Posted by Mdiehl
I'd thought we were talking about "Yamamoto's" proposed fix.
We are talking about the same solution (except I've included all torpedo carrying allied ships in it (incl USN DD's in '42) so that we can concentrate on the merits of the 2 sides at that time).
Everything else is exactly as Yamamoto described (leadership check, ship check). Since you've never played UV, I simply clarified his solution for you (and included USN DD's - therefore, I call it my solution).
I think a USN (or UK, or Aussie, or Dutch) *DD group* would have the same probability of *attempting* such an attack as any IJN group, all other things being equal.
This is where I disagree. I would qualify "attempting" as the determined firing of as many torpedos as doctrine demanded at the target's actual or probable bearing. If you want an example, look at your often referenced USN DD action at Tassafaronga.
There were 4 DDs,
Fletcher, Perkins, Maury and
Drayton involved in the planned "torpedo doctrine" attack. The
Fletcher had SG radar, the rest had SC (at best). We are all agreed that the leader of the DD's, Cole on the I]Fletcher[/I]requested permission to launch when the
Fletcher's SG radar gained a solid track, reportedly on the large IJN DD
Takanami at 10,000 yds. TF commander Wright refused. According to Russel Crenshaw Jnr's "The Battle of Tassafaronga", of the DD's, only
Fletcher had any type of solution. The rest of the DD's having none or minor one's. Attempts by the
Fletcher to pass on and confirm firing solutions to the other DD's using TBS short wave communications was lost in the "excited chatter by inexperienced operators of ranges, bearings and possible tracks". When permission was finally given by Wright at 2320, the following happened.
Cole's ship
Fletcher , with SG, fired a full salvo of torps (10).
Perkins launched 8 of 12 (within USN doctrine).
Maury refused to launch without visual.
Drayton, suffering from differing opinions between bridge, radar director and torpedo fire control, half heartedly fired 2 out of 12 torpedoes. Effectively, only half the DD's fired. The torps were launched from 9,500 yds. All missed (the best firing solution for the range had now gone). All ship's had received
Fletcher's target solution by the time they fired.
Crenshaw, who was serving on the DD's at the time, felt that the same number of launches would have occured had the attack been launched when first requested by Cole (although maybe with better results). The attack was from too far out and was planned at too higher speed (35+ knots). This was entirely the DD formation's choice. It should have been at around half the range (5-6000) and at a speed that would not show a high bow wave. Crenshaw also points out that the experience of Tassafaronga taught the USN DD's that, at night, firing along given fire solution bearing's should become common practice for DD's (otherwise, too many DD's would not fire in the confusion if left entirely up to them (effectively 50%).
In response to the surprise attack, 2 of the 3 IJN DD's that could fire, did so immeadiately (the third did not fire its torps until it had reversed course. At least 4 of the other 5 IJN DD's of the transport units were able to fire their torps when their decks had been cleared of sufficient supply drums (to allow firing). All the IJN ships were heavily experienced at night and had trained in the reverse course/fire torpedo squadron manuever. They executed it well enough (despite the surprise attack) to all ships contibuted to the two multi ship salvo's of torpedoes launched.
At night, the environment will always impose confusion and uncertainty on all forces involved. Finding the enemy is vital. But so to is good radio discipline and communication (training/exp), smooth coordination of individual command, fire control and weapon stations (training/exp) and that all DD's needed to act in unison (training/exp). These are are equally or more relevant than the 6 reasons (listed in your quote below) to whether a ship fires when given the opportunity.
I think the degree of success would be highly dependent (as it was for the IJN in most battles, T'frnga being the one glaring exception) on the following:
1. Alert status of targets (detection of attacking TF and communication of same to other defending vessels).
2. Fatigue.
3. Range.
4. Visibility conditions.
5. Random effects. This sounds clugey, but it's hard to explain why the IJN missed Wash and SoDak at 2nd G'canal with (IIRC) 38 shots. Clearly the range was favorable, and both BBs were lit up like Yuletide logs by their own 5" and 16" flashes. So you need some random factor that leads to "just a bad night" results .. of which the IJN had several in 1942.
6. CAC issues with the TF commander. T'frnga being the example.
I'm a bit lost when you specifically mentioned in previous posts that you were attempting to suggest the factors for a "Tassafaronga engine" for UV and yet now you say that Tassafaronga is an exception to your rules. So exactly, where would your blueprint for recreating real night combat be used to give the Japanese player an opportunity for such a result in UV?
Re points 1-4 : these fall under the category of factors that influence the ability to spot the enemy (although range can also affect the ability to hit). Obviously, some knowledge of the enemy's presence must be known but this has no bearing on how well a ship (or a group) responds after the detection of an enemy at night. Problems in communicating the enemy's presence was almost always a USN problem (poor radio discipline and confusion). The more night experienced IJN (who had practiced in keeping their messages short and precise - according to USN Naval intel's "Operational of Japanese Naval Communications 1942-45") never seemed to suffer from this problem to any real degree. They were also well versed in firing on the bearings supplied from other ships (if needed). I'd say, once an enemy was spotted, the IJN would have the better chance of multi ship firings.
Re your point 5, are you talking about the ability to fire or the ability to hit (I thought your points were addressing allied torpedo carrying ships actually getting off multi ship torpedo salvo's? Also the salvo of 38 torps were only fired at the South Dakota (not the Washington). When passing through the wreckage of earlier damaged or sinking USN DD's, the two BB's seperated. The South Dakota (blind from radar failure and no longer firing), silouetted herself temporarily against the burning USN DD's as she steered erratically past the ships. It was at this point the IJN DD's fired. Had she been sailing straight, she would probably have been hit (as she was now unaware of exactly where the IJN ships were that were firing torpedoes). But this still applies to what effects accuracy, not whether ships (and how many) would fire.
Re your point 6, I agree, command and control is ONE of the valid determinants of whether ships will get an opportunity to fire torpedoes. But you also have to take individual ship CAC into control (as I outlined earlier) as to whether a ship will fire when given that opportunity. This is measured by how well the ships crew stations work together (training/experience).
To summarise quickly. Some of your 6 points would be relevant in determining the overall success of an engagement. However, I completely disagree that you can ignore training, experience and consistent application of doctrine as determinants in whether or not ships/formations would launch torpedoes when the opportunity arises.
