Day-one Scenarios

[JWE]

So many words, so many mirrors. Decided to bite the bullet and crank the data. Had to do most of it anyway, in the context of out group’s upcoming “A-Day, 3-Way” CPX. Having done so, I thought it would be nice to post the results for other scenario designers. This post has the summary data. If I can get it to work, the next will have the individual ship list (along with each ship’s Lloyd’s registry tonnage).

PI invasion TFs have 135 vessels identified, aggregating a cool 775,000 GRT. Of the 135 vessels identified, only about 21 are < 5000 GRT, and of these, 13 are 4200 - 4900 GRT.

Malaysian invasion TFs have 37 vessels identified, aggregating 270,000 GRT. Of the 37 vessels identified, only 6 are < 5000 GRT, and of these, all are 4200 - 4900 GRT.

CenPac (Makin, Guam, Wake) invasion TFs have 14 vessels identified, aggregating 75,000 GRT. Of the 14 vessels identified, only 6 are < 5000 GRT, and of these, 3 are 4200 - 4900 GRT.

Total, 1,120,000 tons of shipping, representing 186 vessels; for Malaysia and CenPac, these are for assault elements only, for the PI, these include up to the 2d reinforcement elements. These are mainly IJA requisitioned ships, with IJN transports representing about 70,000 GRT of the total.

This averages to about 6000 GRT per vessel. According to the Lloyds Register measurements, a 6000 GRT vessel corresponds, in size and real capacity, to something between our C1 and our C2, if a new model, and equivalent to a Federal or Harriman yard vessel, if a tween-war model (both about 425’ and with a 5000 – 5500 Net Cargo Deadweight capacity, metric).

Japan had about 415 ships > 3999 GRT, total, after deductions for Naval Aux conversions, tankers, and the like. Deducting the 186 vessels from the total, leaves 229 vessels. This 229 total includes all passenger and P&C vessels performing nominal point-to-point trooping duties and all passenger and P&C vessels in near seas service, as well as tankers and 106 identified coal-fired vessels, with 12 knot speed, and 6 – 8000 nm fuel mile range. Deducting these, as well as the tankers (approx 40) and the passenger and P&C vessels (approx 27), leaves 56 vessels of reasonable capacity > 3999 GRT, as the sum total of the Japanese merchant marine, as of Dec. 7, 1941. Woof!

[DuckofTindalos]

As you say, woof! Oh well, I'm sure the Japanese soldiers won't mind hot-hammocking on the way to Hawai'i...[:D]

[JWE]

OK, life is a bitch. Here's the list of vessels (and corresponding tonnage) involved in opening day (week) ops. All 135 are in there, identified by nominal objective. Have fun. Ciao.

[el cid again]

You seem not to want to address the IJA ships here. They are technically naval auziliaries - they even have IJN crews - but they are IJA vessels - and we have some difficulty with them in WITP because code won't let us classify them properly as vessels of several functions. Gen Yamashita was on one of these when the war began - it was a command ship - although only in RHS is it classified as an AGC. But it was also an LSD (sort of - same function without a well deck - faster unloading actually - using rollers on RR tracks down a sloped ramp to stern doors) and it could be an aircraft transport, a landing craft transport, of some size. There were a larger number of ships without command facilities, essentially APs and AKs in our classification - yet they should not be excluded from trooping and military sealift - that is their role.

There is also the matter of passenger ships: they should have been used for trooping - and sometimes were - but many were forced to serve as general cargo ships - inefficiently. A number start the war trooping - but get sent to do cargo work later - so how do we classify them?

There is also the matter that there are a lot of smaller vessels involved, and this is a problem on both sides. Mac commissioned "MacArthurs Fleet" of scratch hulls of every sort - over a thousand of them - and if many are below our horizon their aggregate value should count. Japan had many short haul vessels, built many others, and captured or hired far more. RHS added two types of "sea trucks" - barges - junks - and micro tankers and riverine transports - some of which are used on the open ocean rather than riverine work. But in spite of multiple ship units - we have mainly only added famous ones related to specific operations - and many more are absent. Some of these are involved with the ferry systems - or could be. And that brings us to ferries - they can be fine amphibs - and sometimes are. But we are not using them that way - nor is it an option. I have come up with conventions: we exclude half of AKs (associated with the half the resources we cannot consume at the right ratio in industry - 3/4 of that is coal by weight) and 3/4 of the coasters (half for the same reason as AKs, more because some are moving things between hexes - not only ferries but the hard code "Level 3 port to port transfer" rule). But a more formal set of conventions might be appropriate. Note a few famous vessels were always in WITP - yet many of their sisters/near sisters were never done.

[JWE]

ORIGINAL: Terminus

As you say, woof! Oh well, I'm sure the Japanese soldiers won't mind hot-hammocking on the way to Hawai'i...[:D]

Pretty much. It is quite clear that Malaysia + PI + HI is impossible. What the "A-Day, 3-Way" does, is defer the PI assault, in favor of HI lift (iff the Japanese player chooses the HI assault option). Reason is that a HI assault may well tie up assets designated towards the anticipated PI reinforcement schedule and, thus preclude use of the PI as a flanking threat to the SRA ops. All that remains is air ops against the PI (oops, I'm giving it away).

[JWE]

ORIGINAL: el cid again

You seem not to want to address the IJA ships here. They are technically naval auziliaries - they even have IJN crews - but they are IJA vessels - and we have some difficulty with them in WITP because code won't let us classify them properly as vessels of several functions. Gen Yamashita was on one of these when the war began - it was a command ship - although only in RHS is it classified as an AGC. But it was also an LSD (sort of - same function without a well deck - faster unloading actually - using rollers on RR tracks down a sloped ramp to stern doors) and it could be an aircraft transport, a landing craft transport, of some size. There were a larger number of ships without command facilities, essentially APs and AKs in our classification - yet they should not be excluded from trooping and military sealift - that is their role.

There is also the matter of passenger ships: they should have been used for trooping - and sometimes were - but many were forced to serve as general cargo ships - inefficiently. A number start the war trooping - but get sent to do cargo work later - so how do we classify them?

There is also the matter that there are a lot of smaller vessels involved, and this is a problem on both sides. Mac commissioned "MacArthurs Fleet" of scratch hulls of every sort - over a thousand of them - and if many are below our horizon their aggregate value should count. Japan had many short haul vessels, built many others, and captured or hired far more. RHS added two types of "sea trucks" - barges - junks - and micro tankers and riverine transports - some of which are used on the open ocean rather than riverine work. But in spite of multiple ship units - we have mainly only added famous ones related to specific operations - and many more are absent. Some of these are involved with the ferry systems - or could be. And that brings us to ferries - they can be fine amphibs - and sometimes are. But we are not using them that way - nor is it an option. I have come up with conventions: we exclude half of AKs (associated with the half the resources we cannot consume at the right ratio in industry - 3/4 of that is coal by weight) and 3/4 of the coasters (half for the same reason as AKs, more because some are moving things between hexes - not only ferries but the hard code "Level 3 port to port transfer" rule). But a more formal set of conventions might be appropriate. Note a few famous vessels were always in WITP - yet many of their sisters/near sisters were never done.

Try reading the attachment. <edit> All the ships (98%) of them were IJA ships. No matter what you want to call it, if it was present, it is included. A lot of passenger types are included in the tabulation totals. Those not included, didn't participate. Smaller vessels ?? sure; the data is for < 3999 GRT; that's fact. The rest, lots of dinky this & that, is your nickel. The Japanese didn't think they were particularly useful, opening day, but you gotta do what you gotta do.

[JWE]

Some folks couldn't view the original attachment, so let me try it this way.

[DuckofTindalos]

I'm reading a "grand total" of 4 ships of 10,000+ tons. Not exactly impressive.

[JWE]

ORIGINAL: Terminus
I'm reading a "grand total" of 4 ships of 10,000+ tons. Not exactly impressive.

That was just for the PI op. Here's for Malaysian, and the CenPac ops.

[DuckofTindalos]

Adds 2 more. Wonder where all those extra ships are that Sid assured us they have available...?[8|]

[JWE]

ORIGINAL: Terminus
I'm reading a "grand total" of 4 ships of 10,000+ tons. Not exactly impressive.

No it's not, is it? There weren't that many 10,000+ tonners in service to begin with. There were only about 13 (25 if you include hulls >7,999), total, floating around in late '41. IJA/IJN took 5 (took 10 if you include hulls >7,999) for transport service, leaving 8 hulls >9,999, or 15 hulls >7,999, for everything else. The 'everything else' includes regular trooping duty to China, Korea, Taiwan, you know, rear area stuff. Here's all the Japanese passenger and P&Cs.

13 passenger ships > 12,000 GRT (12-18,000 GRT) - 5 undergoing conversion to CV, 2 more to AMC thence to CV. 6 available of which 2 taken by IJN and fitted as naval transports.

13 passenger ships: 10 – 11, 999 GRT – 3 undergoing conversion to AMC, 3 more to AS. 7 available, of which 3 taken by IJN and fitted as naval transports.

17 Passenger ships: 8 – 9,999 GRT – 2 declared AH, 3 more undergoing conversion to AS. 12 available of which 5 taken by IJN and fitted as naval transports.

23 Passenger and P&C ships: 5 – 7,999 GRT – 3 undergoing conversion to AS, 2 declared AH. 18 available of which 6 taken by IJN and fitted as naval auxiliaries/transports.

27 Passenger and P&C ships: 3 – 4,999 GRT – none taken by IJN and fitted as naval transports.

28 Passenger and P&C ships: 1 – 2,999 GRT – none taken IJN and fitted as naval transports.

[JWE]

ORIGINAL: Terminus
Adds 2 more. Wonder where all those extra ships are that Sid assured us they have available...?[8|]

Well, I think it’s because Sid has this curious idea that a lot of small ships are more efficient than fewer larger ones, and since Japan had lots of small coasters, fishing boats, and “sea trucks”, you just add up that tonnage and voila, instant invasion TF.

Up & down the China coast, inter-islands in the Solomons and the PI, maybe; doubt it, but maybe. Even so, the Japanese opening day festivities were most carefully planned, over a long period, and utilized the full set of assets that IJGHQ could requisition, cajole, or outright take, from the commercial economy. Clearly, IJGHQ was somewhat dense, since they acquired the majority of large, fast, capable ships available, and the majority of everything else that was large and capable, although not necessarily fast. They only included about 4 ships < 2,000 GRT in these highly critical operations. Silly, silly IJGHQ.

A good representative of the < 2,000 ton group is a very large, engines-aft, class built in the Kawasaki yards from about 1934, onward; 270’, 1800 – 1900 GRT, 2700 – 2800 DwT, 1785 NCDwT, double expansion, reciprocating, coal burning, 500 NHP, 12 kt max (as if), 9 – 10 kt nominal, with 3800 – 4000 nm fuel mile range (2000 out & 2000 back). Could possibly handle about 200 troops, if shelter deck accommodations were rigged, and the troopies were stuffed in mullet style.

Sea trucks, < 1,000 tons are about 120 - 150’; DwT between 500 and 1500; 325 - 975 NCDwT; a few diesel, most coal; 9 knots nominal; 2000 fuel miles range (1000 out & 1000 back). Could possibly handle a platoon, but in open ocean, needs double wide scuppers for the barf. Not rated for (not insured for) and would likely sink in conditions Beaufort 7 and above (Lloyd’s).

It doesn't seem to me that any extra ships were available.

[JWE]

Statistics be darned. A lot of stats on this issue, mostly not aggregated in a usable form.

However!! Expect a publication, about summer 2008, that deals with Japanese ship utilization in the war years and the tension (hatred) between the IJN/IJA and the commercial sector. One of the co-authors is a contributor to these forums, the other co-authors are very well known and have been misrepresented herein on a regular basis.

We are negotiating mainly with Norton, and the USNI Press. The work is in the form of a monograph, so Norton would be the most likely publisher.

Your auditor has a particular view on the contents of this volume. The ship tables and class structures of the IJMM will be made available on this forum. Credible modders will know how to use the information.

Ciao.

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: JWE

ORIGINAL: Terminus
Adds 2 more. Wonder where all those extra ships are that Sid assured us they have available...?[8|]

Well, I think it’s because Sid has this curious idea that a lot of small ships are more efficient than fewer larger ones, and since Japan had lots of small coasters, fishing boats, and “sea trucks”, you just add up that tonnage and voila, instant invasion TF.

Up & down the China coast, inter-islands in the Solomons and the PI, maybe; doubt it, but maybe. Even so, the Japanese opening day festivities were most carefully planned, over a long period, and utilized the full set of assets that IJGHQ could requisition, cajole, or outright take, from the commercial economy. Clearly, IJGHQ was somewhat dense, since they acquired the majority of large, fast, capable ships available, and the majority of everything else that was large and capable, although not necessarily fast. They only included about 4 ships < 2,000 GRT in these highly critical operations. Silly, silly IJGHQ.

A good representative of the < 2,000 ton group is a very large, engines-aft, class built in the Kawasaki yards from about 1934, onward; 270’, 1800 – 1900 GRT, 2700 – 2800 DwT, 1785 NCDwT, double expansion, reciprocating, coal burning, 500 NHP, 12 kt max (as if), 9 – 10 kt nominal, with 3800 – 4000 nm fuel mile range (2000 out & 2000 back). Could possibly handle about 200 troops, if shelter deck accommodations were rigged, and the troopies were stuffed in mullet style.

Sea trucks, < 1,000 tons are about 120 - 150’; DwT between 500 and 1500; 325 - 975 NCDwT; a few diesel, most coal; 9 knots nominal; 2000 fuel miles range (1000 out & 1000 back). Could possibly handle a platoon, but in open ocean, needs double wide scuppers for the barf. Not rated for (not insured for) and would likely sink in conditions Beaufort 7 and above (Lloyd’s).

It doesn't seem to me that any extra ships were available.

Sea trucks were mainly wartime construction - you don't start with them in numbers. You don't even have any at all in any non RHS scenario. And RHS only gives you two of the several different sizes of them. The first SC unit only appears in May 1942 (representing two vessels). The first SD unit only appears in April 1942 (representing three vessels). Neither is available for a 1941 invasion - and neither is available in numbers any time in 1942. So this speculation is not founded on what I have done or said.

I do not believe that moving a large land unit to mid Pacific would best be done on small ships. Rather I think one might move them on large ships - as Japan did when the War began - a convoy of eight ships passing Formosa Strait caused considerable concern. But the Japanese army used Taan (and to a lesser extent, Cam Rahn Bay and Saigon, and even Bako) as points of departure for the actual invasion transports bound for Malaya. Just like the British in the Falklands war, the QE II was used to carry troops forward, not not to land them. Before that, they re-barked onto smaller vessels.
If Japan took secondary islands prior to taking Oahu - and most plans indicate this was the operational concept - it could have its cake and eat it too. You can even make the final passage in landing craft - and only wave conditions mean they probably would not IRL elect to do that (depending, of course, on the actual conditions).

There is still no room to wiggle on this matter: Japan has far more ships than are required in 1941 and 1942 to do all these operations (SRA, support the economy, invade Hawaii). If you try it in RHS, you are forced to feed your economy in a sense not present in other forms of WITP, but you only get half the ships that are in other forms of WITP to do it with. And your ships are not long legged (unless they were) - no "almost nuclear powered" ship as WITP was when I found it: typically running vastly more range with less fuel at higher than real cruising speeds. Still - I doubt you can find a job for every ship - nor should you. It is nice to have ships to run an unexpected requirement - and it is going to happen you need to ship oil and resources soon after you capture them (unless it is a very short game) - and it is nice not to have to transfer all the ships back off phib ops. I find only about half the offensive ships can transfer in undamaged condition - the other half are lost, damaged, or still required by forward commands - so "extra" ships are nice. But the point is - you have all the ships you need for any reasonable requirement - and more besides. Now I don't care how you figure this - it remains the case - whatever values you use. If you use real loadings - vice WITP code loadings - you will have significantly more ships than if you use game loadings. Because code does not permit anything like real loadings - particularly for Japan.

[JWE]

I don't play RHS.

I have my own mod where ship speeds, endurance, fuel capacity, cargo and troop capacities are representative of what actually obtained in the Japanese merchant marine in 1941.

I have the invasion TF records and have identified the invasion TF ships; not the delivery wagons, but the vessels that put troops, equipment, supplies, on the beach.

Should be able to read about it this coming spring/summer.

[JWE]

ORIGINAL: el cid again

Sea trucks were mainly wartime construction - you don't start with them in numbers. You don't even have any at all in any non RHS scenario. And RHS only gives you two of the several different sizes of them. The first SC unit only appears in May 1942 (representing two vessels). The first SD unit only appears in April 1942 (representing three vessels). Neither is available for a 1941 invasion - and neither is available in numbers any time in 1942. So this speculation is not founded on what I have done or said.

In my scenarios, there are several, but since they are extremely limited in range and capacity, it is not understood how they would be functional.

I do not believe that moving a large land unit to mid Pacific would best be done on small ships. Rather I think one might move them on large ships - as Japan did when the War began - a convoy of eight ships passing Formosa Strait caused considerable concern. But the Japanese army used Taan (and to a lesser extent, Cam Rahn Bay and Saigon, and even Bako) as points of departure for the actual invasion transports bound for Malaya. Just like the British in the Falklands war, the QE II was used to carry troops forward, not not to land them. Before that, they re-barked onto smaller vessels.
If Japan took secondary islands prior to taking Oahu - and most plans indicate this was the operational concept - it could have its cake and eat it too. You can even make the final passage in landing craft - and only wave conditions mean they probably would not IRL elect to do that (depending, of course, on the actual conditions).

Nope, the biggies went to the beach. I have the IJA/IJN TK makeup, and the biggies went to the beach.

There is still no room to wiggle on this matter: Japan has far more ships than are required in 1941 and 1942 to do all these operations (SRA, support the economy, invade Hawaii). If you try it in RHS, you are forced to feed your economy in a sense not present in other forms of WITP, but you only get half the ships that are in other forms of WITP to do it with. And your ships are not long legged (unless they were) - no "almost nuclear powered" ship as WITP was when I found it: typically running vastly more range with less fuel at higher than real cruising speeds. Still - I doubt you can find a job for every ship - nor should you. It is nice to have ships to run an unexpected requirement - and it is going to happen you need to ship oil and resources soon after you capture them (unless it is a very short game) - and it is nice not to have to transfer all the ships back off phib ops. I find only about half the offensive ships can transfer in undamaged condition - the other half are lost, damaged, or still required by forward commands - so "extra" ships are nice. But the point is - you have all the ships you need for any reasonable requirement - and more besides. Now I don't care how you figure this - it remains the case - whatever values you use. If you use real loadings - vice WITP code loadings - you will have significantly more ships than if you use game loadings. Because code does not permit anything like real loadings - particularly for Japan.

A lotta words, a lotta poop. The actual, physical, operational vessels are there for all to see. I have developed a mod where real loadings (troops as well as cargo) are fundamental to play. It's easy. It just takes thought and a bit of understanding of how the code works.

[akdreemer]

ORIGINAL: JWE

So many words, so many mirrors. Decided to bite the bullet and crank the data. Had to do most of it anyway, in the context of out group’s upcoming “A-Day, 3-Way” CPX. Having done so, I thought it would be nice to post the results for other scenario designers. This post has the summary data. If I can get it to work, the next will have the individual ship list (along with each ship’s Lloyd’s registry tonnage).

PI invasion TFs have 135 vessels identified, aggregating a cool 775,000 GRT. Of the 135 vessels identified, only about 21 are < 5000 GRT, and of these, 13 are 4200 - 4900 GRT.

Malaysian invasion TFs have 37 vessels identified, aggregating 270,000 GRT. Of the 37 vessels identified, only 6 are < 5000 GRT, and of these, all are 4200 - 4900 GRT.

CenPac (Makin, Guam, Wake) invasion TFs have 14 vessels identified, aggregating 75,000 GRT. Of the 14 vessels identified, only 6 are < 5000 GRT, and of these, 3 are 4200 - 4900 GRT.

Total, 1,120,000 tons of shipping, representing 186 vessels; for Malaysia and CenPac, these are for assault elements only, for the PI, these include up to the 2d reinforcement elements. These are mainly IJA requisitioned ships, with IJN transports representing about 70,000 GRT of the total.

This averages to about 6000 GRT per vessel. According to the Lloyds Register measurements, a 6000 GRT vessel corresponds, in size and real capacity, to something between our C1 and our C2, if a new model, and equivalent to a Federal or Harriman yard vessel, if a tween-war model (both about 425’ and with a 5000 – 5500 Net Cargo Deadweight capacity, metric).

Japan had about 415 ships > 3999 GRT, total, after deductions for Naval Aux conversions, tankers, and the like. Deducting the 186 vessels from the total, leaves 229 vessels. This 229 total includes all passenger and P&C vessels performing nominal point-to-point trooping duties and all passenger and P&C vessels in near seas service, as well as tankers and 106 identified coal-fired vessels, with 12 knot speed, and 6 – 8000 nm fuel mile range. Deducting these, as well as the tankers (approx 40) and the passenger and P&C vessels (approx 27), leaves 56 vessels of reasonable capacity > 3999 GRT, as the sum total of the Japanese merchant marine, as of Dec. 7, 1941. Woof!

Great work. Looks like back to the modding board again..heheheh

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: JWE

ORIGINAL: el cid again

Sea trucks were mainly wartime construction - you don't start with them in numbers. You don't even have any at all in any non RHS scenario. And RHS only gives you two of the several different sizes of them. The first SC unit only appears in May 1942 (representing two vessels). The first SD unit only appears in April 1942 (representing three vessels). Neither is available for a 1941 invasion - and neither is available in numbers any time in 1942. So this speculation is not founded on what I have done or said.

In my scenarios, there are several, but since they are extremely limited in range and capacity, it is not understood how they would be functional.

See Parillo (The Japanese Merchant Marine and World War II). Sea Trucks, landing craft, native craft, junks, and a variety of other smaller vessels were used for forward area supply. It is hard to model in this game system, but IRL these vessels are pretty good at hiding in places larger ships can not go. Parillo also has a photograph of one disgused as a tiny "island" - and it does not look like any sort of ship at all! You can imagine - if it were making almost no headway - why recon might miss it entirely. Anyway - the general reason that smaller vessels are better for landings also applies to forward logistics: it is wiser to spread your cargo over many packages. Each one must be separately targeted, and any that is lost does not have very much on board. In a way this IS well modeled in the game - although accidentally: if you attack a large group of small vessels - you will virtually never sink them all. There is some truth to that IRL. I once witnessed a "naval battle" between three US Navy destroyers - one of them modern - two modernized WWII gunships - and several hundred (400????) junks. We thought we could cut the SLOC between Malaya and Cambodia - which ran more tonnage to the Viet Cong in Southern Vietnam than the Ho Chi Minh Trail did. They made the crossing by night - and we believed radar gave us an inherant advantage in night combat. We were wrong - and it was a strange battle which - after analysis - we never dared risk again. Some of the junks were armed - apparently with 122mm and 152mm gun howitzers. Trying to use these from a moving, pitching deck - with optical sights - vs naval targets at night - sounds like mission impossible. But numbers count - and we found that they were able to tell where we were well enough to make it dangerous to close to close ranges. On the other hand, we found the number of targets impossible to engage effectively. Disciplined, they did not run as we expected, but continued on to Cambodia - where most got right inshore and we lost them altogether. The SLOC to Cambodia was never cut between then (1968) and the incursion into Cambodia several years later - on land. Officially it was done to cut that line of supply - a tacit admission naval and air power had failed to do so. If we could not cut a SLOC with many small vessels in 1968, imagine trying to do so with WWII era technology. Does this help you understand?

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: JWE

ORIGINAL: el cid again

I do not believe that moving a large land unit to mid Pacific would best be done on small ships. Rather I think one might move them on large ships - as Japan did when the War began - a convoy of eight ships passing Formosa Strait caused considerable concern. But the Japanese army used Taan (and to a lesser extent, Cam Rahn Bay and Saigon, and even Bako) as points of departure for the actual invasion transports bound for Malaya. Just like the British in the Falklands war, the QE II was used to carry troops forward, not not to land them. Before that, they re-barked onto smaller vessels.
If Japan took secondary islands prior to taking Oahu - and most plans indicate this was the operational concept - it could have its cake and eat it too. You can even make the final passage in landing craft - and only wave conditions mean they probably would not IRL elect to do that (depending, of course, on the actual conditions).

Nope, the biggies went to the beach. I have the IJA/IJN TK makeup, and the biggies went to the beach.

This must be a terminology thing. It is somewhere between impractical and impossible to land troops from a truly large passenger vessel. Japan did have a very few of these - none of QE / Normandie size - but some the next tier down. And not one of those was so tasked. Nada. You must be thinking of smaller vessels more like the size we used as APAs.
Further - for the landings on Malaya- the Japanese elected to use a lot of AKs acting as APAs - probably because they were able to handle landing craft (having been designed for that). [Japanese AKs had broad decks - and self loading cranes - and they often stacked landing craft half a dozen high - several abreast fore and aft - resulting in LC counts very similar to our purpose built assault vessels]. I do not believe any truly large passenger vessel has ever been used by any nation for amphibous operations. The largest might be HMS Canberra - which did run into San Carlos Water in 1982. But QE II - which itself is barely a giant - did not.

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: JWE

ORIGINAL: el cid again

A lotta words, a lotta poop. The actual, physical, operational vessels are there for all to see. I have developed a mod where real loadings (troops as well as cargo) are fundamental to play. It's easy. It just takes thought and a bit of understanding of how the code works.

IF that were true, you would admit you were wrong - big time. Since you don't, clearly you did not use real loading values. Japan has perhaps 100% more lift than is required for all operations by the most conservative of estimates - and almost certainly more than that if you allocate shipping with care. We are talking millions of tons of shipping here - never mind they capture 300,000 more in the first months of the war - or are building at a significant rate so more ships appear regularly. Over 5 million tons. If a troop required a ton (in a Tsuji box you get four per ton) - that would be 5 million men worth of lift. Or 5 million tons of cargo (space type tons).