Grognards. PH. Midway. Phillipines

[Rankorian]

Since there are a lot, I see, experts in this forum:

1. If Japan had sunk all the US CVs at Pearl Harbor, would they have won the war? Was the Japanese plan fundamentally flawed, or any simulation which does not take into account American resolve? (My vote, the plan was flawed.)

2. Same with Midway. Reversed result. Japanese win war?

3. This, to me, is a more unknown issue: If Japan had only, as far as US territory, attacked the Phillipines/Guam, and had not Germany foolishly declared war soon after, is it possible that American public opinion might have led to something other than total war/victory?

[Capt]

Japan could not have won the war. Not a chance. Even if they had sunk all the US carriers at Midway, had those carriers escaped at PH.

Japan lacked population, resources, industrial strength, research facilities and the A bomb.

The loss of an additional 6 or 8 carriers would have just further irated the American public. removing the prospect of a a magnanimous peace governed by Proconsul MacArthur.

[LoBaron]

Capt is right.

Just to show wiki is not always crap when looking for data:

The GDP (Gross domestic product output) over the years:

Country 1938 1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945

Japan 169 184 192 196 197 194 189 144
USA 800 869 943 1094 1235 1399 1499 1474

quoted there from the "The Economics of World War II: Six Great Powers in International Comparison", Cambridge University Press (1998).

At this size its a numbers game. Neither Germany nor Japan would have stood a chance. Reverse Midway, Stalingrad, the Battle of Britain
or any other battle of your liking and change VJ day date a couple of months or 1-2 years maximum.

There is just too much industrial output delta...

[Q-Ball]

I think Germany had an outside chance, provided the US didn't enter the war. And that would have presumed that Hitler would know when to make peace, which probably wasn't happening. Once the US was in it, though, Germany was toast. It is interesting to debate what-ifs around Germany.

Japan, any way you slice it, was going to lose, period. Starting the war was national suicide.

The Allies had it right with the Europe-First strategy.

[Lifer]

Sounds like the possibility of a PBEM with an AAR.  Need to coax an aggressive IJN player with a pretty savvy US with a HR to either remove the US CVs to the East coast or somewhere and not to use them for anything or scuttle them and let the games begin.  Could be a very interesting time for the Allies in 42/43.

[vettim89]

ORIGINAL: Rankorian

Since there are a lot, I see, experts in this forum:

1. If Japan had sunk all the US CVs at Pearl Harbor, would they have won the war? Was the Japanese plan fundamentally flawed, or any simulation which does not take into account American resolve? (My vote, the plan was flawed.)

2. Same with Midway. Reversed result. Japanese win war?

3. This, to me, is a more unknown issue: If Japan had only, as far as US territory, attacked the Phillipines/Guam, and had not Germany foolishly declared war soon after, is it possible that American public opinion might have led to something other than total war/victory?

1. That would have been Enterprise and Lexington lost. Lexington did not survive six months of war and while Enterprise did survive the war, Yorktown and Hornet (her sister ships) did not survive 1942. So maybe PM falls to Japan which likely would have become a liablity more than an asset and no Doolittle Raid for lack of CV's to pull it off. Perhaps Japan's expansion continues into late 1942 versus mid year but IMO worst case scenario is that the war lasts another six months

2. Again, maybe alter the course of the war a little but the 1943/1944 surge of men and material was coming regardless. Perhaps we would have seen a few truly contested carrier battles in 1943 with KB vs Essex class CV's but hard to see the war being extended by more than 6-8 months

3. Here is the kicker. There was still a very strong Neutrality/Isolationist movement in the US late in 1941. PH destroyed that. What if there were no PH? Would the US resolve be as strong? Perhaps there might have been a negotiated peace. That said, if once word of Japanese treatment of Allied prisoners got back to the US, it likely would have stirred up the same feelings that PH did. So while I give this one a little more credence, it still likely would have ended up the same.

[LoBaron]

I agree Q-Ball. Without the US Germany would be on a more even footing.

I still think that this "what if" scenario is very fictional. The US already supported the British Empire long before actually joining the war.
It was only a question of time until a German submarine stumbled across a ship flying a red cross banner or something similar to give the
final reason for joining on the UK side, this would have happened with or without the Japanese attack on PH.

Only operation Sealion could have finished the war on the western side of Europe and Germany was not really in a position to attempt a
successful landing, even more when counting the neccesary support of troops on the British Isles.

[pompack]

Another intersting article from Combined Fleet

http://www.combinedfleet.com/economic.htm

[bristolduke]

I'm still trying to get my arms around this game so i can play PEBM, however I have studied the political situation prior to and about WWII so I'll toss a couple of thoughts out.

First, in a war to capitulation Japan has no chance regardless of the starting scenario. The economy numbers are the killer. Remember that the US fought a two front war and allocated only 30% of it's industry to the Pacific theater and it was still too much for Japan to overcome.

That being said, both Japan and Germany were really trying to wage limited wars. Japan wanted a negotiated peace. Germany is probably a longer discussion, but there were many political paths which could have been options. There was a very strong anti Europe view in the US. If Hitler doesn't declare war, Roosevelt may not be able to get a war in Europe. England delared war on Japan immediately after PH, in large part hoping for a US declaration of war against Germany/Italy. It didn't happen because Roosevelt couldn't swing it. The US would have persecuted a war on Japan by themselves, but the support to Britian may have slowed down considerably as the US would have had to build for the Pacific first. That is what the people would have demanded.

The key to a negotiated peace scenario with Japan has to do with the diplomatic snafus. If Dec 7 is not a suprise attack and the Japanese actually declare war first. The American public didn't care about China anymore than Europe. If there were a considerable loss of life and a perception that it would be a long war, there very well could have been a public opinion of stopping the war. The Americas(North, Central, South) were the prime domain of US political influence. The public related to that, but sending troops across oceans in what was a very isolationist mindset was going to be a tough sell. Certainly not for the European colonies. Possibly for the Phillipines.

Once there was a surprise attack a negotiated peace was out of the question, but in a normal diplomatic breakdown and attack, things would not have been as certain.

[Hokum]

Militarily, Japan alone had no chance. But then again, public opinions change really fast, a string of defeat in Normandy and in the Mariannes and who knows what the US public would have thought?

Anyway, the outcome of the war was decided in Russia, not in the Pacific. (Pretty much just like PH happened because of 1940, not 1937)

[LoBaron]

Interesting conclusions bristolduke.

So are you actually saying that, had the Japanese started the attack on PH with a "correct" declaration of war after stopping the peace negotiations,
the USA could have shown a tendency to negotiate peace and accept a redrawing of borders in the SWPAC/DEI/Philipines?

I´m having difficulties to imagine that. The only scenario I can think of would be, that a prewarned USN was not the Sitting PH Duck, the attack would have had less impact,
and after some losses to both sides and the occupation of the Philipines, the war would draw to a standoff and peace negotiations.
The chances for such a developement are a bit slim in my opinion. Could an industrialized nation at those times simply accept losses in manpower, material and
territory and sue for peace? I think not. Even today, when Argentinian or UK politians make a careless comment on some area as remote as the Falklands the
press is full of (equally remote, admittedly) expectation of a renewed armed conflict.
Was US isolationism so strong to overcome such tendencies?

[bristolduke]

I'm not being absolute on the affect of PH if done "by the rules". What I am saying is that, everything we think is biased because of the surprise attack. That was the crystalizing act, not as much as where it occurred. Also, you have to remember the media dynamics of the 30's. In today's instant media, things like the Falklands are blown way out of proportion BEFORE the politicans can react. Even then the UK didn't have the mindset of wiping Argentina off the map. The videos you are seeing in WWII are movie video not TV, as the communication medium of the day was radio. Just a much different dynamic than we see today.

There is also the fact that history has painted a story for us which we believe because we weren't there and have no real reason to believe otherwise. But living and re-acting to it in real time would have to be in that communication infrastructure and in the prevailing culture, not the post WWI culture. For example, we all believe that the concentration camps were horrible and that the the world wanted accountability. They were horrible, but the world at the time did lillte until after the war. There were camps in 37-88, in which the world's nations did nothing. The Germans wanted the Jews out, but no nation, including the US would take them OR lift a finger to help them, thus the camps were generated. There were a couple of civilian efforts, but there was no way they could be effective. If the world's nations had been willing to take the German/Austria Jews into their their countries, there would probably not have been the camps. After the war, the world wanted to punish the Germans, but that was a huge change from 1938. History doesn't say much of what happenned in 37-38 only the post war results. (Another example of knowing only part of the story from history is how many know of the Hitler assination attempt in 1939?)


So my point is that there were plausible political settlements available in WWII. Those have to be understood and evaluated in context of the nations biases on the first three decades of the century and the communications infrastructure of the time.

And yes, the isolastionist attitude in the US was that strong.

[AirGriff]

I think that if the Japanese would have hit the PI, then the US would have gone to war, or at least a "Police Action" of some sort. We had a bunch of troops there and were planning on putting a bunch more. Dare I make a comparison and pull pin on the political hand grenade of US commitments and troops in S. Korea?

The next big question would be, what if the Japanese didn't hit any US commitments--only the Brit and Dutch? I still think we would have gone in, but it would have taken every ounce of FDR's political savvy to do it--I believe there was a kind of gentlemen's agreement between the US and British that this would be the case, though we'll never know how far that really would have held since there was ample evidence for months that if the Japanese were going to war the US was going to get hit, too. Plus, I'm not sure the Japanese would have considered this an option with the PI threatening the sea lanes out there.

I love this stuff!

[bristolduke]

Churchill needed the US desperately. He was doing whatever he could to get America in the war. Most of the intelligence we were getting in 39/40 on Japan was from the British. Churchill wanted our ships in the Atlantic convoys knowing they would be sunk as provocation. Despite the Germans sinking merchant ships and destroyers, Roosevelt resisted (or failed to garner enough support) to enter the war. He did not declare war on Germany after PH.

We were going to war in the Pacific because the Japanese were going to declare war on us. It was therefore unavoidable. That's a far cry from giving us the relentless determination due to a surprise attack. Remember Hawaii was not a state, so it was the same as the Phillipines with repect to a base/possession. So we can reasoable expect to be at war in the Pacific. I would contend that would have actually made it harder to become engaged in Europe. The people simply would not have supported it and the military probably would not have either. They supported the Germany first because of the two front war but if already at war with Japan, they weren't going on their own to Roosevelt and saying lets attack Germany/Italy also. We were woofully unprepared.

In looking at the Japanese pre-war mentality, it is the US they are upset with because of the embargo and meddling in China affairs. They knew the European powers were "busy". So attacking the US was the objective. The navy also had a decisive battle mentality ingrained into them (in part because Japan couldn't sustain a long term war). So they were always going to have the big battle plan as part of their initial strike, whether it is the air faction or the battleship faction. They were not looking to conquer the US just get them to stop interferring. They did believe that the US would sue for peace as opposed to fight a protracted war in Asia. One can argue that they should have focused only on the Phillipines as it was critical to their SE Asia sphere. However, they considered Pearl Harbor a threat, so it had to be dealt with. But given their penchant for detailed planning, they could have just as easily set up an ambush to gain their decisive battle.

Given the isolationist view of America, it is hard to envision a scenario where a protracted Pacific war would be tolerated. We were trying to help the Chinese but that was against the communists. A land war in China is the last thing anyone would endorse, so again a limted war from the US is possible unless there becomes another stimulus.

The surprise attack stirred the nation and jolted us out of the view that we could ignore the rest of the world. The resulting industrial revolution propelled us to a powerful nation in conjunction with Russia. The two nations were powers simply because of their size and ability to focus their national resources. Neither started the war with that objective and neither wanted war, but once awakened!!

[PaxMondo]

I'm with Bristolduke on most of this. 
 
The Dec 6, 1941 Des Moines Register headlines are calling Roosevelt a traitor and asking for impeachment.  Outside of the NE, there was active opposition to the war in europe throughout the mid-west and west.  It wasn't called draft dodging back then, but simply put, the "farm boys" in the west never came in from the round ups and nobody wnet looking for them either.
 
It is really a close call IMHO about getting the DOW correct on Dec 7.  We can't know about that.  However, I truly do beleive that if the attack was on Manila (as many espouse as a better opening) the USA entry into the war would have been far different ... lukewarm at best.  The BB's would all have been sunk in mid-ocean when some idiot decided to try Plan Orange (and they very well may have been so stupid without a PH to prove otherwise).  That defeat would have been telling on public opinion.
 
As for Europe .... MO is that if St. Petersburg and Moscow fall in '41 (which as we all know was quite a close thing several times), Stalin is assasinated by coup and USSR leaves the war.  At that point, GER economy is not dwarfed by USA.  Smaller, yes.  But not dwarfed.  And with a single front to contend, the Med is likely closed down and Normandy has to wait two or three years or more.
 
Worse, GER gets the T-34 design and factories amoung other "goodies".  GER with the T-34 would have been a very bad thing for the allies in the mid 40's.  She also have the materials now to fund the sub warfare on the USA ....  I dont' know.  This becomes a very scary scenario to me.

[mike scholl 1]

ORIGINAL: Hokum

Militarily, Japan alone had no chance. But then again, public opinions change really fast, a string of defeat in Normandy and in the Mariannes and who knows what the US public would have thought?

This arguement always intrigues me. From 1942 until 1945, both Germany and Japan suffered an endless string of defeats and disasters without collapse (until the A-Bomb). Why is it that we always seem to assume that America was going to fold up like a house of cards if things didn't go perfectly?

I've heard the "isolationist" arguement, but Hitler and the Nazis came to power as a minority Government and still held together under the strain of a never overly popular war. Isolationism was losing ground steadily long before the US entered the war.

[xj900uk]

Hmmm, interesting comments...
Germany could have won the war by Dec ’41 if it had concentrated on U-Boat production from day 1 and blockaded Britain into starvation during 40-41 (as Doenitz so desperately wanted). You have to remember that in those days Britain was just about self-sufficient in food, but had to import most of its raw materials for the war effort (especially aluminium and rubber, which it had no home-grown resources), and, perhaps most important of all, all of its aviation fuel and oil.
A determined U-boat blockade could have strangled British industry in 40-41 and completely negated its ability to wage war, a negotiated peace favourable to Germany would have been the inevitable outcome no matter what Churchill thought.
Contrary to popular belief, the Battle of Britain was not the decisive battle, although it is true if the RAF had been destroyed, there would have been no need for an invasion and German bombers could have roamed wild and free until Britain negotiated a peace, but this was far, far harder for Germnay to accomplish (particularly with Herman Goering in charge of the German effort). The U-boat menace was far more telling and, crucially, hurt Britain far harder than nearly all of the German bombing raids (London docks and Coventry being a few exceptions). That was why, when, faced with an imminent launching of Operation Sealion, Churchill commented ‘they won’t invade’ and sent all of Britains remaining reserves of armour (not much after Dunkirk) to the North African desert.
In his history of WWII, Churchill himself wrote ‘the only thing that really scared me was the U-boat peril’.

Regarding Japan, that’s a toughie. IMO (and I know this is controversial) the only way they could have ‘won’ was fighting a war of very limited objectives and concentrating in the DEI and CBI theatres. The ‘unprovoked’ and ‘unanounced’ attack on PH was what united the US people behind Roosevelt. Even if Port Morseby had fallen, or Guadalcanal, or the IJN had won the battle of Midway, or even if teh IJ had succeeded in invading Hawaii and taking PH (as the US feared at the end of ’41) , the war would have continued and the US would have been just as determined. True, it would have taken a hell of a lot longer, but the result would have been teh same. And I doubt the US would ever have been in the mood to negotiate an early cease-fire.
If, however, the IJ had concentrated in the DEI and CBI theatres, then I doubt even if Guam and the PI had been attacked, Roosevelt would had got anything like the same level of both political and public backing to simply prop up and sustain fading European colonial interest in S E Asia.... The ‘America First’ movement would also have still continued to enjoy a lot of support and encourage isolationist policies. No doubt the US would have fought some kind of campaign, looked to rap the IJ over the knuckles and then negotiate some kind of peace which would guarantee their own possessions and probably little more...

[LoBaron]

bristolduke, PaxMondo, very interesting analysis. I agree on most parts, except for that the fall of Moskow or Leningrad would have
changed anything in the outcome of the war. Prolonged it, yes, changed the outcome, no.

There are so many situations that a conquering force has to overcome, most of all if not supported by the local population.
The larger the German territory grew, the more vulnerable it became to partisan attacks, the longer the frontlines grew the more options were present for counterattack,
the longer the supply lines got, the more impact had the fact that Germany never had a navy to speak of compared to the Allieds.

It comes again down to industrial output and sheer manpower. In the beginning of ´44 the German male population was already streched to the limit,
with 16-30 year olds to being drafted and sent to the frontline. Whether the the Axis offensive was able to continue or not does not change the fact
that Germany was fighting against an enemy continuosely growing in relative strenght, while its own reserves where slowly diminishing.

No technological advance, T-34, Me262 or R4M could have changed this. Longer, yes, bloodier, yes. Axis victory? No.

The only "what if" that makes me really shudder was if the Axis powers were the first to develop the atomic bomb, because when this would
have happened I´d most probably wont sit here and type these lines.

[xj900uk]

Germany had no real interest in the atomic bomb, despite its early success with heavy water experiments. Hitler had no interest in it so no real resources or industrial/R&D might was ever put behind it.

It is, on the other hand, interesting to see what Germany was capable of when it put it's mind to it - look at the success and technological leaps of its rocketry division.
Talkign of the Me262, Goering officially cancelled research on it (and other far-reaching projects) in 1940, a rather unwise move. Willie Messerschmitt continued his development in private, but as it happend development of the engine began to lag behind that of the airframe. You can say that Hitler's final decision to develop the Me262 as a blitzbomber was a crass mistake, but on the other hand you could also argue that without his intervention it would probably never have seen service, as a reliable engine would never have been got ready...

[mike scholl 1]

ORIGINAL: xj900uk

A determined U-boat blockade could have strangled British industry in 40-41 and completely negated its ability to wage war, a negotiated peace favourable to Germany would have been the inevitable outcome no matter what Churchill thought.

Problem with this arguement is that it would have required a decision in 1936 to forgo an expanded and prestigeous surface navy in favor of total concentration on U-Boats..., and Hitler wanted the prestige for political ends. With both the Luftwaffe and the Wehrmacht in expansion modes, there was no "extra" to be diverted to U-Boats..., something would have to be sacrificed.
Same reasoning also led the British, French, Italians, and even the Russians to building Battleships in the late 1930's.

It's a nice piece of hindsight, but not a realistic one. And the same reasoning could lead to the British building a hundred long ranged escorts instead of the KGV's. You can always come up with reasons why something else would have been a better choice..., but nations have to fight wars with what they have.