Grognards. PH. Midway. Phillipines

[rockmedic109]

ORIGINAL: Rankorian

1.  I respect the opinions here, but am a tad concerned that the US and even Roosevelt of 1941 is being viewed too much through post D-Day eyes.  Political winds can change quickly, and still suspect (perhaps erroneously) that there could have been some sequence of events in 1941-42, even accidents (US carrier explodes while under construction, where it is clearly the fault of some private company, with much loss of life, and a congressional investigation into corrupt business practices which distracts the Congress and the country), that could have lead to something less than full US war mobilization, despite Japan gaining access to DEI oil.  Again, this would presume someones very shrewd in the Japanese high command.

2. Changing the victory conditions so that the Allies lose if they take a certain absolute amount of troop/plane/ship point losses seems both historical to me, and would make the game more interesting in late years.  I am not sure relative losses affected American thinking.  The "we lost x soldiers this week, but the other side lost 5x, so we are winning" did not work well in Vietnam, and I doubt most Americans cared if the US owned Guam. 

3. Consider Japan waiting until it is right up against the resource wall before attacking--say, November 1942.  What result in Europe and the Pacific?   Russia gets all of Germany, because D-day is delayed?  Would the US/British/Dutch been unbeatable a year later, or further weakened--drawn towards Europe?

1. I believe a Japanese invasion of Java would've pulled the U.S. trigger. Even without a Pearl Harbor. At this point then if the U.S. had lost a certain level of casulties then you MIGHT have a U.S. come to peace talks. If there had been any notable atrocites committed against U.S. troops, then the war would've ended when Japan surrendered after being pounded back to the stone age.

2. After Pearl Harbor, the outcome of the war was going to be the same. Japanese surrender. The american public would not have allowed any half measures or an end to the conflict without Japanese surrender.

3. Japan could not have waited much longer. They had to take the resources they needed, but they also had to have the resources secured and being shipped to their industry before Japan ran out. This means the area had to be secured, the damage repaired and shipping in place. I think {I have no empirical data} they would've run out of resources had they waited much longer.

[xj900uk]

Agreed, but I've said all along there was little mood both amongst Congress and also the American public (thanks largely to isolationist pressure groups like 'America First' which Roosevelt found to be a right 'pain in the butt') for America entering a Pacific War largely to prop up ailing European Colonial interests in S E Asia. OK perhaps there could hve been limited US intervention, or a similar situation to the Atlantic (with Roosevelt commiting sea assets to run supply convoys to beleagured Dutch and British possessions) but a large scale commitment of troops and air assets? I think not.
Even if the IJ had attacked the PI only, again I feel that there wouldn't have been the level of commitment from the US both politically and socially. OK so the PI had been US-controlled since the last century (when I think they wrested it from the Spanish, although somebody feel free to correct me) but it was still never regarded as being US soil and US citizens. Congress and the War Office might have been furious, and tried their utmost to implement Orange to try and maintain control of it or wrestle it back (eventually) but a full scale effort right across the board in all areas? Again I think not.
No, it was the decision and commitment by the IJN to hit PH and the installations on Hawaii that galvanised the US Congress and public opinion like no other & insured US commitment in full and 'to the bitter end'. And there were three main reasons for this :
(1). Hawaii and PH was regarded as American soverign territory, even though I'm not sure it actually was (didn't Hawaii actually only become the 49th or 50th state afte rthe end of WWII?) and those who lived & worked there were regarded (slighly incorrectly) as US citizens, well at least most of them
(2). PH was supposed to be the most heavily guarded, fortified and protected naval base on earth, and the jewel in the crown of US Naval Power in the Pacific. Yet the IJN just waltzed in and blitzed the place, catching the US totally cold and causing an awful lot of (largely repairable) damage whilst suffering negligible casualties in return. Also the IJN was shown to be far more powerful and capable than most US planners and intelligence officers had ever dreamed of.
(3). (And perhaps most tellingly of all) the IJ had never declared war in advance. Although Nakamura had tried to deliver the 14-part declaration in Washington (to Stimpson I think) to coincide to the second with the first planes going in, and US intelligence and code-breakers were well ahead of his translation of it in some areas), thanks to the lack of a skilled typist and other factors he actually delivered it some 40 minutes after the attack had begun. This fact seems to have been largely consigned to history, and was glossed over from the US public at large.

[mike scholl 1]

ORIGINAL: xj900uk

Agreed, but I've said all along there was little mood both amongst Congress and also the American public (thanks largely to isolationist pressure groups like 'America First' which Roosevelt found to be a right 'pain in the butt') for America entering a Pacific War largely to prop up ailing European Colonial interests in S E Asia. OK perhaps there could hve been limited US intervention, or a similar situation to the Atlantic (with Roosevelt commiting sea assets to run supply convoys to beleagured Dutch and British possessions) but a large scale commitment of troops and air assets? I think not.
Even if the IJ had attacked the PI only, again I feel that there wouldn't have been the level of commitment from the US both politically and socially. OK so the PI had been US-controlled since the last century (when I think they wrested it from the Spanish, although somebody feel free to correct me) but it was still never regarded as being US soil and US citizens. Congress and the War Office might have been furious, and tried their utmost to implement Orange to try and maintain control of it or wrestle it back (eventually) but a full scale effort right across the board in all areas? Again I think not.

You don't even know for sure that the Philippines were obtained from Spain as a result of the Spanish-American War..., but you expect everyone to accept "what you think" as a persuasive arguement?

There was simply no way for the Japanese to ignore the Philippines indefinitely, nor for them to seize the islands without causing a major loss of US lives and property. Given the mileage the Roosevelt Government was able to get out of the German Sub attacks in the North Atlantic (Neutrality Patrols, Lend Lease, etc.), how can you think that the American Public couldn't be brought to a full war footing by an invasion of the Philippines and the subsequent devastation and loss of thousands of American casualties (not to mention the inevitable "atrocities" given the character of the IJA).

"America First" had been steadily losing ground since 1939 as more and more Axis aggression occurred, and it became plain that like it or not, we were going to be at war with them sooner or later. A direct attack on American lives and possessions was virtually guaranteed to be "the straw that broke the camel's back".

[xj900uk]

True, I've never said that a US war intervention wouldnt have been inevitable at some point rather tahn just sticking at Lend-Lease. However it was the attack on PH which gave Congress and the public the impetus and determination to wage all-out total war with 'unconditional surrender' (at least of Japan) rather than a more limited intervention which would probably have happened had the IJ forces confined themselves to attacks in CBI and also the DEI.
Risking US lives purely to prop up UK and Dutch colonial interests in S.E. Asia? Not for long I don't think!

If the PI had been attacked as well, because of more US interests in those islands I honestly don't know how far the US would have responded (and with what aims/goals) but I doubt it would have been all-out unconditional surrender-type as was earnestly waged after PH

[herwin]

ORIGINAL: xj900uk

True, I've never said that a US war intervention wouldnt have been inevitable at some point rather tahn just sticking at Lend-Lease. However it was the attack on PH which gave Congress and the public the impetus and determination to wage all-out total war with 'unconditional surrender' (at least of Japan) rather than a more limited intervention which would probably have happened had the IJ forces confined themselves to attacks in CBI and also the DEI.
Risking US lives purely to prop up UK and Dutch colonial interests in S.E. Asia? Not for long I don't think!

If the PI had been attacked as well, because of more US interests in those islands I honestly don't know how far the US would have responded (and with what aims/goals) but I doubt it would have been all-out unconditional surrender-type as was earnestly waged after PH

Prewar planning allocated one third of war production to the Pacific--mostly ships. After PH, that was upped to 40%.

[anarchyintheuk]

ORIGINAL: xj900uk

No, it was the decision and commitment by the IJN to hit PH and the installations on Hawaii that galvanised the US Congress and public opinion like no other & insured US commitment in full and 'to the bitter end'. And there were three main reasons for this :

(3). (And perhaps most tellingly of all) the IJ had never declared war in advance. Although Nakamura had tried to deliver the 14-part declaration in Washington (to Stimpson I think) to coincide to the second with the first planes going in, and US intelligence and code-breakers were well ahead of his translation of it in some areas), thanks to the lack of a skilled typist and other factors he actually delivered it some 40 minutes after the attack had begun. This fact seems to have been largely consigned to history, and was glossed over from the US public at large.

It's glossed over because it's irrelevant imo. Nakamura did not deliver a declaration of war. At best it was a break in diplomatic relations. Even if it was a dow and was delivered on time, it wouldn't have mattered. It may make good operational sense to have a cvtf steaming towards your enemy's main naval base and planning to attack it while in the middle of diplomatic negotiations but it would have been seen by the US public as a ruse to cover an attack that was months in planning and execution. US opinion would have been the same imo.

[Zemke]

1. No
2. No
3. No