs or 1500 tanks or 150,000 machine guns - but ony ONE of them in the trade off decision. The capacity cannot be changed rapidly - mostly you are going to get the same amount at best month after month - and it is not really related to ships until you lose so many you cannot mimport enough iron ore or coking coal. More ships would not give Japan any more aluminum at all.

Yes - they exported some stuff to Germany (a pittance - was it even 1 million tons during the course of the war?) in trade for some crucially needed stuff. As pointed out they imported 21 million tons of material in the first 2 years of the war.
[/quote]

I don't know what you are talking about? In just 42 materials, Japan imported vastly more than that each year. 60 per cent by weight of imports were coal. Nothing like 21 million tons came from Europe - unless Stalin did a lot more trade than I know about. [Both ROC China and the USSR sold a LOT of stuff - mostly resources - to Japan during the war. It was a marriage of convenience, and there were sound reasons for most of it. For that matter - WE traded with Germany to an extent not usually admitted - and for similar reasons. But very little went by ocean shipping - unless you count a trip across the Sea of Japan.]

[treespider]

I'm thinking of historical actions that we do not see in games with a Sir Robin feel:

- The sortie of Force Z
- The reinforcement of Singapore and Java
- The various naval engagements in and around Java, such as:
-- The Battle of Badung Straight
-- The Battle of Java Sea
-- The Battle of Sunda Straight

IMO part of the reason for the lack of these actions in the game is the Betty/Nell torpedo menace and the feeling of impotence the Allied player has when facing them. In other words - why bother to stick around and fight when there is little to no chance of inflicting any damage on the Japanese. Hopefully AE will successfully change the nature of the Betty/Nell by limiting the torpedo menace.

ORIGINAL: ChezDaJez

IMO I think it is more a state of mind...an unwillingness (so to speak) of the Allies to try and engage the Japanese during 1942.

And I think that is a large part of it.

When I think of the "Sir Robin" defense, I think of the wholesale evacuation of land forces from areas that I have yet to attack. I sometimes see this happen with Dutch forces from Java before I even set foot there. That simply would not have been politically possible.

As a Japanese player exclusively, I don't mind the Sir Robin tactic because it does make my job easier. But I also dislike it because it forces me to make a choice... that is to either let it happen or attempt to interdict the sea-borne retreat of troops from the DEI and Philippines. If I choose to interdict, then I must play ahistorically and race to capture airfields such as Kendari before the allied player can withdraw large numbers of troops from Java or the PI.

Now as far as allied air and naval forces go, these are mobile units and the allies IRL did their best to save as many as possible. Withdrawing them to safer locations that still allowed them to strike is not a Sir Robin. To me, that is a fighting retreat and very prudent. To withdraw large numbers of troops, on the other hand, simply wasn't possible due to both military and political reasons.

Now I don't call it Sir Robin if the allies attempt to remove troops from areas that are under attack and the area is about to fall. For example, if I hold most of Java with the exception of a couple of bases, I don't expect my opponent to make a last stand unless trapped. However, if he begins withdrawing Dutch troops the moment my APs showed up off of Batavia, then I would find that to be a classic "Sir Robin" and very unrealistic.

Now, having said all that, I don't care if an allied player conducts a Sir Robin or conducts a fighting retreat. He has to decide his strategy and mine will be based, in part, upon what his defensive posture is.

Chez

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: vettim89

Some ravings form another Madman.

1. I think the Japanese shipping/Industry issues relate to lack of slots more than anything else. If the resource needs were realistic then there wouldn't be enough shipping. Ergo it is fudged and is that so bad. The Japanese have to move less stuff but have less ships to do it. This seems to be a compromise

REPLY: the first effort to get this right was in RHS - which is logistically oriented. It is hard for both sides - ships have jobs now. You can do anything you want - but doing it means you are not moving a different cargo a different place - and that has operational consequences. I love it.

2. I think we need to define terms better. What really is Sir Robin. The cultural reference is to a coward - the Monty Python character wet himself and ran away when he was challenged. So when people use the term Sir Robin it has a negative if not derogatory connotation. So what EXACTLY does Sir Robin mean?

REPLY: Never watch Python. But Sir Robin is a general retirement of land units without attempting to contest Japanese landings or advances. It may involve moving things to another territory - but doing so en mass is not practical unless (like Burma) you can walk out. Only in RHS (and only in EOS family or PPO in older formats) can you transfer a lot by changing pp. Failure to defend is a grave strategic and operational error - and if anyone truly believes otherwise - I ask him to put up - to show me: I bet dollars to donuts that he will change his mind when I get done demonstrating that active defense is powerful. Sir Robin is causing the standard Japanese invasion to come in unopposed - the same for the standard Japanese advance - nothing but static units in his way - except perhaps at Singapore and Bataan or Manila or Soerabaja.

3. If the objection is to a tactic then there is no basis for argument unless you and your opponent agree beforehand that ahistorical tactics are to be avoided. But be careful. The original US/Filipino plan was to move as much supplies into Bataan as possible and then slowly withdraw there for a final stand or releif to come. The problem is that the Japanese advanced so fast that they were not able to accomplish the plan. So technically at least as far as the PI is concerned is Sir Robinning to Bataan is actually historically correct. Point being that one man's "gamey tactic" may just be a viable solution to the historical problem.

REPLY: WHICH "original plan?" While HISTORICAL plans were to withdraw to Bataan - Mac canceleld those - and stopped stockpiling years before the war. HIS plan was to defend forward - everywhere - modified to Everywhere on Luzon and the most valuable other points when the war came too soon. He CHANGED the plan again - back to withdraw to Bataan - when he learned the Japanese could not be stopped in the open. It is a bad idea - 100 per cent of US troops got both malaria and dengue fever - as they must in such country. They also starved. Far wiser would be to defend the temperate Ilocos Norte highlands - rugged mountains - rice terraces - valuable mines. The Japanese might NEVER have taken the area - and Yamashita demonstrated that so well we decided not to fight him out. As for agreement - if you play RHS you should be playing in the context of a broad general house rule NEVER to do something a historical commander would not attempt. A full Sir Robin is not possible IRL - so not in the context of honoring the rule. My motto is "power to the players" and I think anything reasonable should be allowed. Physically impossible and politically impossible are the ONLY exceptions in my book. I like a self generated penalty - and Sir Robin falls into that - you can cheat and do it - but the game will reward the other side if you do. I seek mainly to cultivate understanding that it is a bad idea - not to forbid it per se. On the other hand, it is so ineffective I don't think I want to play anyone who would do it - I am playing more than one who is - and it is not very helpful in testing the limits of the Japanese.

4. If the objection is to the game engine allowing players to do something that many feel it shouldn't, exactly what is it that it allows? Most gamey techniques can be solved by a simple House Rule. For instance in my game with Greasylake, I agreed to not remove Dutch and Phillipine units from their native territories. As a return favor, he agreed to allow me to tranfer Canadian units to unrestricted commands if he invades Oz or NZ.

I don't advocate denial of moving ALL NEI or Philippine units - this really happened. I advocate more sophisticated play. New Zealand militia will never leave the country for example. But if Philippine Scouts might go anywhere (they are US Army, not Philippine Army - and I use PA to tell you who Philippine Army is) - Philippine Army would not even be wanted to go. Malay States local units should not be used to fight in some other part of the world either. I prefer to use common sense to rules. But it DOES require reason to work. I am amazed that common sense permits leaving every point on Luzon undefended (except the static unit at Bataan and Manila). But apparently for some it does.

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: rtrapasso

ORIGINAL: vettim89

Some ravings form another Madman.

1. I think the Japanese shipping/Industry issues relate to lack of slots more than anything else. If the resource needs were realistic then there wouldn't be enough shipping. Ergo it is fudged and is that so bad. The Japanese have to move less stuff but have less ships to do it. This seems to be a compromise

AFAIK, there aren't that many SHIPS left out of the IJ OOB and merchant fleet unless you start to go under 500 tons. There was some CD Database put out a few years ago that listed thousands of "ships" down to 50 tons that were controlled by Japan... most of them were strictly limited to coastal or even harbor duties, but it got a lot of people drooling. They are (sort of) represented in the game by barges (but seemed to be ignored by some folks). Some ships are "idealized" - i.e. there is a rule in the game about supplies passing between 2 ports on opposite sides of a straight. Troops can capture ports on another island without shipping ("autocapture").

REPLY: I have added hundreds of ships over 500 tons to both sides. There are whole series of military ships missing even in CHS. But on the other hand, I deliberately do not use about half the AKs - and the SLOCs require some shipping be off the map - the portion depends on the route. So the Allies have some ships serving - say - the South Atlantic - in RHS before Level 7 - you only get them in Level 7 (when you then must decide the routings).

There are numerous Allied ships of >7000 tons missing (i tried looking up my Dad's ship and its sisters - about 1/3 of them are missing.) How many Japanese ships of over 7000 tons are missing?

REPLY: Ships are horribly researched. Thousands of ships are listed that are not even PTO. ONLY the USN LSTs are carefully done - and I am sure there still are errors. Thanks to the work of AKWARRIOR mostly we got them right. I have corrected hundreds - but never looked at most of them I am sure. When someone spots an error - we add/delete/modify it as appropriate. Even so - for technical reasons - we have to leave about half the AKs out- they are represented by the other half.



The US and other ARMY also ran a lot of ships (i.e. "Mineplanter" (minelayer) ship(s) in the PI which don't show up in Vanilla nor CHS, AFAIK). Trying to find any information on any of these ships is problematic. Try looking up ships run by the New Zealand Army, for instance - it's really a pain! The Japanese Army also tried running ships (but they seem to be in the CHS mod, at least).

REPLY: The US Army operated substantially in excess of 80,000 vessels (more than any other entity in the world - USN operated over 60,000) -
but most are small. Mine planters cannot be in the game - Matrix refused to do mines right - planters take LONG PERIODS to plant carefully laid defensive minefields. They are abstractly represented by those minefields at ports when the game begins - took years to get them. In RHS we DID give you whole units of Army craft when appropriate - including the only case of US Army commissioned ROYAL Navy craft in history - in Burma.

There were also lot of specialized ships run by the Allies that never appear in the game (some played crucial roles in the war, such as aircraft transport ships that moved planes intact, ready to go when unloaded... one of these played a crucial role getting planes to Midway).

REPLY: Air craft transports are well enough done - with AKs and with CVEs and AVs all able to move them. We are going to get more of this sort of thing in future I believe.

However, getting back to the shipping issues between various mods:

A lot of the shipping problems stem from very basic questions - i.e. - what is a ton? It has NUMEROUS definitions, and not all of them relate to weight... shipping tonnage is actually volume. The numbers involved in WITP are weight (from what i can figure out.) Then of course, there is the confusion from different types of tonnage (several kinds, and it is not always clear trying to determine what is listed in the stats).

When you start to mix apples and oranges like this, all kinds of confusion results. This resulted in drastic decrease in the amount of cargo a ship could haul in some mods.

REPLY: You are correct here. For logistic purposes a "ton" is probably 100 cubic feet of cargo. Only some cargos weigh a ton - and most of those are absent. The main cargo is coal - everything else combined only amounts to half the amount of coal moved (at least by Japan - and it won't be much different for other countries). Then there are complications like deck cargo: this may mean a ship carries MORE than its rating. These matters were carefully looked at for RHS - and in many cases ship cargos were indeed reduced. Also we found ranges were often excessive and fuel often understated. I called ships in WITP "practically nuclear powered" - they could go farther and faster than IRL on less fuel. Typical stock errors were hundreds of per cent - sometimes thosands of per cent. That may have created erronious ideas about how easy it is to move things.

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: treespider

ORIGINAL: el cid again

Until RHS no effort was made to look at the numbers. We found that the RATIO of oil and resources consumed was structurally wrong - that it is impossible to consume enough resources using the WITP model. [Because of manpower centers we can get closer] We found we could only account for about HALF the tonnage - so we REMOVED the other half - entirely - and shipping to correspond to that. In RHS Japan has to worry a lot about moving resources and oil - and then fuel and supplies. The Allies do too - although they don't really need HI points - the resources and oil make supplies and fuel they DO need - and the distances are so vast they better use ships to move them - or they will not have much to fight with. No more "AKs to burn" (quoting Joe Wilkerson) in RHS.

Still trying to sell us on RHS...

I didn't think that was necessary. I didn't even want to do RHS - in the beginning I wanted to make changes to CHS - but the scale of the changes required was too big for the "plank holders". I think what RHS did logistically SHOULD HAVE BEEN in STOCK - I see no sense in NOT doing logistics right to begin with.

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: bradfordkay

I'm going to say that I think we are lumping two different types of defense under the "Sir Robin" moniker in this thread.

A true Sir Robin defense would be pulling all units out of the PI, DEI and Malaya as fast as you possibly can (realizing that PP limits will prevent most of this).

I cannot call a defense where an allied player decides to concentrate his forces within those regions a Sir Robin. The idea that the dutch troops would refuse to leave Benkolen to, say, bolster the defenses at Batavia is ridiculous, IMO. In wartime soldiers will go where they are ordered to go.

I would not play in any game where the house rules prevent any relocation of SRA defenses. The allies certainly cannot defend everywhere, so a smart defender will try to at least make certain locations more difficult to capture.

These are the house rules on this subject that Chez and I worked out:
4. Allied player may not evacuate USAFFE/ABDA forces units until either Clark or Manila have fallen for USAFFE forces, or an invasion south of Luzon/northeast coast of Borneo/Celebes Sea and until either Soerabaja or Batavia have fallen for ABDA forces. This does not prevent redeployment of Dutch forces within the NEI.

Since there is no mod (not even EOS family RHS) that permits ALL units to relocate in the first few days - not enough pp - the idea that Sir Robin means you MUST do what you cannot do makes no sense to me. Clearly it must mean what players can do - and all too often do do. Joe says it is the NORMAL defense - and I begin to suspect he is right - it is what I usually see.

I don't like saying you cannot do this or you must do that. I prefer to leave it up to you. But I object to NO defense at all - to moving EVERY non static unit - to the extent you can - as far as you can - and not attempting anything approximating a real defense of the territory. It won't work - so it is self penalizing - but it is as useful as playing the AI (which DOES move everything to Singapore for example). A game should involve an Allied strategy - not just "the Japanese can go as fast as they can move everywhere they want to try"

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: ChezDaJez

IMO I think it is more a state of mind...an unwillingness (so to speak) of the Allies to try and engage the Japanese during 1942.

And I think that is a large part of it.

When I think of the "Sir Robin" defense, I think of the wholesale evacuation of land forces from areas that I have yet to attack. I sometimes see this happen with Dutch forces from Java before I even set foot there. That simply would not have been politically possible.

As a Japanese player exclusively, I don't mind the Sir Robin tactic because it does make my job easier. But I also dislike it because it forces me to make a choice... that is to either let it happen or attempt to interdict the sea-borne retreat of troops from the DEI and Philippines. If I choose to interdict, then I must play ahistorically and race to capture airfields such as Kendari before the allied player can withdraw large numbers of troops from Java or the PI.

Now as far as allied air and naval forces go, these are mobile units and the allies IRL did their best to save as many as possible. Withdrawing them to safer locations that still allowed them to strike is not a Sir Robin. To me, that is a fighting retreat and very prudent. To withdraw large numbers of troops, on the other hand, simply wasn't possible due to both military and political reasons.

Now I don't call it Sir Robin if the allies attempt to remove troops from areas that are under attack and the area is about to fall. For example, if I hold most of Java with the exception of a couple of bases, I don't expect my opponent to make a last stand unless trapped. However, if he begins withdrawing Dutch troops the moment my APs showed up off of Batavia, then I would find that to be a classic "Sir Robin" and very unrealistic.

Now, having said all that, I don't care if an allied player conducts a Sir Robin or conducts a fighting retreat. He has to decide his strategy and mine will be based, in part, upon what his defensive posture is.

Chez

Perfectly expressed.

Adm Hart DID a Sir Robin with Asiatic Fleet - it was not cought in port - but was dispersed - mostly well South of its peacetime stations on Luzon.

Sir Robin is wholesale evacuation of all or most of a territory BEFORE it is invaded - and it is (would be IRL) "politically impossible". You can move almost any unit you wish. Only a few units would never leave their country - these mainly militiamen - and one MIGHT make a case even for ONE of these AFTER a fight (NOT before). But you should not want to - or feel free to - evacuate everything so there is an average of zero at almost every point (the only exceptions being static units you could not move or the end most point you can get to - e.g. Singapore).

I have one game going with a veteran wargamer. He also knows me well - and both of us are combined arms theorists. In both Malaya and Luzon I have been stopped on two fronts. On Luzon he has retaken 10000 sq miles (four hexes) I once was in - he forced me out of half of it and I left the other half for attrition reasons. I will take both territories - but I won't do so in 1941.

[el cid again]

[quote]ORIGINAL: treespider

I'm thinking of historical actions that we do not see in games with a Sir Robin feel:

- The sortie of Force Z
- The reinforcement of Singapore and Java
- The various naval engagements in and around Java, such as:
-- The Battle of Badung Straight
-- The Battle of Java Sea
-- The Battle of Sunda Straight

IMO part of the reason for the lack of these actions in the game is the Betty/Nell torpedo menace and the feeling of impotence the Allied player has when facing them. In other words - why bother to stick around and fight when there is little to no chance of inflicting any damage on the Japanese. Hopefully AE will successfully change the nature of the Betty/Nell by limiting the torpedo menace.


[quote]

Have you tried RHS? Many air units do NOT have torpedo loadouts even if the plane can do it. Many airfields start so small they won't permit torpedo loading either - unless and until built up.

This was to address such concerns - along with logistical ones - the limited number of torpedoes.

[Anonymous]

[Deleted by Admins]

[Jim D Burns]

I think the best solution to Sir Robin is to throw out fixed commands. Let the allies move units about willy nilly and you will no longer see the perfect 2-1 invasions landing at every critical base in the DEI’s in the opening weeks. This kind of freedom would allow the allied player to oppose a Japanese blitz through the DEI’s semi-effectively and can really put a crimp in the Japanese timetables if he tries a lot of shoestring ops early on.

But as things stand now, moving anything costs a lot of political points. And you simply cannot free up enough force fast enough to successfully reposition enough troops in a forward defense to prevent the Japanese Blitz, so it’s perfectly acceptable to pull out the troops you pay for. Leaving them to die is just a waist of political points.

Now with fixed commands gone, you would then need a game mechanic that disbands a country’s units when all its controlled bases are gone. You can’t tie it to just one or a few bases as that would be exploitable. But if all the Philippine bases fall, then all the Philippine units should disband except for one, which should be immediately placed into the reinforcement track to arrive at half strength in about 90 days in the US West Coast.

This one unit would represent the forces in exile for that country and would only be allowed to draw from the disbanded equipment squads, perhaps after halving the initial pool or something. Regular daily replacement squads should be zeroed out until a Philippine base with manpower is recaptured.

Do this for every country, and the logic for pulling units back to the rear is no longer present in the game and players would fight tooth and nail for every base instead. But without the freedom to seriously interfere with early Japanese moves, Sir Robin should not be messed with as it is really the only option available to the allies other than total annihilation. And Japan is already far too strong in the game, hamstringing the allies even further by removing their ONE strategic option would make no sense.

Jim

[Shark7]

OK guys, gonna give you my take on it.
 
First off, if the AFB wants to pull a Brave Sir Robin on me, I'm not going to complain.  Just don't expect me to sit on Truk with 250k troops and not try to save them in return when the game switches momentum.
 
That being said, there are a few problems with being able to evacuate all the troops.
 
1.  PI --  are you going to stay and try to defend your village or get on a boat with Macarthur to defend Oz?  Some might have left, but not all.
 
2.  Dutch Units -- NEI was a colony.  Soldiers with family back in Europe would have little reason to stay and fight on, however soldiers with families in the NEI would have a reason to fight tenaciously.
 
3.  Singapore -- IRL, the British actually tried to reinforce Fortress Singapore.  However, from a strategic standpoint it makes much more sense to evacuate it.
 
What I would do to fix it is simple.  PI and Dutch units need to have devices of their own in the Database.  These would not be produced and start with a pool for replacements only for a short period of time (to simulate emergency conscriptions for replacements to defend their homelands).  Once the pool was used up, these units would not be able to rebuild, so while you might save them from being over-run, they don't become usefull combat units down the road.  It doesn't prevent Brave Sir Robin, but it also doesn't make risking ships worth it either.
 
The game deviates from history as soon as the Japanese player issues his first order.  This is part of wargaming, to see if you can do better.  However, there does need to be a difference between what is possible and what is plausible. 
 
It would have been very possible for MacArthur to take elements of the Phillipine Army with him, however getting replacements for the Phillipine units with the PI under Japanese occupation is just not plausible.
 
And in fact, the Dutch did evacuate to Australia during the war.  So that is very possible as well.  But once again, with Holland under German Occupation replacements would have been hard to find. 
 
Another way to deal with this is to allow the LCUs to be disbanded into other LCUs similar to air groups being disbanded.  In this way you could get 1 or 2 fully functional PI or Dutch units by withdrawing fragments, but not end up with a dozen fully staffed units as is possible by pulling Brave Sir Robin.
 
This doesn't apply only to AFBs either.  If Manchuria or Thailand were to get over-run (in a mod that includes those units) then the same rules should apply.
 
 

[morganbj]

I say ship 'em out.  Why not?

I see nothing wrong with the Allies trying to save a few cadres of trained officers and NCOs.  If one side is free to shift forces around and an alternate strategy to what happened IRL, then the other should be allowed to do it as well.

I seldom have the ability to get out all that many, due to the demands of other operations, but I do try to pull out enough that I'm not waiting for months and years for sufficient base units to arrive for me to operate enough airbases to house a few more air units.  Feinder is correct; it is not a simulation.  It is a game that abstracts reality into a "few" lines of code.  If the code allows you to let your CVs be sunk so they can be replaced with better and larger versions a few years hence, then it's ok to use that same code to evauate a few cadres.

After all, can't the Japanese player completely change the types of planes produced?  If that's not gamey (and it's not, IMO), then Sir Robin isn't.

[USSAmerica]

ORIGINAL: Big B

From the scenario design forum...

ORIGINAL: vettim89

In truth the problem is really the Land Combat System (BEEP!: thread hijack warning). From the historical info we have the poorly trained. equipped, and often led Commonwealth, Phillipine, RA US, and Dutch troops could not stand up to the Japanese Army that had been fighting in China for the better part of a decade. The RL Allies folded before the oncoming Japanese.This is not to say that there weren't cases where the Allies put up stout defense, just that from a strategic point of view, it was an untenable situation.

The Allies failed to turn back any Japanese advance until August/September 1942 when the Australians repelled the Milne Bay invasion. That was followed by numerous battles on GC eventually leading to vicory. IMO troop quality and experience plus supplies finally came up enough at this point where the Allied armies could and did first resist and then defeat the Japanese.

So if "Sir Robin" means withdrawing unit fragments by sub and other means than ok its a bit gamey. But if "Sir Robin" is really the JFB screaming "Stand still so I can hit you", the RL Allies didn't/couldn't, why should your AFB opponents? If the latter is true then IMHO, the Japanese player needs to invade areas where the Allies have no choice but fight: Oz, India, HI, WCUSA (LOL)

To me what makes this game great is exploring the What If's. If the invasion of Oz/India is the ultimate Japanes What If, isn't the implementation of Sir RObin in whatever form really just another What If? How many of you JFB want to take me up in a game where you agree to not invade Oz, India, HI, New Zealand, New Caledonia, Samoa, or Alaska Proper if I agree to not Sir Robin?

For those who don't venture into the scenario design forum - this discussion has been going on for a couple of days.
Not wishing to infringe on RHS design discussions - I am starting this thread here for any and all input regarding "the Sir Robin" defense.

Personally, I find that term as more of a taunt than anything else -
But that is why this thread has been started.

Big B, I just wanted to mention that I love the 1776 references in your sig and avatar! [:D]

There's no other reason why I might have looked at this thread at all. Honest.

[mdiehl]

Evacuating US troops from the PI, Aussies from Singapore and all that is as legitimate a choice as the Japanese "grab everywhere" strategy. Allied players seem to go for the "Sir Robin" defense because it's far too easy for the Japanese player to invade Port Moresby, Australia, New Caledonia, Ceylon &c. while tying up those assets historically left in the PI with a few units and waiting for the "consolidation" phase of Japanese conquest.

If the Allied defenses were made capable of inflicting serious harm as the Japanese feared, and if Japanese logistics was accurately modeled such that invading Australia, India or Ceylon by sea were nigh impossible regardless of the presence of an actual opfor, then there would not be quite the incentive for Allies to withdraw from vulnerable spots in the "Southern Resource Area."

Perhaps the PI should start to generate huge gobs of new men, material, supply and increasing troop quality for the Allies, and Singapore too, if these areas are NOT conquered by the Japanese by the historical surrender dates.

[AcePylut]

The problem that brings about the Brave Sir Robin has already been noted...

The Japs can land anywhere they want on Dec 7th with the exact amount of troops to score 2-1 odds.

As long as that happens, where the Japs know the exact strength of troops at any base and thus exactly what units necessary to achieve 2-1 odds, then the "Brave Sir Robin" will be used.

If the allies were able to re-position some forces around the DEI on "December 6th" (and within limits), the Japs won't know troop strength, and thus will be forced to recon & bring "more than enough" troops to attack.

As a result, there will be more impetuous for the Allies to stand and fight.

Right now in my PBEM game, it'a almost April 1st, and my bastion at Singapore has about 3k supplies left and lvl 9 forts, still holding strong... I've got an airbridge and subbridge up and running that are doing their best to keep it supplied. We also have a rapidly escalating battle for PM.

[JWE]

ORIGINAL: Big B
For those who don't venture into the scenario design forum - this discussion has been going on for a couple of days.
Not wishing to infringe on RHS design discussions - I am starting this thread here for any and all input regarding "the Sir Robin" defense.

Personally, I find that term as more of a taunt than anything else -
But that is why this thread has been started.

Yo, Brian! Good to see ya back in the world, bucko!

I’m wondering as the thrust of the discussion. As you know, the work we have done on AE renders most of the old arguments as to gaming strategy quite nugatory. These new “things” substantially restrict the old unlimited Japanese expansion, that impelled the Sir Robin counter, as well as limiting the scope and scale of “run away” options. As you also know, we are looking at the “Bunker”.

It is quite likely that gamers will eventually find some sort of new “Sir Robin” or “Bunker” strategy to defeat the odds, but in the meantime, the old rules have been changed.

I like your moral stance. I believe I have a similar one. I believe we have devised a methodology that will go far in alleviating the zanoschivost’yi’ that exists now.

Ciao. John