New troop counts for November scenario

[Mr. Z]

The upshot is: 110K for Union in Potomac River (including garrisons), 10K in Baltimore garrisons. Then, 41K in Fredericksburg. (I don't know about the garrisons; I'm inclined to leave them as they are, unless someone would like to suggest another solution.)

Here is a brief essay outlining the reasons for these changes. You are all more than welcome to comment freely on them.

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The starting point is that Battle Cry of Freedom by McPherson does indeed state that “In October, McClellan had 120,000 men while Beauregard and Johnston had only 45,000 in and near Manassas". These are fairly accurate figures. However—

In McClellan’s letter of late October to Secretary Cameron (posted here by christof139) States that as of 10/15/61, the army included 133K present for duty, ignoring the sick, confined, and (obviously) the absent—including all those groups, the grand aggregate was 152K. This was “the number of troops in and about Washington, inclusive of the garrison of the city and Alexandria, the city guard and the forces on the Maryland shore of the Potomac below Washington, and as far as the Cumberland above, the troops under the command of General Dix at Baltimore and its dependencies” (taken from McClellan’s official report, p. 10).

However, when, on 9/27/61, McClellan has reported a strength of 168,318, he had also “with a cautiousness that was to prove typical of him pared the number available for offensive action to 76,285” (from Russel Weigley’s A Great Civil War). What he had done was subtracted the troops that were either partially or wholly unarmed or unequipped, and then subtracted the numbers he figured were required for garrisons along the Potomac.

Considering that the aggregate had fallen between late September and mid-October, we could perhaps guess that the number of troops that were truly combat-ready may have fallen slightly, too. On the other hand, perhaps more became battle-ready by then. At any rate, there were at most 133K troops under McClellan’s command, including the brigades in Baltimore and Annapolis (and perhaps only 76K or so ready for battle) around 11/1/61.

As I said, it appears that McClellan is not including garrisons in the figure “available for offensive action”. In a letter which likewise dates from “the latter part of October” (McClellan, p. 6) he reports that Baltimore and Annapolis had a garrison of about 10K (ibid, 7) which was sufficient for their defense, but that Washington would need 35K to remain behind in the garrison, along with another 5K to guard the upper Potomac and 8K to guard the lower Potomac. Subtracting all those forces out gives him the 76K figure.

I’m going to guess that McPerson’s figure of 120K is just an estimate of the 133K present for duty on 10/15, minus the Baltimore and Annapolis garrisons.

So for our purposes, we should begin the November scenario with about 10K in the Baltimore garrison, and some figure no greater than 123K in Potomac province. I don’t know how we want to handle the unarmed and unequipped troops, which numbered as high as 12K in late September. Presumably some of those had become battle-ready, but presumably other new recruits had also undergone training and were awaiting their weapons. On the other hand, perhaps new weapons had arrived by then—but on the other hand, the number present for duty in general had dropped between late September and mid-October. So it may all be a wash, in which case we may only want to include about 110K in the Potomac for 11/1/61.

(BTW, In that same letter McClellan states that he has no official figures for the remainder of the US forces. However, he provides estimates of about 30K in Western Virginia—an overestimate, I would say—and 40K in Kentucky, as well as 80K In Missouri and 11K in Fortress Monroe, along with about 100K mobilizing elsewhere.)

(McClellan’s forces grew steadily, BTW—to 169K ready for duty out of an aggregate of 198K by 12/1. By 2/1/62 the figures were 190K out of 222K.)

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As for the Confederates, James Ford Rhodes, in his History of the Civil War 1861-65, also listed a figure of 41K under Johnson in late October, mentioning that “the health of the Union army was good, that of the Confederate bad…on the other hand, the Confederates had an immense advantage in the moral effect of their victories at Bull Run and Ball’s Bluff.” (Rhodes, 58-59) Johnson wanted another 19K immediately for offensive maneuvers (ibid, 69) but Jefferson Davis was certain that they were not available, and they did not materialize. At any rate, Johnston himself gives us the estimate of 41K at the beginning of November (including 2400 cavalry). By the end of the month it had grown to 47.2K, including 4.8K in the Acquia district and 3.7K in the Valley district.

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So, both USA and CSA numbers in the Eastern Theatre will probably be reduced significantly, to 110K for Union in Potomac River (including the garrisons) and 10K in the Baltimore city/fort garrisons, and to only 41K for the Confederacy in Fredericksburg. We may raise this slightly by giving Jackson and Holmes sizeable detachments for their respective districts, maybe 1-2K each. In addition, considering that the CSA troops were badly armed, it might be fair to give the USA back the 13K troops I left out due to their inadequate armaments and training. What do others think?

(I also confess to being a little fuzzy about how well-fortified the fort garrisons were—we generally followed a policy of giving forts whatever they needed to improve playability, though in crucial areas like Henry and Donelson they were based on somewhat detailed research.)

[Alex Gilbert]

I have avoided adding to this debate because I certainly do not know as much about the civil war as some on this site.  However, my concern with the reductions in troops at the start of the scenario is that while we may get historical troop counts at the start of the scenario, there is no way to achieve historical counts at any other time. 
 
For example, by the 7  days (June-July '62) confederate strength around Richmond was 85-105 thousand (at least that I have seen).  The low figure comes from Douglas Freeman (R.E. Lee vol.2. pp116-117) who quotes several sources including DH Hill Jr, EP Alexander and WH Taylor.  This 85K figure does not include roughly 7000 men in the richmond defenses which ARE included in the upper value which I found here: http://www.brettschulte.net/OOBs/SevenDays/SevenDays.html
 
In either case, the army of 10 Bdes and 40,000 men in Nov, grew to about 90,000 men and 39 Bdes in just 6 months.  Some of these troops came from brigades initially stationed in the deep south, but others were newly created at a seemingly very rapid pace.  It is interesting that far more brigades seem to have been created in these 6 months, than throughout the rest of the war.  I have always supposed that this simply represented the time to collect the initial call up of the southern forces after the onset of war, but I really dont know. 
 
The point is, that there is no similar mechanism in the game for this rapid initial call-up.  I think what will happen if the numbers are reduced is that the CSA will never generate a force of any significant (and historic) size and be quickly overwhelmed. 
 
My counter-suggestion is to reduce the Virginia forces to the levels suggested, but add more brigades in other deep south states.  It will take time for the CSA to bring these forces north, especially with limited RR.  Perhaps 10-15 Bdes.  The others, the CSA player will have to decide to build or not. 
 
There are those who will argue (not incorrectly) that this is not strictly historical (or maybe it is, I really do not know enough about the detail of southern forces to say).  However, I think that this will produce a more historical feel and result and more accurately reflect the strategic problems that the CSA faced.

[Erik Rutins]

ORIGINAL: Alex Gilbert
The point is, that there is no similar mechanism in the game for this rapid initial call-up.  I think what will happen if the numbers are reduced is that the CSA will never generate a force of any significant (and historic) size and be quickly overwhelmed.

Actually, there is. Muster early and play either Southern Steel or one of the others with the Greater Population option and you'll be able to do this easily.

Regards,

- Erik

[Hard Sarge]

yea, you can muster all you want, so who cares if it ruins the Ecc of the side you are playing, nothing like losing Richmond for 10 to 12 turns due to unrest
 
I am not sure numbers are the way to look at it, I would try to be sure we have the right units in place, more then how many men the units have, the losses are going to be higher in almost any game then they were in real life, so if you try to model the numbers, you going to run out much faster then they did in real life also
 
I really do not know if lowing the numbers will work the way people think, without major rechange to the morale and skill system in the game, the at 41,000 to 110,000 the ANV could still be a hassle to the Union, but the AI can double or triple that starting number in no time, besides the fact, it can shift as many men from the west
 
so I think Numbers got to be looked at with what the effect those numbers will bring
 

[Erik Rutins]

ORIGINAL: Hard Sarge
yea, you can muster all you want, so who cares if it ruins the Ecc of the side you are playing, nothing like losing Richmond for 10 to 12 turns due to unrest

Mustering doesn't cause unrest, only conscripting does.

Regards,

- Erik

[sadja]

Then only impressment and conscription cause unrest , but muster does not, other than lower Gov attitude

[Greyhunterlp]

maybe have all the governers "support mustering" for the first few turns? to simulate the popular support at the start of the war?

[Gil R.]

ORIGINAL: Grey Hunter

maybe have all the governers "support mustering" for the first few turns? to simulate the popular support at the start of the war?

An interesting idea. I'm not sure how easy that would be to program. But in case it can be done without Eric spending countless hours on it, what do people think of the idea? (Disclaimer: even if it can be programmed, the idea might need to be saved for a future patch.)

[Alex Gilbert]

Interesting idea.  I like it because it reflects the difference between the first months of war and the remainder.  I think that doing it from Nov through April would be interesting as well-- the first round of musters (before the end of March) would be no-brainers (or at least less controversial), but it would create an interesting strategic choice of whether you continue to muster in April and then run with a diminished economy for 1862 until the population is replaced in March 1863.    

[ericbabe]

That is an interesting idea.

[Gil R.]

Well, there you have it, folks. The idea has been officially designated "interesting."

[ericbabe]

I didn't say "Simon says."

[Erik Rutins]

ORIGINAL: ericbabe
I didn't say "Simon says."

Yes you did, you just said it. [;)]

[Gil R.]

News flash: in private correspondence with me, Eric has raised his opinion of the idea from "interesting" to "swell." We'll keep you posted...

[Alex Gilbert]

If we are already at swell, can groovy be far off???

[Drex]

I prefer "bitchin". i already augment the starting forces by mass mustering of all cities with 60:10 and 3 or more in population except for the large cities I intend to raise high grade troops from: for the union - boston, Phil, N.Y., Cinncinati,St. Louis. I use these troops for garrisoning the large cities to the max on the Ohio-Missouri line. I sometimes conscript if the ratio os 80:10 or better but only on the first turn.

[ericbabe]

"Hip", "dope", and "fly" all come between "swell" and "groovy".

[Erik Rutins]

These updated OOBs are in the 1.9.16 Public Beta Southern Steel scenario. In addition, the generals file has continually been improved and updates for that are in all 1.9.16 Public Beta scenarios.

[spruce]

are you sure this is right ?
 
I load a game as CSA and I have an army of about 110.000 men in Fredericksburg and a smaller one in Richmond area. There are 2 army ! containers and I have 2 four star generals close to Richmond Johnston and Beauregard.
 
I didn't knew the CSA had so many troops in Fredericksburg in november 1862. That's even more then Gettysburg OOB.

[Erik Rutins]

Spruce, is this in Southern Steel?