Supply, Foraging, and March Attrition Ideas for Next Patch

[Anthropoid]

The addition of the supply source provinces was a HUGE improvement, and on the whole the system works pretty well. However, several threads of late have noted some anomalies in how the supply and attrition sytem is working. Not that I'm saying there is total agreement on this, but some folks seem to feel there are anomolies with respect to what a player can get away with compared to what happened in real history. There are several threads on this type of stuf already and I hope this one is not just redundant, but I felt like we needed one place to consolidate discussion.

Problems that have been noted:
1. Naval units should not be able to stay at sea permanently without penalty. Maybe this is not really a problem, but I think that some of us think so at present.

2. Units sitting still should not automatically be exempt from attrition relative to units that move becoming subject to it, i.e., "March Attrition."

3. The forager special ability should not offer 100% exemption from foraging losses.

4. The magnitude of march attrition losses at the highest end may be a bit unbalanced with respect to the rest of the game (I'm paraphrasing here what I perceive to be Marshall's thoughts from the AltHist thread).

My ideas to fix
1. Naval units have to return to port after a certain period of time else they start to suffer attrition? The funny thing here that I've noticed is, you can turn supply on/off for naval units, and it DOES have an impact on your total economic costs, but I have not noticed for certain if they suffer attrition from being in forage mode or not? I don't think that they do suffer forage losses, but correct me if I'm wrong. Maybe they are just less ready for combat if you leave them set to forage?

Barb had some ideas in some old threads, that might be superior to this, but it might be really good to consolidate all that in one thread so the Devs could mull it over?

2. Instead of the higher difficulties imposing "March Attrition" just have them impose "attrition," i.e., you lose men to non-combat losses ALL the time, but worse when in large stacks, worse when in low forage prov, worse in bad weather, worse when out of supply, worse when marching, worse when in hostile territory, etc. I won't even try to propose an "algorithm" but that would be my general idea. Assuming nothing else were changed, maybe that right there would balance it out a lot?

3. A unit with the forager special ability (FSA) offers some protection from foraging losses to (3a)itself, and to (3b) its allied units in the same container as a function of its Morale, and numbers of troops (more troops, and more experienced/competent troops will be better at rounding up supplies than less troops and less experienced). Example algorithms:

(3a) Forage loses range between 50% to 100% (determined randomly calculated on a turn-by-turn basis, and moderated by other values like weather, hostility of territory, max foraging value of province, etc.) of normal values calculated without FSA, modified downward by Morale*3% (Morale of four would then reduce maximum forage losses by 12% to a range of 38% to 88%; morale of 8 = -24% range 26% to 76%). Numbers of men amplify this by an additional 3% for each 1000 men in excess of 5000. Something like that . . .

(3b) Could be something like the same algorithms except use 1.5% for other units in the same Container, up to a maximum of 3 additional units?

Lets assume a corps, 1st Corps with six units (1st, 2nd, and 3rd Infantry Div; 1st Jag; 1st Cav; 1st Art) all set to forage, and assume "all else equal" with respect to external moderating factors (weather, hostility, prov forage value, etc.). If we have one 10,000 man infantry unit "1st Div" with FSA with a morale of 5, his forage losses will be reduced by (5*3%) + (5*3%) = -30% of the randomly determined forage losses (50% to 100% of standard forage losses [instead of -100% as at present]). So if the engine would have actually imposed forage losses of 500, then in this case 1st Div would suffer forage losses of between 20% and 70% of that 500 (calculated randomly). Two other units in the Corps could not be helped, and thre others would experience forage losses ranging between 35% and 85% of what would normally be calculated.

Whether having two or more units with FSA in the same container should add cumulative benefits I do not know. The problem with that could be a failure to realistic relfect the fact that: any given province, in any given month is only going to be able to provide so much forage (as the province forage values reflect) so the benefit to units foraging should not be able to exceed some sort of maximum despite having multiple units with FSA. The other complication that could be modeled is that, as the forage extracted from a province increases, the negative impact on the morale, population level, health, and hostility of the civilian population in that province should in theory increase.

[Anthropoid]

Expanding on my idea to fix "march attrition" by making it more generally "attrition" and quoting Marshal from their AltHist PBEM thread

ORIGINAL: Marshal Villars

It seems that the march attrition equation Losses=15%x(N-(Morale*300)) means that the more units you have in your army of say, 50,000, the better protected you are against losses. In effect, the term (Morale*300) stays the same regardless of the unit's size. Which means that as the unit gets smaller, the losses it takes shrink at an even faster rate. Mus made the interesting observation that it seems as if the equation makes the assumption that the toughest, most loyal individuals in each unit stay around the longest (but in that case, the average morale of the unit should be going up at the same time). It seems that perhaps a linear relationship should be introduced, which would function the same for an army of 100,000 as it would for a unit of 10,000 if they had the same morale. In my opinion if we have time to change it, Leviathan should be using a linear relationship like the following:

Losses=(Number of men in the unit)*(1/morale of unit)*(X)

Note that the final value (X) is a fixed number which can be adjusted to raise or lower march attrition losses globally during testing. In this case a value of 1/5 (.20) returns excellent results. If a unit is 10,000 men and their morale is 4.0, the march attrition result gives 500 (with X=.2). The value of X would have to be settled on after some thorough testing. I think that for a single space, the .2 is too high, and perhaps a .1 would be closer to a final value used.

A simple model, make this formula

Losses=(Number of men in the unit)*(1/morale of unit)*(X)

the one for units SITTING STILL (not fighting, not moving, just sitting there), noting of course that the number that gets plugged in as (X) will be adjusted depending on troop density as a function of prov richness, weather, hostility of the province, in supply/out of supply, etc., etc.

For actual MARCH Attrition:

Loses =(Number of men in unit)*(1/morale of unit)*(Y) where (Y) is an intrinsically larger number than (X) above (say for example 2X for first province entered, 2.6X for second province entered, 3.8X for third province entered, and 3.9X for each additional province entered, and most likely is adjusted by additional moderators that do not influence (X) (e.g., presence of roads).

[Mus]

ORIGINAL: Anthropoid

1. Naval units should not be able to stay at sea permanently without penalty. Maybe this is not really a problem, but I think that some of us think so at present.

Disagree completely with this one. Fleet containers are expensive and are meant to abstract the kind of supply that was used for Britain to maintain constant blockade duties during this time period.

Ships rarely let crew off ship even when in port for fear they would desert.

There really is no problem with them remaining at sea indefinetely and stops of individual ships within fleets for repairs/refit, watering, picking up supplies, or supplying underway being abstracted.

[Anthropoid]

ORIGINAL: Mus

ORIGINAL: Anthropoid

1. Naval units should not be able to stay at sea permanently without penalty. Maybe this is not really a problem, but I think that some of us think so at present.

Disagree completely with this one. Fleet containers are expensive and are meant to abstract the kind of supply that was used for Britain to maintain constant blockade duties during this time period.

Ships rarely let crew off ship even when in port for fear they would desert.

There really is no problem with them remaining at sea indefinetely and stops of individual ships within fleets for repairs/refit, watering, picking up supplies, or supplying underway being abstracted.

I had the impression that Marshal was more opposed to this than me. Personally I'm a bit indecided about it. I definitely hear you Mus, and think you make a generally sound argument for it being abstracted in terms of intial build cost, and supply/maintenance costs, with two caveats:

1. "maintain constant blockade duties" and "remaining at sea indefinitely" is not the same thing as _maintaining constant blockade duties and/or remaining at sea indefinitely with zero fluctuation (down or for that matter up too) in operational quality. Is it true that the British navy (or for that matter a squadron or fleet) was just as solid at then end of a 6 or 9 month period of blockade/patrol duty as it was when it left port? Maintaining a constant blockade does not equal the capacity for ALL ships in a nations navy to remain at sea all the time, and forever with zero degradation, and it is here that I'm betting abstraction breaks down with respect to real history. If a fleet (say for example "The 1st Fleet") was on blockade duty for 6 months, there was probably a constant flow of support ships, and a certain amount of the actual military ships going back and forth to ports. But at some point, "maintaining a constant blockade" would have necessitated that First Fleet be replaced by "Auxiliary Fleet" so that First Fleet could return (even if only briefly) to home port for necessary replenishments of various sorts.

Correct me if I'm wrong heere but: As it is at present, England (or any nation for that matter) can send her entire navy to sea on turn one and NEVER have to return ANY of those fleets or ships back to a port and still (assuming no combat damage to them) maintain exactly the same operational effectiveness as on turn one simply by paying the supply maintenance costs. The abstraction works fine for individual fleets, even ships; it is when the impact of that abstracted system is considered in its effects on the game as a whole that I see a problem. But again, I'm not totally decided on it, and would love to hear your replies to this, as well as Marshal and others.

2. Time and Distance (2nd caveat). Referring again to Britain, since they are the primary nation which I think the current system may be unduly privileging in game, "maintaining a constant blockade" of for example, The French-Belgin Coast was not equivalent in real life to maintaining a constant blockade of (for example) all of France, plus the Baltic, plus areas of the Mediterranean. By this I do not mean that "British forces would have to be more thinly spread." Obviously that is true, and indeed, in game dynamics maintaining blockades over larger areas _does_ require spreading them thinner. What I refer to is not the weaker blockade from spreading thinner, but the weaker, more vulnerable, and more economically strained logistics from spreading a broader and more distant net of blockading/patrolling.

Again, correct me if I'm wrong but, England can park her entire navy of the coast of the Turkey in the Black Sea, or all right off the coast of St Petersburg, or spread the entire thing out to fill up every possible water "province" with ships and fleets, and it all "costs the same" in terms of logistics.

While the current system may simulate the strategic ins-and-outs of how one hides/deploys, spreads/concentrates, uses/neglects a navy, IMO it fails to adequately simulate the varying logistical costs of various strategic deployments, thus privileging nations with large and powerful navies in game, even more than is warranted in terms of their greater numbers, and greater combat effectiveness.

Last issue: intelligence from naval units. Is it not absurd that parking a Frigate or a Fleet off a coastline offers improved intell on a province? This to me is the worst part of the way the naval game works.

[Mus]

ORIGINAL: Anthropoid

The abstraction works fine for individual fleets, even ships; it is when the impact of that abstracted system is considered in its effects on the game as a whole that I see a problem.

The effect on the game as a whole is where I see a problem in introducing a high level of micromanagement into the naval system. If individual ships have to be returned to port for refitting (resupply and watering can be done at sea) Britain needs more ships to maintain her historical level of security and the way that attach/detach effects the actions of containers in the 6 movements phases has to be carefully looked at and balanced.

WAY more trouble than it is worth IMO, for a system that already works.

[Mus]

ORIGINAL: Anthropoid

Again, correct me if I'm wrong but, England can park her entire navy of the coast of the Turkey in the Black Sea, or all right off the coast of St Petersburg, or spread the entire thing out to fill up every possible water "province" with ships and fleets, and it all "costs the same" in terms of logistics.

That is something that could be changed without unbalancing the game dynamic.

Some kind of small modifier to support costs for fleets or ships more than 3-4 zones away from a friendly or allied port could be introduced.

Would make places like Gibraltar, Malta and Corfu more valuable as well.

[Anthropoid]

ORIGINAL: Mus

ORIGINAL: Anthropoid

Again, correct me if I'm wrong but, England can park her entire navy of the coast of the Turkey in the Black Sea, or all right off the coast of St Petersburg, or spread the entire thing out to fill up every possible water "province" with ships and fleets, and it all "costs the same" in terms of logistics.

That is something that could be changed without unbalancing the game dynamic.

Some kind of small modifier to support costs for fleets or ships more than 3-4 zones away from a friendly or allied port could be introduced.

Would make places like Gibraltar, Malta and Corfu more valuable as well.

Exactly! Agree on this and your previous post too. I would not argue for a dramatic increase in micro-management (similar to say War in the Pacific . . . though maybe for COGEE II that WOULD be way cool. . .) but simply for something that would just balance it out a bit more in the least troublesome way for the Devs (so that it could be readily into a next patch) and would strike a happy balance between improving the game while not overly complicating things.

Related to point 1, a conceiably simple solution would be that a fleet can stay at sea for some reasonable amount of time (6 months, 9 months?) then it starts to suffer increasing supply costs, until it returns to a friendly port for maybe one full month? Maybe one month in port gives a six month patrol allowance and two months gives a nine month allowance? Perhaps individual ships can only stay at sea for 3 or 4 months before their supply costs increase?

Related to point 3 (naval AWACS phenomenae): whatever algorithm determines the intell that a land unit derives from adjacent enemy provinces, apply it, or perhaps even a halved version of it!

Mus, what are your thoughts on these other two points?

[Mus]

Regarding point 1, any attempt to require entire fleets to go into port will create huge openings that didn't really exist for France or some other power to sail big invasion fleets to England without a chance to react. I don't think it would be a good thing to require a fleet to return to port as I don't believe they did. Individual ships did, but this level of micromanagement would be bad for game balance.

Regarding point 3, ships should give some intell about adjacent zones, particularly in peacetime. During wartime I don't believe you get that much accurate information anyways, so probably not much of an issue.

[Anthropoid]

Yeah, maybe you are right about 1.

3, "some" intell, but not more than land forces. Like you said, getting off the ship was not allowed.

ORIGINAL: Mus

Regarding point 1, any attempt to require entire fleets to go into port will create huge openings that didn't really exist for France or some other power to sail big invasion fleets to England without a chance to react. I don't think it would be a good thing to require a fleet to return to port as I don't believe they did. Individual ships did, but this level of micromanagement would be bad for game balance.

Regarding point 3, ships should give some intell about adjacent zones, particularly in peacetime. During wartime I don't believe you get that much accurate information anyways, so probably not much of an issue.

[Randomizer]

ORIGINAL: Anthropoid

Yeah, maybe you are right about 1.

3, "some" intell, but not more than land forces. Like you said, getting off the ship was not allowed.

Getting off the ship was seldom allowed but warships spoke with merchants and fishers and garnered intelligence, accurate or not, from them. Comparing ships to land units in the areas of intelligence gathering, operations and supply probably skews the capabilities and limitations of both and I think that Mus hits the nail nicely on the head.

I suspect you would find that there were times, sometimes significant periods, where there were few operational warships left in English ports. Of course there were ships of the line refitting, commissioning, decommissioning, laid up without crews and completing for service but in game terms such ships are in effect invisible. Micromanaging the Navy would be tedious and likely as not, result in little substantive change in naval effects.

[Marshal Villars]

I won't say anything about the naval system here.

Of course some of what happens in CoG:EE naval warfare is impossibile. But isn't that the case in every game?

Other than that, I agree with a lot of things being said in this thread. And believe me, I hear ya loud and clearly. I am working hard to address this stuff.

[ericbabe]

I've always wanted to add a simple rule to make operations near friendly ports more advantageous, so perhaps some attrition rule for fleets ending their turns away from sea zones near a friendly port might be easy to do.

We did try to account for some of the ship-rotation in our naval OOBs.  I can't remember the exact figures off the top of my head, but every ship spent a significant fraction of the campaigning season in-port for maintenance and resupply.  I reckoned it would be extremely tedious for players to have to detach all their ships and send them back to port throughout the year.  (For players who really like realistic micromanagement, I could add a "scrape the barnacles off the ship" button, but you'd have to press it 100 times for it actually to do anything, simulating what tedious and difficult work it was to scrape the barnacles off of a ship. [:)] )

[Marshal Villars]

I do know that I have had a good time working on some of this stuff, and I can tell you that WCS is always interested in improving their games based on player input.

I do agree that the CoG:EE system IS a good game as I said from day one. And it has incredibly organic solutions and literally ground breaking mechanics--no BS.

I think also that even if there were an "advanced" naval system, that there should also be a "basic" naval system for players who don't want to deal with that stuff and leave a fleet at sea for 23 years if they like. I honestly have no problem with that--or with players who want to play that way. I generally agree that players who don't want to scrub barnacles--shouldn't have to!