RHSEBO Test 10b Allied semi Tag Team vs OSO

[el cid again]

OSO has created a Japanese start turn for a file set about 7.91 - it has some 7.92 features included because of a special update sent just to him.

I have assembled a team of policy advisors - and the lead of these will sometimes make moves on the "central front" - he is Aussie and he represents the ANZACs.. I proposed a very unusual strategy for EBO - which features a Japanese Central Pacific Offensive - that we concentrate forces on Australia - maximize resistence North of there - and minimize the ability of Japan to secure the SRA - ending up with a strong position to come back from (very much like IRL - but without a divided command). In particular - I proposed that the Australians command this area - which promptly ended his worries that there would not be enough ships to cover the SE industrial area - etc.
If HE decides - they are covered.

We propose to concentrate Allied carrier forces in the islands rather than the open seas. Long distance warfare is Japan's game - and the Allies need the bases of the islands and Australia so they can combine land based and sea based air power in better numbers.

I have a Canadian player - and Canada runs the Alaska area as well as Canada.

We have a Dutch advisor - and he has listed what Dutch units can and would be politically able to conduct joint operations effectively. If need be they can move forward from NEI - just as ships and planes did IRL - because we are sending stuff in the back door. The bulk of US and British forces are going to be sent to the Central Front.

[el cid again]

The Soviet Union is concerned about the potential for hostilities in the Far East - something not welcome in this time of crisis.

We proposed to implement some security measures including:

1) Declare military policy - with a view to confidence building. To the extent what is learned makes it clear that declared policy is what is happening - over time this should minimize concerns about intentions. A sub point of this is that changes in declared policy will have 100 days notice - the planning time for units - and 10 days more than required for notice of withdrawall from a treaty.

2) Bomber units inland will be set to training or, on a one per front basis, reconnaissance.

3) Bomber units along the coast will be set to automatically engage ships or submarines approaching Soviet ports - but range limited so any sub or task force well to sea will not be at risk. That is, anti naval and anti sub missions will be range limited - it appears that there is never a need to come closer than 2 hexes to a Soviet port - so beyond that is a zone of non-bellegerant passage. Both Soviet and Japanese ships need to be able to transit straits in territorial waters of the other - at least rarely - so this is not to say "stay away from the coast" but rather "stay away from the ports."

4) Submarines will patrol this same zone - and ASW TFs may also patrol it. That is, ships or subs within two hexes of a Soviet PORT probably will automatically be engaged on local authority.

5) Patrol units and some bombers in coastal areas may be set to longer range naval reconnaissance. This is somewhat risky - rarely even unarmed planes assigned this mission will "hit" a detected target. But it should build confidence that there is no invasion approaching to be able to "see" far to see - as long as no bomber formations are able to respond to detected TFs. Note this is DIFFERENT from ASW patrol - which must be range limited - or subs will be automatically attacked where it reaches.

6) Recon is also risky - in that AAA and fighters may shoot it down occasionally. But it helps confidence to know you can "see" any point you want to - and if it is limited to one flight per sector - there are about 3 fronts - it won't seem to be a way to build data for an immediate attack. We won't protest or react to recon (or naval search) missions that go astray.

7) Large merchant ships will transit - once at the start - out of the area - to feed the Kamchatka and Ul Kel areas - or other things - out of the Pacific Northwest. No need to be constantly transiting the Kurils with large merchant ships risking a serious incident.

8) Large subs will transit one time at the start to Nikolaevsk na Amur - they will transit as TRANSPORT subs so they cannot attack - and they will enter port and stay put - so patrols won't attack them.

9) Small transports will move cargo in the Sea of Othosk and along the river systems. Those in the South will transit North one time - at the start. We can use rail to move resources, oil, fuel and supplies in Amur Province - but not to offshore points farther North and East. This means merchant shipping will not be at risk of incidents except where they go to or from Kamchatka. Similarly - Japanese ships in the Southern Sea of Othosk will normally not be at risk of an incident except when feeding Paramushiro. If they don't get within 2 hexes of a PORT they will not be attacked - and if they do - it is automatic. The problem is - Paramushiro can not have a similar policy - or we cannot pass. But we can declare when passage is required if that helps. Nor will we allow Allied ships in Soviet waters - and code won't let them use Soviet ports.

10) We will move troops to regional assembly points - and some points of concentration forward will go to minimum garrisons. Fortifications will be built up. Air bases forward also will be reduced to one unit - and excess units will move back to bases farther back. Airfields will be built up some distance from the border - not on it. The one exception is Khabarovsk na Amur - which is on the border - but which is not near any land LOC on the Manchukuo side - and it serves as a regional concentration point - and as such is treated as if it is "back" from the border.

11) River navigation is a problem where it is the border. We will transit all armed vessels to the lower Amur basin - away from the border - and we will see if we can avoid river traffic for transport of economic materials (if rail works)? This way river traffic will be visible mainly East of Khabarovsk - and any exception will be transports for oil and resources only - not naval vessels. There should be no need to use the upper river systems for economics by Manchukuo - but the interior river system - which serves cities - might be useful - although rail goes along it - so maybe it is moot? We moved the naval patrol unit from Khabarovsk to the coast - so it won't be searching the rivers for naval units. If - after turn 1 - Japanese units stay West of Kiamusze and ours stay East of Khabarovsk - there should be no possibility of hostile interactions. The coastal policy of two hexes being patrolled for automatic air attack is NOT in effect because of the tradition of peaceful joint use of the river in border areas. This might change eventually - if the river indeed falls into disuse where it is the border. This policy could be changed if there is a problem with it.

12) A tank concentration including a whole armored division (2 tank brigades and a motorized infantry regiment) will be moved to the interior of Siberia from the border area where it might be interpreted as a threat to go down the NE rail system to central Manchukuo. Instead it will defend the Trans Siberian RR West of Chita.

[el cid again]

The Allied first turn is submitted - and Poly has sent a set of reports/replay - so we will shortly generate a report. But first - what I tried to do - and also - I need to complete a different game turn before we get into the details.

This was the most complicated turn I ever attempted in WITP by Matrix. There are literally hundreds of threads intertwined - most of which need lonber than a day to resolve - and many of which are traps that never will spring. But before we see what happens I should explain what I wanted to happen? And the methodology I used - which is not standard - to create opportunities for those things to happen.

[el cid again]

The working assumptions for this game were:

a) Basic situation as outlined for the scenario description. That is, no naval treaties since 31 Dec 1932.
So it is like history writ large: there is tension - most people think there will be a war soon - but no one knows exactly when or where - nor do most believe Japan can cross the Pacific in force.

b) Operational surprise is achieved, but tactical surprise is not achieved. The Allied militaries are still in the grip of a peacetime mentality, but too many indications exist something is afoot to be completely ignored. They ARE ignored until too late - but like the ISF the night before the Yom Kippur War (an Arab offensive on two fronts with strategic surprise) - some movement is possible the night before the war begins.

c) Each command region interprets the local imperatives differently:

1) The Russians are (not officially of course) quite pleased - Japan will be decisively distracted from invading during its worst crisis since the Revolution; They are moving armor and some other forces away from the border and taking other confidence building measures - as you know;

2) The British, Indians and Commonwealth are engaged in moving toward or away from the presumed battle areas; They are inherently overconfident - unable to comprehend the reality that Japan might be as strong as it is - but nevertheless - they know they have too few forces in the area to fight everywhere. So they are focused on key points - and as ever for an oceanic power - on moving things where they will be (or might be ) needed. They have marginal support from the NEI - but no common command language - and the list of Dutch land units able to cooperate in land combat is dismally short - almost everything in the area are local troops. Anyway - the British pretty much intend to withdraw toward India - and the Dutch are going a different direction - toward Australia - so only British units that withdraw SE instead of NW will stay together with them.

3) Austalia and New Zealand are more or less in panic- more or less as IRL. They have way too few forces in the area to fight a war - having sent their forces to ETO - and just as IRL they are in significant political disagreement with Churchill on priorities. [It does not help the Liberal Party is in power - but fundamentally the issues are strategic - and would also apply to a Conservative government] In the end they turn to the Americans - but were more warmly received than IRL - and a lot of the friction that happened (which was considerable) may be avoided by not imposing the peculiar command (and commander = MacArthur) that was done. The problem is - almost nothing can be done but start moving a few small things - there not being much around to move in the first place. It does not help that all they really know is the general direction of the Japanese - not the details of which points must be defended or when. So they are more or less doing the same as the British - writ small - and hoping something comes of American promises (which, in EBO, may be problematical - but they don't exactly understand this yet).

4) Admiral Hart - the only US commander to know the war was coming - and the only one to disperse his forces - has this advantage still (pretty much imposed by the scenario start). He had secret orders from FDR to start the war - to provoke it - and two of the three vessels to be used (USS Lanokai and USS Isabel) are in the game. He had secret - and forbidden - intel from the RN - the code shop in Singapore had fixed the start of hostilities "on or after 8 December Manila time" based on "all merchant ships will be in home waters by that date." [Churchill forbid telling the Americans - but the local Navy did anyway - and the RN fleet boss did so in person a few days before in Manila] So he can only disperse slightly more than IRL -
and probably not fast or effectively enough - given 20 20 hindsight on the other side. But nevertheless - it may be the Asiatic Fleet will get in some licks on its way to join ABDA at Soerabaja.

5) Admiral Kimmel is luckier this time. He has a clear sense something is brewing out of the Mandates.
Unfortunately it comes too late to put together a proper plan. So he put together an improvised one. The problem is complicated by the promises made to the ANZACs - neither losing the fleet nor losing Hawaii are really acceptable options - and he cannot know that both are fairly likely. So he is trying to prevent both at the same time - a dangerous division of focus - throwing out the book about how Hawaii would be defended. This may be as well - the book was written for battleships - and battleships are now more like super heavy cruisers than capital ships. So the plan is based on trying to assemble the new capital ships - the carriers - and the less glamorous task of tankers for them - which usually takes MONTHS of planning. The day before positions - and condition (i.e. empty tanks on most tankers) - dictates a most awful improvised solution - but for all that - any plan is better than no plan. Everyone else is in support: either you are assigned to defend some island or other, or you are moving toward one of the assembly points for the carriers or their support ships, or are doing something related to one or the other task - or in a couple of cases - you are sent away - because you have no use for either. Away is not to say in one uniform direction - every possible point is in play - even Tokyo as a destination: if you are of no use in Hawaii - are you useful in Alaska, in the South Pacific, getting repairs on the West Coast, or maybe taking the war to the home islands? All these things apply to at least a couple of units. If you are assigned to fight for an island - it is as if you are in the Russian army: the only acceptable excuse for failure is your body on the field. You will be supported - when, if, as and to the degree possible - but there is no guarantee or expectation it will always be enough soon enough.
[Read Wake Island for the Marine Defense Battalion expectations]

[el cid again]

Lets go into United States Fleet emergency operations planning a bit:

what is supposed to happen here is something akin to the Japanese centrifugal offensive writ smaller (since the force is smaller) -
forces will erupt from Oahu in literally all directions - with various objectives - all at one time - creating a bit of security in the form
of a "target rich environment" - too many targets for all to be engaged - so surely many won't be.

There are two broad missions - stated in the post above

1) Keep Hawaii - or failing that - make them pay for it

2) Support the ANZAC alliance with as many heavy units - and valuable air units - as possible.

Any unit unable to contribute to either of these missions is to serve one of the following secondary objectives:

a) If damaged, go get fixed
b) If a very long range sub able to operate independently in home or Mandate waters - go to a vital objective -
and base at Cold Bay
c) If useful in Alaska - go there
d) If useful in EITHER the South Pacific - or if it would be valuable in Australia - go to the South Pacific

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: el cid again

Lets go into United States Fleet emergency operations planning a bit:

what is supposed to happen here is something akin to the Japanese centrifugal offensive writ smaller (since the force is smaller) -
forces will erupt from Oahu in literally all directions - with various objectives - all at one time - creating a bit of security in the form
of a "target rich environment" - too many targets for all to be engaged - so surely many won't be.

There are two broad missions - stated in the post above

1) Keep Hawaii - or failing that - make them pay for it

2) Support the ANZAC alliance with as many heavy units - and valuable air units - as possible.

Any unit unable to contribute to either of these missions is to serve one of the following secondary objectives:

a) If damaged, go get fixed
b) If a very long range sub able to operate independently in home or Mandate waters - go to a vital objective -
and base at Cold Bay
c) If useful in Alaska - go there
d) If useful in EITHER the South Pacific - or if it would be valuable in Australia - go to the South Pacific

The basic strategy for objective one - keep Hawaii - is to remember this is an ARMY mission - and also to remember this is MOUNTAIN terrain - very hard to attack into. So I divided the weaker of the two divisions into three regiments - and sent all but the disabled squads of these to Molokai, Lahaina and Hilo (with the latter sending an element to Kona). In addition a Marine Defense Battalion went to Kona - and the remnant of the Marine Defense Bn at Midway which is still on Oahu went to Lanai. Many - most - ships participated in this operation - as did the short range air transports. Thus - ships are NOT sent out as surface combat forces in the traditional sortee - but rather as high speed transports. Then they do one of two other things: if really good ships and in good shape with reasonable range - they go ON to an assembly point in the islands to the South; otherwise return to PH by the end of the day. This puts infantry in the mountains in a way not possible to calculate in invasion planning - and it should mess him up - but he won't know it until enough time passes and he tries to attack. This was easier to do because I am not a battleship admiral: I see battleships as "very heavy cruisers" and NOT the main body of the fleet - so even they were pressed into transport duty to help the Army get where it needs to be in a hurry.

Supplimental to that, three forces able to do so lay mines. I am a mine warfare fan - and IRL this would matter more than in WITP - becuase Matrix does not treat mines properly. Further - I did this classically at Molokai - the traditional Fleet Anchorage - and an obvious place to worry about losing: I convered the minefields with PT boats - literally basing them there - where they can refuel and repair. The small minelaying forces all return to PH where they can rearm and do it again - if they survive.

Note both primary and secondary movements of warships will tend to create possible night and day surface actions - and some of these may well be with inferior forces. Note I have learned the lessons of naval war in ETO since 1938 - so my fighters cover all the major TFs - based on every possible field - not all of which will be lost. The only problem is that not many planes will fly on turn one- but "what can be done will be done."

The basic strategy for prioity two is much harder: we see the heart of the fleet as its carriers - and our carriers and supporting vessels are widely scattered. We found - mainly by study of loaded tankers - there are only three of these - that it was necessary to assemble at two different points. But we sent units from as far as New Orleans - and Alaska - and the US West Coast - to these points - which we will call Point North and Point South. From these we will at least consider moving to combine the forces into one - this deep in the enemy rear - and then sailing on to the Southwest Pacific to meet our obligations to the Allies. This is possible because of fuel - maybe - if we don't lose too much in the assembly process. But assembly will take more than a day.

First - I optimized the carriers with five squadrons (they are designed for four). Not liking the range or performance of the TBD - I landed them. One unit went to Midway, one to Johnston Island - these set to attack so low fighters won't stop them - and one to Long Beach - these set to hunt subs approaching LA, Long Beach or San Diego. Useful tasks - and now the deck space can be used by fighters - or SBDs.

More to follow - parental obligations intervene.

[el cid again]

Two carriers were caught by the crisis exposed - delivering planes to Midway and Johnston. I decided not to deliver the planned units - but instead to keep them to fight on board - and to offload the TBDs in their place. Then two squadrons of carrier planes on Oahu were flown out to the ships - so now we have one with two fighter squadrons and three dive bomber squadrons - the other with one and four. Back in the USA a third carrier similarly swapped out TBDs - but in favor of fighters - and ended up with three fighter squadrons and two bomber squadrons. Thus - both carrier forces have three fighter squadrons - all set to fight at different altitudes to get fighters, dive bombers or torpedo planes.

The Enterprise and Lexington will meet at Point North. Two good modern CL will join them out of PH - and a replenishment oiler out of Alaska will be en route - they can fall back on her until they meed - and then have the option of a deep penetration raid vs the long enemy LOC.
Unless AI causes carriers to react - Point North will be near French Frigage Shoals. If these ships must fight - they are better off together - and with a surface TF in the same hex AI may misidentify.

Sara probably needs more time to reach her assembly point. So do many other ships. Point South is Christmas Island (Kiriimati Island misprounounced actually). Two modern fast battleships are headed that way from New Orleans. Three CA are detaching from convoys to head there from the Central and South Pacific. Three DD are sailing in from the US West coast - modern ones. Many elements of the United States Fleet at PH will also attempt to go there - after delivering their troops to various islands on the opening day. And two replenishment tankers. Other support ships in good shape are going to assemble there - as will many cargo vessels with supplies, fuel, ground security and AAA elements. This point is to become the first line in a new LOC to support the fleet - and a few units are also sent to other parts of this LOC - mainly aircraft. Two of the loaded tankers are headed there - and several others will load and back them up.

It is historically US Air Force doctrine that "the primary function of an air force is to provide information about the enemy." Using this, we set almost all long range planes to naval search, or submarine hunting which also detects naval surface ships. We did this in a broad area in the Central and South Pacific - to provide a reasonably complete operational picture inside which to decide how to move the two carrier forces.
Once the Northern Force has assembled and met its tanker - it may be possible to attempt to sail SW in the general direction of Kwajalein (similar to the real war - the first carrier strikes going in on Japanese mandate bases) - and the Sara may be able to link up with them in that area - before retiring on Australia. To which end fuel and recon planes - and security troops - are being sent to points along the way. New Zealand First Brigade went to Noumea - another unit starts the game defending Fiji and there are two tiny units on other islands from NZ - they are in the war - and the coming of the US Fleet justifies risking sending another brigade North. Austraila has only three modern warships fit to fight - and one working up - these three were sent to Brisbane to link up with the Americans if they get that far. [An old Aussie cruiser went to thursday Island - as did a security battalion - on principle]

An auxiliary thread is submarine warfare. We are working on a chain of bases to end at Anchorage in the North and Melbourne in the South. Short range subs are defending islands or attacking enemy bases near them. Long range subs are headed deep into enemy waters - all the way to the major ports in the Home Islands, and to the fleet bases like Truk and Kwajalein. Instead of running them out of PH they will run out of Cold Bay - and eventually Adak - and out of Noumea - with heavy repairs farther back at Anchorage or Kodiak, Melbourne, Sydney or Brisbane. Chicken of the Sea reports my subs are a problem in this new system - and he faces me as Japan. Here I have many more Allied subs - and it used to be said in WWII games I "use subs like SSNs" - they will seem to be everywhere - because they will be reviewed every day for optimum employment. Subs are a two fold weapon - they not only torpedo and shell things - they provide nice detailed identification of enemy units for exploitation by air and carrier forces.

Note that in this conception there is no longer a battle fleet per se. There are just carrier forces and cruiser destroyer forces - either may or may not have battleships in them. The object of the surface forces is to cover and protect carrier forces or convoys, and occasionally to bombard enemy targets - in particular if this is in support of a landing - or deliver troops directly as fast transports. As units assemble at Point South - most will move on to the Southwest - except any deemed prudent to defend the LOC - or possibly to conduct operations in support of the units still in Hawaii. The main contribution of this base complex - there are three islands here - aside from logistics - is long range recon and bomber support for the area. [IRL it would also matter that the Trans Pacific Cable has a station on the center island - the one with a NZ garrison on it; that would make possible communications that could not be intercepted nor blocked by bad atmospherics]

The defense of Hawaii is the job of the Army - formally and practically. The idea is to make the islands hard to take - and then nibble at the LOC of the enemy. Imperial forces are overspecialized - and at the limit of their logistic reach - so they cannot sustain operations for long at that distance - nor greatly increase the already maximum effort. If they fail to take Oahu before they take too many casualties and too much damage, it will be like a wave crashing over rocks - the rocks get wet but not really hurt that much. Establishing ASAP a base complex in air range and short range ship hopping distance of Hawaii provides options - only time will tell if opportunities to exploit come of that - but odds are they will.

In case the Christmas Island base complex falls - we are establishing a different one with a first point at Tahiti - and units were sent that way to start building it up - and defending it - and also to build stocks of fuel and supplies. This will feed out of a Southeast Pacific ship channel direct to Panama - not to the US West coast per se.

[el cid again]

The Asiatic Fleet will more or less do something similar to history: Adm Hart knew war was coming and his fleet was dispersed before the war. But now we know war is coming NOW the fleet will explode in a way similar to the United States Fleet at Oahu. Units will erupt in all directions - some bound for Japan - some for its LOC bases - and the rest ultimately to assemble with ABDA at Soerabaja. Damaged units will flee immediately. Other units will attempt to bring in ground defenses for Cagayan - which will be the B-17 base of choice. Jolo will be an assembly point for a cruiser destroyer force - and possibly it will meet enemy transports.

In Luzon we will defend forward and hard - trying to keep supply generating hexes generating for as long as possible. We hope to frustrate landings using submarines, PT boats and gunboats - and planes - just as they did IRL- but also we plan to actually fight intelligently. In particular units are headed into the mountains - and to the critical beaches of Linguayn Gulf and San Fernando. What is the point of reserves if you are too little too late? Better to catch partial units while landing with your full force. But the trick is in the execution - are these troops up to it?

[el cid again]

I am now ready to study events - but I forgot to talk about China.

IMHO WWII PTO is about China. China is the strategic issue over which, if differences in policy did not exist,
there would be no war in the first place. But China is a problem child - already poor and already weakened by
war and revolution - she has been at war continuously since 1935 - and in another sense since 1911. There are
really two Chinas - just on the Allied side - with different war aims - and vast areas are Chinese self governing
territories or even countries on the Axis side (see Manchukuo, Lioning, Inner Mongolia - and two different regimes
in North and South China). I run an international web discussion group on China, write about China, was married
in China, and generally am familiar with the geography (which I extensively roughed up for RHS) and military history
(which was extensively enhanced for RHS, adding not just units by capabillities). Even so - what to do was not clear?

I think the Reds won't cooperate with the ROCs in most circumstances - so they will have their own little war in their area.

I don't think it is realistic for the Allies to send lots of first line planes to China early - because they would not do that.
But I do think the AVG can go - and I sent 3rd Squadron on the first day. The rest is going to fight until exhausted where they
are - in Burma - in case it can cause an upset.

I decided to concentrate the Chinese air forces - and to modernize some of the units up from biplanes. I intend to combine LOC warfare with actual combined arms operations - and I have decided to listen to the American advisors - distribut the artillery - and go in with air support where the enemy is isolated. He is all spread out - and vulnerable. Where we are cut off - instead of retreating like a wise man - we will jump on his LOC - in the hope of causing a general collapse inland - and that may turn out to be safer than trying to walk for months on end without supply on trails.

OK - now to see what happened???

[el cid again]

Dec 7, 1941 (Hawaii time) or Dec 8 (Japan and most of the theater)

I-173 tried to attack a destroyer group - and in turn 5 ships in that group tried to hurt I-173 - but nobody scored. This was a fast transport group near Hawaii.

AK Segoland ran into submarine laid Type 88 mines at Olongapo - trying to leave Manila Bay - and hit one of them. This was an unlucky ship - as we will see. A MSW unit ran into the same field - and probably cleared a channel for the many ships following them. Two DD and four PG encountered the same field - and cleared more of it.

Ro-27 and Ro-29 missed their targets at two different locations. Ro-33 hit AP Basilan with one torp two hexes out of Manila. She missed the same two DD reported clearing mines above.

I-4 - in the Strait of Juan de Fuca (Victoria BC) missed a Soviet merchant ship - just as well - they are not at war - and then hit and sank AP US Grant with one 5.5 inch hit and two torpedoes. I-4 then tried to torpedo a Canadian AMC - but missed her.

S-36 missed an AP at San Fernando - and was missed in turn by two of her escorts.

I-153 was attacked by 4 DD at the narrows between Borneo and Celebes. They failed to harm her, but did cause ops points and fuel to be expended and reduced the chances she could detect and engage other TFs passing the strait. ASW is like that - you must count victories in a statistical sense.

[el cid again]

The day turn began with 19 JAAF bombers hitting Hong Kong - and achieving nothing (except damage to 3 Ki-51s).

44 Ki-48s hit Kota Bahru - not defended in the air - but were too high. They caused 28 casualties, 2 guns lost, 2 vehicles lost, and 28 other hits. Reports indicate ships at Kota Bahru and Singora - although they probably cannot land today - a classical invasion of Malaya.

41 Ki-21s hit Alor Star - also not defended in the air - and again from too high. 44 casualties, 1 gun lost, 37 other hits.

8 Ki-41 Oscars swept Georgetown - good intel - we concentrated air power here - and they met 5 Buffalos on CAP (because first day CAP is terrible). Everyone went home. Then 28 Ki-21s came in unescorted - and 3 got damaged. In spite of being too high they destroyed 12 aircraft on the ground, 4 casualties, 1 gun lost, 29 other hits. Pretty good for opposed bombing.

14 escorted Ki-21s hit Kuantan from even higher - 15,000 feet - and caused only 4 hits.

11 Zeros swept Singapore and met 5 Buffalos on cap - 4 Buffalos got shot down and the other 6 bugged out.

Three full groups of JNAF bombers (81 planes) hit Brunei - from optimum altitude (just above machine gun ceilings - 5000 feet) but were unlucky. 11 casualties and 13 other hits.

97 JNAF bombers of two types from four groups - escorted by 94 zeros also from four groups - hit Clark field - undefended in the air.
They destroyed 4 disabled aircraft on the ground, 95 casualties, 5 vehicles lost, over 200 other hits. This was historically the most accurate Japanese bombing raid of WWII - and it was done from 25,000 feet to boot. 24 more Bettys followed up - getting another aircraft on the ground - and 62 more hits. Clark is down.

24 Bettys hit Midway - which suffered from no fighter cover (my fault - I failed to land the fighters) - and they got 3 aircraft on the ground, and 25 other hits.

97 Vals, 69 Kates, 32 Zeros and 12 carrier recon planes (Kate variants) hit PH - in a classic counter air strike - taking down the field. Our fighters having other missions - only the few covering TFs that happened to be in the same hex engaged. 5 P-40 Bs engaged 32 Zeros - escaped unharmed - and shot down both Vals and Kates (these guys get the Air Medal I am sure ). The raiders destroyed 58 machines on the ground - mostly diabled - 21 casualties - 1 gun lost - nearly 300 other hits. But 12 Vals and 5 Kates were lost - as was a recon plane. 28 other attacking aircraft were damaged and are unavailable for operations tomorrow.

Mavis recon of Midway was damaged by 3 F4Fs flying CAP.

15 JAAF attacks on Chinese ground units caused moderate casualties. But for the second time today an attack on Hong Kong did no damage at all. This was repeated - yet another attack on HK failed to score. Coming in too high avoids AA - but also avoids being effective. Later in the day 8 Ki-48s scored 10 hits at Hong Kong - on airfields.

13 Ki-21s caused 11 casualties to the Philippine 51st Brigade.

10 Kates and 6 Jakes caused 7 casualties to the Guam Insular Force.

3 Kates - must be from CVEs - missed CL Boise at Jolo. The entire Asiatic fleet combat force was able to get to Jolo - but is still in separate task groups. 11 Kates from the same source put 6 bombs into PG Peteral and PG Wake in the same area. 3 more missed AK Norse Carrier at Cebu. Later in the day 32 Kates of this force put 9 bombs into 2 small PG (Tutuila and Cicala)

27 Ki-48s missed ML Redstart in the South China Sea - these probably out of Bako - the Pescadores - by Formosa.

17 Army type Kates out of Cambodia tried to hit 2 ships in port at Victoria Point - but they had left - taking the forward air station unit with them (to Chittagong to unload to march into Burma). They got 2 port hits at an abandoned port for their trouble.

31 Bettys hit Kuantan - causing 1 casualty, 1 gun lost and 5 other hits. He systematically worked most of the air bases in Malaya that could threaten landings - but only Georgetown had planes - so they could concentrate for effect.

30 Nells hit Brunei - causing 24 hits - not very good considering he was at a reasonable altitude (6000 feet).

[el cid again]

33 Kates from the CVL force hit Midway - revealing it is up there. They caused only 3 hits - remarkably bad.

2 Whirraways (!! I hate AI) attacked CA Kinugasa at Kota Bahru. They met 21 fighters of 4 types on CAP or LRCAP.
They survived undamaged - and achieved nothing either. Had they hit - however ineffectively - I would give them medals.
They came out of Georgetown - where all Allied air is in Northern Malaya. Next 10 Vildebeestes gave it a go - and met the
same CAP - and 4 were lost before the rest gave up without penetrating.

Later in the day 2 Hudsons attacked CL Yubari at Singora - but missed. Finally my plan came together - sort of: 16 bombers of 3 types escorted by 15 Buffalos hit Kota Bahru - and had an exciting tangle with 21 enemy fighters of 4 kinds. In the end 5 Buffalos and 5 bombers were lost - and a few of both bugged out - while the few penetrators failed to score. Somewhat of an anti-clymax - after the effort to get good numbers - good CAP was a trump.

27 Allied fighters of 2 types out of Manila tried to hit 7 different ships at Legaspi - and missed them all - in spite of no fighter
cover (his CVEs not being present as they should have been). 2 Phillippine P-43s attacked DD Shurure at San Fernando - a lucky ship
IRL - she was not hit. 2 straggler Hawks tried for CL Isuzu at Legaspi - but nobody seems to have taught these guys how to actually hit
a naval target (typical of USAAF and most air forces). The air force at Georgetown was persistent: they managed another raid by 3 Blenheims on Singora - these met 14 fighters but evaded them all - and still failed to hit anything. They tried yet again - ran into CL Kashii in its CLAA forem - and two of them got hurt. [Kashii has her different guns - SP and DP - replaced with a uniform DP battery - and she already had fine fire control stations for training student officers] Wow - 3 more Blenheims tried again - evaded all 14 fighters at Singora - and missed an AK.

My TBD plan tried to work. 11 attacked transports at Johnston Island - and would have penetrated even if there had been fighter cover (there was not because the carriers are near Oahu and Midway) - but they could not hit even stationary transports any better than USAAF or Philippine AF fighters can. At Midway the other squadron only managed to get 3 in the air - but it missed equally as well as the eleven had done at Johnston. 2 of the unit at Johnston tried for CL Jintsu - and missed yet again. Anyway - these units were not worth taking up valuable deck space on the few carriers we have - so it was a reasonable thing to try to get them to torpedo invasion transports. There was no where else to send them anyway - either keep em on board or land em - and no other places were near enough.

Not having any available aircraft service capacity in Malaya (half starts disabled) except at Singapore where I (wrongly) expected a major raid on the base - I sent a squadron of Vildebeeste to Kuching. These did quite well - 11 of the 12 flew to Brunei - and bombed 3 of the 4 ships they engaged there, setting all 3 on fire. About as good as I have ever seen Vildebeeste's do.

12 Hudsons made a surprising combined attack from Kendari and Amboina on two ships unloading at Manado. AP Ujigawa Maru was hit and set on fire.

12 Ki-48s missed to AKs exeting Manila Bay at Olongapo.

7 Kates from the CVE force put 1 bomb into 1 of 2 AKs attacked at Cagayan. 4 more missed CA Houston at Jolo. 7 more put 3 bombs into AK Dumaguet at Tagbilaran. Most of the other ships had troops on them - but this one was there to pick up a battalion - and was empty. It was probably fatally damaged by 3 x 250 kg bombs.

28 Kates from the CVL force by Midway put 5 torpedoes in to AK Regulus - trying to escape to the North - sinking her (no surprise).

20 Kates from KB attacked a fast transport force of DDs near Lahaina. It appears Allied ships only move one impulse - and don't even complete that one. Covered by 9 P-40s, 3 Kates were destroyed. DD tucker took 3 hits - and 2 others were missed. We have to see if she can survive - she is in a Level 3 port hex and the hex was NOT invaded. Then 17 Vals attacked a similar fast transport force of DDs near Molokai. These were covered by 10 P-40s - and similarly 3 bombers were shot down - but no hits were scored - unusual for Vals.
Next KB got its act together - and sent 22 Kates escorted by no less than 73 Zeros to Hilo - to attack the two most damaged battleships (they only make 18 knots). 7 P-40s met them - scored first blood on a Zero - and went on to get 3 Kates. But 8 (of the 7????) P-40s were shot down (sounds like real combat claims to me) - and 7 torpedo hits were scored. Only one hex from uninvaded Lahaina - they probably will survive.
95 casualties and 5 guns lost indicates either these ships did not unload their troops - or they did not complete doing so.

61 Kates attacked 3 AVs and AD Dobbin West of the Big Island. The 3 AVs took a total of 15 torpedoes - and sank - but the AD was not hit at all. Note I anticipated that too many potential targets might get AI to attack the wrong forces - and so the really valuable ships were mainly not engaged.

It appears an AK never left Legaspi - in spite of orders (peacetime mentality??) and she got cought by a surface action group led by CL Isuzu - 33 hits finally sank her (from weight of shell?)

3 PT units that should have made it to Aparri in a day's sailing didn't get there. But for all that they encountered an enemy transport force at Laoag - put 9 MG hits and 3 torpedoes into three targets - sinking one - setting a second on fire - and were undamaged themselves. Not bad.

CL Marblehead and 5 four pipers encountered a larger transport group at Jolo - sank the lone escort DD Murakumo - hit 3 other ships - one of them aflame - and probably caused it to flee. Landings did not occur. 3 USN ships took 1 hit each - none serious - while 34 hits were scored.

Ro-41 torpedoed and shelled AK Dayak - causing heavy damage (near Singapore).

I-4 - over by Victoria BC - was attacked but not damaged by the returning ASW patrol of sub chasers. Late in the day the force of 3 ships detected, localized, engaged but failed to harm her yet again.

[el cid again]

Both a CA surface group and a heavy BB surface group shelled Kota Bahru. 156 and 421 casualties respectively, plus a total of 6 guns, 16 vehicles, and 41 other hits.

Tanaka's force bombarded Rabaul - 170 casualties - 2 guns lost - 3 vehicles lost - 20 other hits.

Ashigara and Nachi shelled San Fernando (no escorts ? brave ) causing 65 casualties.

Amagi and Hyuga bombarded Johnston Island = 188 casualties - 3 guns lost - 2 vehicles lost - 15 other hits.

Ise, Yamashiro and Fuso bombarded Midway - 653 casualties - 16 guns lost - 3 vehicles lost - 25 other hits.

Landings occurred at Legaspi, Tarawa, Wake, Johnston, Kavieng, Palmyra, Kota Bahru, Aparri, San Fernando, Cagayan,
Guam, Medang, Rabaul, Midway, Strong Trang, Bataan Island, Vigan, Manokwari, Biak, Aitape, Wewak, Menado, Cotabato
and General Santos. Heavy resistence occurred at Wake (39 hits on 7 ships), Kota Baru (3 hits on 1 ship),
Cagayan (6 hits on 3 ships), and Rabaul (5 hits on 2 ships), Midway (33 hits on 12 ships). Since Cagayan has no coast defense
unit - this must have been a surprise - and it means SOME of the units we sent have been landing (we cannot look at the turn file
which has not yet been done).

Wake was captured - and 6 F-4Fs lost with it. 21 to 1764 casualties.

Allied ground bombardment of Wuchang revealed one new ROC Field Army has entered the hex - 8 casualties.

Japanese deliberate attack at Sinyang China captured the city - at a cost of 714 to 272 casualties. We will immediately reinvest the place.

The elite Imperial Guards Mixed Brigade (with organic armor) attacked on Midway (instead of Molokai or Lahaina where it is vital to sieze a forward airfield while Oahu is down) - and failed to take the place - but reduced fortifications to 0 - so it will fall in one day. This reveals a
grave strategic player blunder - compounded by bad luck (it should be able to take a stronger defended point in one attack). Either he does not intend to take Oahu - or he is going to fail - either is fine by me. There is no other time to take a field near enough to Oahu to reduce it except at the start of the game - there is a two or three day window. Oahu will never again be knocked down.

Ground assault failed at Hong Kong - 235 to 74 casualties - and the fort level remains 5.

Bataan Island was caputured with no defense.

Kota Bahru was bombarded - but I didn't know you could set units to do that on a landing? No casualties.
He did it again at Manado and Rabaul - so I guess it is possible to set. Again - no effect.

The turn ended with an operational surprise - an SNLF landing and capture of Palmyra - which had a unit of PBYs running recon.
This is part of the three island Christmas Island base complex called Point South. It is moot - if Hawaii is not going to fall - we don't need it.
And the United States Fleet - and Saratoga - and many other units are headed right here - so it may not work out that well for the SNLF.

The US carriers Lexington and Enterprise - and 2 Brooklyns - should have made it to Point North - are undetected - and so that part of hte op came off well. They are not far from the now plane exhausted CVL force - and a tanker is en route - but probably only 12 hours out of Cold Bay Alaska. Still - they can retire that way if need be.

Hawaii will not fall - and the fleet may not be destroyed - not too bad.

[el cid again]

He might go hunting battleships - his KB is right in the middle of the whole fleet. But that is strategic folly.
If he prefers hunting battleships to carriers or to taking Hawaii - it is expensive but worth it. We want carriers uningaged by the KB
as they cross the Pacific - sinking ships as they cross his LOC. Looks like we will get that - our force should be assembled at Point North.
The battleships are either intended to return to PH - or if fast and undamaged - to withdraw to Point South. Following them will draw him away from the carriers and lengthen his LOC. It also is happening at the one and only time he might use his carrier power to take the lower Hawiian Islands - and certainly his op was planned with that intent (even if he changed it). We must assume the force designed for that mission is a threat - and anything distracting it fatally from that mission is a victory - however much it may cost.

I have no intention to fight his carriers with mine. We can afford to risk and lose carriers - but they will win pitted against anything else - and might win even vs KB if we are close to land bases and Allied land based air forces - and linked up with RN carriers. So we are going where that is possible - and we will conduct LOC warfare and active defense of the Central Pacific instead of classical "sail out and meet em head on" naval warfare. His most critical resource is carrier planes. Second, he has a critically limited time he can operate on the fuel supply available at this distance. Third, he will not be able to long sustain operational wear and tear far from bases that can repair his ships. Time is on our side - and we need to keep him doing things OTHER THAN taking the air bases on Lahaina and/or Molokai that might permit Oahu to be reduced.
We put half the army forces in Hawaii on these bases to insure they will be harder to take than expected (infantry plus mountains = a hard fight). There is a severely limited time frame he can operate because of the need for planes, fuel and repairs. We just have to keep him entertained while the carriers go where we want and he does not do what he needs to do to win. He is a LONG way from home - and he has embarked aircraft he shold be putting ashore to relieve the strain on his critical carrier planes. But sans bases - they either stay on ship - or are based too far away to matter.