Interesting debate.....

[Footslogger]

Could D-Day of happened without the miracle of Dunkirk?

[witpqs]

Hmmm. And what would it have looked like without the experience of Dieppe?

[warspite1]

Could it? Yes. Would it? Yes.

Dunkirk fails:

The lack of those 200,000 men back in the UK in June 1940 does not alter the military situation one bit. Those men were effectively without arms anyway.

Fact is, the Germans would still have to get across the Channel - and they were not going to be able to achieve that anytime soon.

What is more open to question is whether Halifax and co would have persuaded the war cabinet that it was time to seek peace with Germany. I do not believe this would have been the case. The price would simply have been too great. Sure Hitler may have allowed us to keep our empire (less certain places destined for Mussolini) but we would have been effectively a Nazi puppet state - no thanks.

[Local Yokel]

I may have got this wrong but I have the impression that the decision not to seek peace terms was a near-run thing. Wasn't it the case that Halifax was strongly urging HMG to seek terms, but failed due to Churchill's defiance? If so, and if Churchill were taken out of the equation, perhaps the Halifax lobby would have proved irresistible.

Re-wind to the Norway Debate on 7-8 May 1940, and consider the might-have-beens if Churchill had been censured to the same degree as Chamberlain. By his own admission Churchill regarded himself as extraordinarily fortunate to have escaped such censure, given his position as First Lord carrying much of the responsibility for the Norwegian campaign. Consider the consequences had the U-boats' torpedoes not been plagued by defects at this time: potentially the loss of numerous additional transports and major warships - quite possibly Warspite amongst them. If Churchill had been obliged to take the full blame for such a major naval disaster, I have doubts as to whether he would have entered the running for the premiership, leaving the way open for Halifax as Chamberlain's replacement.

<edit> Corrected from First Sea Lord to First Lord. Stupid boy. </edit>

[redcoat]

ORIGINAL: Local Yokel

I may have got this wrong but I have the impression that the decision not to seek peace terms was a near-run thing. Wasn't it the case that Halifax was strongly urging HMG to seek terms, but failed due to Churchill's defiance? If so, and if Churchill were taken out of the equation, perhaps the Halifax lobby would have proved irresistible.

If I remember Andrew Marr correctly the decision on whether to continue the war in 1940 was down to the five-man coalition War Cabinet. Two of the Conservatives – Chamberlain and Lord Halifax - were in favour of a negotiated peace with Germany that preserved the independence of the UK/Commonwealth and the integrity of the Empire. The two socialists – Atlee and Greenwood - wanted to continue the war at all costs. The casting vote effectively lay with Churchill. He wanted to continue the war because the Nazis were evil and couldn’t be trusted. If Churchill hadn’t been on the Cabinet – and he was lucky to be there at all - things would have been very different. There would have been another Conservative on the Cabinet who would have been in favour of negotiations.

[Local Yokel]

In which case, if Halifax is in the driving seat and puts out peace feelers, how do things then develop? I wonder whether history might have taken much the same course in the short run.

OKH may regard the Channel as a river crossing on a larger scale, but presumably OKM will disabuse the politicians of such a notion. "You are going to sustain a multi-divisional force across the Kanal by means of Rhine barges with slots cut in the pointy end? Hals und Beinbruch!" And the Admiralty and CAS are going to proffer the same advice to Halifax. Even with larger losses off Norway the RN remains substantially intact, as does the only properly integrated air defence system in the world (thank you, Hugh Dowding).

In these circumstances, if Halifax is not completely overawed, he has quite a strong hand to play. Ribbentrop presents an outragous set of demands on behalf of Germany and is told to stick 'em where the sun don't shine. Negotiations drag on. Hitler may decide to 'encourage' them by deployment of the Luftwaffe, but this is liable to prove counter-productive if Fighter Command doesn't die in accordance with the German script. If this situation persists unresolved into September then we are substantially back on the same historical track as before - minus Churchill pending his political rehabilitation.

Britain's greatest vulnerability still lies in the exposure of its commerce to submarine attack, but at Halifax's moment of decision for peace or war, the size of the U-boat force still makes this something of a latent threat.

[redcoat]

Indeed. If we had entered into protracted negotiations we would have been able to buy time. To rearm and expand our Army, strengthen our coastal defences, build more ships and, maybe most importantly, prepare the RAF for an onslaught by the Luftwaffe.

[crsutton]

To think that the conservative government would have lasted for one day after a "negotiated peace" is to vastly underestimate the British people. I doubt that the Western World would have co-exsisted with the Nazi World for any lenght of time. Eventually the issue would have been resolved.

[redcoat]

That’s right. I don’t believe that Parliament - the representative body of the British people - would have ratified any proposed peace agreement put before it. Tory grandees like Lord Halifax were out of touch with British public opinion.

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: crsutton

To think that the conservative government would have lasted for one day after a "negotiated peace" is to vastly underestimate the British people. I doubt that the Western World would have co-exsisted with the Nazi World for any lenght of time. Eventually the issue would have been resolved.

Warspite1

Well said crsutton!

[jmalter]

those 200,000 men were only temporarily unarmed - they were trained regular army troops who could be re-organized to form the nucleus of a credible defense force. Without them, and the competence demonstrated by the RN (& let's not forget the propaganda value of the 'little ships'), the British popular will might easily have turned towards negotiation as the most realistic option. 200,000 add'l P/Ws in German hands coupled with another defeat of the RN would have shaken the nation, disturbed the political unity of the Commonwealth, added to unrest in the Empire and strengthened isolationist sentiment in the USA.

[Local Yokel]

I am far from sure that a proposed peace with Germany would have been rejected out of hand.

I have no doubt that the Labour Party would have bitterly contested any such proposals, but that was a reflection of the same commitment to anti-Fascism as had found expression by joining the International Brigades in Spain. However, Labour was in opposition in 1940, and in a substantial minority in the House of Commons. What was going to count in the short term was the view taken by the preponderant Conservative party in government.

Probably both parties could see well enough where a totalitarian Fascist state might lead, but there were plenty on the right who viewed Fascism as a counterweight to Bolshevism. During the Winter War there were quite vocal demands to assist Finland against the USSR.

I think you also underestimate the public memory of the Great War bloodletting that had ended just twenty years earlier. I have an idea that, confronted with what amounted to a military stand-off, the prospect of an armistice that might pre-empt a repeat of that carnage might well have been attractive to the public.

The economic consequences are something of which I know even less, but since the cost of the war was apparently driving Britain towards bankruptcy at breakneck speed, they might have proved tolerable or possibly even beneficial. But if a resumption of trade was going to accompany the cessation of hostilities, then much might have depended upon the terms under which it was to be permitted - particularly if such terms forced Britain to trade at a disadvantage in European markets.

One question that interests me is this: if Britain comes out of the war and the US remains neutral, then what is the logistical impact upon the USSR once Barbarossa starts? Part of the reason the Soviet Union was able to focus upon the production of excellent weapons was the availability of copious American aid - notably tactical transport. If the USSR has to produce this in addition to guns, tanks and aeroplanes, then does it get fought to a standstill by Germany?

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: Local Yokel

I may have got this wrong but I have the impression that the decision not to seek peace terms was a near-run thing. Wasn't it the case that Halifax was strongly urging HMG to seek terms, but failed due to Churchill's defiance? If so, and if Churchill were taken out of the equation, perhaps the Halifax lobby would have proved irresistible.

Re-wind to the Norway Debate on 7-8 May 1940, and consider the might-have-beens if Churchill had been censured to the same degree as Chamberlain. By his own admission Churchill regarded himself as extraordinarily fortunate to have escaped such censure, given his position as First Lord carrying much of the responsibility for the Norwegian campaign. Consider the consequences had the U-boats' torpedoes not been plagued by defects at this time: potentially the loss of numerous additional transports and major warships - quite possibly Warspite amongst them. If Churchill had been obliged to take the full blame for such a major naval disaster, I have doubts as to whether he would have entered the running for the premiership, leaving the way open for Halifax as Chamberlain's replacement.

<edit> Corrected from First Sea Lord to First Lord. Stupid boy. </edit>

Warspite1

So we are now saying Dunkirk failed AND the German torpedoes worked? Why not throw in, Goering was not put in charge of the Luftwaffe and the phasing in of the Panzer III came on time etc etc. Yes of course LY, if the Germans make no mistakes, then we are all screwed [;)].

Speaking of Norway, look at that campaign in detail. JEEEEEZ were the Germans lucky!! Had Norway not had their own Gamelin in charge in the form of Generalmajor Laake, had they mobilised when given ample warning of a German attack, (the German sailors rescued from the Rio de Janeiro told the Norwegians they were heading for Bergen for goodness sake!! had they manned the coastal defence guns properly, had they mined the flippin fjords, had the high command given the poor s*** on the ground proper instructions and not left heroes like Oberst Eriksen [&o] and the commander of Pol III [&o] to face the music alone, had many of the batteries, naval bases and garrisons not surrendered WITHOUT A SINGLE SHOT being fired etc etc etc then the loss of the Blücher would have been the least of the German problems on the 9th April.

Edit - Phasing IN of the PZR III not out. Doh!

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: jmalter

those 200,000 men were only temporarily unarmed - they were trained regular army troops who could be re-organized to form the nucleus of a credible defense force. Without them, and the competence demonstrated by the RN (& let's not forget the propaganda value of the 'little ships'), the British popular will might easily have turned towards negotiation as the most realistic option. 200,000 add'l P/Ws in German hands coupled with another defeat of the RN would have shaken the nation, disturbed the political unity of the Commonwealth, added to unrest in the Empire and strengthened isolationist sentiment in the USA.

Warspite1

On the other hand, the absence of those troops may have avoided the nonesense that was Greece and Crete, because a defensive strategy would have needed to be adopted in the Middle East.

[ilovestrategy]

I dunno, 200,000 is a lot of men.

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: Local Yokel

I am far from sure that a proposed peace with Germany would have been rejected out of hand.

I have no doubt that the Labour Party would have bitterly contested any such proposals, but that was a reflection of the same commitment to anti-Fascism as had found expression by joining the International Brigades in Spain. However, Labour was in opposition in 1940, and in a substantial minority in the House of Commons. What was going to count in the short term was the view taken by the preponderant Conservative party in government.

Probably both parties could see well enough where a totalitarian Fascist state might lead, but there were plenty on the right who viewed Fascism as a counterweight to Bolshevism. During the Winter War there were quite vocal demands to assist Finland against the USSR.

I think you also underestimate the public memory of the Great War bloodletting that had ended just twenty years earlier. I have an idea that, confronted with what amounted to a military stand-off, the prospect of an armistice that might pre-empt a repeat of that carnage might well have been attractive to the public.

The economic consequences are something of which I know even less, but since the cost of the war was apparently driving Britain towards bankruptcy at breakneck speed, they might have proved tolerable or possibly even beneficial. But if a resumption of trade was going to accompany the cessation of hostilities, then much might have depended upon the terms under which it was to be permitted - particularly if such terms forced Britain to trade at a disadvantage in European markets.

One question that interests me is this: if Britain comes out of the war and the US remains neutral, then what is the logistical impact upon the USSR once Barbarossa starts? Part of the reason the Soviet Union was able to focus upon the production of excellent weapons was the availability of copious American aid - notably tactical transport. If the USSR has to produce this in addition to guns, tanks and aeroplanes, then does it get fought to a standstill by Germany?

Warspite1

I do not believe for a single second - though this is gut feel and I have nothing tangible to support it - that the desire to carry on and the desire to get the hell out of the war with our empire intact, was split along party lines.

I certainly do know however, that it was the left wing luvvies that voted not to fight for King and Country at the Oxford Union debate.

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: ilovestrategy

I dunno, 200,000 is a lot of men.

Warspite1

The loss of 200,000 men makes it LESS likely that Hitler would have been reasonable in his demands. Even Halifax - read Dunkirk by Sebag-Monrefiore - would not have agreed to take us out of the war if our freedom was effectively removed - which it would have been. There would have been no re-armament as someone suggested earlier; we would have been a puppet state.

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: Local Yokel

One question that interests me is this: if Britain comes out of the war and the US remains neutral, then what is the logistical impact upon the USSR once Barbarossa starts? Part of the reason the Soviet Union was able to focus upon the production of excellent weapons was the availability of copious American aid - notably tactical transport. If the USSR has to produce this in addition to guns, tanks and aeroplanes, then does it get fought to a standstill by Germany?

Warspite1

That for me has always been the million dollar question. They say broadly speaking in WWII, the Americans gave money, the Soviets gave blood and the British gave hope. Personally I don't think the last point is any less important than the first two; without the British, the Soviets still give blood....but potentially lose in doing so.

[Chickenboy]

How many British troops (non-commonwealth) were commanded by Montgomery in Normandy in June-August 1944?

I think there were something like 150,000 Allied troops ashore on D+1, 500,000 by D+7 and 2 million by late July. Losing 200,000 PWs at Dunkirk may have slowed down D-day planning or minimized the subsequent British contribution on D-day itself, but the end result for the war in Europe would likely have been the same-provided that the D-day lodgement itself was still successful.

If victory in Europe were delayed, however, I can't help but think that there would be a strong chorus of American military voices voting for use of the first nuclear device on Berlin rather than Hiroshima. In many ways, the Germans got out of the war *just* in time. Who knows how the post-war landscape would have looked then?

[mike scholl 1]

ORIGINAL: redcoat

ORIGINAL: Local Yokel

I may have got this wrong but I have the impression that the decision not to seek peace terms was a near-run thing. Wasn't it the case that Halifax was strongly urging HMG to seek terms, but failed due to Churchill's defiance? If so, and if Churchill were taken out of the equation, perhaps the Halifax lobby would have proved irresistible.

If I remember Andrew Marr correctly the decision on whether to continue the war in 1940 was down to the five-man coalition War Cabinet. Two of the Conservatives – Chamberlain and Lord Halifax - were in favour of a negotiated peace with Germany that preserved the independence of the UK/Commonwealth and the integrity of the Empire.

Would Chamberlain's Government have survived such an attempt? These were the same idiots that had promised "Peace in our times" two years earlier, then had to go to war to a year later. Hard to see them doing another "flip-flop" and getting away without a "vote of confidence".