Comparing aircraft production (CVO baseline revised)

[el cid again]

Now we have put Allied aircraft production on the map, we get statistical reports that are more meaningful and comparable.

After going through the Allied aircraft numbers again for various reasons, it is interesting to note that in the strictly historical scenarios (CVO and BBO families) - the Allies begin the war with about twice the number of aircraft arriving in theater as the Japanese do. That is, Japan gets from about 360 to 378, while the Allies get about 800. This is worse than it sounds like because:

a) Unless the Japanese want to build obsolete aircraft, they must reassign production capacity - and that will drop their production rate at first - typically by 100 or so;

b) The Japanese usually have engine and other constraints which cause the actual number made to be lower than the nominal plant capacity, while the Allies don't have engines and mainly build planes where neither supply nor enemy action will be a factor.

The net effect is that Japan will initially get about 1/3 of the number of aircraft the Allies do.

While there should be a rapid temporary improvement as the Japanese lines regain production numbers, the Allies have very large numbers of new types which will start new production lines. In addition, the older types will be replaced by newer types rapidly. Thus, by early April, 1942, the Allies are producing over 1100 aircraft per month, and already several significant new types have appeared. This is predictable - because the Allied player cannot change it (except he could cause new types not to produce more than 1 per month by never repairing the line up). What the Japanese build depends on lots of choices: most of all by the number and types of engines required by the aircraft he chooses to build, and how available those are? A Japanese player who loves to produce Oscar Is and Zeros is going to get a much higher number of aircraft than one who wants 4 engine transport planes and multi-engine bombers as his focus. It also depends on how many HI points he is willing NOT to invest in other things (e.g. vehicles, armaments, etc). But a balanced approach (more single engine planes, fewer multi engine planes, but significant quantities of both, with due attention to the engine needs BEFORE they arise) can put the Japanese in the 900-1000 range by mid 1942. Which is to say noticably less than the Allies are forced to do - in the best possible year for Japan. Eventually the Allies bring on stream individual aircraft types of superb aircraft which will appear in greater numbers for that one type than total Japanese production at the start of the game: actually a multiple of that. The greatest case is the P-47 - which enjoyed the largest production for a single model of all type.

There is simply no way for Japan to win a direct battle of attrition on the basis of sheer numbers produced. Nor is there any across the board qualitative advantage for Japanese aircraft when the game begins. There are competative aircraft on both sides in almost every category. The Japanese need to figure out how to use force multipliers to have a chance. The most significant one available is interior lines. But it alone is not enough. Another initial force multiplier for Japan is the initiative. If used diligently, it can deny the Allies bases which otherwise would pose significant problems for Japanese interests as early as late 1942. Yet another is a strategy of denial: taking bases and NOT developing them - bases that have no value to Japan per se - simply to deny them to the enemy. A theoretical one is damage the aircraft plants and/or the resources/oil they need to operate. Theoretical because it is doubtful that most of these plants can be significantly disrupted by Japanese forces: they are nearly all beyond Japan's effective reach - and most have supply from rear areas which it is impractical to cut off - short of occupying the hex itself.

The somewhat secret reason that there is a contest at all is that the number of squadrons/groups on both sides which actually can reach the front are remarkably well matched. The Allied advantage in sheer numbers is mainly one that means they can sustain losses - combat or operational - and remain or regain combat effectiveness rapidly - not one that means they will enjoy vast superiority over all airspace. It is only when the number of Japanese squadrons begins to decline (for operational reasons) - while the number of Allied ones continues to grow - that that situation may turn around later in the war. At the same time, the relative improvement of Allied types is greater than for Japanese types - so both quantity and quality begin to go significantly against Japan by 1944. This is probably reflected in a change of the character of operations: 1942 should be a year of Japanese offensives; 1943 should be a swing year; 1944 should be a year of Allied offensives. In large measure this is due to the shifting nature of the air situation. By this time Japan should have lost a significant number of formations, and have many others it is unable to keep fed with enough aircraft of competative quality - while the Allies will have a growning number of ever better air units to feed into the front areas which previously had been more evenly contested.

[m10bob]

This is how it should be!
According to Eric Bergerud, the Japanese did not suffer in 1942 for lack of aircraft, and continued to get new planes to the field to replace the old or missing, but the airfields had damaged planes which were not being repaired from lack of ground crew.
All other air forces had groundcrew going over wrecked planes and cannabalising to get planes aloft with whatever they had.
The Japanese also suffered in that all of their front-line pilots were initially skilled and experienced, so any loss was going to result in replacement by a pilot with much less time in the air, till finally the entire unit suffered in quality.
By 1943, the "elite" formations had already been much diluted and became somewhat average as compared to any other unit, with only surviving "elite" individual pilots standing out, till they too were lost.
Once Sakai returned to air combat, he immediately noticed the difference in the Allied pilots and their planes, and perhaps only was the difference so noticeable by this pilot who had been allowed the temporary hiatus from the front, otherwise we might not have anything to measure the difference by?
Before the war, the Japanese were only passing a small handful of each 1000 pilot entrants, and most were washed out by things totally unassociated with the art of flying.
What might the Japanese have accomplished had they allowed for more trained aviators, even as a "ready reserve" as the Americans did with their vast civilian flight training programs?
In the late thirties and early forties, in the Army Air Corps and Army Air Force, many pilots (my dad included) were washed out at Kelly and Randolph fields, also sometimes for non-flying reasons, but some of them were either already civilian pilots, or were offered other aircrew-type positions, (not just returned home, or sent to the infantry, as was too common in the Japanese training structure.)

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: m10bob

This is how it should be!
According to Eric Bergerud, the Japanese did not suffer in 1942 for lack of aircraft, and continued to get new planes to the field to replace the old or missing, but the airfields had damaged planes which were not being repaired from lack of ground crew.
All other air forces had groundcrew going over wrecked planes and cannabalising to get planes aloft with whatever they had.

The Japanese also suffered in that all of their front-line pilots were initially skilled and experienced, so any loss was going to result in replacement by a pilot with much less time in the air, till finally the entire unit suffered in quality.
By 1943, the "elite" formations had already been much diluted and became somewhat average as compared to any other unit, with only surviving "elite" individual pilots standing out, till they too were lost.
Once Sakai returned to air combat, he immediately noticed the difference in the Allied pilots and their planes, and perhaps only was the difference so noticeable by this pilot who had been allowed the temporary hiatus from the front, otherwise we might not have anything to measure the difference by?
Before the war, the Japanese were only passing a small handful of each 1000 pilot entrants, and most were washed out by things totally unassociated with the art of flying.
What might the Japanese have accomplished had they allowed for more trained aviators, even as a "ready reserve" as the Americans did with their vast civilian flight training programs?
In the late thirties and early forties, in the Army Air Corps and Army Air Force, many pilots (my dad included) were washed out at Kelly and Randolph fields, also sometimes for non-flying reasons, but some of them were either already civilian pilots, or were offered other aircrew-type positions, (not just returned home, or sent to the infantry, as was too common in the Japanese training structure.)

It is generally argued that the Japanese did not inherantly have to suffer from lack of trained pilots. Instead, they failed to organize training properly. And that in spite of proposals from pilots in time to have done so. The US also had a significant and effective reserve system - and while Japan had a form of this - it was not until late in the war that civil pilots were properly organized to conduct basic flight training for new inductees - by which time there was little fuel to train at any level - or to fly operations. It is also usually said by analysts that the policy of rotating experienced pilots back to train others - SOP in the US - was generally absent in Japan - and this also was a mistake - but not the only possible policy. Another aspect of this is that the JNAF was organized so it took too long to train a pilot - and the same number of facilities, aircraft and instructors could have turned out 2 or 3 times more pilots not trained to quite the same level. Much of this is somewhat built into our game system too. Certainly it is possible to run Japan out of gas - and often we see it in test games. Equally certainly, hard code assumes bad things happen to Japanese pilot quality late in 1942 - not to mention that it forces on Japan a kamakaze policy that means ALL units convert by Nov 1942 (if up to AI) - and an air force with NO fighters, transports, search planes, bombers, name it is not useful. Also, the built in pilot table for default air unit ratings assumes Japanese numbers go down over time. Another problem was that the two services would draft experts needed by the other service: a critical aviation worker of any sort might be drafted - into the infantry no less - and his job went to a person not as qualified. More rational organzation did eventually get formed - under the ruthless pressure of modern warfare - but it was by then too late to matter very much.

[el cid again]

Two long game tests on different machines (using RHSAIO) have got to 1944.
This because it runs better for AI than other scenarios. SOME Allied types produce more planes in this scenario than in BBO or CVO families - but many are identical to BBO and CVO. Figure about 15% difference.

Through 1942 and early 1943, the Allies consistently have more factory capacity on line than the Japanese - but the ratio never quite reaches 2:1. Since the Japanese do not get all their capacity to produce, de facto aircraft reaching the game probably exceed 2:1 - but not by much.

Late in 1943, two different things change:

1) The Allied ratio of theoretical factory capacity increases, heads toward 3:1 - and gets there early in 1944.

2) The Japanese ratio of actual aircraft production to theoretical factory capacity decreases, and appears to become remarkably poor. Part of this is engine production issues. Part of it is the constant upgrade issue: as you reset a factory for a new type, it must start building capacity all over again. [The Allies have many types that come on stream as replacements - at the full rate of the replaced aircraft - and sometimes additional production - which builds up] This means that the de facto ratio of planes reaching the map goes to somewhere below 6:1 - tentatively it seems to be about 10:1.


These values are somewhat subject to player control in human games. The Allies can NOT allow some types of factories to repair - and that will decrease their production rates of those types - and thus the total for all aircraft. The Japanese can micromanage (which I didn't do) their economy to feed more HI into aircraft production and engine production - and attempt to optimize where what engine/aircraft is produced. This will have dramatic effects on production - and can be done to very different priorities than I (a balanced force combined arms theorist) used. Thus, a focus on single engine fighters will increase number produced - so will a focus on older aircraft (e.g. A6M2 and Ki-43 I). OTH a focus on 4 engine transports, bombers and flying boats will dramatically reduce the number of aircraft produced. So will a focus on "I want a lot of the latest type - using newer engine types." And shutting down armaments and vehicle production in favor of aircraft production will hurt armaments and vehicle production (duh). This post is only meant to provide a quick and dirty indicator of the impact of switching to on map Allied aircraft production - and the kind of ratios to expect.

[Mike Scholl]

ORIGINAL: el cid again
It is generally argued that the Japanese did not inherantly have to suffer from lack of trained pilots. Instead, they failed to organize training properly. And that in spite of proposals from pilots in time to have done so. The US also had a significant and effective reserve system - and while Japan had a form of this - it was not until late in the war that civil pilots were properly organized to conduct basic flight training for new inductees - by which time there was little fuel to train at any level - or to fly operations. It is also usually said by analysts that the policy of rotating experienced pilots back to train others - SOP in the US - was generally absent in Japan - and this also was a mistake - but not the only possible policy. Another aspect of this is that the JNAF was organized so it took too long to train a pilot - and the same number of facilities, aircraft and instructors could have turned out 2 or 3 times more pilots not trained to quite the same level. Much of this is somewhat built into our game system too. Certainly it is possible to run Japan out of gas - and often we see it in test games. Equally certainly, hard code assumes bad things happen to Japanese pilot quality late in 1942 - not to mention that it forces on Japan a kamakaze policy that means ALL units convert by Nov 1942 (if up to AI) - and an air force with NO fighters, transports, search planes, bombers, name it is not useful. Also, the built in pilot table for default air unit ratings assumes Japanese numbers go down over time. Another problem was that the two services would draft experts needed by the other service: a critical aviation worker of any sort might be drafted - into the infantry no less - and his job went to a person not as qualified. More rational organzation did eventually get formed - under the ruthless pressure of modern warfare - but it was by then too late to matter very much.

Actually Cid, they did. On 12/07/1941 the IJN did not have enough aircrew available to man the A/C it had available. There is good reason for this. Japan traditionally sought to fight a "short victorious war". And in the short run, those highly-trained aircrew would have an advantage. What the Japanese failed to come to terms with was the notion that in taking on the Western Allies they might well end up in a long war of attrition. As they had the proverbial "snowball's chance" of winning such an encounter, they simply stuck their heads in the sand and ignored the possibility. The war would be short, superior skill and spirit would triumph, and all would be well....

America took just the opposite approach. Huge numbers of adequately-trained forces would be needed to "win through to the inevitable triumph"..., and the process of gearing up to produce them was well underway when the war started. Americans had created the entire concept of "mass production", they were the world's past masters at implementing and managing it. And they applied it to everything. They were going to give Japan exactly the kind of war the Japanese were least prepared for..., the kind they couldn't possibly win.

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

ORIGINAL: el cid again
It is generally argued that the Japanese did not inherantly have to suffer from lack of trained pilots. Instead, they failed to organize training properly. And that in spite of proposals from pilots in time to have done so. The US also had a significant and effective reserve system - and while Japan had a form of this - it was not until late in the war that civil pilots were properly organized to conduct basic flight training for new inductees - by which time there was little fuel to train at any level - or to fly operations. It is also usually said by analysts that the policy of rotating experienced pilots back to train others - SOP in the US - was generally absent in Japan - and this also was a mistake - but not the only possible policy. Another aspect of this is that the JNAF was organized so it took too long to train a pilot - and the same number of facilities, aircraft and instructors could have turned out 2 or 3 times more pilots not trained to quite the same level. Much of this is somewhat built into our game system too. Certainly it is possible to run Japan out of gas - and often we see it in test games. Equally certainly, hard code assumes bad things happen to Japanese pilot quality late in 1942 - not to mention that it forces on Japan a kamakaze policy that means ALL units convert by Nov 1942 (if up to AI) - and an air force with NO fighters, transports, search planes, bombers, name it is not useful. Also, the built in pilot table for default air unit ratings assumes Japanese numbers go down over time. Another problem was that the two services would draft experts needed by the other service: a critical aviation worker of any sort might be drafted - into the infantry no less - and his job went to a person not as qualified. More rational organzation did eventually get formed - under the ruthless pressure of modern warfare - but it was by then too late to matter very much.

Actually Cid, they did. On 12/07/1941 the IJN did not have enough aircrew available to man the A/C it had available. There is good reason for this. Japan traditionally sought to fight a "short victorious war". And in the short run, those highly-trained aircrew would have an advantage. What the Japanese failed to come to terms with was the notion that in taking on the Western Allies they might well end up in a long war of attrition. As they had the proverbial "snowball's chance" of winning such an encounter, they simply stuck their heads in the sand and ignored the possibility. The war would be short, superior skill and spirit would triumph, and all would be well....

America took just the opposite approach. Huge numbers of adequately-trained forces would be needed to "win through to the inevitable triumph"..., and the process of gearing up to produce them was well underway when the war started. Americans had created the entire concept of "mass production", they were the world's past masters at implementing and managing it. And they applied it to everything. They were going to give Japan exactly the kind of war the Japanese were least prepared for..., the kind they couldn't possibly win.

This is certainly well founded in Western - particularly US - historical writing. It is the way I was taught, what most historians believed to be the case, and a thoroughly conventional point of view. It isn't, however, the whole story. In Zero - the one by two Japanese Zero pilots - not the one by Makesh about the airplane - the tale is told of a formal proposal to organize JNAF differently. The same story is told by Fujida - but he is telling it second hand - while Zero is written by the person who made the proposal as a co author. In Francillon, you will read (briefly) under the trainers about how ultimately the services enlisted flying schools to train vast numbers of pilots. That organization succeeded - but because of a shortage of aviation spirit - those pilots did not get sufficient flight time to be very useful late in the war. This ranks with "we converted the auto industry to make airplanes, but the Japanese didn't" I was taught - growing up INSIDE the Detroit auto industry - among former members of the USAAF. Nice story - but utterly false: Japan not only did the same - it did so too much - failing to see tanks as war winning weapons. By the time that mistake was corrected, it was too late. Japan ended up with more aircraft than it could crew or fuel - and fewer tanks than it needed. Japan was not unable to train even tens of thousands of pilots - and eventually did so organize. It made the choice not to - and the reasons Mike gives probably are correct about why. I myself agree with the point of view that Japan should seek a "short victorious war" - the Japanese name for the Russo Japanese War (FYI) - but like most US thinkers - I prefer to hedge the bet - in case things go wrong. In war - things can - and often or usually do - go wrong. In a war with a power 10 times the economic size - one should hedge the bet. [We may get a chance to fight a bigger economic power this century - lets not forget]

[el cid again]

A bit of a surprise for me is a dramatic increase in Allied aircraft operational attrition - so that by July they have aggregate losses almost equal to Japan's for the war. This is because

1) There are many more Allied aircraft now
2) Many Allied aircraft are flying offensive missions and getting damaged
3) In AIO Japan has significantly enhanced AAA

The first two factors will also affect CVO and BBO families, but the third will not - so expect somewhat lower Allied aircraft attrition - but still a dramatic change - from more than an order of magnitude less to comparable - and likely to exceed Japanese totals by the end of 1944.

Another surprise: AI TRIES to change Japanese engines - but utterly fails to do so in a competent way. It is lack of engines most of all that messes up Japanes aircraft production - although apparently supply points is also a factor.
In mid 1944 theoretical industrial capacity for aircraft in theater is about 3:1 - and yet more Allied production is coming on stream. Many Allied single models now have three figure totals - F6Fs are running over 300.

For the first time, in game terms, air air losses favor the Allies. This should only get worse, in spite of the fact AIO has better than history choices for Japanese fighters. [Note air to air losses are not just fighter vs fighter losses; as IRL it is all types, and that makes the data hard to interpret. Note also that player games will have very different losses because a lot depends on operational methods - do you escort better than AI does ? etc]

The real "secret" of why EOS family scenarios give Japan more power is that the JAAF and JNAF can share aircraft types more than they generally did. This is combined with a focus on a really superb Japanese fighter design - the Ki-44 - and the adoption for interim production of the Me-109E (or anyway a variant of it) - until the Ki-44 becomes available. The Ki-84, the J2M2, the N1K1-Jb - all these really happened IRL - but later in the war. This early focus on 20mm armed fighters is why Japan is more competative in the air in the early period. Since this is NOT the case in the CVO and BBO families, look for the air air losses to turn agains Japan much earlier - around mid 1942 - when playing those "strictly historical" scenarios. The assumptions for them are more strict: you cannot have an aircraft that was not really produced, even if it could have been (e.g. the Me-109); nor can you have an aircraft in a unit which really had a different one (thus, you get more units with Ki-41 Is or units wait to upgrade to a Jack, Shinden, etc, rather than early availablilty of Me-109s or Ki-44s).

[Mike Scholl]

ORIGINAL: el cid again
This ranks with "we converted the auto industry to make airplanes, but the Japanese didn't" I was taught - growing up INSIDE the Detroit auto industry - among former members of the USAAF. Nice story - but utterly false: Japan not only did the same - it did so too much - failing to see tanks as war winning weapons.

One minor problem with this observation, Cid. The entire Japanese automotive industry produced far fewer vehicles in a YEAR than the US did in a WEEK! America - 2,489,085 vs. Japan - 32,744. The figures are for 1938..., when the US was still mired in the Depression. The Japanese automobile industry was small and backwards as the rest of her consumer economy....

[Mike Scholl]

ORIGINAL: el cid again

A bit of a surprise for me is a dramatic increase in Allied aircraft operational attrition - so that by July they have aggregate losses almost equal to Japan's for the war. This is because

1) There are many more Allied aircraft now
2) Many Allied aircraft are flying offensive missions and getting damaged
3) In AIO Japan has significantly enhanced AAA

The first two factors will also affect CVO and BBO families, but the third will not - so expect somewhat lower Allied aircraft attrition - but still a dramatic change - from more than an order of magnitude less to comparable - and likely to exceed Japanese totals by the end of 1944.

Another surprise: AI TRIES to change Japanese engines - but utterly fails to do so in a competent way. It is lack of engines most of all that messes up Japanes aircraft production - although apparently supply points is also a factor.
In mid 1944 theoretical industrial capacity for aircraft in theater is about 3:1 - and yet more Allied production is coming on stream. Many Allied single models now have three figure totals - F6Fs are running over 300.

For the first time, in game terms, air air losses favor the Allies. This should only get worse, in spite of the fact AIO has better than history choices for Japanese fighters. [Note air to air losses are not just fighter vs fighter losses; as IRL it is all types, and that makes the data hard to interpret. Note also that player games will have very different losses because a lot depends on operational methods - do you escort better than AI does ? etc]

The real "secret" of why EOS family scenarios give Japan more power is that the JAAF and JNAF can share aircraft types more than they generally did. This is combined with a focus on a really superb Japanese fighter design - the Ki-44 - and the adoption for interim production of the Me-109E (or anyway a variant of it) - until the Ki-44 becomes available. The Ki-84, the J2M2, the N1K1-Jb - all these really happened IRL - but later in the war. This early focus on 20mm armed fighters is why Japan is more competative in the air in the early period. Since this is NOT the case in the CVO and BBO families, look for the air air losses to turn agains Japan much earlier - around mid 1942 - when playing those "strictly historical" scenarios. The assumptions for them are more strict: you cannot have an aircraft that was not really produced, even if it could have been (e.g. the Me-109); nor can you have an aircraft in a unit which really had a different one (thus, you get more units with Ki-41 Is or units wait to upgrade to a Jack, Shinden, etc, rather than early availablilty of Me-109s or Ki-44s).

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

ORIGINAL: el cid again
This ranks with "we converted the auto industry to make airplanes, but the Japanese didn't" I was taught - growing up INSIDE the Detroit auto industry - among former members of the USAAF. Nice story - but utterly false: Japan not only did the same - it did so too much - failing to see tanks as war winning weapons.

One minor problem with this observation, Cid. The entire Japanese automotive industry produced far fewer vehicles in a YEAR than the US did in a WEEK! America - 2,489,085 vs. Japan - 32,744. The figures are for 1938..., when the US was still mired in the Depression. The Japanese automobile industry was small and backwards as the rest of her consumer economy....

It was not large in 1938. It was not backwards. In the 1930s Japan led the world in developing practical diesel engines for motor vehicles - and our adoption of them POST war shows it was a good idea. Japan also converted 100% of civil vehicles to self fueling - a feat no other nation ever did. Japan's ideas on APCs either got copied or reinvented - among other places here. Goliath is famous as a German concept - but it existed first in Japan. Backwards is falsely derogatory, and inappropriate for a technology leader in its own right.

I worked for Chevrolet Engineering (at the GM Prooving Grounds at Milford, Michigan) in the 1970s. Chevrolet was still very proud - and pointed out that "if you break up GM, Chevrolet would STILL be the biggest automobile company in the world." No more - GM is not biggest - nor is any US automaker. Toyota is. In those days a major run for a major brand was 2 million units - that because the best dies have a life of 2 million stampings. Yet we did not laugh at US production rates in 1938 - or 1928 - or 1918. And US capacity in 1938 compared with 1945 changed dramatically (although, to be fair, one should sum the automotive and aircraft industries). So did Japanese capacity. Japan did better than Germany did - relative to the size of its industry - again if you sum aircraft and automotive industries. Just what fraction should be aircraft, what fraction tanks, what fraction trucks - these one might change with different strategies. But the industrial performance per se is very impressive in just four cases in WWII: the USA, UK, USSR and Japan. All four nations had problems - and made mistakes - and had things not go as planned - if you get into the nitty gritty details. But backwards is not a term that should objectively be applied to any of them. In fact, since a majority of Japanese automotive designs were licenced copies or modifications of US ones - and the vast majority licenced produced copies or modifications of foreign ones - they can hardly objectively said to be more backwards than those designs they were copies of. And the Japanese had quite original vehicles very competently executed. The TU series of military vehicles - designed in 1934 if I remember right - had more than 50 different variations - and was the foundation of the motorization of the IJA. There was a later series - designed in 1938 if I recall correctly - that was nearly as prolific, which was more efficient to produce, and which was built on an even larger scale. The Japanese were the first to dieselize tanks - a practice that almost became universal after WWII - because diesels are both more efficient and less fire prone than gasoline engines. Japan deliberately decided to develop the diesel for all miliatry vehicle families, and specifically in a form that worked in the cold weather of the North - both ahead of and independently from other national technology programs. Japan developed a number of alternative fuel programs in the 1930s - and we were investigating these as late as the 1970s. Pejorative terms like backwards are based substantially on ignorance of the actual industrial institutions and their people.

I remember a case where one Japanese dealer was selling vastly more US made cars than any other. We sent a technical team to Japan to find out why? The dealer somewhate sheepishly confessed: "We tell our customers these cars are not assembled to American standards. Instead, that they are built to Japanese standards. And they are." He then took the team to his facility: they completely disassembled every vehicle, and reassembled it! I remember another case where I determined an adjustment was required after something was hot or it would not be set right in use: I called the company and asked for "quality control." They didn't understand. Eventually I found out they had no such concept. While in the US a similar assembly would not work 90% of the time, and had to becarefully examined and modified by technicians (so in the end 96% of them worked), in Japan the same assembly worked 98% of the time, in spite of no inspection, never mind inspection by technicians. We would not dare organize in such a way because our workers were nothing like as diligent. Once I saw a girl doing something I didn't understand. I asked "what are you doing?" She replied "I don't know." Then I said, "OK, tell me what you are working on, and I will figure out what you are doing." She replied again "I don't know." Finally, I asked "So how do you know you are doing it right?" She answered by showing me a piece of notebook paper. It said "take parts from box 6 and put them on board 3" or something like that. The pretty little colored bands on resisters were just art to her - not a color code. The band on a diode was not an indication of which direction it worked - she had a 50-50 shot at putting it in backwards. The dot by one of the legs for a transistor had no meaning for her - she had a 2/3 chance of putting it in the wrong way. These girls mostly listened on FM radios to soap opras on TV - just the sound track - and paid no attention to the tasks they did - which they didn't understand in any useful sense. Not once in Japan did I witness similar production "methods." Our arrogance led to our loss of leadership in many industries, and the automotive industry in particular - and I told Chevrolet Engineering it inevitably must do so if we didn't take others in general - and Japan in particular - seriously.

[Mike Scholl]

ORIGINAL: el cid again

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

ORIGINAL: el cid again
This ranks with "we converted the auto industry to make airplanes, but the Japanese didn't" I was taught - growing up INSIDE the Detroit auto industry - among former members of the USAAF. Nice story - but utterly false: Japan not only did the same - it did so too much - failing to see tanks as war winning weapons.

One minor problem with this observation, Cid. The entire Japanese automotive industry produced far fewer vehicles in a YEAR than the US did in a WEEK! America - 2,489,085 vs. Japan - 32,744. The figures are for 1938..., when the US was still mired in the Depression. The Japanese automobile industry was small and backwards as the rest of her consumer economy....

It was not large in 1938. It was not backwards. In the 1930s Japan led the world in developing practical diesel engines for motor vehicles - and our adoption of them POST war shows it was a good idea. Japan also converted 100% of civil vehicles to self fueling - a feat no other nation ever did. Japan's ideas on APCs either got copied or reinvented - among other places here. Goliath is famous as a German concept - but it existed first in Japan. Backwards is falsely derogatory, and inappropriate for a technology leader in its own right.

"Small and backwards" in terms of production. Japan had no mass market civilian economy..., so had no reason to develope a "mass production" economy. The Military in control of her economy pushed production as much as they could in areas of heavy industry and A/C production; but the Generals really didn't understand economics or production techniques---and wouldn't listen to the Industrialists who did.

Even the great "miracles" of A/C production in 1944/45 aren't as miraculous as they look. The numbers increased dramatically, but the "weight of airframes" produced much less so. Much of the increase is due to the switchover to small, light, more easily produced aircraft (primarily fighters).

[el cid again]

Well - I would focus on other aspects of production - but come to a similar conclusion: weight of aircraft produced per ton of aluminum (or engine per ton of aluminum) for example. For me that is an indication of efficiency. Yet many of the choices made make sense in the particular context of the conditions in which they are made - and that is the most you can ever ask of any designer, industrialist, etc. It ought to be embarassing for us that some of the products of that industry were as competative as they were - or in some instances - absolutely superior to our products. I am much more impressed that there were so many adequate and competent products - and I think that is the true measure of wether or not 'backwards' is objectively warranted.

One of the surprising journeys I made in my life was going from what it meant to grow up in Detroit - tutored intensely in the history of US technology by men who were very proud of it (Greenfield Village and the Henry Ford Museum were my schoolyard - and I read Steinmetz - one of the personal associates of Henry Ford - when in sixth grade) - to a detail study of wartime Japanese atomic technology and industry. When I found material on the meeting at Navy Park (a place in Tokyo) in the summer of 1942 - a gathering of naval officers and scientists under the direction of Japan's greatest physicist (one Dr Nishina) - I found the conclusion that "Japan had a better shot at atomic power and weapons using atomic principles than Germany did" laughable - and assumed it was a peculiar Japanese form of hubris. Eventually, I learned that Japan did a great deal better than Germany did - on far less funding - and was in many respects in a race with the USA. There were concepts concieved in Japan first (the most famous - and this isn't unknown either - being the fusion bomb), others more developed in Japan than in the USA (we didn't come up with something comparable to the 250 kg radiological bomb until the 1950s and we never produced a similar scale heavy water production program- although Canada did long after the war). Gen Groves went into a panic when both Magic intercepts and surrendered materials (from U-234, a submarine) indicated a significant Japanese atomic research program was being aided by Germany. One British reviewer (Philip Henshall - see The Nuclear Axis and Vengeance) believes this may be the reason the US rushed to drop atom bombs on a Japan doomed to defeat in the near term. That was ephiphany for me: remembering my own hubris, my CERTAIN "knowledge" the Japanese conclusion at Navy Park was wrong - but instead I had been wrong and they had self evaluated correctly - I try very hard not to repeat that mistake.

[Mike Scholl]

ORIGINAL: el cid again

Well - I would focus on other aspects of production - but come to a similar conclusion: weight of aircraft produced per ton of aluminum (or engine per ton of aluminum) for example. For me that is an indication of efficiency.

I would have looked at effeciency in terms of "Output of Aircraft in Pounds per Man-Day of Labour". In those terms, in 1944, (her best year of production) the Japanese produced 0.71 lbs, the US 2.76 lbs. Good reflection not just of the numbers produced, but the size and complexity of the aircraft themselves. And shows that US workers were almost 4 times as "efficient" as those in Japan. Doesn't mean they worked any harder..., just shows America's great lead over the rest of the world in the science and practical adaptation of mass production technology.

I make no claim for the US in the realms of "pure" or "theoretical" research..., our forte was "applied" science and engineering. Unfortunately for the Japanese, our partner Great Britian did excel in pure research (pennicilin, the cavity magnetron, etc).., and were able to hand the "blueprints" to America to turn out in massive amounts.

[ChezDaJez]

Even the great "miracles" of A/C production in 1944/45 aren't as miraculous as they look. The numbers increased dramatically, but the "weight of airframes" produced much less so. Much of the increase is due to the switchover to small, light, more easily produced aircraft (primarily fighters).

If you are solely looking at "average" airframe weight, you would be correct. However, Japan built 2.5 times as many multi-engined COMBAT aircraft in 1944 as they did in 1942. This does not include trainers and transport aircraft.... (if it did the ratio would be even greater).

In 1944, Japan produced 28180 aircraft according to the USSBS of which 18324 were combat aircraft. Compare that to 1942 when Japan produced only 8861 aircraft, of which 5170 were for combat.

However, I definitely agree that Japan's production methods were not as efficient they were in the U.S. Even before the Home Islands suffered air raids, their production methods consisted of many, many small shops scattered throughout the land. While that in itself is not particularly bad (we call it outsourcing today), the transportation system used to get those parts to where they were needed was woefully inadequate for the task. Just to get the aircraft from the factory to the airfield was a challenge.

According to Akira Yoshimura, author of "Zero Fighter", the A6M Reisens were delivered the 48 km to Kagamigahara Airfield from the Nagoya Aircraft Works using oxcarts.

I'll quote exactly what he says:

"The oxcarts moved slowly along the main street. On the uneven, stony road, the iron-rimmed wheels ground and rattled loudly. The loads swayed heavily. Progress was slow. It would take twenty-four hours, includinf a few hours for a rest to cover the forty-eight kilometers to the airfield.

It seems astonishing that a modern, high-speed fighter should be carried to its test field on an oxcart, but despite objections, the Nagoya Aircraft Works had no other choice. In the first place, the Nagoya Aircraft Works had no adjoining airfield of its own. An airfield needed a vast site and the land was simply not available. As the Nagoya factory of the Aichi Aircraft Compnay and the Himeji factory of the Kawanishi Aircraft Company also had no airfields, however, the Mitsubishi plant did not feel badly about this lack. Then there was the fact that methods of transportation alternative to oxcarts had proven inadequate.

Trucks had been tried. A truck took only two hours to cover the distance to Kagamigahara airfield. Out of Nagoya, the roads were so rough that aircraft carried on trucks had been damaged by strong shocks and vibration. Horse-drawn carts had also been tried. Horses made the trip in twelve hours. But the possibility of stampeded made it too risky to entrust delicate aircraft fuselages to horses.

The narrowness of the roads in parts also created problems for travel by means other than oxcart. In the town of Komaki, halfway along the route, the loads grazed the eaves of the houses as they passed between..."

And so on... and this was in Sept 1939.

Chez

[Mike Scholl]

ORIGINAL: ChezDaJez

Even the great "miracles" of A/C production in 1944/45 aren't as miraculous as they look. The numbers increased dramatically, but the "weight of airframes" produced much less so. Much of the increase is due to the switchover to small, light, more easily produced aircraft (primarily fighters).

If you are solely looking at "average" airframe weight, you would be correct. However, Japan built 2.5 times as many multi-engined COMBAT aircraft in 1944 as they did in 1942. This does not include trainers and transport aircraft.... (if it did the ratio would be even greater). True..., but even by the figures you cite, they built more than 3.5 times as many Combat A/C in 1944---so the percentage of single-engined planes increased. And even the multi-engined A/C included nothing of the size or sophistication of the B-29.

In 1944, Japan produced 28180 aircraft according to the USSBS of which 18324 were combat aircraft. Compare that to 1942 when Japan produced only 8861 aircraft, of which 5170 were for combat.

However, I definitely agree that Japan's production methods were not as efficient they were in the U.S. Even before the Home Islands suffered air raids, their production methods consisted of many, many small shops scattered throughout the land. While that in itself is not particularly bad (we call it outsourcing today), the transportation system used to get those parts to where they were needed was woefully inadequate for the task. Just to get the aircraft from the factory to the airfield was a challenge.

According to Akira Yoshimura, author of "Zero Fighter", the A6M Reisens were delivered the 48 km to Kagamigahara Airfield from the Nagoya Aircraft Works using oxcarts.

I'll quote exactly what he says:

"The oxcarts moved slowly along the main street. On the uneven, stony road, the iron-rimmed wheels ground and rattled loudly. The loads swayed heavily. Progress was slow. It would take twenty-four hours, includinf a few hours for a rest to cover the forty-eight kilometers to the airfield.

It seems astonishing that a modern, high-speed fighter should be carried to its test field on an oxcart, but despite objections, the Nagoya Aircraft Works had no other choice. In the first place, the Nagoya Aircraft Works had no adjoining airfield of its own. An airfield needed a vast site and the land was simply not available. As the Nagoya factory of the Aichi Aircraft Company and the Himeji factory of the Kawanishi Aircraft Company also had no airfields, however, the Mitsubishi plant did not feel badly about this lack. Then there was the fact that methods of transportation alternative to oxcarts had proven inadequate. I don't find this particularly astonishing..., California had a lot more paved roads than Japan. US Civil Engineering was far ahead of most of the world in skill and equipment.

Trucks had been tried. A truck took only two hours to cover the distance to Kagamigahara airfield. Out of Nagoya, the roads were so rough that aircraft carried on trucks had been damaged by strong shocks and vibration. Horse-drawn carts had also been tried. Horses made the trip in twelve hours. But the possibility of stampeded made it too risky to entrust delicate aircraft fuselages to horses.

The narrowness of the roads in parts also created problems for travel by means other than oxcart. In the town of Komaki, halfway along the route, the loads grazed the eaves of the houses as they passed between..."

And so on... and this was in Sept 1939. Perfect example of Japan's basic problems. By dint of concentration of effort she had stayed current (and in a few cases, ahead) with the rest of the world in many types of military hardware. But to do so, the rest of her economy was starved, as was her population. When the time came to expand during the war, she had much less economic "slack" to mobilize

Chez

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

ORIGINAL: el cid again

Well - I would focus on other aspects of production - but come to a similar conclusion: weight of aircraft produced per ton of aluminum (or engine per ton of aluminum) for example. For me that is an indication of efficiency.

I would have looked at effeciency in terms of "Output of Aircraft in Pounds per Man-Day of Labour". In those terms, in 1944, (her best year of production) the Japanese produced 0.71 lbs, the US 2.76 lbs. Good reflection not just of the numbers produced, but the size and complexity of the aircraft themselves. And shows that US workers were almost 4 times as "efficient" as those in Japan. Doesn't mean they worked any harder..., just shows America's great lead over the rest of the world in the science and practical adaptation of mass production technology.

I make no claim for the US in the realms of "pure" or "theoretical" research..., our forte was "applied" science and engineering. Unfortunately for the Japanese, our partner Great Britian did excel in pure research (pennicilin, the cavity magnetron, etc).., and were able to hand the "blueprints" to America to turn out in massive amounts.

I am forced to agree here - and actually I didn't say what I was remembering correctly: I was remembering pounds per man-day data but forgot exactly what it was.

I also must agree that the US science war was dominated by experimentalists, not theoriticians. In Japan - they often solved problems - correctly - on the blackboard. In the US the same problem took a lot more time, a lot more money, a series of measurements, and the result as not as precise. But we still got there. [I often wonder, though, if we might not have had better cooperation between theoretical and experimental physicists].

I have one quibble: while the British did give us the cavity magnetron, they did not invent it. It was one of the last things sent out of France to UK before the surrender! And - FYI - the cavity magnetron was independently invented in Japan.

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: ChezDaJez


However, I definitely agree that Japan's production methods were not as efficient they were in the U.S. Even before the Home Islands suffered air raids, their production methods consisted of many, many small shops scattered throughout the land. While that in itself is not particularly bad (we call it outsourcing today), the transportation system used to get those parts to where they were needed was woefully inadequate for the task. Just to get the aircraft from the factory to the airfield was a challenge.

Chez

The first prototype Zero went to the airfield for its first flight - on an oxcart! [Zero - the one about the plane, not the one about the air war; I think this is also mentioned by Francillon]

Too fast - I see you got that - from yet another source.

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

ORIGINAL: ChezDaJez

I don't find this particularly astonishing..., California had a lot more paved roads than Japan. US Civil Engineering was far ahead of most of the world in skill and equipment.[/b]

Chez

Actually it really depends on the subject. Japanese audiences were offended by The Bridge Over the River Kwai - not because of the allegations of brutality - it is big business selling tours of the Burma Siam RR today on the portion of the route still extant - but because of the allegation the Japanese needed help in RR engineering. The Japanese built the longest "under ocean" RR tunnel in the world in the 1930s - between Kyushu and Honshu. Today the longest one connects Hokkaido and Honshu. The famous high-speed Japanese RR system was designed in the 1930s, was delayed by the war, and has no comparaison in the USA (although it does in France). I grew up hearing the things Mike says - and believed them utterly - until I was stationed in Japan and learned it was essentially propaganda unrelated to the truth. Truth does not give automatic superiority in technology to the USA, not even with respect to Japan, not even in the 1930s and 1940s.

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl


The narrowness of the roads in parts also created problems for travel by means other than oxcart. In the town of Komaki, halfway along the route, the loads grazed the eaves of the houses as they passed between..."

And so on... and this was in Sept 1939. Perfect example of Japan's basic problems. By dint of concentration of effort she had stayed current (and in a few cases, ahead) with the rest of the world in many types of military hardware. But to do so, the rest of her economy was starved, as was her population. When the time came to expand during the war, she had much less economic "slack" to mobilize

Chez

[/quote]

But also a perfect example of a cultural - actually geographical - misunderstanding. Japan has less tillable land than any other first world country. It has less land suitable for major industrial facilities than any other first world country. It has almost no land suitable for wide roads. Japan has an extraordinary amount of mountains - very rough mountains - and these sorts of things are as daunting for our engineers as for theirs.

[Nikademus]

ORIGINAL: el cid again

I have one quibble: while the British did give us the cavity magnetron, they did not invent it. It was one of the last things sent out of France to UK before the surrender! And - FYI - the cavity magnetron was independently invented in Japan.

Who did then? I have British scientists Randall and Boot conducting the first test of their Cavity Magnetron on Feb 21, 1940 in Great Britian.