Japans Indonesian volunteers

[m10bob]

http://www.axishistory.com/index.php?id=7428

[el cid again]

There is a good deal of useful information in this link. However, the author has missed some significant salient points.
The first of these is that, in the nature of Japanese institutions, there were different points of view held by different organizations and different individuals. The statement "the Japanese never wished to foster any Indonesian independence movement in the first place" is actually false - because SOME Japanese individuals and institutions intended just that. The view held in common scholarship in the West - that the Pan East Asia Greater Prosperity Sphere - was merely a propaganda concept - and that it did not intend to have truly independent Asian nations (led by Japan of course) in cooperation is quite wrong at its heart: this was a genuine Japanese intellectual movement (one to which Prime Minister Tojo subscribed) and it was wholeheartedly adopted by the Japanese Foreign Ministry in particular, and by elements of the IJA (notably the Nakano School branches dealing with Malay peoples, of whom Indonesians are one, and Filipinos another).

There is some justification for the normal view in the West:

1) It was good wartime propaganda for us to belittle Japanese efforts to befriend neighboring peoples;

2) The IJA decided NOT to put the Foreign Ministry in charge of occupation generally, and gave this duty to IJA commanders (or, because everything Japanese is complex, sometimes IJN commanders, or even Kempetai at certain points - and Kempetai is actually a separate service - with both Army and Navy branches). The attitudes (and ignorance and sometimes greed) of the military officers resulted, de facto, in anything but what the idealists believed in, and in many places it may fairly be said the Japanese practice stamped out all the welcome they had enjoyed when they had arrived.

Even so, Indonesia generally (not yet Indonesia of course) was generally the exception to this rule. So much so that its IJA commander was charged with breaking Japanese law by violation of orders about how to treat native peoples, even arming them. He was investigated and the charge was sustained! But the recommendation of the investigators was to leave him, and his policy, in place, because it served Japan's interests. You get no hint of this in the article - so it is quite misleading. Not that general statements are universally true: all the incidents and individuals named are correctly described, within the limit of what I know.

The greatest omission is that Japanese armed Indonesian forces - which even included air units and artillery units eventually - were able to resist Dutch reoccupation successfully - and never left the field until Independence was formal. By late in the war this was formal Japanese policy - and not just in Indonesia - but only in Indochina was it equally successful. The case of Burma might have been thought to be a shining success - because actual British colonial officers defected with their units - but in the end these units defected back again! [In 1945 they marched out of Rangoon with great fanfair and proceeded to attack Japanese positions! Probably because nothing else was going to spare their lives. These guys did return to power in Burma - but years later - because no one else was organized enough when the British left - and their desendents rule to this day. They called themselves "the club of 42."] The Japanese enjoyed political support in several places - and did not always squander it (see Truk and the Trukese). Indonesia was an Empire - it is still and Empire - and it is very complex - so generalizations are almost always wrong. There were movements against central rule in the outer islands - and these were very different from the movements on Java - which favored central rule. The opposition movements tended to be run by communists, while those in favor of central control tended to be more or less real allies of Japan (if only of convenience). Their leader - not mentioned - one Gen Nasution - might even be a great captain. He figured out earlier than Hose Rial that guerilla war was the way to go - and he won.

[John 3rd]

The article is interesting and it would be interesting to see a couple of manpower points down there...

[el cid again]

There is one at Batavia, Soerabaya, Palembang, Kendari and Amboina in RHS. But only one (each).

[m10bob]

Would it be possible /feasable to give the Japanese garrison units in some of these Indonesian cities to represent these people?

[el cid again]

Actually, there are Indonesian units on BOTH sides in RHS. The Japanese ones are called "the Anti-Dutch Army" [For example The Anti Dutch Army 3rd Brigade slot 1374]- because that is what they were called. These are on Java. In the outlieing islands, there are communist units, and these are classified as Chinese. [One is The Borneo Militia Battalion slot 3069; another is the Sumatra Militia Battalion slot 3025; another is The New Guinea Militia Battalion slot 2973] They are guerilla units - semi-self supplying. There is a similar "Korean Anti-Japanese" army - the First Bn is led by one obscure major Kim Il Sung. We also have Viet Minh units - the first exists in cadre from in the wilderness near Dien Bien Phu when the war begins - and others form up over time. [If Japan occupies all of Indochina, they will appear in Kunming] We also have the Asano Brigade - ethnic Russians under command of a Russian general - a product of the Nakano School (a special operations school specializing in language and culture for IJA operations) - up in Manchukuo (slot 1210).