Background is that Hartwig was trying to correlate OODA (Boyd ) loops with Soviet doctrine and comparing them to AirLand Battle and stated that it seemed to him that the way to beat Soviet doctrine was to use an AirLand Battle doctrinal approach of having more mobile forces such that the speed of his forces could actually give him a decisive advantage in the A portion of the Boyd loop. Command delay isn't modelled in WiTP except insofar as one can attack one's opponent's mind and thus create uncertainty and the Clausewitzian " Order, counter-order, disorder."
Obviously I disagreed strenuously with this viewpoint he put forward and disagreed that speed was necessary to get inside an opponent's OODA loop. I avered that one could allow a speedier opponent to make all the running but still beat his OODA loop as the loop was NOT about manoeuvre but about decision-making and that, frequently, a force which is faster falls for the chimera of potency and being able to do everything everywhere if only it can phase things properly while, instead, it merely ends up overcommitting and being defeated in detail. Speed can end up getting you into trouble you wouldn't get into if you HAD to make choices between different operations because you didn't have the speed to do them all at once.
So, onto the current mail and response.
hope all is well on your side, any real life interference is of the enjoyable type and you manage to beat vista into submission... I try to make use of the time granted till I get your next turn to get out my crystal ball and figure out your future intentions along with my crowd/mob...
This is a little aside which refers to our side conversation on "the wisdom of crowds" ( people who post advice to his AAR ) vs the "madness of mobs" - which is what I said he needed to watch out for. Crowds can be serene and thoughtful but, more often than not, they degenerate into mobs. So, advisors can be a help as well as a hindrance. One of the true roles for any commander in anysituation ( a project, a war, work etc ) is to listen and then discard what is not helpful.
One of the positive side effects of this AAR is that one writes down his thoughts, which clarifies the situation.
Re. our doctrine discussions, I think you are far ahead of me. This holds in general for your knowledge of the matter, but specifically in that you are at least partly already talking about WitP where I am still reviewing the general real life doctrinal background. Once I have a picture of that, it will require adaption to the circumstances of W itP, where potentially the solitary decisions of the armchair CinC are much more subject to psychological effect and real life effects re. capability of troops are reduced.
I'm not so sure about far ahead for several reasons:
1. I only apply the basics objectively. Sure that's more than many do but it isn't rocket science [:D]
2. Objectively if I accept this praise then I will pay less attention to my dispositions as my "brilliance" will protect me. No, in reality, what protects Pearl or the Home Islands is that I take the pains to come up with a reasonable plan and then apportion my forces accordingly. Divine right has nothing to do with defeating your planning and accepting such praise is the first step toward actually believing it and allowing it to impact on my thinking.
Sure a certain amount of command arrogance is good but accepting that would be to go beyond this.
I think the real world effects of capability of troops isn't reduced and I would argue that in reality and history many times the defeat of a commander's mind DID presage the defeat of his troops just as surely as the paralysis of an opponent in WiTP presages their defeat. The exact scintillas of weighting may vary but the general thrust is present.
In other words: AirLand battle implicitly assumes that NATO has the potential to work through more OODA cycles than its opponents, which cannot be related to the concept that NATO commanders are in general more effective than their counterparts, but is supported by technology and training.
Agreed although I would also add that this is supported doctrinally by giving the NATO commanders the freedom to make those D loop decisions when the situations arose... A freedom which was missing from their WP counterparts.
I would also point out that the freedom to make a Decision in the D loop and an Action in the A loop is not, necessarily, the freedom to make the right D and A. When D & As are wrong then what matters it that you make them more quickly? You've just more quickly given your opponent the advantage in the OODA loop.
Same thing with initiative. In my game with Damian up until very recently Damian had, or at least had the power to have, the initiative in any 2 out of 3 theatres he chose. But what matter that ability when the situation had been shaped such that the choices he made were inappropriate and his D&As acted to render my long-term plan even more favourable to me?
Initiative and speed are, IMO, often over-concentrated on. Sure they are important but at least as important is shaping the battlefield so that one can present the choices one wishes to one's opponent. Then, faced with a series of unpalatable choices all of which are bad one's opponent can be freely left to use their initiative and speed to quickly and, of their own free choice, impale themselves on your spears.
E.g. Cagayan in my game vs Damian... It has become a fulcrum for the front which has robbed other Japanese holdings of some 1800 AV which should have been more than enough to properly garrison Northern Borneo and Southern Borneo +/- Jave, all of which I am now in the process of taking. Damian had a choice of how to go about dealing with Cagayan and when he chose a choice which helped further my long-term goals ( a choice I invited him to make but was POWERLESS to force as I did not have sufficient strength OR the initiative ) I helped invite him to over-commit to that choice ( at ruinous cost to my fighter and bomber forces ) by building up my forces also. Now though a tiny portion of my forces ( about 10%) are tied up in Cagayan while I suspect that roughly 50% of Damian's forces in the DEI/Phillipines are tied up there. The end result of this is that he freely impaled himself on Cagayan when he had the initiative and the ability to commit forces wherever he wanted and without EVER getting inside his OODA loop as re: Cagayan I have used that to create openings elsewhere.
Speed had nothing to do with me making and using Cagayan. As such I feel it is over-rated in terms of OODA loop.
However, your effectiveness is likely to carry the day in our little electronic war. Thus, transfers and adaptions of the doctrine need to be made. You are doubtless aware that to be of use, the doctrine must have compatibility between all sub-components. The approach to maneuver must logically link into the approach to count er-mobility. From this linkage, the equipment and organization must also support the tempo and pace of battlecalled for by the doctrine.
Aye. I think this links to your point below about my use of Fast Transports and Floatplanes etc. Actually I don't think I use them very much normally BUT in my game against Damian I had no prospect of supporting conventional landings with my CVs, utter aerial inferiority ( up until very recently ) and little prospect of upsetting that balance prior to the end of 1942 ( sure I did my best but even still the Japanese have more fighters and more experienced pilots than I on-map and I only retain the capability to gain aerial superiority over 3 or 4 bases at one time ). I did, however, have more freely disposable ground units and a large surface fleet which was, conventionally, useless in the face of enemy aerial and CV power.
As such I adapted my strategy and sought to use my limited strong points ( lots of surface warships and lots of free regiments etc in CONUSA ) to dislocate the enemy positions in the Aleutians and Burma. When the front became fluid I added paratroops etc to the mix.
It wasn't an issue though of that being something I normally do but simply an issue of that being the best way forward given THIS correlation of forces. In other games my analysis leads to different conclusions and thus I attack differently in those games. Tactics must ALWAYS be subordinate to strategy and thus the choice of the means of attack is always subordinate to the strategy. Since the strategy differs in different games any similarity of tactics is pure happenstance IMO.
If you DO have a favourite tactic then prepare to be found out when you use it in an inappropriate situation.
Therefore, transfer is needed. Highly successful approaches in real life, like good old German Auftragstaktik, cannot be implemented in this game. I believe this is also the reasons why rules of conventional wisdom do not work in your game vs Damian. In game, individual OODA cycles are much more important. Note, however, that we are not playing real time. Whereas this does not invalidate the approach, it makes outperforming your opponent more difficult. I also believe -as indicated by my short intervention in John's 2x2 AAR- that well organized teamplay (which should be more than just assigning areas of responsibility to a given player) makes breaking into an OODA cycle much more difficult, as different people filter information differently and react differently. As a consequence, predictions on the enemies cycles are much more difficult. But I deviate...
More difficult but not impossible. Psychic shock can re-assert itself whenever the game file is re-opened. As a psychiatrist I did not expect this but have, over the years, found it to be true. Its fascinating but, unfortunately, not something I'll ever get authorised to research
.In other words, what I am trying to do is to start from a real life doctrine framework and transfer that to this game. I do this now for the first time, though this is not my first PBEM - thus you see that I already start profiting from playing against you...
Therefore, my comments re. the thrust through northern Germany -which may also differ from WitP based on the operational level, as it is much more of a one-theater example (though I am not sure I use that word correctly in the Soviet sense) are based on real life doctrine.
Northern Germany would have been a Front while the entire German theatre of Operations would have been a Strategic Direction.
The Pacific is a Strategic Direction while the forces in the Aleutians are a Front. There is a doctrinal TO&E for a Front but I think it is of little matter in this game.
Every material I could find so far seems to indicate that according to Soviet Doctrine, whenever the enemy advance still retains momentum and the correlation of forces does not guarantee success, it is not considered desirable to counterattack at all.
Aye, absorb the thrust of the enemy tanks ( tanks are the arm of decision and, thus, what Soviet doctrine focusses on defeating,.... well, until recently when they, IMO, went off the rails doctrinally ) on one's largely immobile anti-tank gun fronts. Husband your own arm of decision ( tanks, mobile units etc ) until the enemy is exhausted, recon extensively and then launch a hasty attack at their most vulnerable point.
In these circumstance, it is better to deploy for counter-penetration and halt the enemy by defensive action. It may well prove necessary to utilize the combined arms reserve, and even the second echelon, but this is undesirable as these forces will not then be available for counterattacks later on.
Ideally one should only ever use static units to halt enemy attacks. Wasting mobile units on the defensive means robbing your arm of decision ( mobile armoured units ) of their strength and freshness right before the moment of decision ( the counter-attack). It is up to you to figure out what YOUR arm of decision is in-game but once you do you will need to husband it and I should never see it committed to defensive action - excepting a death ride at game's end.
I think that this is why your argument against the requirement that a counter offensive does not necessarily require the destruction of the enemy does not hold. Soviet doctrine calls for counter attack only if you can stop that center of mass. I think, however, that this statement is not necessarily true for a many theater war with an attack in one theater and an attack in another theater conducted by the other side.
So, the ONLY way to render a thing irrelevant and harmless is to destroy it attritionally is it? That is interesting. I suggest you think of other ways in which an army or CV TF could be rendered harmless without confronting it with synchronous forces and combat --- which through its strength it is almost assuredly destined to win.
Also, all material I could find about AirLand battle points to the concept of using higly mobile troops in the way described in my response.
Aye, it doesn't mean that that's the only way to use an OODA cycle to one's advantage. If I told you you could fly using a glider would that mean you could NOT fly using a powered aeroplane? The presence of one does not preclude the absence of the other.
Relating to the game - let me start by saying that I am not convinced that you use pure Soviet doctrine (after all, Boyd is not exactly soviet).
Ah but Boyd only outlined the OODA cycle. He didn't invent it. It has always been it was just never consciously codified. Much of Soviet doctrine from the time of Tukhachevsky is based on the OODA even though it never speaks of it explicitly. It is implicitly based on it.
As to Soviet doctrine and my adherence to it. Doctrine evolves over time. I wouldn't be too far from the doctrine of the 80s etc but that is derived from the doctrine of Tukhachevsky, Triandafilov etc. I would hark back to those earlier times also.
You did your transfers (like I'll do mine, and as mentioned above I believe that Boyd's conceptual framework works more directly and even better in these games than in real life combat), and that is why even with a force which does not match this doctrine you can use the derivative you created. One of the major issues where this pops to the surface is that imho you stress surprise much more than preemption. Surprise, however, is what NATO considers almost as a requirement for successful ops.
And are you saying that the Soviets valued pre-emption over surprise? Explain the first battle of Kursk to me then.
Next, look at your preferred methods. You love to use air transport and fast transport TFs. Are you really insisting that use of mobile forces is not important ? No, if it is possible, it is preferable to use this approach.
I disagree that I
to use air transport and fast transport TFs. I follow the strategy possible with the forces ( tactical and operational levels ) available. If this limits me to air transport and fast transport then so be it.love
To me that a Fast Transport TF is FAST/mobile is an irrelevancy on a doctrinal level. It is utterly irrelevant. What matters is that it is a force which allows me to minimise my vulnerability to enemy countermeasures and was likely to be survivable enough to survive long enough to reach the end of the Aleutians chain. IF 6 knot AKs had met those criteria then I would have used them instead.
The speed was an irrelevance. The fact that given the unique position in this game at that time ( aerial and naval inferiority to such an extent that the enemy could gain superiority at any point or time of their choosing --- until such time as attrition wore them down ) this was the combination which would work was what mattered.
At the same time I do agree that they are not a must. Your battlegrounds AAR shows that neatly. You set up and sprung your trap almost statically.
TO be honest if I have a preference this would be it. It requires much greater skill to unmask fires from static positions predicted to be on the flanks etc than it does to run around and find a flank.
Personally -without knowing much about this game though I own the battleground series, but I bought it after WitP in a bundle with the napoleonic wars for a special price for the sake of the good times I had with the battle of the bulge scenarios of this or a related engine, and WitP just seems to make anything else unplayed for me- I had the impression that John's actions ever after your blow fell were no longer coherent, he was shocked by being thrown off his expectations, and that flawed his further gameplay from that point onwards.
Yes, his attack fell apart in the face of a single, hard blow struck at a crucial juncture by an inferior force. I was quite pleased at how that played out. It seems to be pretty rare for the Union Army to deliver such a rebuke on Day 1 of Ghettysburg although I'd hope to do much better in future as it was only my 2nd PBEM of that game and I was still learning the system.
For every BB you send to Tokyo Bay without ammo I'll tell you a target [:D] I'll invade over the next 2 monthsAs a side comment: your approach there was more soviet - you used preemption. Which is why I use the crystal ball now, of course. Maybe tea leaves or bones of a sacrificed PoW as well for better results ?
. Expensive but utterly reliable intel 
You are absolutely correct that what I clearly need to do is come up with a way which stresses mobility less first, equally mobile next and finally more mobile, as this is what will most likely happen in the game.
I disagree but I think that perhaps what you mean by mobility is different than what I mean. I don't think the speed with which you can put plans into action will help you much. I think that finding my weaknesses will help you much more. I can sink things moving quickly as easily as things moving slowly but, perhaps, there are things or places where I can't???
I have severe handicaps re. mobility in my present situation, both on the strategic level due to your clever separation of the map (Alfred suggested evacuation of Indian forces to make them reappear in Russia, which was a wonderful idea but just does not look possible any more)
*chuckle* That would have been fun...
and on the tactical level, as I just can't set up a 25 ship TF of capital s hips to move a really significant fast transport TF inlcuding BBs to REALLY get something somewhere quickly due to surprising lack of these ships.
Aye, I hunted them down for that, and other, reasons.
If I would capitalize now on mobility, I would create a doctrine not supported by my assets - that' a nono.
Don't alter your doctrine. Doctrine should be relatively fixed BUT feel free to alter your implementation of it based on the assets available. If you can't do A because I have unit X WHAT can you do that unit X CANNOT defend against? That should be your question IMO.
At the same time, I have to think about the things not on the menu now now as well, in order to derive something on your approach. But I hope I'll come up with something. I believe that invalidation of assumptions is an important concept to make the opponent's OODA cycle ineffective (see your battlefields AAR).
Absolutely. This is why I try to play with as few assumptions as possible. When you don't have assumptions they can't force you into error. Its also why I always talk about objective assessment. The more assumptions you have the more bias you bring to your analysis and the mroe you'll see only what you want to see. "Those tanks at Nijmegen... Oh, a tank repair yard that's all. They won't even be able to move. You go and drop right in that field in front of it Sosabowski."
But in general, the first thing to enforce a decision is providing options. While you are "on track", as long as you can stay within a standard procedure, there are no options (or rather automatically discarded options, as you know how to proceed already), thus you don't need to decide. This is why I want a mobile battlefield in India, of course. Hunkering down in a Festung or three (again, t he separation you achieve works well) makes solution of the India problem a standard procedure. Like solving a linear differential equation. Child's play, if you know your toolbox.
Well you then have the choice of either changing the situation so I can't use schema to solve the differential equation or, and more powerfully and, importantly, more stylishly, you can add in another variable you never tell me about until you unmask it and make me realise that the whole D & A section of the loop I was enacting was in response to OO sections which were completely unfitted to the situation I was facing.
Many times an opponent will delude himself as regards teh OO sections. When faced with an opponent who won't the best way to lead them into improper D&A sections is to surreptitiously change the OO sections without letting them realise it. They will then make good D&A sections for the situation they believe they face but will, in reality, be making utterly inappropriate D&As for the REAL situation.
At the opportune time unmask and watch their psychological balance crumble.
How much SPEED and MOBILITY do you need to do this? Almost none... and hence my contention of the previous email.
Options will lead to a reaction based on assumptions. The more assumptions there are, the more likely are collisions of assumptions. If assumptiuons collide, your filtering/evaluation process runs into probles. You have to make decisions based on different sets of assumptions/rules in parallel. Does not sound like straightforward any more... sounds like complicated, nasty... try to move in a world where in every room the gravity constant is different. Your downfall is imminent !
Well, this is a nice sentence to end this little e-mail. Not sure that it is true, but if reality is incoherent anyway, it must be true somewhere somehow.
LOL! In one of the parallel universes which the quantum universe yields to it is true. In this one? I'm not so sure [:D]
